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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 04:57:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53075 — ppp: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in target netns for unattached ioctls</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53075</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in target netns for unattached ioctls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;/dev/ppp open is currently authorized against file-&amp;gt;f_cred-&amp;gt;user_ns,
while unattached administrative ioctls operate on current-&amp;gt;nsproxy-&amp;gt;net_ns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a local unprivileged user can create a new user namespace
with CLONE_NEWUSER, gain CAP_NET_ADMIN only in that new user namespace,
and still issue PPPIOCNEWUNIT, PPPIOCATTACH, or PPPIOCATTCHAN against
an inherited network namespace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the user namespace that owns the target network
namespace before handling unattached PPP administrative ioctls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This preserves normal pppd operation in the network namespace it is
actually privileged in, while rejecting the userns-only inherited-netns
case.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ppp: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in target netns for unattached ioctls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;/dev/ppp open is currently authorized against file-&amp;gt;f_cred-&amp;gt;user_ns,
while unattached administrative ioctls operate on current-&amp;gt;nsproxy-&amp;gt;net_ns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, a local unprivileged user can create a new user namespace
with CLONE_NEWUSER, gain CAP_NET_ADMIN only in that new user namespace,
and still issue PPPIOCNEWUNIT, PPPIOCATTACH, or PPPIOCATTCHAN against
an inherited network namespace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the user namespace that owns the target network
namespace before handling unattached PPP administrative ioctls.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This preserves normal pppd operation in the network namespace it is
actually privileged in, while rejecting the userns-only inherited-netns
case.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53075</guid>
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