CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
28326 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8QRG-8764-P6W9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:27 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:27Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in photos.php in Shutter 0.1.1 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) albumID, (2) tagID, and (3) photoID parameters to index.html.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-1650"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-05-16T18:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in photos.php in Shutter 0.1.1 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) albumID, (2) tagID, and (3) photoID parameters to index.html.",
"id": "GHSA-8qrg-8764-p6w9",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:27:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:27:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-1650"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/8679"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/35049"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/503493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/34967"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8QV3-P479-CJ62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 17:43 – Updated: 2026-08-12 18:57Summary
enrichContext at packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138 substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then JSON.parses the result. The validator validateQueryInputs at packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71 rejects only Handlebars markers ({{, }}) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (", \, }). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object.
For Mongo find, the parsed filter passes directly to collection.find() (packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder's {name: "..."} with {name: {$exists: true}} and returns every document. The same primitive against an updateMany query (mongodb.ts:577-585) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled $set body runs against every matched document.
The authorized middleware at packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148 short-circuits when the query's role is PUBLIC. CSRF is not enforced on this path. POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId (packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63) accepts the call with no session, only an x-budibase-app-id header that is public from the published-app URL.
Result: an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection and, where the builder has published a PUBLIC write query, modifies every document of that collection with one HTTP request.
Affected
Budibase/budibase server, @budibase/server package, <= 3.39.0 (HEAD feab995, released 2026-05-20).
Reachable on any deployment where a workspace builder has set the role of a non-SQL query (MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST with bodyType=json) to PUBLIC and published the app. This is the canonical low-code public-form use case.
SQL datasources (Postgres, MySQL, MSSQL, Oracle, MariaDB) route through interpolateSQL and are not affected.
Root cause
packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138: processStringSync(fields[key], parameters, {noEscaping: true, noHelpers: true}) writes the raw parameter value into the JSON-body string with no JSON-string escape; the followup JSON.parse(enrichedQuery.json || enrichedQuery.customData || enrichedQuery.requestBody) lifts the substituted text into the integration filter object.
packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71: validateQueryInputs only rejects values where findHBSBlocks(value).length !== 0 (Handlebars markers) and ignores JSON metacharacters.
packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510: collection.find(json) receives the user-controlled filter object directly with no key prefix or operator allow-list.
packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:577-585: collection.updateMany(json.filter, json.update, json.options) accepts the templated filter without verifying that the substituted filter still matches the builder's intent.
packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148: if (resourceRoles.includes(roles.BUILTIN_ROLE_IDS.PUBLIC)) return next() skips both authentication and CSRF.
packages/server/src/integrations/queries/sql.ts:29-122: interpolateSQL rewrites every {{ binding }} to a positional bind placeholder ($N or ?). The SQL leg is bind-parameterised; the JSON leg is not.
Reproduction
budibase/budibase:latest (v3.39.0) Docker single-container, default config. Builder logs in once, creates a MongoDB datasource, creates a query GetUserByName with body { "name": "{{ name }}" }, sets the query role to PUBLIC, and publishes the app.
- Anonymous client sends the inject payload to the read query.
POST /api/v2/queries/<read-queryId> HTTP/1.1
Host: <budibase-host>
x-budibase-app-id: <published-appId>
Content-Type: application/json
{"parameters":{"name":"x\",\"name\":{\"$exists\":true},\"$comment\":\"audit"}}
{"data":[
{"_id":"...","name":"alice","secret":"alice-secret-flag"},
{"_id":"...","name":"bob","secret":"bob-secret-flag"},
{"_id":"...","name":"admin","role":"admin","secret":"ADMIN-SUPER-SECRET-FLAG"}
]}
- Builder publishes a second query
TouchUser(verbupdate, actionupdateMany, body{ "filter": { "name": "{{ name }}" }, "update": { "$set": { "touched": true } } }, rolePUBLIC). Anonymous client sends the same inject pattern.
POST /api/v2/queries/<updateMany-queryId> HTTP/1.1
Host: <budibase-host>
x-budibase-app-id: <published-appId>
Content-Type: application/json
{"parameters":{"name":"x\",\"name\":{\"$exists\":true},\"$comment\":\"esc"}}
{"data":[{"acknowledged":true,"matchedCount":3,"modifiedCount":3,"upsertedId":null,"upsertedCount":0}]}
Live-verified: against Budibase v3.39.0 on 2026-05-20, anonymous read returned every document including ADMIN-SUPER-SECRET-FLAG; anonymous updateMany reported matchedCount: 3, modifiedCount: 3 against a 3-document collection where the builder's filter intended name = "x".
Impact
- Anonymous read of every document in any backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection reachable through a
PUBLICquery, including columns the published query was not designed to return (password_hash,secret,api_token,mfa_secret). - Anonymous modification of every document of that collection where the builder has published a
PUBLICupdate,delete, oraggregatequery, beyond the builder's intended single-document scope. - One HTTP request, no session, no CSRF, no user interaction.
Credit
Jan Kahmen, turingpoint (jan@turingpoint.de).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@budibase/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.39.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54350"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89",
"CWE-943"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T17:43:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T21:16:35Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`enrichContext` at `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138` substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then `JSON.parse`s the result. The validator `validateQueryInputs` at `packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71` rejects only Handlebars markers (`{{`, `}}`) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (`\"`, `\\`, `}`). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object.\n\nFor Mongo `find`, the parsed filter passes directly to `collection.find()` (`packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510`). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder\u0027s `{name: \"...\"}` with `{name: {$exists: true}}` and returns every document. The same primitive against an `updateMany` query (`mongodb.ts:577-585`) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled `$set` body runs against every matched document.\n\nThe `authorized` middleware at `packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148` short-circuits when the query\u0027s role is `PUBLIC`. CSRF is not enforced on this path. `POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63`) accepts the call with no session, only an `x-budibase-app-id` header that is public from the published-app URL.\n\nResult: an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection and, where the builder has published a PUBLIC write query, modifies every document of that collection with one HTTP request.\n\n## Affected\n\n`Budibase/budibase` server, `@budibase/server` package, `\u003c= 3.39.0` (HEAD `feab995`, released 2026-05-20).\n\nReachable on any deployment where a workspace builder has set the role of a non-SQL query (MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST with `bodyType=json`) to `PUBLIC` and published the app. This is the canonical low-code public-form use case.\n\nSQL datasources (Postgres, MySQL, MSSQL, Oracle, MariaDB) route through `interpolateSQL` and are not affected.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138`: `processStringSync(fields[key], parameters, {noEscaping: true, noHelpers: true})` writes the raw parameter value into the JSON-body string with no JSON-string escape; the followup `JSON.parse(enrichedQuery.json || enrichedQuery.customData || enrichedQuery.requestBody)` lifts the substituted text into the integration filter object.\n\n`packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71`: `validateQueryInputs` only rejects values where `findHBSBlocks(value).length !== 0` (Handlebars markers) and ignores JSON metacharacters.\n\n`packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510`: `collection.find(json)` receives the user-controlled filter object directly with no key prefix or operator allow-list.\n\n`packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:577-585`: `collection.updateMany(json.filter, json.update, json.options)` accepts the templated filter without verifying that the substituted filter still matches the builder\u0027s intent.\n\n`packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148`: `if (resourceRoles.includes(roles.BUILTIN_ROLE_IDS.PUBLIC)) return next()` skips both authentication and CSRF.\n\n`packages/server/src/integrations/queries/sql.ts:29-122`: `interpolateSQL` rewrites every `{{ binding }}` to a positional bind placeholder (`$N` or `?`). The SQL leg is bind-parameterised; the JSON leg is not.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n`budibase/budibase:latest` (`v3.39.0`) Docker single-container, default config. Builder logs in once, creates a MongoDB datasource, creates a query `GetUserByName` with body `{ \"name\": \"{{ name }}\" }`, sets the query role to `PUBLIC`, and publishes the app.\n\n1. Anonymous client sends the inject payload to the read query.\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v2/queries/\u003cread-queryId\u003e HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cbudibase-host\u003e\nx-budibase-app-id: \u003cpublished-appId\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"parameters\":{\"name\":\"x\\\",\\\"name\\\":{\\\"$exists\\\":true},\\\"$comment\\\":\\\"audit\"}}\n```\n\n```json\n{\"data\":[\n {\"_id\":\"...\",\"name\":\"alice\",\"secret\":\"alice-secret-flag\"},\n {\"_id\":\"...\",\"name\":\"bob\",\"secret\":\"bob-secret-flag\"},\n {\"_id\":\"...\",\"name\":\"admin\",\"role\":\"admin\",\"secret\":\"ADMIN-SUPER-SECRET-FLAG\"}\n]}\n```\n\n2. Builder publishes a second query `TouchUser` (verb `update`, action `updateMany`, body `{ \"filter\": { \"name\": \"{{ name }}\" }, \"update\": { \"$set\": { \"touched\": true } } }`, role `PUBLIC`). Anonymous client sends the same inject pattern.\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v2/queries/\u003cupdateMany-queryId\u003e HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cbudibase-host\u003e\nx-budibase-app-id: \u003cpublished-appId\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"parameters\":{\"name\":\"x\\\",\\\"name\\\":{\\\"$exists\\\":true},\\\"$comment\\\":\\\"esc\"}}\n```\n\n```json\n{\"data\":[{\"acknowledged\":true,\"matchedCount\":3,\"modifiedCount\":3,\"upsertedId\":null,\"upsertedCount\":0}]}\n```\n\nLive-verified: against Budibase v3.39.0 on 2026-05-20, anonymous read returned every document including `ADMIN-SUPER-SECRET-FLAG`; anonymous `updateMany` reported `matchedCount: 3, modifiedCount: 3` against a 3-document collection where the builder\u0027s filter intended `name = \"x\"`.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Anonymous read of every document in any backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection reachable through a `PUBLIC` query, including columns the published query was not designed to return (`password_hash`, `secret`, `api_token`, `mfa_secret`).\n- Anonymous modification of every document of that collection where the builder has published a `PUBLIC` `update`, `delete`, or `aggregate` query, beyond the builder\u0027s intended single-document scope.\n- One HTTP request, no session, no CSRF, no user interaction.\n\n## Credit\n\nJan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://turingpoint.de) (jan@turingpoint.de).",
"id": "GHSA-8qv3-p479-cj62",
"modified": "2026-08-12T18:57:33Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T17:43:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-8qv3-p479-cj62"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54350"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Budibase has nonymous NoSQL operator injection via published-app query templates"
}
GHSA-8QVV-3GXM-X6R4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:56 – Updated: 2025-04-11 03:52SQL injection vulnerability in models/log.php in the Search Log (com_searchlog) component 3.1.0 for Joomla! allows remote authenticated users, with Public Back-end privileges, to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the search parameter in a log action to administrator/index.php. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-5044"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-11-02T21:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in models/log.php in the Search Log (com_searchlog) component 3.1.0 for Joomla! allows remote authenticated users, with Public Back-end privileges, to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the search parameter in a log action to administrator/index.php. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.",
"id": "GHSA-8qvv-3gxm-x6r4",
"modified": "2025-04-11T03:52:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:56:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-5044"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/59152"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/65185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/40055"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/13746"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/40588"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2010/1363"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8QVV-Q987-C393
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-27 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-28 00:00Wedding Planner v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter at /wedding_details.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-40483"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-26T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Wedding Planner v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter at /wedding_details.php.",
"id": "GHSA-8qvv-q987-c393",
"modified": "2022-09-28T00:00:18Z",
"published": "2022-09-27T00:00:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40483"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Geoduck-CNN/Bug_report/blob/main/vendors/pushpam02/wedding-planner/SQLi-1.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8QWC-4VQH-CFM7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 18:32 – Updated: 2026-06-19 18:32Joomla Component J-ClassifiedsManager 3.0.5 contains an SQL injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL queries by injecting malicious code through POST parameters. Attackers can submit crafted SQL payloads in the categorySearch, adType, and citySearch parameters to the displayads component to extract sensitive database information including usernames, databases, and version details.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-25751"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T18:16:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Joomla Component J-ClassifiedsManager 3.0.5 contains an SQL injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL queries by injecting malicious code through POST parameters. Attackers can submit crafted SQL payloads in the categorySearch, adType, and citySearch parameters to the displayads component to extract sensitive database information including usernames, databases, and version details.",
"id": "GHSA-8qwc-4vqh-cfm7",
"modified": "2026-06-19T18:32:34Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T18:32:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-25751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://extensions.joomla.org/extensions/extension/ads-a-affiliates/classified-ads/j-classifiedsmanager"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/joomla-j-classifiedsmanager-sql-injection"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://cmsjunkie.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8QWH-2GCF-FJ4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-21 15:30 – Updated: 2026-05-20 15:35Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in İstanbul Soft Informatics and Consultancy Limited Company Softomi Advanced C2C Marketplace Software allows SQL Injection.This issue affects Softomi Advanced C2C Marketplace Software: before 12122023.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6145"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-21T14:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027) vulnerability in \u0130stanbul Soft Informatics and Consultancy Limited Company Softomi Advanced C2C Marketplace Software allows SQL Injection.This issue affects Softomi Advanced C2C Marketplace Software: before 12122023.",
"id": "GHSA-8qwh-2gcf-fj4g",
"modified": "2026-05-20T15:35:21Z",
"published": "2023-12-21T15:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-23-0724"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-23-0724"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8QWH-H2PX-GRW6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-11 21:30 – Updated: 2023-01-18 21:30A vulnerability was found in nym3r0s pplv2. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The name of the patch is 28f8b0550104044da09f04659797487c59f85b00. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-218023.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-10038"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-11T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in nym3r0s pplv2. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality. The manipulation leads to sql injection. The name of the patch is 28f8b0550104044da09f04659797487c59f85b00. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-218023.",
"id": "GHSA-8qwh-h2px-grw6",
"modified": "2023-01-18T21:30:22Z",
"published": "2023-01-11T21:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-10038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nym3r0s/pplv2/commit/28f8b0550104044da09f04659797487c59f85b00"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.218023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.218023"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8QWX-WMP7-5594
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:54 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:45The appointment-booking-calendar plugin before 1.1.24 for WordPress has SQL injection, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-7319.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-10916"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-22T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The appointment-booking-calendar plugin before 1.1.24 for WordPress has SQL injection, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-7319.",
"id": "GHSA-8qwx-wmp7-5594",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:45:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:54:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10916"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/appointment-booking-calendar/#developers"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8QXP-52C3-5G3G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-03 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-11 00:00Badminton Center Management System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /bcms/admin/?page=service_transactions/manage_service_transaction&id=.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32000"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-02T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Badminton Center Management System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /bcms/admin/?page=service_transactions/manage_service_transaction\u0026id=.",
"id": "GHSA-8qxp-52c3-5g3g",
"modified": "2022-06-11T00:00:28Z",
"published": "2022-06-03T00:00:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32000"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/k0xx11/bug_report/blob/main/vendors/oretnom23/badminton-center-management-system/SQLi-12.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8QXR-7577-F7RP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:38 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:38Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in BM Classifieds 20080309 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) cat parameter to showad.php and the (2) ad parameter to pfriendly.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-1272"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-03-10T23:44:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in BM Classifieds 20080309 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) cat parameter to showad.php and the (2) ad parameter to pfriendly.php.",
"id": "GHSA-8qxr-7577-f7rp",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:38:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:38:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-1272"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/41066"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5223"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/29297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28159"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.