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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 07:26:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-80829 — ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80829</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_usbmidi_novation_output() lays out a two-byte header at
transfer_buffer[0..1] and passes &amp;amp;transfer_buffer[2] together with a
length of ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer - 2 to snd_rawmidi_transmit():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep-&amp;gt;ports[0].substream,
				     &amp;amp;transfer_buffer[2],
				     ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer - 2);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer comes from the output endpoint&amp;#39;s wMaxPacketSize via
usb_maxpacket(). A malformed or malicious device can advertise a bulk
OUT endpoint with a wMaxPacketSize of 1 - the USB core only clamps this
value downwards - so ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer becomes 1 and the count argument
becomes -1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_rawmidi_transmit() passes the negative count on to
__snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(), where &amp;#34;if (count1 &amp;gt; count) count1 = count&amp;#34;
leaves count1 negative; get_aligned_size() keeps it negative for a
byte-stream substream, so the following memcpy(buffer, ..., count1) runs
with a (size_t)-1 length and writes far past the transfer buffer, which
was allocated with usb_alloc_coherent(ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same class of bug that was fixed for snd_usbmidi_akai_output()
in commit 0970274613fb (&amp;#34;ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in
snd_usbmidi_akai_output()&amp;#34;); the novation output routine was left
unguarded. Bail out when the endpoint cannot hold the two-byte header
plus at least one payload byte.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_usbmidi_novation_output() lays out a two-byte header at
transfer_buffer[0..1] and passes &amp;amp;transfer_buffer[2] together with a
length of ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer - 2 to snd_rawmidi_transmit():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;count = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep-&amp;gt;ports[0].substream,
				     &amp;amp;transfer_buffer[2],
				     ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer - 2);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer comes from the output endpoint&amp;#39;s wMaxPacketSize via
usb_maxpacket(). A malformed or malicious device can advertise a bulk
OUT endpoint with a wMaxPacketSize of 1 - the USB core only clamps this
value downwards - so ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer becomes 1 and the count argument
becomes -1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_rawmidi_transmit() passes the negative count on to
__snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(), where &amp;#34;if (count1 &amp;gt; count) count1 = count&amp;#34;
leaves count1 negative; get_aligned_size() keeps it negative for a
byte-stream substream, so the following memcpy(buffer, ..., count1) runs
with a (size_t)-1 length and writes far past the transfer buffer, which
was allocated with usb_alloc_coherent(ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same class of bug that was fixed for snd_usbmidi_akai_output()
in commit 0970274613fb (&amp;#34;ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in
snd_usbmidi_akai_output()&amp;#34;); the novation output routine was left
unguarded. Bail out when the endpoint cannot hold the two-byte header
plus at least one payload byte.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-80829</guid>
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