CWE-863
Allowed-with-ReviewIncorrect Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
5699 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-3887-7VPG-G78M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-21 18:30 – Updated: 2023-03-24 21:30IBM Security Guardium Key Lifecycle Manager 3.0, 3.0.1, 4.0, 4.1, and 4.1.1 could allow an attacker to upload files that could be used in a denial of service attack due to incorrect authorization. IBM X-Force ID: 247629.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-25923"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-21T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM Security Guardium Key Lifecycle Manager 3.0, 3.0.1, 4.0, 4.1, and 4.1.1 could allow an attacker to upload files that could be used in a denial of service attack due to incorrect authorization. IBM X-Force ID: 247629.",
"id": "GHSA-3887-7vpg-g78m",
"modified": "2023-03-24T21:30:53Z",
"published": "2023-03-21T18:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25923"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/247629"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6962729"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-38F7-VV5R-859M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-26 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:21On Ubuntu kernels carrying both c914c0e27eb0 and "UBUNTU: SAUCE: overlayfs: Skip permission checking for trusted.overlayfs.* xattrs", an unprivileged user may set privileged extended attributes on the mounted files, leading them to be set on the upper files without the appropriate security checks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-2640"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-26T02:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "On Ubuntu kernels carrying both c914c0e27eb0 and \"UBUNTU: SAUCE: overlayfs: Skip permission checking for trusted.overlayfs.* xattrs\", an unprivileged user may set privileged extended attributes on the mounted files, leading them to be set on the upper files without the appropriate security checks.",
"id": "GHSA-38f7-vv5r-859m",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:21:33Z",
"published": "2023-07-26T03:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2640"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-2640"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/kernel-team/2023-July/140923.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6250-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wiz.io/blog/ubuntu-overlayfs-vulnerability"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-38GX-PGPJ-9CW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-11 00:02 – Updated: 2022-03-18 00:01Luocms v2.0 is affected by an incorrect access control vulnerability. Through /admin/templates/template_manage.php, an attacker can write an arbitrary shell file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-24609"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-10T17:46:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Luocms v2.0 is affected by an incorrect access control vulnerability. Through /admin/templates/template_manage.php, an attacker can write an arbitrary shell file.",
"id": "GHSA-38gx-pgpj-9cw5",
"modified": "2022-03-18T00:01:21Z",
"published": "2022-03-11T00:02:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24609"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jsjbcyber/bug_report/blob/main/bug_p"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-38HG-WW64-RRWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-04 06:13 – Updated: 2026-04-07 14:20Summary
Aggregate functions (min, max) applied to fields with the conceal special type incorrectly return raw database values instead of the masked placeholder. When combined with groupBy, any authenticated user with read access to the affected collection can extract concealed field values, including static API tokens and two-factor authentication secrets from directus_users.
Details
Fields marked with conceal are protected by payload processing logic that replaces real values with a masked placeholder on read. This protection works correctly for standard item queries, but aggregate query results are structured differently, operations are nested under their function name rather than appearing as flat field keys. The masking logic does not account for this nested structure, causing it to silently skip concealed fields in aggregate responses and return their raw values to the client.
Impact
-
Account Takeover An authenticated attacker can harvest static API tokens for all users, including administrators, enabling immediate authentication as any account without credentials.
-
2FA Bypass TOTP seeds stored in directus_users can similarly be extracted, allowing an attacker to bypass two-factor authentication for any account.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "directus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35442"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:13:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T22:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAggregate functions (`min`, `max`) applied to fields with the `conceal` special type incorrectly return raw database values instead of the masked placeholder. When combined with `groupBy`, any authenticated user with read access to the affected collection can extract concealed field values, including static API tokens and two-factor authentication secrets from `directus_users`.\n\n### Details\n\nFields marked with `conceal` are protected by payload processing logic that replaces real values with a masked placeholder on read. This protection works correctly for standard item queries, but aggregate query results are structured differently, operations are nested under their function name rather than appearing as flat field keys. The masking logic does not account for this nested structure, causing it to silently skip concealed fields in aggregate responses and return their raw values to the client.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Account Takeover** An authenticated attacker can harvest static API tokens for all users, including administrators, enabling immediate authentication as any account without credentials.\n\n- **2FA Bypass** TOTP seeds stored in directus_users can similarly be extracted, allowing an attacker to bypass two-factor authentication for any account.",
"id": "GHSA-38hg-ww64-rrwc",
"modified": "2026-04-07T14:20:19Z",
"published": "2026-04-04T06:13:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-38hg-ww64-rrwc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35442"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directus: Authenticated Users Can Extract Concealed Fields via Aggregate Queries"
}
GHSA-38RQ-33WV-8XMV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:28 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:28An issue was discovered on LG mobile devices with Android OS 8.0, 8.1, 9.0, and 10 software. BT manager allows attackers to bypass intended access restrictions on a certain mode. The LG ID is LVE-SMP-200021 (September 2020).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-25283"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-11T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on LG mobile devices with Android OS 8.0, 8.1, 9.0, and 10 software. BT manager allows attackers to bypass intended access restrictions on a certain mode. The LG ID is LVE-SMP-200021 (September 2020).",
"id": "GHSA-38rq-33wv-8xmv",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:28:10Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:28:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25283"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lgsecurity.lge.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-38X8-4FFV-QWW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:47 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:53Gallagher Command Centre before 7.80.939, 7.90.x before 7.90.961, and 8.x before 8.00.1128 allows arbitrary event creation and information disclosure via the FT Command Centre Service and FT Controller Service services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-12492"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-06-06T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Gallagher Command Centre before 7.80.939, 7.90.x before 7.90.961, and 8.x before 8.00.1128 allows arbitrary event creation and information disclosure via the FT Command Centre Service and FT Controller Service services.",
"id": "GHSA-38x8-4ffv-qww9",
"modified": "2024-04-04T00:53:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:47:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12492"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gallagher.com/CVE-2019-12492"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gallagher.com/security-advisories"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-392C-VJFV-H7WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-27 12:30 – Updated: 2025-02-13 19:25Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-f678-j579-4xf5. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
Improper authorization check and possible privilege escalation on Apache Superset up to but excluding 2.1.2. Using the default examples database connection that allows access to both the examples schema and Apache Superset's metadata database, an attacker using a specially crafted CTE SQL statement could change data on the metadata database. This weakness could result on tampering with the authentication/authorization data.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "apache-superset"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-28T18:57:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-27T11:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-f678-j579-4xf5. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\n\nImproper authorization check and possible privilege escalation on Apache Superset\u00a0up to but excluding 2.1.2. Using the default examples database connection that allows access to both the examples schema and Apache Superset\u0027s metadata database, an attacker using a specially crafted CTE SQL statement could change data on the metadata database. This weakness could result on tampering with the authentication/authorization data.",
"id": "GHSA-392c-vjfv-h7wr",
"modified": "2025-02-13T19:25:31Z",
"published": "2023-11-27T12:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/orangecertcc/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-f678-j579-4xf5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40610"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/superset"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/jvgxpk4dbxyqtsgtl4pdgbd520rc0rot"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/11/27/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Apache Superset - Elevation of Privilege",
"withdrawn": "2024-01-10T19:16:30Z"
}
GHSA-3936-PPM9-G3C2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-26 21:31 – Updated: 2025-06-26 21:31Successful exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to send Modbus TCP packets to manipulate Digital Outputs, potentially allowing remote control of relay channel which may lead to operational or safety risks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-48466"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-24T03:15:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Successful exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to send Modbus TCP packets to manipulate Digital Outputs, potentially allowing remote control of relay channel which may lead to operational or safety risks.",
"id": "GHSA-3936-ppm9-g3c2",
"modified": "2025-06-26T21:31:04Z",
"published": "2025-06-26T21:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48466"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shipcod3/CVE-2025-48466"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.csa.gov.sg/alerts-and-advisories/alerts/al-2025-061"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-394R-Q6WG-V263
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 06:30 – Updated: 2026-06-25 06:30GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab EE affecting all versions from 17.9 before 18.11.6, 19.0 before 19.0.3, and 19.1 before 19.1.1 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user with custom role permissions to view, create, or delete protected environment configurations despite CI/CD visibility being disabled for the project.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-0934"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T05:16:50Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab EE affecting all versions from 17.9 before 18.11.6, 19.0 before 19.0.3, and 19.1 before 19.1.1 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user with custom role permissions to view, create, or delete protected environment configurations despite CI/CD visibility being disabled for the project.",
"id": "GHSA-394r-q6wg-v263",
"modified": "2026-06-25T06:30:42Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T06:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0934"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3508760"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-1-1-released"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/585961"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-39G2-8X68-PMX8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 23:02 – Updated: 2026-06-26 23:02Summary
PATCH /server/{id} accepts and persists nonexistent ddns_profiles IDs for a member-owned server. If another user later creates a DDNS profile with one of those IDs, the DDNS worker resolves the stored ID and dispatches an update using the other user's DDNS profile configuration in the context of the attacker's server.
This is a second-order authorization bypass: direct binding to an existing foreign DDNS profile is correctly denied, but an unresolved future ID can be stored first and later becomes a live cross-user reference.
Affected versions
Confirmed on:
- Nezha
v2.0.14 - Commit:
8b5e382fe217107c7b777ea9c6b4bc3d2e156202
The exact affected version range was not determined.
Impact
A normal member who owns a server can prebind one or more future DDNS profile IDs to that server. If another user later creates a DDNS profile with a matching ID, the dashboard DDNS worker can use the victim's DDNS profile/provider configuration for the attacker's server.
In the validated worker path, the dispatched DDNS update combines:
- the victim DDNS profile ID and owner
- the victim profile's provider type
- victim profile fields such as domains, access ID, access secret, and retry policy
- attacker server context, including the attacker's server ID, owner, IPv4 address, and override DDNS domains
This can result in unauthorized DDNS update attempts using another user's DDNS profile context. The attacker does not need permission to bind the victim profile after it exists.
The following were not validated: credential disclosure, account takeover, or guaranteed external DNS modification across all providers. The credentials remain server-side in the worker path. The downstream DNS impact depends on the victim profile's provider configuration and what that provider account is authorized to update.
Affected components
PATCH /server/{id}cmd/dashboard/controller/server.goservice/singleton/singleton.goservice/singleton/ddns.goservice/singleton/server.gopkg/ddns/ddns.go
Root cause
The server update path validates submitted DDNS profile IDs through CheckPermission, but that check only rejects existing objects owned by another user. Nonexistent IDs are skipped.
The updateServer path then persists the submitted raw IDs into DDNSProfilesRaw, along with override domain data. Later, the DDNS worker resolves the stored profile IDs by ID and dispatches provider updates without revalidating that the resolved profiles belong to the server owner.
As a result, an invalid unresolved reference can become a valid cross-user reference after another user creates a DDNS profile with the same global auto-increment ID.
Reproduction summary
The behavior was validated locally with focused regression tests.
Controller chain proof
Test file:
cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns_second_order_test.go
Test name:
TestUpdateServerAllowsFutureDDNSProfileBindingThenResolvesVictimProfile
Command:
go test ./cmd/dashboard/controller -run TestUpdateServerAllowsFutureDDNSProfileBindingThenResolvesVictimProfile -count=1
Result:
pass
The test demonstrates:
- A normal member owns server
1. - DDNS profile ID
1does not exist. - The member updates their server with
enable_ddns=trueandddns_profiles=[1]. - The request succeeds.
- The server persists
DDNSProfiles=[1]. - Another user later creates a DDNS profile and receives ID
1. - A fresh attempt by the attacker to bind profile
1is correctly denied. - The previously stored reference remains active and resolves in the DDNS worker path.
Provider-level worker proof
Test file:
service/singleton/ddns_worker_authz_test.go
Test name:
TestUpdateDDNSDispatchesVictimProfileForAttackerServer
Command:
go test ./service/singleton -run TestUpdateDDNSDispatchesVictimProfileForAttackerServer -count=1
Result:
pass
The test proves that the DDNS worker does not merely resolve the victim profile. It dispatches a DDNS update using the victim profile configuration and attacker server context.
Validated assertions include:
- resolved profile ID is
1 - resolved profile owner is victim user
200 - processed server is attacker server
1owned by user100 - provider type is the victim profile's provider
- victim profile fields are present in worker dispatch:
- domains
- access ID
- access secret
- max retries
- attacker server context is present in the same dispatch:
- IPv4
198.51.100.44 - attacker-controlled override domains are passed to the worker:
attacker-controlled.example
Practicality
The attack requires predicting or prebinding future DDNS profile IDs. This limits severity, but does not remove the authorization issue.
Evidence supporting practicality:
- DDNS profile IDs are
uint64GORM primary keys frommodel/common.go. createDDNSuses a normalDB.Create(&p)flow and returnsp.ID.DDNSProfilesis an unbounded[]uint64inmodel/server_api.go.- No length or existence validation is applied in
updateServer. - Invalid/future IDs are preserved in the server record.
- Stored unresolved IDs survive reload.
- Range prebinding was validated with
[1,2,3,4]. - The DDNS worker consumes stored IDs on future DDNS update events.
- Worker dispatch can occur after server edit and agent IP-change events.
- Each DDNS update can retry according to the victim profile's
MaxRetries.
This makes the issue semi-practical: exploitation depends on future ID prediction or range prebinding, but the unresolved IDs persist and can become active later.
Expected behavior
PATCH /server/{id} should reject any submitted DDNS profile ID that does not both:
- exist, and
- belong to the caller or the owner of the server being updated.
The DDNS worker should also avoid trusting stored profile IDs without revalidating ownership before provider resolution or dispatch.
Actual behavior
PATCH /server/{id} accepts nonexistent DDNS profile IDs and persists them. If another user later creates a DDNS profile with a matching ID, the stored reference resolves to that user's profile and is consumed by the DDNS worker for the attacker's server.
Suggested remediation
Apply both bind-time and worker-time validation.
At bind time:
- Reject nonexistent DDNS profile IDs.
- Reject DDNS profile IDs that do not belong to the caller/server owner.
- Reject or limit excessive DDNS profile ID lists if range prebinding is not intended.
At worker time:
- Revalidate that every resolved DDNS profile still belongs to the owner of the server being processed.
- Skip or remove stale, nonexistent, or foreign DDNS profile references before provider dispatch.
Suggested regression tests:
TestUpdateServerRejectsNonexistentDDNSProfileIDsTestUpdateServerRejectsForeignDDNSProfileIDsTestUpdateServerAcceptsOwnedDDNSProfileIDsTestUpdateDDNSSkipsStaleOrForeignStoredDDNSProfiles
Security relevance
A direct bind to an existing foreign DDNS profile is already denied, which shows the intended ownership boundary. The issue is that the same boundary can be bypassed by storing a future unresolved ID before the victim profile exists.
The worker later treats the stored ID as trusted and dispatches a DDNS update using the victim profile's provider configuration with attacker server context. This is an authorization issue in a deferred worker path, not merely malformed input.
Limitations
- The attacker does not read victim DDNS credentials through the validated path.
- Exploitation may require predicting or prebinding future global auto-increment DDNS profile IDs.
- The downstream DNS impact depends on the victim profile's provider configuration.
- External DNS modification was not claimed as guaranteed across all providers.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.14"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53521"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T23:02:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T22:16:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`PATCH /server/{id}` accepts and persists nonexistent `ddns_profiles` IDs for a member-owned server. If another user later creates a DDNS profile with one of those IDs, the DDNS worker resolves the stored ID and dispatches an update using the other user\u0027s DDNS profile configuration in the context of the attacker\u0027s server.\n\nThis is a second-order authorization bypass: direct binding to an existing foreign DDNS profile is correctly denied, but an unresolved future ID can be stored first and later becomes a live cross-user reference.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nConfirmed on:\n\n- Nezha `v2.0.14`\n- Commit: `8b5e382fe217107c7b777ea9c6b4bc3d2e156202`\n\nThe exact affected version range was not determined.\n\n## Impact\n\nA normal member who owns a server can prebind one or more future DDNS profile IDs to that server. If another user later creates a DDNS profile with a matching ID, the dashboard DDNS worker can use the victim\u0027s DDNS profile/provider configuration for the attacker\u0027s server.\n\nIn the validated worker path, the dispatched DDNS update combines:\n\n- the victim DDNS profile ID and owner\n- the victim profile\u0027s provider type\n- victim profile fields such as domains, access ID, access secret, and retry policy\n- attacker server context, including the attacker\u0027s server ID, owner, IPv4 address, and override DDNS domains\n\nThis can result in unauthorized DDNS update attempts using another user\u0027s DDNS profile context. The attacker does not need permission to bind the victim profile after it exists.\n\nThe following were not validated: credential disclosure, account takeover, or guaranteed external DNS modification across all providers. The credentials remain server-side in the worker path. The downstream DNS impact depends on the victim profile\u0027s provider configuration and what that provider account is authorized to update.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- `PATCH /server/{id}`\n- `cmd/dashboard/controller/server.go`\n- `service/singleton/singleton.go`\n- `service/singleton/ddns.go`\n- `service/singleton/server.go`\n- `pkg/ddns/ddns.go`\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe server update path validates submitted DDNS profile IDs through `CheckPermission`, but that check only rejects existing objects owned by another user. Nonexistent IDs are skipped.\n\nThe `updateServer` path then persists the submitted raw IDs into `DDNSProfilesRaw`, along with override domain data. Later, the DDNS worker resolves the stored profile IDs by ID and dispatches provider updates without revalidating that the resolved profiles belong to the server owner.\n\nAs a result, an invalid unresolved reference can become a valid cross-user reference after another user creates a DDNS profile with the same global auto-increment ID.\n\n## Reproduction summary\n\nThe behavior was validated locally with focused regression tests.\n\n### Controller chain proof\n\nTest file:\n\n`cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns_second_order_test.go`\n\nTest name:\n\n`TestUpdateServerAllowsFutureDDNSProfileBindingThenResolvesVictimProfile`\n\nCommand:\n\n```bash\ngo test ./cmd/dashboard/controller -run TestUpdateServerAllowsFutureDDNSProfileBindingThenResolvesVictimProfile -count=1\n```\n\nResult:\n\n`pass`\n\nThe test demonstrates:\n\n1. A normal member owns server `1`.\n2. DDNS profile ID `1` does not exist.\n3. The member updates their server with `enable_ddns=true` and `ddns_profiles=[1]`.\n4. The request succeeds.\n5. The server persists `DDNSProfiles=[1]`.\n6. Another user later creates a DDNS profile and receives ID `1`.\n7. A fresh attempt by the attacker to bind profile `1` is correctly denied.\n8. The previously stored reference remains active and resolves in the DDNS worker path.\n\n### Provider-level worker proof\n\nTest file:\n\n`service/singleton/ddns_worker_authz_test.go`\n\nTest name:\n\n`TestUpdateDDNSDispatchesVictimProfileForAttackerServer`\n\nCommand:\n\n```bash\ngo test ./service/singleton -run TestUpdateDDNSDispatchesVictimProfileForAttackerServer -count=1\n```\n\nResult:\n\n`pass`\n\nThe test proves that the DDNS worker does not merely resolve the victim profile. It dispatches a DDNS update using the victim profile configuration and attacker server context.\n\nValidated assertions include:\n\n- resolved profile ID is `1`\n- resolved profile owner is victim user `200`\n- processed server is attacker server `1` owned by user `100`\n- provider type is the victim profile\u0027s provider\n- victim profile fields are present in worker dispatch:\n - domains\n - access ID\n - access secret\n - max retries\n- attacker server context is present in the same dispatch:\n - IPv4 `198.51.100.44`\n- attacker-controlled override domains are passed to the worker:\n - `attacker-controlled.example`\n\n## Practicality\n\nThe attack requires predicting or prebinding future DDNS profile IDs. This limits severity, but does not remove the authorization issue.\n\nEvidence supporting practicality:\n\n- DDNS profile IDs are `uint64` GORM primary keys from `model/common.go`.\n- `createDDNS` uses a normal `DB.Create(\u0026p)` flow and returns `p.ID`.\n- `DDNSProfiles` is an unbounded `[]uint64` in `model/server_api.go`.\n- No length or existence validation is applied in `updateServer`.\n- Invalid/future IDs are preserved in the server record.\n- Stored unresolved IDs survive reload.\n- Range prebinding was validated with `[1,2,3,4]`.\n- The DDNS worker consumes stored IDs on future DDNS update events.\n- Worker dispatch can occur after server edit and agent IP-change events.\n- Each DDNS update can retry according to the victim profile\u0027s `MaxRetries`.\n\nThis makes the issue semi-practical: exploitation depends on future ID prediction or range prebinding, but the unresolved IDs persist and can become active later.\n\n## Expected behavior\n\n`PATCH /server/{id}` should reject any submitted DDNS profile ID that does not both:\n\n1. exist, and\n2. belong to the caller or the owner of the server being updated.\n\nThe DDNS worker should also avoid trusting stored profile IDs without revalidating ownership before provider resolution or dispatch.\n\n## Actual behavior\n\n`PATCH /server/{id}` accepts nonexistent DDNS profile IDs and persists them. If another user later creates a DDNS profile with a matching ID, the stored reference resolves to that user\u0027s profile and is consumed by the DDNS worker for the attacker\u0027s server.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\nApply both bind-time and worker-time validation.\n\nAt bind time:\n\n- Reject nonexistent DDNS profile IDs.\n- Reject DDNS profile IDs that do not belong to the caller/server owner.\n- Reject or limit excessive DDNS profile ID lists if range prebinding is not intended.\n\nAt worker time:\n\n- Revalidate that every resolved DDNS profile still belongs to the owner of the server being processed.\n- Skip or remove stale, nonexistent, or foreign DDNS profile references before provider dispatch.\n\nSuggested regression tests:\n\n- `TestUpdateServerRejectsNonexistentDDNSProfileIDs`\n- `TestUpdateServerRejectsForeignDDNSProfileIDs`\n- `TestUpdateServerAcceptsOwnedDDNSProfileIDs`\n- `TestUpdateDDNSSkipsStaleOrForeignStoredDDNSProfiles`\n\n## Security relevance\n\nA direct bind to an existing foreign DDNS profile is already denied, which shows the intended ownership boundary. The issue is that the same boundary can be bypassed by storing a future unresolved ID before the victim profile exists.\n\nThe worker later treats the stored ID as trusted and dispatches a DDNS update using the victim profile\u0027s provider configuration with attacker server context. This is an authorization issue in a deferred worker path, not merely malformed input.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- The attacker does not read victim DDNS credentials through the validated path.\n- Exploitation may require predicting or prebinding future global auto-increment DDNS profile IDs.\n- The downstream DNS impact depends on the victim profile\u0027s provider configuration.\n- External DNS modification was not claimed as guaranteed across all providers.",
"id": "GHSA-39g2-8x68-pmx8",
"modified": "2026-06-26T23:02:37Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T23:02:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-39g2-8x68-pmx8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53521"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nezha Monitoring: Stored future DDNS profile ID allows unauthorized use of another user\u0027s DDNS profile context"
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.