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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 11:34:46 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-82735 — Match regex runs on over-length input in Ash.Type.String, enabling regex denial of service</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-82735</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to force an expensive regular expression to run on input that a length constraint should have already rejected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ash.Type.String.apply_constraints/2 (lib/ash/type/string.ex) evaluated the :match regex regardless of the min_length and max_length constraints on the same attribute. Because the length check did not gate the regex, an over-length value that the length constraint rejects still had the pattern applied to it, so the length limit that would otherwise bound the work never constrained the regex input. Against a backtracking pattern this yields catastrophic regex evaluation on attacker-sized input, and even a linear pattern runs on arbitrarily large input, consuming CPU per request. The fix skips the :match regex whenever a length constraint is violated, making the two checks order-independent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.32.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to force an expensive regular expression to run on input that a length constraint should have already rejected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ash.Type.String.apply_constraints/2 (lib/ash/type/string.ex) evaluated the :match regex regardless of the min_length and max_length constraints on the same attribute. Because the length check did not gate the regex, an over-length value that the length constraint rejects still had the pattern applied to it, so the length limit that would otherwise bound the work never constrained the regex input. Against a backtracking pattern this yields catastrophic regex evaluation on attacker-sized input, and even a linear pattern runs on arbitrarily large input, consuming CPU per request. The fix skips the :match regex whenever a length constraint is violated, making the two checks order-independent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.32.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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