CVE-2026-97945 — x86/mm: Fix user-space data loss with MADV_FREE and THP

Affected: Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/mm: Fix user-space data loss with MADV_FREE and THP

Some of users of Polars (a data analytics library) have lost production data from this bug. They seem to have just the right combination of huge pages, MADV_FREE and heavy reclaim pressure.

pmd_modify() masks the old value with (_HPAGE_CHG_MASK & ~_PAGE_DIRTY), silently discarding the hardware dirty bit. The subsequent pmd_mksaveddirty() call is supposed to transfer _PAGE_DIRTY into _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY when write-protecting, but the dirty bit was already stripped from the value, so there is nothing left to transfer.

Contrast with pte_modify(), which keeps _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS in its mask, and pud_modify(), which keeps _HPAGE_CHG_MASK untouched: pmd_modify() is the odd one out. Any pmd_modify() on a writable, dirty PMD loses the dirty state.

One visible consequence is data loss with MADV_FREE on PMD-mapped THP:

memset(buf, 0x5A, size); // PMD-mapped THP, PMD dirty madvise(buf, size, MADV_FREE); // PMD cleaned but left writable, // folio marked lazyfree memset(buf, 0x5A, size); // hardware sets _PAGE_DIRTY again mprotect(buf, size, PROT_READ); // pmd_modify() drops the dirty bit mprotect(buf, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE); // ... memory pressure ...

Reclaim (e.g. under memcg pressure) then finds the lazyfree folio with no dirty bit set anywhere and frees it in __discard_…

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CVE-2026-97945 — x86/mm: Fix user-space data loss with MADV_FREE and THP