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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:14:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-55074 — Ansible FreeBSD Jail Connection Plugin: Jail escape via symlink following in put_file (host-side root mv)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55074</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; chofstede ansible_jailexec&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ansible FreeBSD Jail Connection Plugin is an Ansible connection plugin for FreeBSD Jails via jexec. Through version 1.3.0, the jailexec connection plugin&amp;#39;s put_file resolved a transfer&amp;#39;s destination to a path on the jail host ( + ) and ran mkdir -p and mv there as root on the host. Those commands follow symbolic links, and the path was operated on outside the jail, so a symlink existing inside the jail was followed by the host-side, root-privileged mv. A party controlling content inside a managed jail (the jail&amp;#39;s root, or any process able to create a symlink in a directory an Ansible task later writes to) can therefore cause an arbitrary root-owned write on the host, outside the jail — a full jail escape. Arbitrary root-owned host writes are readily escalated to host compromise (e.g. cron, rc.d, authorized_keys). Preconditions for this vulnerability are that the operator runs a copy/template/fetch-style task (anything using put_file) against the jail, and the attacker can place a symlink inside the jail at or above the task&amp;#39;s destination before the transfer runs. This issue has been fixed in version 2.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; chofstede ansible_jailexec&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ansible FreeBSD Jail Connection Plugin is an Ansible connection plugin for FreeBSD Jails via jexec. Through version 1.3.0, the jailexec connection plugin&amp;#39;s put_file resolved a transfer&amp;#39;s destination to a path on the jail host ( + ) and ran mkdir -p and mv there as root on the host. Those commands follow symbolic links, and the path was operated on outside the jail, so a symlink existing inside the jail was followed by the host-side, root-privileged mv. A party controlling content inside a managed jail (the jail&amp;#39;s root, or any process able to create a symlink in a directory an Ansible task later writes to) can therefore cause an arbitrary root-owned write on the host, outside the jail — a full jail escape. Arbitrary root-owned host writes are readily escalated to host compromise (e.g. cron, rc.d, authorized_keys). Preconditions for this vulnerability are that the operator runs a copy/template/fetch-style task (anything using put_file) against the jail, and the attacker can place a symlink inside the jail at or above the task&amp;#39;s destination before the transfer runs. This issue has been fixed in version 2.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55074</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cxgv-hp74-jj7r — Ansible FreeBSD Jail Connection Plugin: Jail escape via symlink following in put_file (host-side root mv)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cxgv-hp74-jj7r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ansible-jailexec&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Through version 1.3.0, the jailexec connection plugin&amp;#39;s put_file resolved a transfer&amp;#39;s destination to a path on the jail host (&amp;lt;jail filesystem root&amp;gt; + &amp;lt;destination&amp;gt;) and ran mkdir -p and mv there as root on the host. Those commands follow symbolic links, and the path was operated on outside the jail, so a symlink existing inside the jail was followed by the host-side, root-privileged mv.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A party controlling content inside a managed jail (the jail&amp;#39;s root, or any process able to create a symlink in a directory an Ansible task later writes to) can therefore cause an arbitrary root-owned write on the host, outside the jail — a full jail escape. Arbitrary root-owned host writes are readily escalated to host compromise (e.g. cron, rc.d, authorized_keys).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Preconditions: the operator runs a copy/template/fetch-style task (anything using put_file) against the jail, and the attacker can place a symlink inside the jail at or above the task&amp;#39;s destination before the transfer runs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patches: Fixed in 2.0.0. File transfers now run inside the jail via jexec (mkdir -p &amp;lt;dir&amp;gt; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; cat &amp;gt; &amp;lt;dest&amp;gt; for put_file; cat &amp;lt; &amp;lt;src&amp;gt; for fetch_file), so every path resolves within the jail&amp;#39;s chroot. An in-jail symlink can at most redirect within the same jail and can no longer reach the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Workarounds: None in affected versions; upgrade to 2.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ansible-jailexec&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Through version 1.3.0, the jailexec connection plugin&amp;#39;s put_file resolved a transfer&amp;#39;s destination to a path on the jail host (&amp;lt;jail filesystem root&amp;gt; + &amp;lt;destination&amp;gt;) and ran mkdir -p and mv there as root on the host. Those commands follow symbolic links, and the path was operated on outside the jail, so a symlink existing inside the jail was followed by the host-side, root-privileged mv.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A party controlling content inside a managed jail (the jail&amp;#39;s root, or any process able to create a symlink in a directory an Ansible task later writes to) can therefore cause an arbitrary root-owned write on the host, outside the jail — a full jail escape. Arbitrary root-owned host writes are readily escalated to host compromise (e.g. cron, rc.d, authorized_keys).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Preconditions: the operator runs a copy/template/fetch-style task (anything using put_file) against the jail, and the attacker can place a symlink inside the jail at or above the task&amp;#39;s destination before the transfer runs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patches: Fixed in 2.0.0. File transfers now run inside the jail via jexec (mkdir -p &amp;lt;dir&amp;gt; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; cat &amp;gt; &amp;lt;dest&amp;gt; for put_file; cat &amp;lt; &amp;lt;src&amp;gt; for fetch_file), so every path resolves within the jail&amp;#39;s chroot. An in-jail symlink can at most redirect within the same jail and can no longer reach the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Workarounds: None in affected versions; upgrade to 2.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cxgv-hp74-jj7r</guid>
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