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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 06:58:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-98372 — xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98372</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset
with an unbounded loop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;while (offset &amp;gt;= walk-&amp;gt;past + walk-&amp;gt;frags[walk-&amp;gt;fragi].len)
		walk-&amp;gt;past += walk-&amp;gt;frags[walk-&amp;gt;fragi++].len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;walk-&amp;gt;fragi is advanced and walk-&amp;gt;frags[walk-&amp;gt;fragi] is dereferenced
without ever checking fragi against walk-&amp;gt;nr_frags. When the requested
offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk&amp;#39;s fragments,
fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack
frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards
against this with&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (!walk-&amp;gt;nr_frags ||
	    offset &amp;gt;= walk-&amp;gt;total + walk-&amp;gt;initial_offset)
		return len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the
out-of-range walk. Its own &amp;#34;fragi &amp;lt; walk-&amp;gt;nr_frags&amp;#34; bound check runs only
afterwards, too late to prevent the read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG)
payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() -&amp;gt;
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345
   iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset
with an unbounded loop:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;while (offset &amp;gt;= walk-&amp;gt;past + walk-&amp;gt;frags[walk-&amp;gt;fragi].len)
		walk-&amp;gt;past += walk-&amp;gt;frags[walk-&amp;gt;fragi++].len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;walk-&amp;gt;fragi is advanced and walk-&amp;gt;frags[walk-&amp;gt;fragi] is dereferenced
without ever checking fragi against walk-&amp;gt;nr_frags. When the requested
offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk&amp;#39;s fragments,
fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack
frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards
against this with&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (!walk-&amp;gt;nr_frags ||
	    offset &amp;gt;= walk-&amp;gt;total + walk-&amp;gt;initial_offset)
		return len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the
out-of-range walk. Its own &amp;#34;fragi &amp;lt; walk-&amp;gt;nr_frags&amp;#34; bound check runs only
afterwards, too late to prevent the read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG)
payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() -&amp;gt;
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345
   iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-98372</guid>
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