{"uuid": "eba00ce1-bcc2-4c9e-b94d-03e6b74565c7", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2021-24340", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/hacking_Attack/9897", "content": "Black Hat Ethical Hacking\nWP Statistics Bug Allows Attackers to Lift Data from WordPress Sites\n\nhttps://www.blackhatethicalhacking.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/black-hat-locks-and-electronics.jpg WP Statistics Bug Allows Attackers to Lift Data from WordPress SitesPost Views: 17 \nReading Time: 1 Minute\nWP Statistics, a plugin installed on more than 600,000 WordPress websites, has an SQL-injection security vulnerability that could let site visitors make off with all kinds of sensitive information from web databases, including emails, credit-card data, passwords and more. WP Statistics, as its name suggests, is a plugin that delivers analytics for site owners, including how many people visit the site, where they\u2019re coming from, what browsers and search engines they use, and which pages, categories and tags have the most visits. It also delivers anonymized data around IP addresses, referring sites, and country- and city-level details for visitors, all presented in the form of charts and graphs.\n\nWordfence researchers found the high-severity bug (tracked as CVE-2021-24340, rating 7.5 out of 10 on the CVSS scale) in the \u201cPages\u201d function, which lets administrators see which pages have received the most traffic. It returns this data using SQL queries to a back-end database \u2013 but it turns out that unauthenticated attackers can hijack the function to perform their own queries, in order to purloin sensitive information.\nSee Also: Windows PoC Exploit Released for Wormable RCE \u201cWhile the \u2018Pages\u2019 page was intended for administrators only and would not display information to non-admin users, it was possible to start loading this page\u2019s constructor by sending a request to wp-admin/admin.php with the page parameter set to wps_pages_page,\u201d said Wordfence researchers in a posting\u00a0this week. \u201cSince the SQL query ran in the constructor for the \u2018Pages\u2019 page, this meant that any site visitor, even those without a login, could cause this SQL query to run. A malicious actor could then supply malicious values for the ID or type parameters.\u201d\n\nThe specific vulnerability is a time-based blind SQL injection, according to researchers at Wordfence. This technique involves sending requests to the database that \u201cguess\u201d at the content of a database table and instruct the database to delay the response or \u201csleep\u201d if that guess is correct.\n\nFor instance, an attacker could ask the database if the first letter of the admin user\u2019s email address starts with the letter \u201cA,\u201d and instruct it to delay the response by five seconds if this is true.\n\n\u201cExfiltrating information would be a relatively slow process, and it would be impractical to use it to extract bulk records, but high-value information such as user emails, password hashes, and encryption keys and salts could be extracted in a matter of hours with the help of automated tools such as sqlmap,\u201d according to Wordfence. \u201cIn a targeted attack, this vulnerability could be used to extract personally identifiable information from commerce sites containing customer information. This underscores the importance of having security protections with an endpoint firewall in place wherever sensitive data is stored.\u201d\n\nThe only reliable method of preventing SQL injection is to prepare all SQL statements before executing them, researchers added. Prepared statements isolate each query parameter so that an adversary would not be able to see the entire scope of the data that\u2019s returned.\nSee Also: Offensive Security Tool: EyeWitness \u201cUnfortunately, while this SQL query used esc_sql to attempt to escape the ID and type input parameters, it did not use a prepared statement,\u201d explained the researchers. \u201cSince the ID input parameter was not quoted[...]", "creation_timestamp": "2026-09-08T06:00:04.755033Z"}