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    <title>Most recent sightings.</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent sightings.</description>
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      <title>c3cd93cd-aa2d-4385-82c3-52772a61d7bb</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/sighting/c3cd93cd-aa2d-4385-82c3-52772a61d7bb/export</link>
      <description>{"uuid": "c3cd93cd-aa2d-4385-82c3-52772a61d7bb", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2023-35935", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cibsecurity/65869", "content": "\u203c CVE-2023-35935 \u203c\n\n@fastify/oauth2, a wrapper around the `simple-oauth2` library, is vulnerable to cross site request forgery (CSRF) prior to version 7.2.0.. All versions of @fastify/oauth2 used a statically generated `state` parameter at startup time and were used across all requests for all users. The purpose of the Oauth2 `state` parameter is to prevent CSRF attacks. As such, it should be unique per user and should be connected to the user's session in some way that will allow the server to validate it. Version 7.2.0 changes the default behavior to store the `state` in a cookie with the `http-only` and `same-site=lax` attributes set. The state is now by default generated for every user. Note that this contains a breaking change in the `checkStateFunction` function, which now accepts the full `Request` object. There are no known workarounds for the issue.\n\n\ud83d\udcd6 Read\n\nvia \"National Vulnerability Database\".", "creation_timestamp": "2023-07-03T20:22:38.000000Z"}</description>
      <content:encoded>{"uuid": "c3cd93cd-aa2d-4385-82c3-52772a61d7bb", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2023-35935", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cibsecurity/65869", "content": "\u203c CVE-2023-35935 \u203c\n\n@fastify/oauth2, a wrapper around the `simple-oauth2` library, is vulnerable to cross site request forgery (CSRF) prior to version 7.2.0.. All versions of @fastify/oauth2 used a statically generated `state` parameter at startup time and were used across all requests for all users. The purpose of the Oauth2 `state` parameter is to prevent CSRF attacks. As such, it should be unique per user and should be connected to the user's session in some way that will allow the server to validate it. Version 7.2.0 changes the default behavior to store the `state` in a cookie with the `http-only` and `same-site=lax` attributes set. The state is now by default generated for every user. Note that this contains a breaking change in the `checkStateFunction` function, which now accepts the full `Request` object. There are no known workarounds for the issue.\n\n\ud83d\udcd6 Read\n\nvia \"National Vulnerability Database\".", "creation_timestamp": "2023-07-03T20:22:38.000000Z"}</content:encoded>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 03 Jul 2023 20:22:38 +0000</pubDate>
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