https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 01:26:40 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80802 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak</p> <p>fdp_nci_i2c_read() takes the next packet length from two device-supplied bytes and never validates it. The value is a u16 used as the i2c_master_recv() count into a 261-byte on-stack buffer: a malicious, counterfeit or malfunctioning controller (or an i2c bus interposer) can drive it far past the buffer for a stack out-of-bounds write that clobbers the canary and return address, or below the minimum frame size (directly, or by truncating the computed sum) so the header/LRC strip and the next length read run past a short receive. Reject a length outside [FDP_NCI_I2C_MIN_PAYLOAD, FDP_NCI_I2C_MAX_PAYLOAD], as a corrupted packet already is, and force resynchronization.</p> <p>The same loop allocates one data skb per iteration and assumes a length packet followed by a data packet; a device that sends two data packets in one call leaks the first skb when the second allocation overwrites it. Free a previously allocated skb before allocating the next.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak</p> <p>fdp_nci_i2c_read() takes the next packet length from two device-supplied bytes and never validates it. The value is a u16 used as the i2c_master_recv() count into a 261-byte on-stack buffer: a malicious, counterfeit or malfunctioning controller (or an i2c bus interposer) can drive it far past the buffer for a stack out-of-bounds write that clobbers the canary and return address, or below the minimum frame size (directly, or by truncating the computed sum) so the header/LRC strip and the next length read run past a short receive. Reject a length outside [FDP_NCI_I2C_MIN_PAYLOAD, FDP_NCI_I2C_MAX_PAYLOAD], as a corrupted packet already is, and force resynchronization.</p> <p>The same loop allocates one data skb per iteration and assumes a length packet followed by a data packet; a device that sends two data packets in one call leaks the first skb when the second allocation overwrites it. Free a previously allocated skb before allocating the next.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80802