https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent sightings. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 27 May 2026 14:18:50 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/sighting/ceb6bd12-b75c-4e7e-9db6-c2f1fdaa3a0d/export {"uuid": "ceb6bd12-b75c-4e7e-9db6-c2f1fdaa3a0d", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2024-42096", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cvedetector/1904", "content": "{\n \"Source\": \"CVE FEED\",\n \"Title\": \"CVE-2024-42096 - Linux Kernel x86 Stack Overflow Vulnerability\", \n \"Content\": \"CVE ID : CVE-2024-42096 \nPublished : July 29, 2024, 6:15 p.m. | 37\u00a0minutes ago \nDescription : In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: \n \nx86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc() \n \nThe 'profile_pc()' function is used for timer-based profiling, which \nisn't really all that relevant any more to begin with, but it also ends \nup making assumptions based on the stack layout that aren't necessarily \nvalid. \n \nBasically, the code tries to account the time spent in spinlocks to the \ncaller rather than the spinlock, and while I support that as a concept, \nit's not worth the code complexity or the KASAN warnings when no serious \nprofiling is done using timers anyway these days. \n \nAnd the code really does depend on stack layout that is only true in the \nsimplest of cases. We've lost the comment at some point (I think when \nthe 32-bit and 64-bit code was unified), but it used to say: \n \n Assume the lock function has either no stack frame or a copy \n of eflags from PUSHF. \n \nwhich explains why it just blindly loads a word or two straight off the \nstack pointer and then takes a minimal look at the values to just check \nif they might be eflags or the return pc: \n \n Eflags always has bits 22 and up cleared unlike kernel addresses \n \nbut that basic stack layout assumption assumes that there isn't any lock \ndebugging etc going on that would complicate the code and cause a stack \nframe. \n \nIt causes KASAN unhappiness reported for years by syzkaller [1] and \nothers [2]. \n \nWith no real practical reason for this any more, just remove the code. \n \nJust for historical interest, here's some background commits relating to \nthis code from 2006: \n \n 0cb91a229364 (\"i386: Account spinlocks to the caller during profiling for !FP kernels\") \n 31679f38d886 (\"Simplify profile_pc on x86-64\") \n \nand a code unification from 2009: \n \n ef4512882dbe (\"x86: time_32/64.c unify profile_pc\") \n \nbut the basics of this thing actually goes back to before the git tree. \nSeverity: 0.0 | NA \nVisit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...\",\n \"Detection Date\": \"29 Jul 2024\",\n \"Type\": \"Vulnerability\"\n}\n\ud83d\udd39 t.me/cvedetector \ud83d\udd39", "creation_timestamp": "2024-07-29T21:19:23.000000Z"} {"uuid": "ceb6bd12-b75c-4e7e-9db6-c2f1fdaa3a0d", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2024-42096", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cvedetector/1904", "content": "{\n \"Source\": \"CVE FEED\",\n \"Title\": \"CVE-2024-42096 - Linux Kernel x86 Stack Overflow Vulnerability\", \n \"Content\": \"CVE ID : CVE-2024-42096 \nPublished : July 29, 2024, 6:15 p.m. | 37\u00a0minutes ago \nDescription : In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: \n \nx86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc() \n \nThe 'profile_pc()' function is used for timer-based profiling, which \nisn't really all that relevant any more to begin with, but it also ends \nup making assumptions based on the stack layout that aren't necessarily \nvalid. \n \nBasically, the code tries to account the time spent in spinlocks to the \ncaller rather than the spinlock, and while I support that as a concept, \nit's not worth the code complexity or the KASAN warnings when no serious \nprofiling is done using timers anyway these days. \n \nAnd the code really does depend on stack layout that is only true in the \nsimplest of cases. We've lost the comment at some point (I think when \nthe 32-bit and 64-bit code was unified), but it used to say: \n \n Assume the lock function has either no stack frame or a copy \n of eflags from PUSHF. \n \nwhich explains why it just blindly loads a word or two straight off the \nstack pointer and then takes a minimal look at the values to just check \nif they might be eflags or the return pc: \n \n Eflags always has bits 22 and up cleared unlike kernel addresses \n \nbut that basic stack layout assumption assumes that there isn't any lock \ndebugging etc going on that would complicate the code and cause a stack \nframe. \n \nIt causes KASAN unhappiness reported for years by syzkaller [1] and \nothers [2]. \n \nWith no real practical reason for this any more, just remove the code. \n \nJust for historical interest, here's some background commits relating to \nthis code from 2006: \n \n 0cb91a229364 (\"i386: Account spinlocks to the caller during profiling for !FP kernels\") \n 31679f38d886 (\"Simplify profile_pc on x86-64\") \n \nand a code unification from 2009: \n \n ef4512882dbe (\"x86: time_32/64.c unify profile_pc\") \n \nbut the basics of this thing actually goes back to before the git tree. \nSeverity: 0.0 | NA \nVisit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...\",\n \"Detection Date\": \"29 Jul 2024\",\n \"Type\": \"Vulnerability\"\n}\n\ud83d\udd39 t.me/cvedetector \ud83d\udd39", "creation_timestamp": "2024-07-29T21:19:23.000000Z"} https://vulnerability.circl.lu/sighting/ceb6bd12-b75c-4e7e-9db6-c2f1fdaa3a0d/export Mon, 29 Jul 2024 21:19:23 +0000