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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:15:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-16317 — Silent Drop of TLS 1.3 Encrypted Records in s2n-tls</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-16317</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; AWS s2n-tls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Missing validation of the outer content_type byte on TLS 1.3 encrypted records in s2n-tls allows an active man-in-the-middle to silently discard individual application data records without either endpoint detecting the modification. RFC 8446 Section 5.2 requires that the outer content_type of all encrypted TLS 1.3 records must be application_data (0x17). The s2n-tls AEAD implementation hardcodes this value in the additional authenticated data rather than using the actual wire byte, so the outer content_type is not covered by the authentication tag.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This enables selective suppression of application data. In HTTP pipelining scenarios, dropping a TLS record containing an HTTP request can cause request/response desynchronization, where subsequent responses are delivered to the wrong requests. In write-heavy workloads, a dropped record containing a write request can result in undetectable data loss when the client interprets a subsequent success response as confirmation of the dropped write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All TLS 1.3 connections are affected. Both TLS clients and servers are affected. TLS 1.2 and QUIC connections are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We recommend you upgrade s2n-tls to version v1.7.6&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; AWS s2n-tls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Missing validation of the outer content_type byte on TLS 1.3 encrypted records in s2n-tls allows an active man-in-the-middle to silently discard individual application data records without either endpoint detecting the modification. RFC 8446 Section 5.2 requires that the outer content_type of all encrypted TLS 1.3 records must be application_data (0x17). The s2n-tls AEAD implementation hardcodes this value in the additional authenticated data rather than using the actual wire byte, so the outer content_type is not covered by the authentication tag.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This enables selective suppression of application data. In HTTP pipelining scenarios, dropping a TLS record containing an HTTP request can cause request/response desynchronization, where subsequent responses are delivered to the wrong requests. In write-heavy workloads, a dropped record containing a write request can result in undetectable data loss when the client interprets a subsequent success response as confirmation of the dropped write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All TLS 1.3 connections are affected. Both TLS clients and servers are affected. TLS 1.2 and QUIC connections are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We recommend you upgrade s2n-tls to version v1.7.6&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-16317</guid>
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