CWE-285
DiscouragedImproper Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
2730 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2Q92-JQ5R-M2X3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-11 00:31 – Updated: 2024-12-11 00:31Adobe Experience Manager versions 6.5.21 and earlier are affected by an Improper Authorization vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and gain unauthorized access. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43731"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-10T22:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Adobe Experience Manager versions 6.5.21 and earlier are affected by an Improper Authorization vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and gain unauthorized access. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.",
"id": "GHSA-2q92-jq5r-m2x3",
"modified": "2024-12-11T00:31:25Z",
"published": "2024-12-11T00:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43731"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/experience-manager/apsb24-69.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2Q9X-HQ7P-V7M6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-17 00:32 – Updated: 2025-11-04 18:31Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.36 and prior and 8.3.0 and prior. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all MySQL Server accessible data and unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.9 (Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-21166"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-16T23:15:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.36 and prior and 8.3.0 and prior. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all MySQL Server accessible data and unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.9 (Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-2q9x-hq7p-v7m6",
"modified": "2025-11-04T18:31:08Z",
"published": "2024-07-17T00:32:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240801-0002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2024.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2QF8-5W74-42Q7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-31 09:30 – Updated: 2025-05-31 09:30The Profitori plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation due to a missing capability check on the stocktend_object endpoint in versions 2.0.6.0 to 2.1.1.3. This makes it possible to trigger the save_object_as_user() function for objects whose '_datatype' is set to 'users',. This allows unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary strings straight into the user’s wp_capabilities meta field, potentially elevating the privileges of an existing user account or a newly created one to that of an administrator.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-4631"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-31T07:15:21Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Profitori plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation due to a missing capability check on the stocktend_object endpoint in versions 2.0.6.0 to 2.1.1.3. This makes it possible to trigger the save_object_as_user() function for objects whose \u0027_datatype\u0027 is set to \u0027users\u0027,. This allows unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary strings straight into the user\u2019s wp_capabilities meta field, potentially elevating the privileges of an existing user account or a newly created one to that of an administrator.",
"id": "GHSA-2qf8-5w74-42q7",
"modified": "2025-05-31T09:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-05-31T09:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4631"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profitori/tags/2.1.1.3/profitori.php#L2675"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profitori/tags/2.1.1.3/profitori.php#L2679"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profitori/tags/2.1.1.3/profitori.php#L2698"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profitori/tags/2.1.1.3/profitori.php#L3673"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/profitori/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c764811f-e9dc-4c3d-b696-5792e70ff0b6?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2RQW-CVQ5-CPCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-10 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:00Improper authorization in the Intel(R) EMA software before version 1.9.0.0 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via local access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-45128"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-10T14:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper authorization in the Intel(R) EMA software before version 1.9.0.0 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via local access.",
"id": "GHSA-2rqw-cvq5-cpcc",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:00:13Z",
"published": "2023-05-10T15:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45128"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00797.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2RV4-33JH-89FC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-21 21:31Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Web Services). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0, 14.1.2.0.0 and 15.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle WebLogic Server. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle WebLogic Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34315"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T21:16:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Web Services). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0, 14.1.2.0.0 and 15.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle WebLogic Server. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle WebLogic Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N).",
"id": "GHSA-2rv4-33jh-89fc",
"modified": "2026-04-21T21:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T21:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34315"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2RX5-2G7J-2659
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 20:44 – Updated: 2026-07-28 20:44Summary
The Constellation-tunnel bypass branch in tokenMiddleware at src/proxy/routerGen.go:53-66 returns to the upstream handler before the request's x-cosmos-user, x-cosmos-role, x-cosmos-user-role, and x-cosmos-mfa headers are stripped at lines 68-72, and before the AdminOnlyWithRedirect gate at lines 109-117 runs. Any holder of a valid Constellation device API key sends x-cosmos-user: admin to a proxied backend; the documented forward-auth integration treats the caller as admin with no JWT cookie, password, or MFA.
Preconditions
- Cosmos is deployed with Constellation enabled and at least one device enrolled.
- Attacker holds a valid
x-cstln-authAPI key for an enrolled device. - Attacker reaches Cosmos over the Constellation Nebula tunnel.
- Target proxy route has
AuthEnabled=true; upstream trusts thex-cosmos-userforward-auth header.
Details
// src/proxy/routerGen.go:46-122 - bypass returns before headers are reset
func tokenMiddleware(route utils.ProxyRouteConfig) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
enabled := route.AuthEnabled
adminOnly := route.AdminOnly
// bypass auth if from Constellation tunnel
if ((enabled && r.Header.Get("x-cosmos-user") != "") || !enabled) { // attacker-set header opens the branch
remoteAddr, _ := utils.SplitIP(r.RemoteAddr)
isConstIP := constellation.IsConstellationIP(remoteAddr)
isConstTokenValid := constellation.CheckConstellationToken(r) == nil
if isConstIP && isConstTokenValid {
utils.Debug("Bypassing auth for Constellation tunnel")
r.Header.Del("x-cstln-auth")
next.ServeHTTP(w, r) // forwards x-cosmos-user as set by attacker
return
}
}
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user") // only runs on the fall-through path
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-role")
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user-role")
r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-mfa")
r.Header.Del("x-cstln-auth")
// ... JWT path runs here ...
if enabled && adminOnly {
if errT := AdminOnlyWithRedirect(w, r, route); errT != nil { // also skipped by bypass
return
}
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
The branch was written for tunneled-cluster traffic where an upstream Cosmos instance has already authenticated the user and signed the x-cosmos-user header itself. The branch condition reads the header before the strip block runs at lines 68-72, so any client can open the branch by sending the header. The Constellation IP and API-key checks then gate progression, but a Constellation device holder satisfies both: the API key was issued by the admin when the device was enrolled, and the tunnel terminates with the device's Constellation IP as the TCP source. Once the branch is taken, the original x-cosmos-user value flows to the backend untouched, and AdminOnlyWithRedirect is never invoked. Backends configured per Cosmos's documented forward-auth integration (the standard pattern for "Cosmos in front of an app that reads identity from a header") treat the attacker's chosen string as the authenticated identity.
The Constellation network is sold as a way for an operator to invite family and friends without exposing ports. Those invited members hold device API keys but are not Cosmos administrators - the trust boundary this bug crosses is exactly the "invited member -> admin role on a proxied app" line.
Proof of concept
Environment used to reproduce:
- Version:
masterbranch, audited 2026-05-13 (modulegithub.com/azukaar/cosmos-server) - Deployment:
docker run azukaar/cosmos-server:latest(or thedocker-compose.ymlfrom the project README) - Setup steps:
- Complete initial setup via
/cosmos-ui/; promote the operator account to admin. - Enable Constellation: Settings > Constellation > Create lighthouse.
- Enrol a device under a non-admin user: Constellation > Devices > Create. Save the device profile and the displayed API key.
- Configure one proxy route with
Host=admin-app.example,Mode=PROXY,Target=http://internal-app:port,AuthEnabled=true,AdminOnly=true. Upstream must trust thex-cosmos-userheader (the documented Cosmos forward-auth integration, e.g. an internal admin panel that reads identity from that header). - Attacker connects to the Nebula tunnel with the issued device profile, so the request's TCP source is the device's Constellation IP.
# 1. Variables - fill in from the steps above
DEVICE_APIKEY="<APIKey shown when admin created the device>"
PROXY_ROUTE="https://admin-app.example"
# 2. Single request that bypasses Cosmos auth and asserts admin to the backend
curl -k \
-H "x-cstln-auth: Bearer $DEVICE_APIKEY" \
-H "x-cosmos-user: admin" \
-H "x-cosmos-role: 2" \
-H "x-cosmos-user-role: 2" \
-H "x-cosmos-mfa: 0" \
"$PROXY_ROUTE/" -i
# Expected: HTTP 200 with the admin-gated backend rendering as user "admin".
# No JWT cookie was sent; no admin Cosmos account is held by the caller.
# Cosmos's debug log shows: "Bypassing auth for Constellation tunnel".
A second request demonstrates cross-user impersonation on the same backend by changing the asserted identity:
curl -k \
-H "x-cstln-auth: Bearer $DEVICE_APIKEY" \
-H "x-cosmos-user: someotheruser" \
"$PROXY_ROUTE/" -i
# Backend renders as "someotheruser"; any per-user data partitioning at the
# backend is now under attacker control.
Impact
- AuthN: bypasses Cosmos JWT login, password, and MFA for any holder of a Constellation device key.
- AuthZ: skips the per-route
AdminOnlygate, unlocking admin-only proxied backends. - Confidentiality: caller reads every admin-only proxied app as
adminfrom one curl. - Integrity: caller performs any admin-tier write the backend exposes via the forward-auth identity.
- Affected population: every Cosmos deployment with Constellation enabled, at least one enrolled device, and one or more proxy routes integrated via the documented
x-cosmos-userheader.
Suggestions to fix
This has not been tested - it is illustrative only.
Strip the identity headers unconditionally at function entry so they cannot open the bypass branch, and keep the AdminOnly gate on the Constellation path. The branch should only fire for routes that are explicitly AuthEnabled=false - on auth-required routes the JWT path must always run so the proxy itself is the sole authority that writes x-cosmos-user.
--- a/src/proxy/routerGen.go
+++ b/src/proxy/routerGen.go
@@ -46,15 +46,17 @@
func tokenMiddleware(route utils.ProxyRouteConfig) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ // Always strip identity headers before any decision based on them.
+ r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user")
+ r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-role")
+ r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user-role")
+ r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-mfa")
+
enabled := route.AuthEnabled
adminOnly := route.AdminOnly
- // bypass auth if from Constellation tunnel
- if ((enabled && r.Header.Get("x-cosmos-user") != "") || !enabled) {
+ // Constellation bypass only applies to non-auth routes; on auth-required
+ // routes the JWT path is the sole authority that may set x-cosmos-user.
+ if !enabled {
remoteAddr, _ := utils.SplitIP(r.RemoteAddr)
isConstIP := constellation.IsConstellationIP(remoteAddr)
isConstTokenValid := constellation.CheckConstellationToken(r) == nil
@@ -65,12 +67,7 @@
return
}
}
-
- r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user")
- r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-role")
- r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-user-role")
- r.Header.Del("x-cosmos-mfa")
r.Header.Del("x-cstln-auth")
Defence in depth: document that backends downstream of Cosmos must not accept x-cosmos-user over an untrusted hop. Bind the trust to a mutual TLS leg or a shared HMAC over <x-cosmos-user, request-id, timestamp> injected by the proxy and verified by the backend.
Regression test: add a unit test against tokenMiddleware asserting that a request bearing x-cosmos-user: admin and a valid x-cstln-auth reaches the next handler with r.Header.Get("x-cosmos-user") == "" whenever route.AuthEnabled == true.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.22.18"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.22.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T20:44:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Constellation-tunnel bypass branch in `tokenMiddleware` at `src/proxy/routerGen.go:53-66` returns to the upstream handler before the request\u0027s `x-cosmos-user`, `x-cosmos-role`, `x-cosmos-user-role`, and `x-cosmos-mfa` headers are stripped at lines 68-72, and before the `AdminOnlyWithRedirect` gate at lines 109-117 runs. Any holder of a valid Constellation device API key sends `x-cosmos-user: admin` to a proxied backend; the documented forward-auth integration treats the caller as admin with no JWT cookie, password, or MFA.\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- Cosmos is deployed with Constellation enabled and at least one device enrolled.\n- Attacker holds a valid `x-cstln-auth` API key for an enrolled device.\n- Attacker reaches Cosmos over the Constellation Nebula tunnel.\n- Target proxy route has `AuthEnabled=true`; upstream trusts the `x-cosmos-user` forward-auth header.\n\n### Details\n\n```go\n// src/proxy/routerGen.go:46-122 - bypass returns before headers are reset\nfunc tokenMiddleware(route utils.ProxyRouteConfig) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n enabled := route.AuthEnabled\n adminOnly := route.AdminOnly\n\n // bypass auth if from Constellation tunnel\n if ((enabled \u0026\u0026 r.Header.Get(\"x-cosmos-user\") != \"\") || !enabled) { // attacker-set header opens the branch\n remoteAddr, _ := utils.SplitIP(r.RemoteAddr)\n isConstIP := constellation.IsConstellationIP(remoteAddr)\n isConstTokenValid := constellation.CheckConstellationToken(r) == nil\n\n if isConstIP \u0026\u0026 isConstTokenValid {\n utils.Debug(\"Bypassing auth for Constellation tunnel\")\n r.Header.Del(\"x-cstln-auth\")\n next.ServeHTTP(w, r) // forwards x-cosmos-user as set by attacker\n return\n }\n }\n\n r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-user\") // only runs on the fall-through path\n r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-role\")\n r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-user-role\")\n r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-mfa\")\n r.Header.Del(\"x-cstln-auth\")\n // ... JWT path runs here ...\n\n if enabled \u0026\u0026 adminOnly {\n if errT := AdminOnlyWithRedirect(w, r, route); errT != nil { // also skipped by bypass\n return\n }\n }\n next.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n })\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe branch was written for tunneled-cluster traffic where an upstream Cosmos instance has already authenticated the user and signed the `x-cosmos-user` header itself. The branch condition reads the header before the strip block runs at lines 68-72, so any client can open the branch by sending the header. The Constellation IP and API-key checks then gate progression, but a Constellation device holder satisfies both: the API key was issued by the admin when the device was enrolled, and the tunnel terminates with the device\u0027s Constellation IP as the TCP source. Once the branch is taken, the original `x-cosmos-user` value flows to the backend untouched, and `AdminOnlyWithRedirect` is never invoked. Backends configured per Cosmos\u0027s documented forward-auth integration (the standard pattern for \"Cosmos in front of an app that reads identity from a header\") treat the attacker\u0027s chosen string as the authenticated identity.\n\nThe Constellation network is sold as a way for an operator to invite family and friends without exposing ports. Those invited members hold device API keys but are not Cosmos administrators - the trust boundary this bug crosses is exactly the \"invited member -\u003e admin role on a proxied app\" line.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nEnvironment used to reproduce:\n\n- Version: `master` branch, audited 2026-05-13 (module `github.com/azukaar/cosmos-server`)\n- Deployment: `docker run azukaar/cosmos-server:latest` (or the `docker-compose.yml` from the project README)\n- Setup steps:\n 1. Complete initial setup via `/cosmos-ui/`; promote the operator account to admin.\n 2. Enable Constellation: Settings \u003e Constellation \u003e Create lighthouse.\n 3. Enrol a device under a non-admin user: Constellation \u003e Devices \u003e Create. Save the device profile and the displayed API key.\n 4. Configure one proxy route with `Host=admin-app.example`, `Mode=PROXY`, `Target=http://internal-app:port`, `AuthEnabled=true`, `AdminOnly=true`. Upstream must trust the `x-cosmos-user` header (the documented Cosmos forward-auth integration, e.g. an internal admin panel that reads identity from that header).\n 5. Attacker connects to the Nebula tunnel with the issued device profile, so the request\u0027s TCP source is the device\u0027s Constellation IP.\n\n```bash\n# 1. Variables - fill in from the steps above\nDEVICE_APIKEY=\"\u003cAPIKey shown when admin created the device\u003e\"\nPROXY_ROUTE=\"https://admin-app.example\"\n\n# 2. Single request that bypasses Cosmos auth and asserts admin to the backend\ncurl -k \\\n -H \"x-cstln-auth: Bearer $DEVICE_APIKEY\" \\\n -H \"x-cosmos-user: admin\" \\\n -H \"x-cosmos-role: 2\" \\\n -H \"x-cosmos-user-role: 2\" \\\n -H \"x-cosmos-mfa: 0\" \\\n \"$PROXY_ROUTE/\" -i\n\n# Expected: HTTP 200 with the admin-gated backend rendering as user \"admin\".\n# No JWT cookie was sent; no admin Cosmos account is held by the caller.\n# Cosmos\u0027s debug log shows: \"Bypassing auth for Constellation tunnel\".\n```\n\nA second request demonstrates cross-user impersonation on the same backend by changing the asserted identity:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k \\\n -H \"x-cstln-auth: Bearer $DEVICE_APIKEY\" \\\n -H \"x-cosmos-user: someotheruser\" \\\n \"$PROXY_ROUTE/\" -i\n# Backend renders as \"someotheruser\"; any per-user data partitioning at the\n# backend is now under attacker control.\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- **AuthN:** bypasses Cosmos JWT login, password, and MFA for any holder of a Constellation device key.\n- **AuthZ:** skips the per-route `AdminOnly` gate, unlocking admin-only proxied backends.\n- **Confidentiality:** caller reads every admin-only proxied app as `admin` from one curl.\n- **Integrity:** caller performs any admin-tier write the backend exposes via the forward-auth identity.\n- **Affected population:** every Cosmos deployment with Constellation enabled, at least one enrolled device, and one or more proxy routes integrated via the documented `x-cosmos-user` header.\n\n### Suggestions to fix\n\n\u003e _This has not been tested - it is illustrative only._\n\nStrip the identity headers unconditionally at function entry so they cannot open the bypass branch, and keep the `AdminOnly` gate on the Constellation path. The branch should only fire for routes that are explicitly `AuthEnabled=false` - on auth-required routes the JWT path must always run so the proxy itself is the sole authority that writes `x-cosmos-user`.\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/proxy/routerGen.go\n+++ b/src/proxy/routerGen.go\n@@ -46,15 +46,17 @@\n func tokenMiddleware(route utils.ProxyRouteConfig) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {\n return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n+ // Always strip identity headers before any decision based on them.\n+ r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-user\")\n+ r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-role\")\n+ r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-user-role\")\n+ r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-mfa\")\n+\n enabled := route.AuthEnabled\n adminOnly := route.AdminOnly\n \n- // bypass auth if from Constellation tunnel\n- if ((enabled \u0026\u0026 r.Header.Get(\"x-cosmos-user\") != \"\") || !enabled) {\n+ // Constellation bypass only applies to non-auth routes; on auth-required\n+ // routes the JWT path is the sole authority that may set x-cosmos-user.\n+ if !enabled {\n remoteAddr, _ := utils.SplitIP(r.RemoteAddr)\n isConstIP := constellation.IsConstellationIP(remoteAddr)\n isConstTokenValid := constellation.CheckConstellationToken(r) == nil\n@@ -65,12 +67,7 @@\n return\n }\n }\n-\n- r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-user\")\n- r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-role\")\n- r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-user-role\")\n- r.Header.Del(\"x-cosmos-mfa\")\n r.Header.Del(\"x-cstln-auth\")\n```\n\nDefence in depth: document that backends downstream of Cosmos must not accept `x-cosmos-user` over an untrusted hop. Bind the trust to a mutual TLS leg or a shared HMAC over `\u003cx-cosmos-user, request-id, timestamp\u003e` injected by the proxy and verified by the backend.\n\nRegression test: add a unit test against `tokenMiddleware` asserting that a request bearing `x-cosmos-user: admin` and a valid `x-cstln-auth` reaches the next handler with `r.Header.Get(\"x-cosmos-user\") == \"\"` whenever `route.AuthEnabled == true`.",
"id": "GHSA-2rx5-2g7j-2659",
"modified": "2026-07-28T20:44:33Z",
"published": "2026-07-28T20:44:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/azukaar/Cosmos-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-2rx5-2g7j-2659"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/azukaar/Cosmos-Server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/azukaar/Cosmos-Server/releases/tag/v0.22.19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cosmos-Server has an authentication bypass via forward-auth header smuggling on Constellation tunnel"
}
GHSA-2V26-H6G3-VRGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-07 15:31 – Updated: 2024-10-07 15:31Information disclosure while sending implicit broadcast containing APP launch information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38425"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-07T13:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Information disclosure while sending implicit broadcast containing APP launch information.",
"id": "GHSA-2v26-h6g3-vrgj",
"modified": "2024-10-07T15:31:39Z",
"published": "2024-10-07T15:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38425"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.qualcomm.com/product/publicresources/securitybulletin/october-2024-bulletin.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2VGJ-5CMQ-Q6Q3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-04 18:30 – Updated: 2024-09-04 18:30A vulnerability in Cisco Expressway Edge (Expressway-E) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to masquerade as another user on an affected system.
This vulnerability is due to inadequate authorization checks for Mobile and Remote Access (MRA) users. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by running a series of crafted commands. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to intercept calls that are destined for a particular phone number or to make phone calls and have that phone number appear on the caller ID. To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must be an MRA user on an affected system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-20497"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-04T17:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in Cisco Expressway Edge (Expressway-E) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to masquerade as another user on an affected system.\n\nThis vulnerability is due to inadequate authorization checks for Mobile and Remote Access (MRA) users. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by running a series of crafted commands. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to intercept calls that are destined for a particular phone number or to make phone calls and have that phone number appear on the caller ID. To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must be an MRA user on an affected system.",
"id": "GHSA-2vgj-5cmq-q6q3",
"modified": "2024-09-04T18:30:58Z",
"published": "2024-09-04T18:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20497"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-expressway-auth-kdFrcZ2j"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2VV4-MHF8-RGMR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-11 06:30 – Updated: 2025-11-11 06:30The Astra Security Suite – Firewall & Malware Scan plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to insufficient validation of remote URLs for zip downloads and an easily guessable key in all versions up to, and including, 0.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11521"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-11T04:15:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Astra Security Suite \u2013 Firewall \u0026 Malware Scan plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to insufficient validation of remote URLs for zip downloads and an easily guessable key in all versions up to, and including, 0.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site\u0027s server which may make remote code execution possible.",
"id": "GHSA-2vv4-mhf8-rgmr",
"modified": "2025-11-11T06:30:20Z",
"published": "2025-11-11T06:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11521"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/getastra"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/f99a6b5c-e95d-49d0-a4b2-1d7188447da1?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2W24-8J54-P2GX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-09 15:30 – Updated: 2025-08-09 15:30A vulnerability was found in macrozheng mall up to 1.0.3 and classified as problematic. This issue affects the function detail of the file UmsMemberController.java of the component com.macro.mall.portal.controller. The manipulation of the argument orderId leads to authorization bypass. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8755"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-09T14:15:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in macrozheng mall up to 1.0.3 and classified as problematic. This issue affects the function detail of the file UmsMemberController.java of the component com.macro.mall.portal.controller. The manipulation of the argument orderId leads to authorization bypass. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-2w24-8j54-p2gx",
"modified": "2025-08-09T15:30:21Z",
"published": "2025-08-09T15:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/N1n3b9S/cve/issues/14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/N1n3b9S/cve/issues/14#issue-3269039303"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.319253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.319253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.624046"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security
An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.
CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing
This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.