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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 21:45:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-90341 — firmware: coreboot: Validate table bounds</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90341</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;firmware: coreboot: Validate table bounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing coreboot_table_populate() bounds checks limit individual
entries to the mapped length.  However, coreboot_table_probe() replaces
the platform resource length with header and table sizes supplied by
firmware before mapping the full table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malformed table can overflow the 32-bit size addition or advertise an
extent beyond the resource, causing the driver to map and parse memory
outside the resource.  A resource shorter than the fixed header is also
mapped as though it contained a complete header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject resources shorter than the fixed header.  After validating the
signature, require a complete header, calculate the advertised extent
with overflow checking, and reject extents beyond the resource before
remapping the table.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;firmware: coreboot: Validate table bounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing coreboot_table_populate() bounds checks limit individual
entries to the mapped length.  However, coreboot_table_probe() replaces
the platform resource length with header and table sizes supplied by
firmware before mapping the full table.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malformed table can overflow the 32-bit size addition or advertise an
extent beyond the resource, causing the driver to map and parse memory
outside the resource.  A resource shorter than the fixed header is also
mapped as though it contained a complete header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject resources shorter than the fixed header.  After validating the
signature, require a complete header, calculate the advertised extent
with overflow checking, and reject extents beyond the resource before
remapping the table.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90341</guid>
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