<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:18:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-98349 — wifi: libipw: reject too-short beacon and probe responses</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98349</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: libipw: reject too-short beacon and probe responses&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libipw_process_probe_response() and the libipw_network_init() call it
makes assume the frame contains the full 36-byte beacon and probe
response prefix, but the ipw2100 and ipw2200 receive paths only
establish that a management frame carries the generic 24-byte
three-address header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libipw_network_init() then computes the information element length as&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;stats-&amp;gt;len - sizeof(*beacon)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;stats-&amp;gt;len is a u16 and sizeof() has type size_t, so the subtraction is
evaluated as size_t and wraps instead of going negative.  Truncating
that to the u16 length parameter of libipw_parse_info_param() yields
65524 for a 24-byte beacon, and the parser then walks the receive
buffer as if it held almost 64 KiB of information elements, reading
past the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject the frame before any fixed field is touched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by an AI-assisted review of length arithmetic in management frame
parsers.  Verified with a KUnit case under Generic KASAN on arm64 under
QEMU; I do not have the hardware, so it is not tested on a real device.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wifi: libipw: reject too-short beacon and probe responses&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libipw_process_probe_response() and the libipw_network_init() call it
makes assume the frame contains the full 36-byte beacon and probe
response prefix, but the ipw2100 and ipw2200 receive paths only
establish that a management frame carries the generic 24-byte
three-address header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libipw_network_init() then computes the information element length as&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;stats-&amp;gt;len - sizeof(*beacon)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;stats-&amp;gt;len is a u16 and sizeof() has type size_t, so the subtraction is
evaluated as size_t and wraps instead of going negative.  Truncating
that to the u16 length parameter of libipw_parse_info_param() yields
65524 for a 24-byte beacon, and the parser then walks the receive
buffer as if it held almost 64 KiB of information elements, reading
past the allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject the frame before any fixed field is touched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by an AI-assisted review of length arithmetic in management frame
parsers.  Verified with a KUnit case under Generic KASAN on arm64 under
QEMU; I do not have the hardware, so it is not tested on a real device.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98349</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
