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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:38:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-98366 — RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98366</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR&amp;#39;s PD&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr-&amp;gt;ibmr.pd first and only then
validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (flags &amp;amp; IB_MR_REREG_PD) {
		rxe_put(old_pd);
		rxe_get(pd);
		mr-&amp;gt;ibmr.pd = ibpd;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (flags &amp;amp; IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) {
		if (access &amp;amp; ~RXE_ACCESS_SUPPORTED_MR)
			return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
		mr-&amp;gt;access = access;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both flags pass the entry check because RXE_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED is
IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS, so a caller can reach the access
check with mr-&amp;gt;ibmr.pd already reassigned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mr-&amp;gt;ibmr.pd is owned by the core, which adjusts pd-&amp;gt;usecnt only on the
success path: ib_uverbs_rereg_mr() jumps to put_new_uobj on a driver error
without undoing the reassignment, so mr-&amp;gt;pd == new_pd while the usecnts
still charge the MR to orig_pd. ib_dereg_mr_user() then decrements
new_pd, whose count can reach zero while a memory window still references
it; uverbs_free_pd() frees the PD on that count alone and rxe_mw_cleanup()
writes to freed memory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881301dd690 by task rxe_poc/591
   __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0
   rxe_mw_cleanup+0x42/0x200
   __rxe_cleanup+0x115/0x370
   rxe_dealloc_mw+0x4c/0x80
  Allocated by task 591:
   ib_uverbs_alloc_pd+0x258/0x540
  Freed by task 591:
   ib_dealloc_pd_user+0x174/0x210
   uverbs_free_pd+0x8d/0xc0
   ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd+0x1…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR&amp;#39;s PD&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr-&amp;gt;ibmr.pd first and only then
validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (flags &amp;amp; IB_MR_REREG_PD) {
		rxe_put(old_pd);
		rxe_get(pd);
		mr-&amp;gt;ibmr.pd = ibpd;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (flags &amp;amp; IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) {
		if (access &amp;amp; ~RXE_ACCESS_SUPPORTED_MR)
			return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
		mr-&amp;gt;access = access;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both flags pass the entry check because RXE_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED is
IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS, so a caller can reach the access
check with mr-&amp;gt;ibmr.pd already reassigned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mr-&amp;gt;ibmr.pd is owned by the core, which adjusts pd-&amp;gt;usecnt only on the
success path: ib_uverbs_rereg_mr() jumps to put_new_uobj on a driver error
without undoing the reassignment, so mr-&amp;gt;pd == new_pd while the usecnts
still charge the MR to orig_pd. ib_dereg_mr_user() then decrements
new_pd, whose count can reach zero while a memory window still references
it; uverbs_free_pd() frees the PD on that count alone and rxe_mw_cleanup()
writes to freed memory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881301dd690 by task rxe_poc/591
   __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0
   rxe_mw_cleanup+0x42/0x200
   __rxe_cleanup+0x115/0x370
   rxe_dealloc_mw+0x4c/0x80
  Allocated by task 591:
   ib_uverbs_alloc_pd+0x258/0x540
  Freed by task 591:
   ib_dealloc_pd_user+0x174/0x210
   uverbs_free_pd+0x8d/0xc0
   ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd+0x1…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98366</guid>
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