https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 01:18:04 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-13622 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.12, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.13, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.14, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.15, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.16, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.17, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.18, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.19, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.20, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.21 and 1 more</p> <p>A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt&#39;s virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/root/ paths using net.Dial() without symlink protection. These socket paths reside in qemu-owned directories writable by the virt-launcher user. An attacker with namespace edit and pods/exec permissions can replace a migration proxy socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket. Because virt-handler runs as root in the host mount namespace, absolute symlink targets resolve against the host filesystem, and the bidirectional io.Copy proxy relays attacker-controlled bytes to the container runtime, enabling full node compromise.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.12, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.13, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.14, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.15, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.16, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.17, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.18, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.19, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.20, Red Hat Container Native Virtualization 4.21 and 1 more</p> <p>A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt&#39;s virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/root/ paths using net.Dial() without symlink protection. These socket paths reside in qemu-owned directories writable by the virt-launcher user. An attacker with namespace edit and pods/exec permissions can replace a migration proxy socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket. Because virt-handler runs as root in the host mount namespace, absolute symlink targets resolve against the host filesystem, and the bidirectional io.Copy proxy relays attacker-controlled bytes to the container runtime, enabling full node compromise.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-13622