GHSA-H87Q-G2WP-47PJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-09 22:41 – Updated: 2022-02-15 01:51

Summary

Signatures are mistakenly recognized to be valid in jsrsasign

Details

In the jsrsasign package through 10.1.13 for Node.js, some invalid RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are mistakenly recognized to be valid. NOTE: there is no known practical attack.

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "jsrsasign"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-08T20:09:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the jsrsasign package through 10.1.13 for Node.js, some invalid RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are mistakenly recognized to be valid. NOTE: there is no known practical attack.",
  "id": "GHSA-h87q-g2wp-47pj",
  "modified": "2022-02-15T01:51:57Z",
  "published": "2022-02-09T22:41:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30246"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kjur/jsrsasign/issues/478"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kjur/jsrsasign/releases/tag/10.1.13"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kjur/jsrsasign/releases/tag/10.2.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kjur.github.io/jsrsasign"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Signatures are mistakenly recognized to be valid in jsrsasign"
}

GHSA-HC36-C89J-5F4J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 20:28 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:21

Summary

bsv-sdk and bsv-wallet persist unverified certifier signatures in acquire_certificate (direct and issuance paths)

Details

Unverified certifier signatures persisted by `acquire_certificate`

Affected packages

Both bsv-sdk and bsv-wallet are published from the sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk repository. The vulnerable code lives in lib/bsv/wallet_interface/wallet_client.rb, which is physically shipped inside both gems (the bsv-wallet.gemspec files list bundles the entire lib/bsv/wallet_interface/ tree). Consumers of either gem are independently vulnerable; the two packages are versioned separately, so each has its own affected range.

Package	Affected	Patched
`bsv-sdk`	`>= 0.3.1, < 0.8.2`	`0.8.2`
`bsv-wallet`	`>= 0.1.2, < 0.3.4`	`0.3.4`

Summary

BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate persists certificate records to storage without verifying the certifier's signature over the certificate contents. Both acquisition paths are affected:

acquisition_protocol: 'direct' — the caller supplies all certificate fields (including signature:) and the record is written to storage verbatim.
acquisition_protocol: 'issuance' — the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification.

An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to list_certificates and prove_certificate.

Details

BRC-52 requires a certificate's signature field to be verified against the claimed certifier's public key over a canonical hashing of (type, subject, serialNumber, revocationOutpoint, fields) before the certificate is trusted. The reference TypeScript SDK enforces this in Certificate.verify().

Direct path

The Ruby implementation's acquire_via_direct path (lib/bsv/wallet_interface/wallet_client.rb) constructs the certificate record directly from caller-supplied fields:

def acquire_via_direct(args)
  {
    type: args[:type],
    subject: @key_deriver.identity_key,
    serial_number: args[:serial_number],
    certifier: args[:certifier],
    revocation_outpoint: args[:revocation_outpoint],
    signature: args[:signature],
    fields: args[:fields],
    keyring: args[:keyring_for_subject]
  }
end

The returned record is then written to the storage adapter by acquire_certificate. No verification of args[:signature] against args[:certifier]'s public key occurs at any point in this path.

Issuance path

acquire_via_issuance POSTs to a certifier-supplied URL and parses the response body into a certificate record, which is then written to storage without verifying the returned signature. A hostile or compromised certifier endpoint — or anyone able to redirect/MITM the plain HTTP request — can therefore return an arbitrary signature value for any subject and have it stored as authentic. This is the same class of bypass as the direct path; it was tracked separately as finding F8.16 in the compliance review and is closed by the same fix.

Downstream impact

Downstream reads via list_certificates and selective-disclosure via prove_certificate treat stored records as valid without re-verifying, so any forgery that slips past acquire_certificate is trusted permanently.

Impact

Any caller that can invoke acquire_certificate — via either acquisition protocol — can forge a certificate attributed to an arbitrary certifier identity key, containing arbitrary fields, and have it persisted as authentic. Applications and downstream gems that rely on the wallet's certificate store as a source of truth for identity attributes (e.g. KYC assertions, role claims, attestations) are subject to credential forgery.

This is a credential-forgery primitive, not merely a spec divergence from BRC-52.

CVSS rationale

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N → 8.1 (High)

AV:N — network-reachable in any wallet context that exposes acquire_certificate to callers.
AC:L — low attack complexity: pass arbitrary bytes as signature:.
PR:L — low privileges: any caller authorised to invoke acquire_certificate.
UI:N — no user interaction required.
C:H — forged credentials via prove_certificate can assert attributes about the subject.
I:H — the wallet's credential store is polluted with attacker-controlled data.
A:N — availability unaffected.

Proof of concept

client = BSV::Wallet::WalletClient.new(key, storage: BSV::Wallet::MemoryStore.new)

client.acquire_certificate(
  type: 'age-over-18',
  acquisition_protocol: 'direct',
  certifier: claimed_trusted_pubkey_hex,
  serial_number: 'any-serial',
  revocation_outpoint: ('00' * 32) + '.0',
  signature: 'deadbeef' * 16,       # arbitrary bytes — never verified
  fields: { 'verified' => 'true' },
  keyring_for_subject: {}
)

client.list_certificates(
  certifiers: [claimed_trusted_pubkey_hex],
  types: ['age-over-18']
)
# => returns the forged record as if it were a real certificate from that certifier

Affected versions

The vulnerable direct-path code was introduced in commit d14dd19 ("feat(wallet): implement BRC-100 identity certificate methods (Phase 5)") on 2026-03-27 20:35 UTC. The vulnerable issuance-path code was added one day later in 6a4d898 ("feat(wallet): implement certificate issuance protocol", 2026-03-28 04:38 UTC), which removed an earlier raise UnsupportedActionError and replaced it with an unverified HTTP POST.

bsv-sdk: the v0.3.1 chore bump (89de3a2) was committed 28 minutes after d14dd19, so the direct-path bypass shipped in the v0.3.1 tag. The v0.3.1 release raised UnsupportedActionError for the issuance path, so the issuance-path bypass first shipped in v0.3.2 (5a335de). Every subsequent release up to and including v0.8.1 is affected by at least one path, and every release from v0.3.2 onwards is affected by both. Combined affected range: >= 0.3.1, < 0.8.2.

bsv-wallet: at the time both commits landed, the wallet gem was at version 0.1.1. The first wallet release containing any of the vulnerable code was v0.1.2 (5a335de, 2026-03-30), which shipped both paths simultaneously. Every subsequent release up to and including v0.3.3 is affected on both paths. Affected range: >= 0.1.2, < 0.3.4.

Patches

Upgrade to bsv-sdk >= 0.8.2 and/or bsv-wallet >= 0.3.4. Both releases ship the same fix: a new module BSV::Wallet::CertificateSignature (lib/bsv/wallet_interface/certificate_signature.rb), which builds the BRC-52 canonical preimage (type, serial_number, subject, certifier, revocation_outpoint, lexicographically-sorted fields) and verifies the certifier's signature against it via ProtoWallet#verify_signature with protocol ID [2, 'certificate signature'] and counterparty = the claimed certifier's public key. Both acquire_via_direct and acquire_via_issuance now call CertificateSignature.verify! before returning the certificate to acquire_certificate, so invalid certificates raise BSV::Wallet::CertificateSignature::InvalidError (a subclass of InvalidSignatureError) and are never written to storage.

Consumers should upgrade whichever gem they depend on directly; they do not need both. bsv-wallet 0.3.4 additionally tightens its dependency on bsv-sdk from the stale ~> 0.4 to >= 0.8.2, < 1.0, which forces the known-good pairing and pulls in the sibling advisory fixes (F1.3, F5.13) tracked separately.

The issuance-path fix also partially closes finding F8.16 from the same compliance review. F8.16's second aspect — switching the issuance transport from ad-hoc JSON POST to BRC-104 AuthFetch — is not addressed here and remains deferred to a future release.

Fixed in sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk#306.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

Do not expose acquire_certificate (either acquisition protocol) to untrusted callers.
Do not invoke acquire_certificate with acquisition_protocol: 'issuance' against a certifier URL you do not fully trust, and require TLS for any such request.
Treat any record returned by list_certificates / prove_certificate as unverified and perform an out-of-band BRC-52 verification against the certifier's public key before acting on it.

Credit

Identified during the 2026-04-08 cross-SDK compliance review, tracked as findings F8.15 (direct path) and F8.16 (issuance path, partial).

References

HLR: sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk#305
Fix PR: sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk#306
Compliance review: .architecture/reviews/20260408-cross-sdk-compliance-review.md
BRC-52 specification: https://brc.dev/52
TypeScript reference: Certificate.verify() in @bsv/sdk

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "bsv-sdk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "bsv-wallet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40070"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-09T20:28:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T18:17:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Unverified certifier signatures persisted by `acquire_certificate`\n\n## Affected packages\n\nBoth `bsv-sdk` and `bsv-wallet` are published from the [sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk](https://github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk) repository. The vulnerable code lives in `lib/bsv/wallet_interface/wallet_client.rb`, which is **physically shipped inside both gems** (the `bsv-wallet.gemspec` `files` list bundles the entire `lib/bsv/wallet_interface/` tree). Consumers of either gem are independently vulnerable; the two packages are versioned separately, so each has its own affected range.\n\n| Package | Affected | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `bsv-sdk` | `\u003e= 0.3.1, \u003c 0.8.2` | `0.8.2` |\n| `bsv-wallet` | `\u003e= 0.1.2, \u003c 0.3.4` | `0.3.4` |\n\n## Summary\n\n`BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate` persists certificate records to storage **without verifying the certifier\u0027s signature** over the certificate contents. Both acquisition paths are affected:\n\n- `acquisition_protocol: \u0027direct\u0027` \u2014 the caller supplies all certificate fields (including `signature:`) and the record is written to storage verbatim.\n- `acquisition_protocol: \u0027issuance\u0027` \u2014 the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification.\n\nAn attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to `list_certificates` and `prove_certificate`.\n\n## Details\n\nBRC-52 requires a certificate\u0027s `signature` field to be verified against the claimed certifier\u0027s public key over a canonical hashing of `(type, subject, serialNumber, revocationOutpoint, fields)` before the certificate is trusted. The reference TypeScript SDK enforces this in `Certificate.verify()`.\n\n### Direct path\n\nThe Ruby implementation\u0027s `acquire_via_direct` path (`lib/bsv/wallet_interface/wallet_client.rb`) constructs the certificate record directly from caller-supplied fields:\n\n```ruby\ndef acquire_via_direct(args)\n  {\n    type: args[:type],\n    subject: @key_deriver.identity_key,\n    serial_number: args[:serial_number],\n    certifier: args[:certifier],\n    revocation_outpoint: args[:revocation_outpoint],\n    signature: args[:signature],\n    fields: args[:fields],\n    keyring: args[:keyring_for_subject]\n  }\nend\n```\n\nThe returned record is then written to the storage adapter by `acquire_certificate`. No verification of `args[:signature]` against `args[:certifier]`\u0027s public key occurs at any point in this path.\n\n### Issuance path\n\n`acquire_via_issuance` POSTs to a certifier-supplied URL and parses the response body into a certificate record, which is then written to storage without verifying the returned signature. A hostile or compromised certifier endpoint \u2014 or anyone able to redirect/MITM the plain HTTP request \u2014 can therefore return an arbitrary `signature` value for any subject and have it stored as authentic. This is the same class of bypass as the direct path; it was tracked separately as finding **F8.16** in the compliance review and is closed by the same fix.\n\n### Downstream impact\n\nDownstream reads via `list_certificates` and selective-disclosure via `prove_certificate` treat stored records as valid without re-verifying, so any forgery that slips past `acquire_certificate` is trusted permanently.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny caller that can invoke `acquire_certificate` \u2014 via either acquisition protocol \u2014 can forge a certificate attributed to an arbitrary certifier identity key, containing arbitrary fields, and have it persisted as authentic. Applications and downstream gems that rely on the wallet\u0027s certificate store as a source of truth for identity attributes (e.g. KYC assertions, role claims, attestations) are subject to credential forgery.\n\nThis is a credential-forgery primitive, not merely a spec divergence from BRC-52.\n\n## CVSS rationale\n\n`AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` \u2192 **8.1 (High)**\n\n- **AV:N** \u2014 network-reachable in any wallet context that exposes `acquire_certificate` to callers.\n- **AC:L** \u2014 low attack complexity: pass arbitrary bytes as `signature:`.\n- **PR:L** \u2014 low privileges: any caller authorised to invoke `acquire_certificate`.\n- **UI:N** \u2014 no user interaction required.\n- **C:H** \u2014 forged credentials via `prove_certificate` can assert attributes about the subject.\n- **I:H** \u2014 the wallet\u0027s credential store is polluted with attacker-controlled data.\n- **A:N** \u2014 availability unaffected.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```ruby\nclient = BSV::Wallet::WalletClient.new(key, storage: BSV::Wallet::MemoryStore.new)\n\nclient.acquire_certificate(\n  type: \u0027age-over-18\u0027,\n  acquisition_protocol: \u0027direct\u0027,\n  certifier: claimed_trusted_pubkey_hex,\n  serial_number: \u0027any-serial\u0027,\n  revocation_outpoint: (\u002700\u0027 * 32) + \u0027.0\u0027,\n  signature: \u0027deadbeef\u0027 * 16,       # arbitrary bytes \u2014 never verified\n  fields: { \u0027verified\u0027 =\u003e \u0027true\u0027 },\n  keyring_for_subject: {}\n)\n\nclient.list_certificates(\n  certifiers: [claimed_trusted_pubkey_hex],\n  types: [\u0027age-over-18\u0027]\n)\n# =\u003e returns the forged record as if it were a real certificate from that certifier\n```\n\n## Affected versions\n\nThe vulnerable direct-path code was introduced in commit `d14dd19` (\"feat(wallet): implement BRC-100 identity certificate methods (Phase 5)\") on 2026-03-27 20:35 UTC. The vulnerable issuance-path code was added one day later in `6a4d898` (\"feat(wallet): implement certificate issuance protocol\", 2026-03-28 04:38 UTC), which removed an earlier `raise UnsupportedActionError` and replaced it with an unverified HTTP POST.\n\n**`bsv-sdk`:** the v0.3.1 chore bump (`89de3a2`) was committed 28 minutes after `d14dd19`, so the direct-path bypass shipped in the **v0.3.1** tag. The v0.3.1 release raised `UnsupportedActionError` for the issuance path, so the issuance-path bypass first shipped in **v0.3.2** (`5a335de`). Every subsequent release up to and including **v0.8.1** is affected by at least one path, and every release from v0.3.2 onwards is affected by both. Combined affected range: `\u003e= 0.3.1, \u003c 0.8.2`.\n\n**`bsv-wallet`:** at the time both commits landed, the wallet gem was at version 0.1.1. The first wallet release containing any of the vulnerable code was **v0.1.2** (`5a335de`, 2026-03-30), which shipped both paths simultaneously. Every subsequent release up to and including **v0.3.3** is affected on both paths. Affected range: `\u003e= 0.1.2, \u003c 0.3.4`.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to `bsv-sdk \u003e= 0.8.2` **and/or** `bsv-wallet \u003e= 0.3.4`. Both releases ship the same fix: a new module `BSV::Wallet::CertificateSignature` (`lib/bsv/wallet_interface/certificate_signature.rb`), which builds the BRC-52 canonical preimage (`type`, `serial_number`, `subject`, `certifier`, `revocation_outpoint`, lexicographically-sorted `fields`) and verifies the certifier\u0027s signature against it via `ProtoWallet#verify_signature` with protocol ID `[2, \u0027certificate signature\u0027]` and counterparty = the claimed certifier\u0027s public key. Both `acquire_via_direct` and `acquire_via_issuance` now call `CertificateSignature.verify!` before returning the certificate to `acquire_certificate`, so invalid certificates raise `BSV::Wallet::CertificateSignature::InvalidError` (a subclass of `InvalidSignatureError`) and are never written to storage.\n\nConsumers should upgrade whichever gem they depend on directly; they do not need both. `bsv-wallet 0.3.4` additionally tightens its dependency on `bsv-sdk` from the stale `~\u003e 0.4` to `\u003e= 0.8.2, \u003c 1.0`, which forces the known-good pairing and pulls in the sibling advisory fixes (F1.3, F5.13) tracked separately.\n\nThe issuance-path fix also partially closes finding **F8.16** from the same compliance review. F8.16\u0027s second aspect \u2014 switching the issuance transport from ad-hoc JSON POST to BRC-104 AuthFetch \u2014 is not addressed here and remains deferred to a future release.\n\nFixed in sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk#306.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Do not expose `acquire_certificate` (either acquisition protocol) to untrusted callers.\n- Do not invoke `acquire_certificate` with `acquisition_protocol: \u0027issuance\u0027` against a certifier URL you do not fully trust, and require TLS for any such request.\n- Treat any record returned by `list_certificates` / `prove_certificate` as unverified and perform an out-of-band BRC-52 verification against the certifier\u0027s public key before acting on it.\n\n## Credit\n\nIdentified during the 2026-04-08 cross-SDK compliance review, tracked as findings F8.15 (direct path) and F8.16 (issuance path, partial).\n\n## References\n\n- HLR: sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk#305\n- Fix PR: sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk#306\n- Compliance review: [`.architecture/reviews/20260408-cross-sdk-compliance-review.md`](../../.architecture/reviews/20260408-cross-sdk-compliance-review.md)\n- BRC-52 specification: https://brc.dev/52\n- TypeScript reference: `Certificate.verify()` in `@bsv/sdk`",
  "id": "GHSA-hc36-c89j-5f4j",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T16:21:47Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T20:28:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-hc36-c89j-5f4j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40070"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk/issues/305"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk/pull/306"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk/commit/4992e8a265fd914a7eeb0405c69d1ff0122a84cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://brc.dev/52"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/bsv-sdk/CVE-2026-40070.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/bsv-wallet/CVE-2026-40070.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "bsv-sdk and bsv-wallet persist unverified certifier signatures in acquire_certificate (direct and issuance paths)"
}

GHSA-HC7F-QWFJ-7FCF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-11 09:31

Details

The UpdraftPlus: WP Backup & Migration Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.26.4 via the UpdraftPlus_Remote_Communications_V2::wp_loaded function. This is due to insufficient validation of the remote communications message format, where signature verification can be bypassed and unchecked decryption return values collapse to a predictable all-zero encryption key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to forge arbitrary RPC commands and run them as the connected administrator, such as uploading and activating a malicious plugin, which ultimately leads to remote code execution.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-10795"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T07:16:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The UpdraftPlus: WP Backup \u0026 Migration Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.26.4 via the UpdraftPlus_Remote_Communications_V2::wp_loaded function. This is due to insufficient validation of the remote communications message format, where signature verification can be bypassed and unchecked decryption return values collapse to a predictable all-zero encryption key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to forge arbitrary RPC commands and run them as the connected administrator, such as uploading and activating a malicious plugin, which ultimately leads to remote code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-hc7f-qwfj-7fcf",
  "modified": "2026-06-11T09:31:55Z",
  "published": "2026-06-11T09:31:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10795"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/updraftplus/tags/1.26.4/vendor/team-updraft/common-libs/src/updraft-rpc/class-udrpc.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/updraftplus/tags/1.26.4/vendor/team-updraft/common-libs/src/updraft-rpc/class-udrpc2.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3561938/updraftplus/trunk/vendor/team-updraft/common-libs/src/updraft-rpc/class-udrpc2.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e901c2a0-2477-4b9a-8483-6002419e0a2f?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HCHW-XWHF-3QVM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-12 03:30 – Updated: 2026-06-26 03:31

Details

In neomutt and mutt, the To and Cc email headers are not validated by cryptographic signing which allows an attacker that intercepts a message to change their value and include himself as a one of the recipients to compromise message confidentiality.

Severity

7.4 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-49393"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-12T02:15:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In neomutt and mutt, the To and Cc email headers are not validated by cryptographic signing which allows an attacker that intercepts a message to change their value and include himself as a one of the recipients to compromise message confidentiality.",
  "id": "GHSA-hchw-xwhf-3qvm",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T03:31:24Z",
  "published": "2024-11-12T03:30:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49393"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/issues/4223"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/pull/4221"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/pull/4227"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-49393"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2325317"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HCVW-475W-8G7P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-09 21:31 – Updated: 2026-02-13 20:32

Summary

Keycloak affected by improper invitation token validation

Details

A flaw was found in Keycloak. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by modifying the organization ID and target email within a legitimate invitation token's JSON Web Token (JWT) payload. This lack of cryptographic signature verification allows the attacker to successfully self-register into an unauthorized organization, leading to unauthorized access.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-services"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "26.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.5.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-services"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.2.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-services"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "26.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.4.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1529"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-10T18:35:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T20:15:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in Keycloak. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by modifying the organization ID and target email within a legitimate invitation token\u0027s JSON Web Token (JWT) payload. This lack of cryptographic signature verification allows the attacker to successfully self-register into an unauthorized organization, leading to unauthorized access.",
  "id": "GHSA-hcvw-475w-8g7p",
  "modified": "2026-02-13T20:32:01Z",
  "published": "2026-02-09T21:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1529"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/issues/46145"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/pull/46155"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/commit/82cd7941d1dd28fa14a67a6e6b912301f1a5e1a1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/commit/8fc9a98026106a326f4faa98d4c9a48341ace2d7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/commit/b2519756487b519f95c07aa8b10afe003e492119"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2363"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2364"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2366"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-1529"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2433783"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Keycloak affected by improper invitation token validation"
}

GHSA-HFCF-V2F8-X9PC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 17:43 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:49

Summary

bitcoinj has a ScriptExecution P2PKH/P2WPKH Verification Bypass

Details

Summary

ScriptExecution.correctlySpends() contains two fast-path verification bugs for standard P2PKH and native P2WPKH spends in core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java.

In both branches, bitcoinj verifies an attacker-controlled signature/public-key pair but fails to verify that the public key is the one committed to by the output being spent. As a result, any attacker keypair can satisfy bitcoinj's local verification for arbitrary P2PKH and P2WPKH outputs.

This doesn't affect the SPV (simple payment verification) trust model, as this model follows PoW and doesn't verify input signatures at all.

Details

The issue is in the optimized branches of ScriptExecution.correctlySpends(...).

In the P2PKH fast path at core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1042, the code:

parses the attacker-supplied signature from scriptSig
parses the attacker-supplied public key from scriptSig
computes the sighash against the victim output's scriptPubKey
checks only pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature)

It never enforces the missing P2PKH binding:

HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2PKH(scriptPubKey)

That means the OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <hash> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG semantics are not actually enforced in this fast path.

Relevant code:

} else if (ScriptPattern.isP2PKH(scriptPubKey)) {
    if (chunks.size() != 2)
        throw new ScriptException(...);
    TransactionSignature signature;
    try {
        byte[] data = Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(0).data);
        signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(data, true, true);
    } catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {
        throw new ScriptException(...);
    }
    ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(1).data));
    Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptPubKey,
            signature.sigHashMode(), false);
    boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);
    if (!validSig)
        throw new ScriptException(...);
}

In the native P2WPKH fast path at core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1023, the bug is similar. The code:

reads the attacker-supplied pubkey from witness
builds scriptCode from that attacker pubkey with ScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey)
computes the BIP143 sighash using that attacker-derived scriptCode
verifies the signature against the attacker pubkey

It never enforces:

HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2WH(scriptPubKey)

So for P2WPKH, the attacker controls both the pubkey and the scriptCode used for signing.

Relevant code:

if (ScriptPattern.isP2WPKH(scriptPubKey)) {
    Objects.requireNonNull(witness);
    if (witness.getPushCount() < 2)
        throw new ScriptException(...);
    TransactionSignature signature;
    try {
        signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(witness.getPush(0), true, true);
    } catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {
        throw new ScriptException(...);
    }
    ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(witness.getPush(1));
    Script scriptCode = ScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey);
    Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForWitnessSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptCode, value,
            signature.sigHashMode(), false);
    boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);
    if (!validSig)
        throw new ScriptException(...);
}

Affected call sites include:

core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/core/TransactionInput.java:546
core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/wallet/Wallet.java:4520
core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/LocalTransactionSigner.java:84
core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/CustomTransactionSigner.java:77

These call sites use correctlySpends() for transaction/input validation and pre-signing checks. Any application that treats a successful result from this path as proof that a spend is valid is affected.

Fix

The issue is fixed on the release-0.17 branch via 2bc5653c41d260d840692bc554690d4d79208f9c, and on master via b575a682acf614b9ff95cacbdeb48f86c3ababe0. A 0.17.1 maintenance release has been made available on Maven Central.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.15"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44714"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T17:43:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T17:16:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`ScriptExecution.correctlySpends()` contains two fast-path verification bugs for standard `P2PKH` and native `P2WPKH` spends in `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java`.\n\nIn both branches, bitcoinj verifies an attacker-controlled signature/public-key pair but fails to verify that the public key is the one committed to by the output being spent. As a result, any attacker keypair can satisfy bitcoinj\u0027s local verification for arbitrary `P2PKH` and `P2WPKH` outputs.\n\nThis doesn\u0027t affect the SPV (simple payment verification) trust model, as this model follows PoW and doesn\u0027t verify input signatures at all.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is in the optimized branches of `ScriptExecution.correctlySpends(...)`.\n\nIn the `P2PKH` fast path at `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1042`, the code:\n\n- parses the attacker-supplied signature from `scriptSig`\n- parses the attacker-supplied public key from `scriptSig`\n- computes the sighash against the victim output\u0027s `scriptPubKey`\n- checks only `pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature)`\n\nIt never enforces the missing `P2PKH` binding:\n\n- `HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2PKH(scriptPubKey)`\n\nThat means the `OP_DUP OP_HASH160 \u003chash\u003e OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG` semantics are not actually enforced in this fast path.\n\nRelevant code:\n\n```java\n} else if (ScriptPattern.isP2PKH(scriptPubKey)) {\n    if (chunks.size() != 2)\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n    TransactionSignature signature;\n    try {\n        byte[] data = Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(0).data);\n        signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(data, true, true);\n    } catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n    }\n    ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(1).data));\n    Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptPubKey,\n            signature.sigHashMode(), false);\n    boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);\n    if (!validSig)\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n}\n```\n\nIn the native `P2WPKH` fast path at `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1023`, the bug is similar. The code:\n\n- reads the attacker-supplied pubkey from `witness`\n- builds `scriptCode` from that attacker pubkey with `ScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey)`\n- computes the BIP143 sighash using that attacker-derived `scriptCode`\n- verifies the signature against the attacker pubkey\n\nIt never enforces:\n\n- `HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2WH(scriptPubKey)`\n\nSo for `P2WPKH`, the attacker controls both the pubkey and the `scriptCode` used for signing.\n\nRelevant code:\n\n```java\nif (ScriptPattern.isP2WPKH(scriptPubKey)) {\n    Objects.requireNonNull(witness);\n    if (witness.getPushCount() \u003c 2)\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n    TransactionSignature signature;\n    try {\n        signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(witness.getPush(0), true, true);\n    } catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n    }\n    ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(witness.getPush(1));\n    Script scriptCode = ScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey);\n    Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForWitnessSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptCode, value,\n            signature.sigHashMode(), false);\n    boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);\n    if (!validSig)\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n}\n```\n\nAffected call sites include:\n\n- `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/core/TransactionInput.java:546`\n- `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/wallet/Wallet.java:4520`\n- `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/LocalTransactionSigner.java:84`\n- `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/CustomTransactionSigner.java:77`\n\nThese call sites use `correctlySpends()` for transaction/input validation and pre-signing checks. Any application that treats a successful result from this path as proof that a spend is valid is affected.\n\n### Fix\nThe issue is fixed on the `release-0.17` branch via 2bc5653c41d260d840692bc554690d4d79208f9c, and on `master` via b575a682acf614b9ff95cacbdeb48f86c3ababe0. A 0.17.1 maintenance release has been made available on Maven Central.",
  "id": "GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:49:51Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T17:43:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/security/advisories/GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44714"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/commit/2bc5653c41d260d840692bc554690d4d79208f9c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/commit/b575a682acf614b9ff95cacbdeb48f86c3ababe0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/releases/tag/v0.17.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "bitcoinj has a ScriptExecution P2PKH/P2WPKH Verification Bypass"
}

GHSA-HFMF-Q43V-2FFJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-08-23 21:42 – Updated: 2021-08-17 22:08

Summary

Improper Key Verification in openpgp

Details

Versions of openpgp prior to 4.2.0 are vulnerable to Improper Key Verification. The OpenPGP standard allows signature packets to have subpackets which may be hashed or unhashed. Unhashed subpackets are not cryptographically protected and cannot be trusted. The openpgp package does not verify whether a subpacket is hashed. Furthermore, due to the order of parsing a signature packet information from unhashed subpackets overwrites information from hashed subpackets. This may allow an attacker to modify the contents of a key certification signature or revocation signature. Doing so could convince a victim to use an obsolete key for encryption. An attack require a victim to import a manipulated key or update an existing key with a manipulated version.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 4.2.0 or later. If you are upgrading from a version <4.0.0 it is highly recommended to read the High-Level API Changes section of the openpgp 4.0.0 release: https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.0.0

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openpgp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9154"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2019-08-23T21:41:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Versions of `openpgp` prior to 4.2.0 are vulnerable to Improper Key Verification. The OpenPGP standard allows signature packets to have subpackets which may be hashed or unhashed. Unhashed subpackets are not cryptographically protected and cannot be trusted. The `openpgp` package does not verify whether a subpacket is hashed. Furthermore, due to the order of parsing a signature packet information from unhashed subpackets overwrites information from hashed subpackets. This may allow an attacker to modify the contents of a key certification signature or revocation signature. Doing so could convince a victim to use an obsolete key for encryption. An attack require a victim to import a manipulated key or update an existing key with a manipulated version.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 4.2.0 or later. \nIf you are upgrading from a version \u003c4.0.0 it is highly recommended to read the `High-Level API Changes` section of the `openpgp` 4.0.0 release: https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.0.0",
  "id": "GHSA-hfmf-q43v-2ffj",
  "modified": "2021-08-17T22:08:26Z",
  "published": "2019-08-23T21:42:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/pull/797"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/pull/797/commits/47138eed61473e13ee8f05931119d3e10542c5e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.2.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-openpgp-js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-OPENPGP-460247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/Mailvelope_Extensions/Mailvelope_Extensions_pdf.html#download=1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1161"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154191/OpenPGP.js-4.2.0-Signature-Bypass-Invalid-Curve-Attack.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Improper Key Verification in openpgp"
}

GHSA-HFPC-8R3F-GW53

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 20:25 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:31

Summary

AWS-LC has PKCS7_verify Signature Validation Bypass

Details

Summary

AWS-LC is an open-source, general-purpose cryptographic library.

Impact

Improper signature validation in PKCS7_verify() in AWS-LC allows an unauthenticated user to bypass signature verification when processing PKCS7 objects with Authenticated Attributes.

Customers of AWS services do not need to take action. aws-lc-sys contains code from AWS-LC. Applications using aws-lc-sys should upgrade to the most recent release of aws-lc-sys.

Impacted versions:

aws-lc-sys versions: >= 0.24.0, < 0.38.0

Patches

The patch is included in v0.38.0

Workarounds

There is no workaround. Applications using aws-lc-sys should upgrade to the most recent release of aws-lc-sys.

Resources

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "aws-lc-sys"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.24.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.38.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T20:25:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAWS-LC is an open-source, general-purpose cryptographic library.\n\n### Impact\nImproper signature validation in PKCS7_verify() in AWS-LC allows an unauthenticated user to bypass signature verification when processing PKCS7 objects with Authenticated Attributes.\n\nCustomers of AWS services do not need to take action. aws-lc-sys contains code from AWS-LC. Applications using aws-lc-sys should upgrade to the most recent release of aws-lc-sys.\n\n#### Impacted versions: \naws-lc-sys versions: \u003e= 0.24.0, \u003c 0.38.0\n\n### Patches\nThe patch is included in v0.38.0\n\n### Workarounds\nThere is no workaround. Applications using aws-lc-sys should upgrade to the most recent release of aws-lc-sys.\n\n### Resources\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the [vulnerability reporting page](https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting) or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-hfpc-8r3f-gw53",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:31:14Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T20:25:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-lc-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-hfpc-8r3f-gw53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-lc/security/advisories/GHSA-jchq-39cv-q4wj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3338"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-005-AWS"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-lc-rs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0047.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AWS-LC has PKCS7_verify Signature Validation Bypass"
}

GHSA-HJGW-9XVW-334R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:49 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:13

Details

Mailvelope prior to 3.3.0 allows private key operations without user interaction via its client-API. By modifying an URL parameter in Mailvelope, an attacker is able to sign (and encrypt) arbitrary messages with Mailvelope, assuming the private key password is cached. A second vulnerability allows an attacker to decrypt an arbitrary message when the GnuPG backend is used in Mailvelope.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-07-09T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Mailvelope prior to 3.3.0 allows private key operations without user interaction via its client-API. By modifying an URL parameter in Mailvelope, an attacker is able to sign (and encrypt) arbitrary messages with Mailvelope, assuming the private key password is cached. A second vulnerability allows an attacker to decrypt an arbitrary message when the GnuPG backend is used in Mailvelope.",
  "id": "GHSA-hjgw-9xvw-334r",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T01:13:33Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:49:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope/blob/master/Changelog.md#v330"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/Mailvelope_Extensions/Mailvelope_Extensions_pdf.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/Mailvelope_Extensions/Mailvelope_Extensions_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile\u0026v=3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HJJC-9HHM-H336

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 21:32 – Updated: 2026-06-10 15:31

Details

A lack of cryptographic signature verification in the validateAccessToken function of bookcars v8.3 allows attackers to bypass authentication via a forged JWT token.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-36721"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T19:17:42Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A lack of cryptographic signature verification in the validateAccessToken function of bookcars v8.3 allows attackers to bypass authentication via a forged JWT token.",
  "id": "GHSA-hjjc-9hhm-h336",
  "modified": "2026-06-10T15:31:30Z",
  "published": "2026-06-09T21:32:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-36721"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CC-T-454455/Vulnerabilities/tree/master/bookcars/vulnerability-2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CWE-347

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

GHSA-H87Q-G2WP-47PJ

GHSA-HC36-C89J-5F4J

Unverified certifier signatures persisted by `acquire_certificate`

Affected packages

Summary

Details

Direct path

Issuance path

Downstream impact

Impact

CVSS rationale

Proof of concept

Affected versions

Patches

Workarounds

Credit

References

GHSA-HC7F-QWFJ-7FCF

GHSA-HCHW-XWHF-3QVM

GHSA-HCVW-475W-8G7P

GHSA-HFCF-V2F8-X9PC

Summary

Details

Fix

GHSA-HFMF-Q43V-2FFJ

Recommendation

GHSA-HFPC-8R3F-GW53

Summary

Impact

Impacted versions:

Patches

Workarounds

Resources

GHSA-HJGW-9XVW-334R

GHSA-HJJC-9HHM-H336

CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack

CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation

CWE-347

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Unverified certifier signatures persisted by acquire_certificate

Affected packages

Summary

Details

Direct path

Issuance path

Downstream impact

Impact

CVSS rationale

Proof of concept

Affected versions

Patches

Workarounds

Credit

References

Summary

Details

Fix

Recommendation

Summary

Impact

Impacted versions:

Patches

Workarounds

Resources

CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack

CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation

Unverified certifier signatures persisted by `acquire_certificate`