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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 10:46:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-80778 — futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80778</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A private futex key borrows the waiter&amp;#39;s mm without taking an mm_users
reference. Nevertheless, attach_to_pi_owner() currently accepts an owner
from a different address space and copies the private key into the owner&amp;#39;s
PI state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When that owner exits, exit_pi_state_list() uses the saved key to find the
hash bucket and acquires a reference to the waiter&amp;#39;s private hash. If the
last user of the waiter&amp;#39;s mm exits concurrently, futex_hash_free() frees
the hash while the owner still uses its bucket and reference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prevent this by validating in attach_to_pi_owner() that, for private
futexes, the owner mm and waiter mm are the same. Perform the check with
the owner&amp;#39;s pi_lock held and after validating owner::futex::state to
serialize against a concurrent PI-state exit cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[ tglx: Amended comment ]&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A private futex key borrows the waiter&amp;#39;s mm without taking an mm_users
reference. Nevertheless, attach_to_pi_owner() currently accepts an owner
from a different address space and copies the private key into the owner&amp;#39;s
PI state.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When that owner exits, exit_pi_state_list() uses the saved key to find the
hash bucket and acquires a reference to the waiter&amp;#39;s private hash. If the
last user of the waiter&amp;#39;s mm exits concurrently, futex_hash_free() frees
the hash while the owner still uses its bucket and reference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prevent this by validating in attach_to_pi_owner() that, for private
futexes, the owner mm and waiter mm are the same. Perform the check with
the owner&amp;#39;s pi_lock held and after validating owner::futex::state to
serialize against a concurrent PI-state exit cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[ tglx: Amended comment ]&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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