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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 22:57:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-101045 — Fleet Homebrew Cask OS Command Injection via Metadata</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-101045</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; fleetdm fleet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet-maintained app install and uninstall scripts for macOS are generated from Homebrew cask metadata. In manifests generated before 2026-08-19, the script generator escaped this metadata at some interpolation sites but not all of them, so cask metadata containing shell metacharacters (for example $(...) command substitution) could be carried into scripts that execute as root on managed macOS hosts. An attacker who could land crafted metadata in an upstream Homebrew cask — without needing any Fleet credentials — could achieve arbitrary command execution as root on managed macOS hosts that install or uninstall the affected Fleet-maintained app; exploitation required the crafted metadata to pass both upstream Homebrew cask review and Fleet&amp;#39;s review of the automated ingestion pull request. The fix (fleetdm/fleet#51324) landed in Fleet&amp;#39;s ingestion pipeline on 2026-08-19 so that all manifests generated on or after that date escape cask metadata at every interpolation site; because manifests are generated centrally and distributed as pre-built content, remediation applied to all deployments with no customer action, and the code fix is included in Fleet v4.92.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; fleetdm fleet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fleet-maintained app install and uninstall scripts for macOS are generated from Homebrew cask metadata. In manifests generated before 2026-08-19, the script generator escaped this metadata at some interpolation sites but not all of them, so cask metadata containing shell metacharacters (for example $(...) command substitution) could be carried into scripts that execute as root on managed macOS hosts. An attacker who could land crafted metadata in an upstream Homebrew cask — without needing any Fleet credentials — could achieve arbitrary command execution as root on managed macOS hosts that install or uninstall the affected Fleet-maintained app; exploitation required the crafted metadata to pass both upstream Homebrew cask review and Fleet&amp;#39;s review of the automated ingestion pull request. The fix (fleetdm/fleet#51324) landed in Fleet&amp;#39;s ingestion pipeline on 2026-08-19 so that all manifests generated on or after that date escape cask metadata at every interpolation site; because manifests are generated centrally and distributed as pre-built content, remediation applied to all deployments with no customer action, and the code fix is included in Fleet v4.92.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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