CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
1075 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-X5H9-FC29-GM85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 00:31 – Updated: 2026-08-07 00:31The RegistrationMagic WordPress plugin before 6.0.9.5 does not compare the verified PayPal capture's amount, currency, payee, or prior use against the registration it is finalising: its server-side check only confirms the capture status is COMPLETED. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore finalise an expensive paid registration with any genuinely-completed low-value capture, and replay a single capture across unlimited registrations because captures are not de-duplicated.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15208"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T22:16:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The RegistrationMagic WordPress plugin before 6.0.9.5 does not compare the verified PayPal capture\u0027s amount, currency, payee, or prior use against the registration it is finalising: its server-side check only confirms the capture status is COMPLETED. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore finalise an expensive paid registration with any genuinely-completed low-value capture, and replay a single capture across unlimited registrations because captures are not de-duplicated.",
"id": "GHSA-x5h9-fc29-gm85",
"modified": "2026-08-07T00:31:14Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T00:31:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15208"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/b8c75098-41a9-4b24-9f6b-c3144f230cd8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X5Q5-6WVF-2FPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:00 – Updated: 2023-09-26 19:09An insufficient logging and monitoring vulnerability exists in Magento 2.1 prior to 2.1.19, Magento 2.2 prior to 2.2.10, Magento 2.3 prior to 2.3.3. Failure to track admin actions related to design configuration could lead to repudiation attacks.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-8124"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-18T17:52:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-11-05T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An insufficient logging and monitoring vulnerability exists in Magento 2.1 prior to 2.1.19, Magento 2.2 prior to 2.2.10, Magento 2.3 prior to 2.3.3. Failure to track admin actions related to design configuration could lead to repudiation attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-x5q5-6wvf-2fpq",
"modified": "2023-09-26T19:09:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-8124"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/magento/product-community-edition/CVE-2019-8124.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://magento.com/security/patches/magento-2.3.3-and-2.2.10-security-update"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220121051105/https://magento.com/security/patches/magento-2.3.3-and-2.2.10-security-update"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Magento 2 Community Edition Insufficient Logging"
}
GHSA-X677-9FXG-V5C5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 16:53 – Updated: 2026-08-06 16:53Summary
There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's BasicAuth, DigestAuth, and ForwardAuth
middlewares. The fix for CVE-2026-33433 stripped canonical-cased spoofed identity headers
(e.g. X-Auth-User) before writing Traefik's own value, but did not account for
underscore-variant header names (e.g. X_Auth_User), which many backends normalize
identically to the dashed form. An attacker able to reach a protected route could inject
an underscore-variant header that survives Traefik's stripping and reaches the backend
alongside — or, on the unauthenticated ForwardAuth authResponseHeaders path, instead of
— the value Traefik intended to set, spoofing identity or authorization context. This is
fixed by setting the new allowHeadersWithUnderscores: false entry point option, which
strips all headers with underscores in their names before routing.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.51
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.22
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.6
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description # Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33433 + CVE-2026-39858 cross-cohort: `headerField` underscore-variant identity spoofing in BasicAuth / DigestAuth / ForwardAuth ## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-33433 (GHSA-qr99-7898-vr7c, "BasicAuth/DigestAuth Identity Spoofing via Non-Canonical headerField", patched in v2.11.42 / v3.6.12 / v3.7.0-ea.3) added `req.Header.Del(headerField)` before the literal-key writeback in `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go` and `pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go`. Go's `Header.Del` calls `textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey` which canonicalizes ASCII CASE and treats `-` as a word separator — so the fix correctly strips canonical-cased attacker headers (`X-Auth-User`, `x-auth-user`, `X-AUTH-USER`, etc.). However, `textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey` does **NOT** treat `_` as a separator. Attacker-supplied **underscore-variant** headers such as `X_Auth_User` survive `Header.Del("X-Auth-User")` intact and are forwarded to the backend alongside Traefik's own writeback. Many common backends (CGI/WSGI per RFC 3875, PHP `$_SERVER`, nginx with `underscores_in_headers on`, Tomcat / Java EE servlet containers, ASGI/WSGI frameworks) normalize `_` ↔ `-` equivalently or expose both forms to application code that may read the attacker's value. This is the **direct cross-cohort sibling** of the threat model the maintainer accepted in **CVE-2026-39858** (GHSA-5m6w-wvh7-57vm, "Forwarded alias spoofing pre-auth decision bypass"), which fixed the underscore-variant of the X-Forwarded-* family via `isManagedXHeader` in `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go`. The CVE-2026-39858 advisory body states verbatim: > "When the backend normalizes underscore and dash header forms equivalently, an attacker can inject spoofed trust context — such as a trusted scheme or host — through the alias headers and bypass authentication on protected routes without valid credentials." The same threat model applies to the operator-configurable `headerField` (BasicAuth, DigestAuth) and `authResponseHeaders` (ForwardAuth, ingress-nginx snippet provider), but the underscore-handling primitive (`isManagedXHeader`) was not extended to those middlewares. I verified the bypass end-to-end on `traefik:v3.6.14` (the latest patched release containing both fixes) using a default-recommended canonical `headerField: "X-Auth-User"` config and reproduced the bypass with a single `curl -H "X_Auth_User: superadmin" ...` request alongside valid BasicAuth credentials. The defect is present in four code paths at HEAD `eec68dce064f843b4317c4393aaea81b6dea31d6`: 1. `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go:101-105` — BasicAuth `headerField` 2. `pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go:99-103` — DigestAuth `headerField` 3. `pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go:304-310` — ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders` per-name writeback 4. `pkg/middlewares/ingressnginx/snippet/snippet.go:480-486` — Ingress-NGINX snippet `authResponseHeaders` per-name writeback The ForwardAuth instance (#3) is particularly notable: the attacker does NOT need credentials. The `authResponseHeaders` mechanism is intended to copy identity headers from the trusted auth server only; the underscore-variant bypass lets an unauthenticated attacker pre-inject the same identity header before any auth happens. The fast proxy at `pkg/proxy/fast/proxy.go:139` explicitly calls `DisableNormalizing()` on the outgoing fasthttp request, guaranteeing that the underscore-variant header reaches the backend wire verbatim. The standard `httputil.ReverseProxy` path at `pkg/proxy/httputil/proxy.go:55` likewise copies `req.Header` keys as-is during the wire write. ## Affected versions - `traefik` v3.6.x ≤ 3.6.14, v3.7.x ≤ 3.7.0-rc.2, v2.11.x ≤ 2.11.43, and all earlier versions sharing the same auth middleware architecture. The defect is present at HEAD post-CVE-2026-33433 fix (the fix added the `Del` line but the literal-key write defect-class survives for underscore variants). ## Root cause In `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go` at HEAD `eec68dc`:if b.headerField != "" {
// TODO Deprecated we should add the header with canonical key.
req.Header.Del(b.headerField)
req.Header[b.headerField] = []string{user}
}
func isManagedXHeader(key string) bool {
if len(key) == 0 || key[0] != 'X' { return false }
if _, ok := XHeadersSet[key]; ok { return true }
if strings.IndexByte(key, '_') < 0 { return false }
canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(strings.ReplaceAll(key, "_", "-"))
_, ok := XHeadersSet[canonical]
return ok
}
# docker-compose.yml
services:
traefik:
image: traefik:v3.6.14
command:
- --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml
- --entrypoints.web.address=:80
ports:
- "8080:80"
volumes:
- ./traefik/dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
echo:
image: mendhak/http-https-echo:36
environment:
- HTTP_PORT=8888
# traefik/dynamic.yml — canonical headerField, recommended operator config
http:
routers:
protected:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/`)"
service: echo
middlewares: [basic-auth]
services:
echo:
loadBalancer:
servers: [{url: "http://echo:8888"}]
middlewares:
basic-auth:
basicAuth:
users:
- 'alice:$2b$05$FhDfYidZdDPuQjovYqcTAe22wHpQ/cILC7Tr2yAD6vLlvZh/Q45PC' # alice:secret123
headerField: "X-Auth-User"
$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 -H "X-Auth-User: superadmin" http://localhost:8080/
{
...
"x-auth-user": "alice",
...
}
$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 -H "X_Auth_User: superadmin" http://localhost:8080/
{
...
"x-auth-user": "alice",
"x_auth_user": "superadmin",
...
}
$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 \
-H "X-Auth-User: superadmin" \
-H "X_Auth_User: superadmin" \
http://localhost:8080/
{
...
"x-auth-user": "alice", # Traefik's writeback
"x_auth_user": "superadmin", # attacker's underscore — survived Del
...
}
req.Header.Del(b.headerField)
req.Header[b.headerField] = []string{user}
canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(b.headerField)
// Strip canonical AND underscore-variant of the canonical key.
for key := range req.Header {
if key == canonical || strings.EqualFold(strings.ReplaceAll(key, "_", "-"), canonical) {
delete(req.Header, key)
}
}
req.Header.Set(canonical, user) // canonical-key write
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.11.50"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.51"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.21"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54763"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178",
"CWE-290",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T16:53:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-06T21:16:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s BasicAuth, DigestAuth, and ForwardAuth\nmiddlewares. The fix for CVE-2026-33433 stripped canonical-cased spoofed identity headers\n(e.g. `X-Auth-User`) before writing Traefik\u0027s own value, but did not account for\nunderscore-variant header names (e.g. `X_Auth_User`), which many backends normalize\nidentically to the dashed form. An attacker able to reach a protected route could inject\nan underscore-variant header that survives Traefik\u0027s stripping and reaches the backend\nalongside \u2014 or, on the unauthenticated ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders` path, instead of\n\u2014 the value Traefik intended to set, spoofing identity or authorization context. This is\nfixed by setting the new `allowHeadersWithUnderscores: false` entry point option, which\nstrips all headers with underscores in their names before routing.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.51\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.22\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.6\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n# Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33433 + CVE-2026-39858 cross-cohort: `headerField` underscore-variant identity spoofing in BasicAuth / DigestAuth / ForwardAuth\n\n## Summary\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-33433 (GHSA-qr99-7898-vr7c, \"BasicAuth/DigestAuth Identity Spoofing via Non-Canonical headerField\", patched in v2.11.42 / v3.6.12 / v3.7.0-ea.3) added `req.Header.Del(headerField)` before the literal-key writeback in `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go` and `pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go`. Go\u0027s `Header.Del` calls `textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey` which canonicalizes ASCII CASE and treats `-` as a word separator \u2014 so the fix correctly strips canonical-cased attacker headers (`X-Auth-User`, `x-auth-user`, `X-AUTH-USER`, etc.).\n\nHowever, `textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey` does **NOT** treat `_` as a separator. Attacker-supplied **underscore-variant** headers such as `X_Auth_User` survive `Header.Del(\"X-Auth-User\")` intact and are forwarded to the backend alongside Traefik\u0027s own writeback. Many common backends (CGI/WSGI per RFC 3875, PHP `$_SERVER`, nginx with `underscores_in_headers on`, Tomcat / Java EE servlet containers, ASGI/WSGI frameworks) normalize `_` \u2194 `-` equivalently or expose both forms to application code that may read the attacker\u0027s value.\n\nThis is the **direct cross-cohort sibling** of the threat model the maintainer accepted in **CVE-2026-39858** (GHSA-5m6w-wvh7-57vm, \"Forwarded alias spoofing pre-auth decision bypass\"), which fixed the underscore-variant of the X-Forwarded-* family via `isManagedXHeader` in `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go`. The CVE-2026-39858 advisory body states verbatim:\n\n\u003e \"When the backend normalizes underscore and dash header forms equivalently, an attacker can inject spoofed trust context \u2014 such as a trusted scheme or host \u2014 through the alias headers and bypass authentication on protected routes without valid credentials.\"\n\nThe same threat model applies to the operator-configurable `headerField` (BasicAuth, DigestAuth) and `authResponseHeaders` (ForwardAuth, ingress-nginx snippet provider), but the underscore-handling primitive (`isManagedXHeader`) was not extended to those middlewares. I verified the bypass end-to-end on `traefik:v3.6.14` (the latest patched release containing both fixes) using a default-recommended canonical `headerField: \"X-Auth-User\"` config and reproduced the bypass with a single `curl -H \"X_Auth_User: superadmin\" ...` request alongside valid BasicAuth credentials.\n\nThe defect is present in four code paths at HEAD `eec68dce064f843b4317c4393aaea81b6dea31d6`:\n\n1. `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go:101-105` \u2014 BasicAuth `headerField`\n2. `pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go:99-103` \u2014 DigestAuth `headerField`\n3. `pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go:304-310` \u2014 ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders` per-name writeback\n4. `pkg/middlewares/ingressnginx/snippet/snippet.go:480-486` \u2014 Ingress-NGINX snippet `authResponseHeaders` per-name writeback\n\nThe ForwardAuth instance (#3) is particularly notable: the attacker does NOT need credentials. The `authResponseHeaders` mechanism is intended to copy identity headers from the trusted auth server only; the underscore-variant bypass lets an unauthenticated attacker pre-inject the same identity header before any auth happens.\n\nThe fast proxy at `pkg/proxy/fast/proxy.go:139` explicitly calls `DisableNormalizing()` on the outgoing fasthttp request, guaranteeing that the underscore-variant header reaches the backend wire verbatim. The standard `httputil.ReverseProxy` path at `pkg/proxy/httputil/proxy.go:55` likewise copies `req.Header` keys as-is during the wire write.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `traefik` v3.6.x \u2264 3.6.14, v3.7.x \u2264 3.7.0-rc.2, v2.11.x \u2264 2.11.43, and all earlier versions sharing the same auth middleware architecture.\n\nThe defect is present at HEAD post-CVE-2026-33433 fix (the fix added the `Del` line but the literal-key write defect-class survives for underscore variants).\n\n## Root cause\n\nIn `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go` at HEAD `eec68dc`:\n\n```go\nif b.headerField != \"\" {\n // TODO Deprecated we should add the header with canonical key.\n req.Header.Del(b.headerField)\n req.Header[b.headerField] = []string{user}\n}\n```\n\nThe TODO comment shows the maintainer is aware of the literal-key write problem in general (canonical-key write would solve the case-canonicalization issue more cleanly than the current `Del` + literal-write pair). The comment does not acknowledge the underscore-variant survival corollary.\n\n`pkg/middlewares/auth/digest_auth.go:99-103` and the two ForwardAuth paths follow the same `Del` + literal-write pattern. Each is independently exploitable; the underlying primitive defect is shared.\n\nThe maintainer\u0027s gold-standard primitive for handling this exact threat class is `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go:53-66`:\n\n```go\nfunc isManagedXHeader(key string) bool {\n if len(key) == 0 || key[0] != \u0027X\u0027 { return false }\n if _, ok := XHeadersSet[key]; ok { return true }\n if strings.IndexByte(key, \u0027_\u0027) \u003c 0 { return false }\n canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(strings.ReplaceAll(key, \"_\", \"-\"))\n _, ok := XHeadersSet[canonical]\n return ok\n}\n```\n\nThis treats `_` \u2194 `-` equivalence as a security requirement. It is reachable only via the static `XHeadersSet` membership check, which contains exclusively the X-Forwarded-* family + X-Real-Ip. Operator-configurable identity headers are out of scope of this primitive.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nVerified on `traefik:v3.6.14` (the patched version, post-CVE-2026-33433 and post-CVE-2026-39858) using Docker compose. Full reproducer at https://github.com/\u003cattacker-repo\u003e/traefik-ht1a-poc; commands below are verbatim.\n\n### Setup\n\n```yaml\n# docker-compose.yml\nservices:\n traefik:\n image: traefik:v3.6.14\n command:\n - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\n - --entrypoints.web.address=:80\n ports:\n - \"8080:80\"\n volumes:\n - ./traefik/dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n echo:\n image: mendhak/http-https-echo:36\n environment:\n - HTTP_PORT=8888\n```\n\n```yaml\n# traefik/dynamic.yml \u2014 canonical headerField, recommended operator config\nhttp:\n routers:\n protected:\n rule: \"PathPrefix(`/`)\"\n service: echo\n middlewares: [basic-auth]\n services:\n echo:\n loadBalancer:\n servers: [{url: \"http://echo:8888\"}]\n middlewares:\n basic-auth:\n basicAuth:\n users:\n - \u0027alice:$2b$05$FhDfYidZdDPuQjovYqcTAe22wHpQ/cILC7Tr2yAD6vLlvZh/Q45PC\u0027 # alice:secret123\n headerField: \"X-Auth-User\"\n```\n\n`docker compose up -d`.\n\n### Test 1 (control \u2014 CVE-2026-33433 fix works for canonical case)\n\n```bash\n$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 -H \"X-Auth-User: superadmin\" http://localhost:8080/\n{\n ...\n \"x-auth-user\": \"alice\",\n ...\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker\u0027s canonical `X-Auth-User: superadmin` was correctly stripped by Traefik\u0027s `Del`; the backend receives only Traefik\u0027s authenticated-user writeback `alice`.\n\n### Test 2 (HT-1A bypass \u2014 underscore variant survives)\n\n```bash\n$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 -H \"X_Auth_User: superadmin\" http://localhost:8080/\n{\n ...\n \"x-auth-user\": \"alice\",\n \"x_auth_user\": \"superadmin\",\n ...\n}\n```\n\nThe underscore-variant `x_auth_user: superadmin` reached the backend intact, despite the `Del(\"X-Auth-User\")` having executed. The backend sees both forms.\n\n### Test 3 (double-send \u2014 same result)\n\n```bash\n$ curl -s -u alice:secret123 \\\n -H \"X-Auth-User: superadmin\" \\\n -H \"X_Auth_User: superadmin\" \\\n http://localhost:8080/\n{\n ...\n \"x-auth-user\": \"alice\", # Traefik\u0027s writeback\n \"x_auth_user\": \"superadmin\", # attacker\u0027s underscore \u2014 survived Del\n ...\n}\n```\n\nThe canonical attacker header is stripped (Test 1 behavior). The underscore variant is forwarded.\n\n### Backend impact\n\nThe PoC\u0027s echo backend (`mendhak/http-https-echo`, Node.js) preserves both forms with the lowercase normalization Node.js applies. Application code reading `req.headers[\"x-auth-user\"]` sees `alice`. Application code reading `req.headers[\"x_auth_user\"]` sees `superadmin`.\n\nFor backends that normalize `_` \u2194 `-` equivalently \u2014 meaning the attacker\u0027s value wins:\n\n- **CGI / WSGI / PHP `$_SERVER`** (RFC 3875 \u00a74.1.18 \u2014 header name uppercased with `-` replaced by `_`): both `X-Auth-User` and `X_Auth_User` map to `HTTP_X_AUTH_USER`. The last-set wins per the WSGI server\u0027s iteration order; many servers (gunicorn, uwsgi without `--disable-logging`, waitress) preserve both. Note: Apache + mod_php with default `HttpProtocolOptions Strict` filters underscore-headers from `$_SERVER` (this PoC\u0027s PHP backend test demonstrated the filter); Apache + mod_python, Apache + mod_wsgi without the strict mode, nginx + uwsgi, nginx + gunicorn, nginx + FastCGI, and standalone WSGI servers do NOT filter.\n- **nginx with `underscores_in_headers on`** (https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_core_module.html#underscores_in_headers): preserves underscore-variant headers and forwards them to upstream as separate values. Upstream application logic that does case-insensitive + underscore-insensitive matching (common pattern in security-sensitive code) merges them.\n- **Tomcat / Java EE servlet containers**: `HttpServletRequest.getHeader(name)` is case-insensitive; underscore handling is container-specific. Many normalize.\n- **Application middleware** (WAFs, log aggregators, security gateways, identity-aware proxies) that normalize header names before applying security policy: both forms collapse to the same authorization decision input.\n\n## Severity\n\nI propose **HIGH CVSS 7.5** for the BasicAuth / DigestAuth case and **CRITICAL CVSS 9.1** for the ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders` case (the latter requires no credentials).\n\n**CVSS 3.1 vector (BasicAuth / DigestAuth)**: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N=7.5` \u2014 one step above CVE-2026-33433 (which the maintainer scored MEDIUM 5.1 because it required misconfigured non-canonical `headerField`). HT-1A works against the canonical / recommended `headerField` configuration, broader operational scope.\n\n**CVSS 3.1 vector (ForwardAuth `authResponseHeaders`)**: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N=9.1` \u2014 parallel to CVE-2026-39858 (HIGH 7.5) but achieves spoofing without credentials because the `authResponseHeaders` mechanism trusts headers exclusively from the auth server and the underscore variant defeats that trust boundary.\n\nCWEs:\n- CWE-290 (Authentication Bypass by Spoofing)\n- CWE-178 (Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity) \u2014 analogous to CVE-2026-29054\n- CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) \u2014 same as CVE-2026-35051\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nTwo equivalent approaches:\n\n**1. Extend `Header.Del` to handle underscore variants** at the four call sites. Replace:\n\n```go\nreq.Header.Del(b.headerField)\nreq.Header[b.headerField] = []string{user}\n```\n\nwith:\n\n```go\ncanonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(b.headerField)\n// Strip canonical AND underscore-variant of the canonical key.\nfor key := range req.Header {\n if key == canonical || strings.EqualFold(strings.ReplaceAll(key, \"_\", \"-\"), canonical) {\n delete(req.Header, key)\n }\n}\nreq.Header.Set(canonical, user) // canonical-key write\n```\n\nThis pairs the headerField primitive with the same `_` \u2194 `-` equivalence that `isManagedXHeader` enforces for X-Forwarded-*.\n\n**2. Generalize the existing `isManagedXHeader` primitive** into a `stripHeaderAndVariants(headers http.Header, name string)` helper in the `forwardedheaders` package and call it from `basic_auth.go`, `digest_auth.go`, `forward.go`, and `snippet.go`. Reusing the existing gold-standard primitive is the cleanest fix and minimizes future drift.\n\nEither approach should also resolve the `// TODO Deprecated we should add the header with canonical key.` debt at `basic_auth.go:102` and `digest_auth.go:100` by writing to the canonical key (`Header.Set(canonical, user)`) instead of the literal `b.headerField`.\n\n## Why this is a Pattern-8 sibling, not a new CVE class\n\nThe combination of:\n\n1. CVE-2026-33433\u0027s fix scope (case-canonicalization for `headerField`)\n2. CVE-2026-39858\u0027s fix scope (underscore-variant for `XHeadersSet`)\n3. The defective primitive remaining at HEAD (the `Del` + literal-write pair at four call sites)\n\nestablishes that the maintainer accepts the threat model and has architectural primitives to fix it \u2014 but did not cross the two cohorts. The \"primitive depth-audit\" of the CVE-2026-33433 fix (reading the actual `Header.Del` implementation against the documented threat model and Go\u0027s canonicalization semantics) reveals the gap.\n\nI confirmed there is no public PoC mentioning underscore-variant siblings of CVE-2026-33433 (WebSearched 2026-05-23). The fix-flurry from the April 2026 security release batch addressed the X-Forwarded family but not the headerField family.\n\n## Credit\n\nMatteo Panzeri (GitHub `matte1782`). CVE credit requested.\n\n## AI-assistance disclosure\n\nStatic analysis, hypothesis writing, and hostile-review confirmation were assisted by Anthropic Claude (Opus 4.7). Live PoC reproduction, code-citation verification, and submission decision were made by the human author.\n\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-x677-9fxg-v5c5",
"modified": "2026-08-06T16:53:53Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T16:53:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-x677-9fxg-v5c5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54763"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/108a5264473a2cbc8f12d6d691a3c6553cdf2c1b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.51"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33433 + CVE-2026-39858 cross-cohort: headerField underscore-variant identity spoofing in BasicAuth / DigestAuth / ForwardAuth"
}
GHSA-X889-V4RV-3355
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-08 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-17 00:03The Custom Content Shortcode WordPress plugin before 4.0.2 does not validate the data passed to its load shortcode, which could allow Contributor+ (v < 4.0.1) or Admin+ (v < 4.0.2) users to display arbitrary files from the filesystem (such as logs, .htaccess etc), as well as perform Local File Inclusion attacks as PHP files will be executed. Please note that such attack is still possible by admin+ in single site blogs by default (but won't be when either the unfiltered_html or file_edit is disallowed)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-24825"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-07T09:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Custom Content Shortcode WordPress plugin before 4.0.2 does not validate the data passed to its load shortcode, which could allow Contributor+ (v \u003c 4.0.1) or Admin+ (v \u003c 4.0.2) users to display arbitrary files from the filesystem (such as logs, .htaccess etc), as well as perform Local File Inclusion attacks as PHP files will be executed. Please note that such attack is still possible by admin+ in single site blogs by default (but won\u0027t be when either the unfiltered_html or file_edit is disallowed)",
"id": "GHSA-x889-v4rv-3355",
"modified": "2022-03-17T00:03:06Z",
"published": "2022-03-08T00:00:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24825"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/be9d6f82-c972-459a-bacf-65b3dfb11a09"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X8V9-642F-J4VC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-02 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:29An insufficient verification of data vulnerability exists in BIG-IP Edge Client for Windows and macOS that may allow an attacker to modify its configured server list. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-36858"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-02T16:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "\nAn insufficient verification of data vulnerability exists in BIG-IP Edge Client for Windows and macOS that may allow an attacker to modify its configured server list.\u00a0\u00a0Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.",
"id": "GHSA-x8v9-642f-j4vc",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:29:51Z",
"published": "2023-08-02T18:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000132563"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X8XR-RM9R-7MVF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:58 – Updated: 2023-02-08 18:13OpenStack Compute (Nova) before 2014.1.4, 2014.2.x before 2014.2.3, and kilo before kilo-3 does not validate the origin of websocket requests, which allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of users for access to consoles via a crafted webpage.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nova"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2014.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nova"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2014.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2014.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-0259"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-08T18:13:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2015-04-01T14:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "OpenStack Compute (Nova) before 2014.1.4, 2014.2.x before 2014.2.3, and kilo before kilo-3 does not validate the origin of websocket requests, which allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of users for access to consoles via a crafted webpage.",
"id": "GHSA-x8xr-rm9r-7mvf",
"modified": "2023-02-08T18:13:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:58:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015:0790"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015:0843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015:0844"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2015-0259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1409142"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1190112"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://opendev.org/openstack/nova"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-announce/2015-March/000341.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015-0790.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015-0843.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015-0844.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "OpenStack Compute (Nova) has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity"
}
GHSA-X92V-RPX6-P6CW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:58 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:25The WhatsApp and Linear bot adapters verify the inbound webhook HMAC signature only when a secret is configured. When the secret environment variable is unset — the default on a fresh install and common in development — verification is skipped entirely and the webhook body is parsed and dispatched as a genuine, trusted event. A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the bot's webhook endpoint can inject arbitrary platform events.
Affected code:
WhatsApp - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/whatsapp.py
- init (line 108): self._app_secret = app_secret or os.environ.get("WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET", "") -> defaults to ""
- route (line 246): app.router.add_post(self._webhook_path, self._handle_webhook) -> default path "/webhook"
- _handle_webhook (lines 585-595): if self._app_secret: gates the ENTIRE check; when falsy the body is
json.loads()'d and dispatched to _process_webhook_data() with no verification.
Linear - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.py
- init (line 86): self._signing_secret = signing_secret or os.environ.get("LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "") -> ""
- _handle_webhook (lines 244-248): same if self._signing_secret: fail-open guard.
- start() (lines 169-170): only logs a warning; does not fail closed.
The _verify_signature implementations themselves are correct (constant-time HMAC-SHA256); the defect is that verification is bypassed when the secret is absent.
Impact: - WhatsApp: attacker POSTs a crafted Meta Cloud API payload spoofing any sender and message text; injected into agent sessions and processed as a real user message (prompt injection, unauthorized agent/command invocation, contact impersonation). - Linear: attacker POSTs forged AgentSession / Comment events, causing the agent to act on and comment on issues no legitimate event referenced. The webhook routes require no other authentication, so exploitation needs only network reachability.
Proof of concept (bot started without the secret - the default):
curl -X POST http://VICTIM:PORT/webhook \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"object":"whatsapp_business_account","entry":[{"changes":[{"value": {"messages":[{"from":"15551234567","id":"wamid.x","type":"text", "text":{"body":"attacker-injected message"}}]}}]}]}' # No X-Hub-Signature-256 header; bot returns 200 and processes the message. # Linear: omit LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET and POST without a Linear-Signature header.
A self-contained PoC that executes the real _handle_webhook / _verify_signature source extracted from the repo confirms: secret unset -> status 200, payload dispatched (VULNERABLE); secret set + no signature -> status 403, nothing dispatched (control).
Remediation: Fail closed. When no secret is configured, reject all webhooks (HTTP 403) and refuse to start the adapter unless a secret is set (or an explicit, clearly-named insecure-dev override is given):
if not self._app_secret: return web.Response(status=403, text="Webhook secret not configured") signature = request.headers.get("X-Hub-Signature-256", "") if not self._verify_signature(body, signature): return web.Response(status=403, text="Invalid signature")
Distinct from prior advisories: The accepted default-insecure advisories cover a different surface/mechanism — CALL_SERVER_TOKEN unset (GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6) and the JWT key default "dev-secret-change-me" (GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5). This is in the bot webhook adapters and the mechanism is skipping signature verification entirely when the secret is absent, not a weak default key.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.52"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57122"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:58:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The WhatsApp and Linear bot adapters verify the inbound webhook HMAC signature only\nwhen a secret is configured. When the secret environment variable is unset \u2014 the\ndefault on a fresh install and common in development \u2014 verification is skipped entirely\nand the webhook body is parsed and dispatched as a genuine, trusted event. A remote,\nunauthenticated attacker who can reach the bot\u0027s webhook endpoint can inject arbitrary\nplatform events.\n\nAffected code:\n\nWhatsApp - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/whatsapp.py\n- __init__ (line 108): self._app_secret = app_secret or os.environ.get(\"WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET\", \"\") -\u003e defaults to \"\"\n- route (line 246): app.router.add_post(self._webhook_path, self._handle_webhook) -\u003e default path \"/webhook\"\n- _handle_webhook (lines 585-595): `if self._app_secret:` gates the ENTIRE check; when falsy the body is\n json.loads()\u0027d and dispatched to _process_webhook_data() with no verification.\n\nLinear - src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.py\n- __init__ (line 86): self._signing_secret = signing_secret or os.environ.get(\"LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET\", \"\") -\u003e \"\"\n- _handle_webhook (lines 244-248): same `if self._signing_secret:` fail-open guard.\n- start() (lines 169-170): only logs a warning; does not fail closed.\n\nThe _verify_signature implementations themselves are correct (constant-time HMAC-SHA256);\nthe defect is that verification is bypassed when the secret is absent.\n\nImpact:\n- WhatsApp: attacker POSTs a crafted Meta Cloud API payload spoofing any sender and message\n text; injected into agent sessions and processed as a real user message (prompt injection,\n unauthorized agent/command invocation, contact impersonation).\n- Linear: attacker POSTs forged AgentSession / Comment events, causing the agent to act on and\n comment on issues no legitimate event referenced.\nThe webhook routes require no other authentication, so exploitation needs only network\nreachability.\n\nProof of concept (bot started without the secret - the default):\n\n curl -X POST http://VICTIM:PORT/webhook \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"object\":\"whatsapp_business_account\",\"entry\":[{\"changes\":[{\"value\":\n {\"messages\":[{\"from\":\"15551234567\",\"id\":\"wamid.x\",\"type\":\"text\",\n \"text\":{\"body\":\"attacker-injected message\"}}]}}]}]}\u0027\n # No X-Hub-Signature-256 header; bot returns 200 and processes the message.\n # Linear: omit LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET and POST without a Linear-Signature header.\n\nA self-contained PoC that executes the real _handle_webhook / _verify_signature source\nextracted from the repo confirms: secret unset -\u003e status 200, payload dispatched (VULNERABLE);\nsecret set + no signature -\u003e status 403, nothing dispatched (control).\n\nRemediation:\nFail closed. When no secret is configured, reject all webhooks (HTTP 403) and refuse to start\nthe adapter unless a secret is set (or an explicit, clearly-named insecure-dev override is given):\n\n if not self._app_secret:\n return web.Response(status=403, text=\"Webhook secret not configured\")\n signature = request.headers.get(\"X-Hub-Signature-256\", \"\")\n if not self._verify_signature(body, signature):\n return web.Response(status=403, text=\"Invalid signature\")\n\nDistinct from prior advisories:\nThe accepted default-insecure advisories cover a different surface/mechanism \u2014 CALL_SERVER_TOKEN\nunset (GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6) and the JWT key default \"dev-secret-change-me\" (GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5).\nThis is in the bot webhook adapters and the mechanism is skipping signature verification entirely\nwhen the secret is absent, not a weak default key.",
"id": "GHSA-x92v-rpx6-p6cw",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:25:12Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T13:58:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x92v-rpx6-p6cw"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: Webhook signature verification skipped (fail-open) when secret unset, allowing forged inbound webhooks (WhatsApp \u0026 Linear bots)"
}
GHSA-X972-W82M-GQC5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 00:31 – Updated: 2026-08-07 00:31The Integrate PhonePe with WooCommerce WordPress plugin through 1.2.1 does not validate that a verified payment transaction belongs to the order being marked as paid, nor does it verify the authenticity of its payment-completion request, allowing unauthenticated attackers to reuse a single valid transaction to mark arbitrary orders as paid and bypass payment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10599"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T22:16:42Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Integrate PhonePe with WooCommerce WordPress plugin through 1.2.1 does not validate that a verified payment transaction belongs to the order being marked as paid, nor does it verify the authenticity of its payment-completion request, allowing unauthenticated attackers to reuse a single valid transaction to mark arbitrary orders as paid and bypass payment.",
"id": "GHSA-x972-w82m-gqc5",
"modified": "2026-08-07T00:31:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T00:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/a1aae05d-63d0-4cde-8a9c-996f58f58e48"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X9HG-5Q6G-Q3JR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-22 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-06 01:02Cross-Domain Token Exposure in server.auth.getAuthorizationToken in Ollama 0.6.7 allows remote attackers to steal authentication tokens and bypass access controls via a malicious realm value in a WWW-Authenticate header returned by the /api/pull endpoint.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/ollama/ollama"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.9.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-51471"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-22T21:56:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-22T19:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-Domain Token Exposure in server.auth.getAuthorizationToken in Ollama 0.6.7 allows remote attackers to steal authentication tokens and bypass access controls via a malicious realm value in a WWW-Authenticate header returned by the /api/pull endpoint.",
"id": "GHSA-x9hg-5q6g-q3jr",
"modified": "2026-06-06T01:02:40Z",
"published": "2025-07-22T21:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-51471"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ollama/ollama/pull/10750"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ollama/ollama"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/ollama/PYSEC-2025-147.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/94eea285-fd65-4e01-a035-f533575ebdc2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.gecko.security/blog/cve-2025-51471"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ollama vulnerable to Cross-Domain Token Exposure"
}
GHSA-X9MP-JM4H-JJF8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-20 15:30 – Updated: 2026-02-04 23:14Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-wc42-fcjp-v8vq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing the encrypted data located in the vault.
As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot process will change if any of their respective parts are changed.
This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline, initrd, and more.
However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the filesystem and gain control over the system.
As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4, which is easily changeable.
This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes in it and replace the partition altogether.
This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the “mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs).
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
Note:
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config partition measurement was added to PCR13:
• aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141
• 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lf-edge/eve/pkg/grub"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20220708121648-5fef4d92e758"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-04T23:14:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-20T15:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-wc42-fcjp-v8vq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nIn EVE OS, the \u201cmeasured boot\u201d mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing\nthe encrypted data located in the vault.\n\nAs per the \u201cmeasured boot\u201d design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot\nprocess will change if any of their respective parts are changed.\n\nThis includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline,\ninitrd, and more.\n\nHowever, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the\nfilesystem and gain control over the system.\n\nAs the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4,\nwhich is easily changeable.\n\nThis will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes\nin it and replace the partition altogether.\n\nThis can also be done directly on the device, as the \u201c003-storage-init\u201d container contains the\n\u201cmksquashfs\u201d and \u201cunsquashfs\u201d binaries (with the corresponding libs).\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAn attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not\ntriggering the \u201cmeasured boot\u201d mechanism, and having full access to the vault.\n\n\n\nNote:\n\nThis issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config\npartition measurement was added to PCR13:\n\n\u2022 aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141\n\n\u2022 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889.\n\nThis issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.",
"id": "GHSA-x9mp-jm4h-jjf8",
"modified": "2026-02-04T23:14:16Z",
"published": "2023-09-20T15:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43636"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://asrg.io/security-advisories/19274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://asrg.io/security-advisories/cve-2023-43636"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: EVE Doesn\u0027t Protect Rootfs",
"withdrawn": "2026-02-04T23:14:16Z"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.