https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 20:35:57 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-81930 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Apache Software Foundation Apache Airflow Snowflake provider</p> <p>Apache Airflow&#39;s Snowflake provider did not validate the connection&#39;s `account` and `region` fields before interpolating them into request URLs. The SQL API endpoint is built as `https://{account}.snowflakecomputing.com/api/v2/statements`, so an `account` value containing `/`, `?` or `#` demotes the intended domain to a path, query or fragment and leaves the attacker in control of the request host.</p> <p>The provider sends that request with an `Authorization: Bearer` header carrying a JWT minted from the connection&#39;s private key, or the configured OAuth or programmatic access token. A user who can edit the Snowflake connection but cannot read its secrets — Airflow gives connection-configuration users write-only access to stored credentials, and a `private_key_file` lives on the worker rather than in the connection — can therefore cause a valid token for the account to be delivered to a host of their choosing and replay it against the genuine Snowflake endpoint. No Dag-authoring ability is required: the attacker edits the connection and waits for an existing Dag to use it. The same unvalidated value was also used to build the OAuth token-request URL and the Cortex Agent base URL.</p> <p>Affects deployments where Snowflake connections are editable by users who are not trusted with the connection&#39;s credentials. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-snowflake` `6.18.0` or later, which rejects `account` and `region` values containing anything other than letters, digits,…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Apache Software Foundation Apache Airflow Snowflake provider</p> <p>Apache Airflow&#39;s Snowflake provider did not validate the connection&#39;s `account` and `region` fields before interpolating them into request URLs. The SQL API endpoint is built as `https://{account}.snowflakecomputing.com/api/v2/statements`, so an `account` value containing `/`, `?` or `#` demotes the intended domain to a path, query or fragment and leaves the attacker in control of the request host.</p> <p>The provider sends that request with an `Authorization: Bearer` header carrying a JWT minted from the connection&#39;s private key, or the configured OAuth or programmatic access token. A user who can edit the Snowflake connection but cannot read its secrets — Airflow gives connection-configuration users write-only access to stored credentials, and a `private_key_file` lives on the worker rather than in the connection — can therefore cause a valid token for the account to be delivered to a host of their choosing and replay it against the genuine Snowflake endpoint. No Dag-authoring ability is required: the attacker edits the connection and waits for an existing Dag to use it. The same unvalidated value was also used to build the OAuth token-request URL and the Cortex Agent base URL.</p> <p>Affects deployments where Snowflake connections are editable by users who are not trusted with the connection&#39;s credentials. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-snowflake` `6.18.0` or later, which rejects `account` and `region` values containing anything other than letters, digits,…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-81930