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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 07:06:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-93216 — mm/page_owner: use memcg_data snapshot to avoid TOCTOU in print_page_owner_memcg()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93216</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/page_owner: use memcg_data snapshot to avoid TOCTOU in print_page_owner_memcg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print_page_owner_memcg() reads page-&amp;gt;memcg_data via READ_ONCE() at the
start to guard against tail pages and NULL data.  However, it later
re-reads page-&amp;gt;memcg_data locklessly in two places:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1: page_memcg_check(page)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2: PageMemcgKmem(page) (via folio_memcg_kmem(), which includes
   VM_BUG_ON assertions for tail pages and MEMCG_DATA_OBJEXTS)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the page is concurrently freed and reallocated as a THP tail page or
slab page between these calls, the VM_BUG_ON assertions can trigger on
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y builds, crashing the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both TOCTOU issues by using the memcg_data snapshot throughout.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/page_owner: use memcg_data snapshot to avoid TOCTOU in print_page_owner_memcg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print_page_owner_memcg() reads page-&amp;gt;memcg_data via READ_ONCE() at the
start to guard against tail pages and NULL data.  However, it later
re-reads page-&amp;gt;memcg_data locklessly in two places:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1: page_memcg_check(page)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2: PageMemcgKmem(page) (via folio_memcg_kmem(), which includes
   VM_BUG_ON assertions for tail pages and MEMCG_DATA_OBJEXTS)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the page is concurrently freed and reallocated as a THP tail page or
slab page between these calls, the VM_BUG_ON assertions can trigger on
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y builds, crashing the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both TOCTOU issues by using the memcg_data snapshot throughout.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93216</guid>
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