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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 01:37:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-48599 — Authorization bypass via path binding override in elixir-grpc/grpc HTTP transcoding</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48599</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; elixir-grpc grpc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In &amp;#39;Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode&amp;#39;:map_request/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?user_id=victim (or a POST with {&amp;#34;user_id&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;victim&amp;#34;} when body: &amp;#34;*&amp;#34;) yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects grpc: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; elixir-grpc grpc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In &amp;#39;Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode&amp;#39;:map_request/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?user_id=victim (or a POST with {&amp;#34;user_id&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;victim&amp;#34;} when body: &amp;#34;*&amp;#34;) yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects grpc: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48599</guid>
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