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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 10:33:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-97960 — perf/x86/intel: Prevent drain_pebs() reentry</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-97960</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/intel: Prevent drain_pebs() reentry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The PEBS buffer is shared by all events on a CPU, so drain_pebs() must
not be reentered. If so, one instance may observe stale buffer state and
potentially access out-of-bound memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most invocations happen in NMI context, which naturally prevents reentry.
However, drain_pebs() is also reachable from process context via
intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In those paths, the PMU is often already disabled, but not guaranteed.
For example, __intel_pmu_pebs_disable() only disables the target counter,
so other active counters can still raise a PMI and interrupt an in-flight
drain_pebs(). Here is an example,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__perf_addr_filters_adjust()
  perf_event_stop()
    __perf_event_stop()
      x86_pmu_stop() (event-&amp;gt;pmu-&amp;gt;stop)
        intel_pmu_disable_event()
          intel_pmu_pebs_disable()
            __intel_pmu_pebs_disable()
              intel_pmu_drain_large_pebs()
                intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Introduce __intel_pmu_quiesce() and __intel_pmu_resume() helpers and
use them in intel_pmu_drain_large_pebs() to disable the full PMU
around the intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer() call, preventing reentry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also add a warning in intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer() when the full PMU is
not disabled.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf/x86/intel: Prevent drain_pebs() reentry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The PEBS buffer is shared by all events on a CPU, so drain_pebs() must
not be reentered. If so, one instance may observe stale buffer state and
potentially access out-of-bound memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most invocations happen in NMI context, which naturally prevents reentry.
However, drain_pebs() is also reachable from process context via
intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In those paths, the PMU is often already disabled, but not guaranteed.
For example, __intel_pmu_pebs_disable() only disables the target counter,
so other active counters can still raise a PMI and interrupt an in-flight
drain_pebs(). Here is an example,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__perf_addr_filters_adjust()
  perf_event_stop()
    __perf_event_stop()
      x86_pmu_stop() (event-&amp;gt;pmu-&amp;gt;stop)
        intel_pmu_disable_event()
          intel_pmu_pebs_disable()
            __intel_pmu_pebs_disable()
              intel_pmu_drain_large_pebs()
                intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Introduce __intel_pmu_quiesce() and __intel_pmu_resume() helpers and
use them in intel_pmu_drain_large_pebs() to disable the full PMU
around the intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer() call, preventing reentry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Also add a warning in intel_pmu_drain_pebs_buffer() when the full PMU is
not disabled.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-97960</guid>
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