https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 20:26:22 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55536 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, Browser Server _handle_connection() checks Chrome extension origins with re.match() and the unanchored expression chrome-extension://[a-z0-9]{32}. Extra trailing characters pass before websocket.accept(), allowing start_session commands and unauthorized browser automation. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, Browser Server _handle_connection() checks Chrome extension origins with re.match() and the unanchored expression chrome-extension://[a-z0-9]{32}. Extra trailing characters pass before websocket.accept(), allowing start_session commands and unauthorized browser automation. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55536 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6g6r-q6gw-w8fg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`praisonai/browser/server.py` validates incoming WebSocket connections using a Chrome extension Origin check. The regex `chrome-extension://[a-z0-9]{32}` is applied with `re.match()`, which **only anchors at the start of the string, not the end**. Any Origin header with more than 32 alphanumeric characters after `chrome-extension://` — including non-alphanumeric trailing characters — passes the check.</p> <p>This is a **patch bypass** of GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92. That advisory triggered the addition of origin validation; this finding shows the validation is bypassable by any WebSocket client that forges an Origin header. After bypassing, the attacker can send `start_session` commands that are executed by any Chrome extension currently connected to the server — causing the extension to perform arbitrary browser automation including cookie theft and screenshot capture.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>**Vulnerable code — `browser/server.py` line 186:**</p> <p>```python elif parsed_origin.scheme == &#34;chrome-extension&#34; and \ re.match(r&#34;chrome-extension://[a-z0-9]{32}&#34;, origin): is_allowed = True ```</p> <p>`re.match()` returns a match object if the pattern matches at the **beginning** of the string; trailing characters after the 32nd are not evaluated. `re.fullmatch()` (or anchoring with `$`) is required to enforce exact length.</p> <p>**There is no other authentication mechanism** in `_handle_connection()`. Confirmed by source inspection: - No bearer token check - No API key check - No extension ID all…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`praisonai/browser/server.py` validates incoming WebSocket connections using a Chrome extension Origin check. The regex `chrome-extension://[a-z0-9]{32}` is applied with `re.match()`, which **only anchors at the start of the string, not the end**. Any Origin header with more than 32 alphanumeric characters after `chrome-extension://` — including non-alphanumeric trailing characters — passes the check.</p> <p>This is a **patch bypass** of GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92. That advisory triggered the addition of origin validation; this finding shows the validation is bypassable by any WebSocket client that forges an Origin header. After bypassing, the attacker can send `start_session` commands that are executed by any Chrome extension currently connected to the server — causing the extension to perform arbitrary browser automation including cookie theft and screenshot capture.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>**Vulnerable code — `browser/server.py` line 186:**</p> <p>```python elif parsed_origin.scheme == &#34;chrome-extension&#34; and \ re.match(r&#34;chrome-extension://[a-z0-9]{32}&#34;, origin): is_allowed = True ```</p> <p>`re.match()` returns a match object if the pattern matches at the **beginning** of the string; trailing characters after the 32nd are not evaluated. `re.fullmatch()` (or anchoring with `$`) is required to enforce exact length.</p> <p>**There is no other authentication mechanism** in `_handle_connection()`. Confirmed by source inspection: - No bearer token check - No API key check - No extension ID all…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6g6r-q6gw-w8fg