<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 03:34:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2024-37891 — Proxy-Authorization request header isn't stripped during cross-origin redirects in urllib3</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-37891</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; urllib3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. When using urllib3&amp;#39;s proxy support with `ProxyManager`, the `Proxy-Authorization` header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected. However, when sending HTTP requests *without* using urllib3&amp;#39;s proxy support, it&amp;#39;s possible to accidentally configure the `Proxy-Authorization` header even though it won&amp;#39;t have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn&amp;#39;t treat the `Proxy-Authorization` HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn&amp;#39;t strip the header on cross-origin redirects. Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the `Proxy-Authorization` header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident. Users should use urllib3&amp;#39;s proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the `Proxy-Authorization` header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren&amp;#39;t using the correct approach. We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited: 1. Setting the `Proxy-Authorization` header without using urllib3&amp;#39;s built-in proxy support. 2. Not disabling HTTP redirects. 3. Either not using an HTTPS origin server…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; urllib3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. When using urllib3&amp;#39;s proxy support with `ProxyManager`, the `Proxy-Authorization` header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected. However, when sending HTTP requests *without* using urllib3&amp;#39;s proxy support, it&amp;#39;s possible to accidentally configure the `Proxy-Authorization` header even though it won&amp;#39;t have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn&amp;#39;t treat the `Proxy-Authorization` HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn&amp;#39;t strip the header on cross-origin redirects. Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the `Proxy-Authorization` header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident. Users should use urllib3&amp;#39;s proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the `Proxy-Authorization` header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren&amp;#39;t using the correct approach. We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited: 1. Setting the `Proxy-Authorization` header without using urllib3&amp;#39;s built-in proxy support. 2. Not disabling HTTP redirects. 3. Either not using an HTTPS origin server…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-37891</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
