https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:25:48 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-81728 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> dolibarr</p> <p>Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST(&#39;updatekeys&#39;, &#39;array&#39;) in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.&#39; = &#39;.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace(&#39;/^.*\./i&#39;, &#39;&#39;, $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this-&gt;db-&gt;query(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> dolibarr</p> <p>Dolibarr before 24.0.0 contains a SQL injection in its CSV and XLSX import wizard. The wizard reads its update keys with GETPOST(&#39;updatekeys&#39;, &#39;array&#39;) in htdocs/imports/import.php, which applies only the generic alphanohtml filter: that strips HTML but leaves SQL keywords, comment markers, parentheses, spaces and quotes intact. import_insert() in htdocs/core/modules/import/import_csv.modules.php then iterates the submitted values and builds a filter with $where[] = $key.&#39; = &#39;.$data[$key], having first applied preg_replace(&#39;/^.*\./i&#39;, &#39;&#39;, $key), an alias strip that does nothing to a value containing no dot. The assembled string is executed through $this-&gt;db-&gt;query(). The injected SELECT resolves the row id that the import then assigns to $lastinsertid, which becomes the WHERE target of a subsequent UPDATE, so a UNION SELECT returning an attacker-chosen integer both exfiltrates arbitrary table content and redirects which row the import overwrites; for category link tables the raw filter array is spliced into that UPDATE directly. The interface offers a fixed list of legitimate column codes but the server never checks the submitted values against it. A user holding the import permission can exploit this. Release 23.0.4 does not carry the fix; the allow-list test was added in 24.0.0.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-81728