https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 22:05:07 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-103651 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MISP</p> <p>MISP contains a vulnerability in its one-time password (OTP) authentication flow that allows replay of a consumed HOTP (paper) token and rewinding of the token counter.</p> <p>The HOTP verification logic compared the submitted token against a counter value that was cached in the user&#39;s session at the time the password was entered, rather than against the authoritative counter stored in the database. Because the session-cached counter is not updated after a token is successfully consumed, an attacker who holds a valid session (password already submitted) can reuse a previously burned HOTP token. The stale cached counter still matches the replayed token, granting a second successful authentication and effectively rewinding the counter state.</p> <p>Preconditions:</p> <p>- The target user has HOTP (paper token) second-factor authentication enabled.</p> <p>- The attacker possesses a valid session in which the password step has already been completed (the OTP step is pending).</p> <p>- The attacker has access to at least one HOTP token value (e.g., a paper token list).</p> <p>Security impact:</p> <p>- Bypass of the second authentication factor, allowing unauthorized access to a user&#39;s MISP account.</p> <p>- Corruption of the HOTP counter state, potentially invalidating subsequent legitimate tokens or enabling further replays.</p> <p>Affected versions: &lt;2.5.48.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MISP</p> <p>MISP contains a vulnerability in its one-time password (OTP) authentication flow that allows replay of a consumed HOTP (paper) token and rewinding of the token counter.</p> <p>The HOTP verification logic compared the submitted token against a counter value that was cached in the user&#39;s session at the time the password was entered, rather than against the authoritative counter stored in the database. Because the session-cached counter is not updated after a token is successfully consumed, an attacker who holds a valid session (password already submitted) can reuse a previously burned HOTP token. The stale cached counter still matches the replayed token, granting a second successful authentication and effectively rewinding the counter state.</p> <p>Preconditions:</p> <p>- The target user has HOTP (paper token) second-factor authentication enabled.</p> <p>- The attacker possesses a valid session in which the password step has already been completed (the OTP step is pending).</p> <p>- The attacker has access to at least one HOTP token value (e.g., a paper token list).</p> <p>Security impact:</p> <p>- Bypass of the second authentication factor, allowing unauthorized access to a user&#39;s MISP account.</p> <p>- Corruption of the HOTP counter state, potentially invalidating subsequent legitimate tokens or enabling further replays.</p> <p>Affected versions: &lt;2.5.48.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-103651