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      <title>0efd330a-cc64-4839-bd92-7a9681b13424</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/sighting/0efd330a-cc64-4839-bd92-7a9681b13424/export</link>
      <description>{"uuid": "0efd330a-cc64-4839-bd92-7a9681b13424", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2024-5982", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cvedetector/9328", "content": "{\n  \"Source\": \"CVE FEED\",\n  \"Title\": \"CVE-2024-5982 - Gaizhenbiao/Chuanhuchatgpt Path Traversal RCE and Disclosure Vulnerability\", \n  \"Content\": \"CVE ID : CVE-2024-5982 \nPublished : Oct. 29, 2024, 1:15 p.m. | 22\u00a0minutes ago \nDescription : A path traversal vulnerability exists in the latest version of gaizhenbiao/chuanhuchatgpt. The vulnerability arises from unsanitized input handling in multiple features, including user upload, directory creation, and template loading. Specifically, the load_chat_history function in modules/models/base_model.py allows arbitrary file uploads, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE). The get_history_names function in utils.py permits arbitrary directory creation. Additionally, the load_template function in utils.py can be exploited to leak the first column of CSV files. These issues stem from improper sanitization of user inputs concatenated with directory paths using os.path.join. \nSeverity: 9.1 | CRITICAL \nVisit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...\",\n  \"Detection Date\": \"29 Oct 2024\",\n  \"Type\": \"Vulnerability\"\n}\n\ud83d\udd39 t.me/cvedetector \ud83d\udd39", "creation_timestamp": "2024-10-29T14:46:55.000000Z"}</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Oct 2024 14:46:55 +0000</pubDate>
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