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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:54:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-46242 — eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46242</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file-&amp;gt;f_ep under
file-&amp;gt;f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section
(is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock).
A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in
that window observed the transient NULL, skipped
eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op-&amp;gt;release / file_free().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op-&amp;gt;release is
ep_eventpoll_release() -&amp;gt; ep_clear_and_put() -&amp;gt; ep_free(), which
kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded -&amp;gt;refs
hlist_head is exactly where epi-&amp;gt;fllink.pprev points, so the
subsequent hlist_del_rcu()&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;*pprev = next&amp;#34; scribbles into freed
kmalloc-192 memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot
backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() --
reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still
nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable
kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the
critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file
cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and
transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the
hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its
__fput…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file-&amp;gt;f_ep under
file-&amp;gt;f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section
(is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock).
A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in
that window observed the transient NULL, skipped
eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op-&amp;gt;release / file_free().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op-&amp;gt;release is
ep_eventpoll_release() -&amp;gt; ep_clear_and_put() -&amp;gt; ep_free(), which
kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded -&amp;gt;refs
hlist_head is exactly where epi-&amp;gt;fllink.pprev points, so the
subsequent hlist_del_rcu()&amp;#39;s &amp;#34;*pprev = next&amp;#34; scribbles into freed
kmalloc-192 memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot
backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() --
reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still
nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable
kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the
critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file
cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and
transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the
hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its
__fput…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46242</guid>
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