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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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      <title>CVE-2023-45288 — HTTP/2 CONTINUATION flood in net/http</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2023-45288</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go standard library net/http, golang.org/x/net/http2, go_standard_library net\/http, golang http2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request&amp;#39;s headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go standard library net/http, golang.org/x/net/http2, go_standard_library net\/http, golang http2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request&amp;#39;s headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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