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      <title>CVE-2026-43976 — wger: cross-tenant admin notes/contracts leak via gym=None bypass (5 views)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-43976</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; wger-project wger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. Prior to version 2.6, five gym management views in wger apply a flawed gym-scope guard (`gym_a != gym_b`) that silently passes when both operands are `None`. A trainer with `gym.gym_trainer` and `gym.add_adminusernote` permissions and no gym assignment (`gym=None`) can read private admin notes, uploaded documents, gym contracts, user configuration, and user permission data for **any other unaffiliated user** on the instance. The subsequent querysets filter only on the attacker-supplied `member_id` with no secondary gym-scoped validation, so all records are disclosed. Version 2.6 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; wger-project wger&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. Prior to version 2.6, five gym management views in wger apply a flawed gym-scope guard (`gym_a != gym_b`) that silently passes when both operands are `None`. A trainer with `gym.gym_trainer` and `gym.add_adminusernote` permissions and no gym assignment (`gym=None`) can read private admin notes, uploaded documents, gym contracts, user configuration, and user permission data for **any other unaffiliated user** on the instance. The subsequent querysets filter only on the attacker-supplied `member_id` with no secondary gym-scoped validation, so all records are disclosed. Version 2.6 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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